violations has constituted a main obstacle to democratie consolidation in the two countries.
That the question of human rights violations has had a profound
influence on democratie stability and consolidation in both Chile and
Argentina may better be understood by considering the extensiveness of the impact of repression on the two societies. The officially recognized figures for deaths due to gross human rights violations during the last dictatorshipin Chile are around 3,000; for Argentina, the figures are close to 10,000.
Leaving all disputes of the "real" numbers aside, these figures indicate that
~ ~g~ l-ll
large sectors of the two societies were affected by repression. 1 The
magnitude of the figures also suggests that it is not likely that the deaths were due to arbitrary or unsystematic violence.
The overall objective of this chapter is twofold, namely to explore the issue of gross human rights violation as a contextual and explanatory variable. Contextual in the sense that it sets the scene of repression serving as a backdrop to the empirical analysis to follow in the ensuing chapters;
explanatory in the sense that human rights violations provoked reactions in
civil society which to a substantial extent explains the onset of the
transition in both countries, as well as the difference in outcome of
democratic consolidation.
Because the differences between the Chilean and Argentinean "maps" of repression partly account for the variation in organized response, an effort has been made to show how these differences may be attributed to the pre-coup context and military traditions of the two countries. It is essential to comprehend the crises of 1973 and 1976 in order to understand the genesis of subsequent human rights violations and the political development that followed. By directing the attention to the rationale or ideology dominating the military forces at the time of the coups, the cases will also be placed
in a larger international context.
2.2 The geopolitical context and the national security
doctrine
The latest military dictatorships in Chile and Argentina are located within the same historical framework; that of the Cold War. The coups of 1973 and 1976 took place in an international context of general anti-communism following the Cuban Revolution in 1959. In the wake of the Revolution,
Marxist ideas spre ad all over the Latin American continent. Not only did
the United States live in constant fear of such anti-capitalist ideas gaining
a stronghold in its so-called backyard. Also, the growing strength of
Marxist-oriented political parties and more unorthodox militant left-wing groups worried many national right-wing governments, and the military in particular. One should not forget that the military in Latin America on the
whole have hel d a much more central position in politics than have their
Exact numbers for human rights violations are invariably open to dispute. It is extremely difficult to quantify repression as it deals basically with qualitative phenomena affecting the personal dignity or life of a human being. On the subject of problems involved in quantification, see Orellana 1992.
European counterparts. Right-wing governments have more often than not been backed by the military , and the practice of military interventionism holds long traditions on the Latin American continent. The national security doctrine was launched by the right as a new strategy of political violence to combat the perceived threat of Marxist and Socialist ideas.2 In the words of the Chilean lawyer and human rights activist, José Zalaquett,
In its essentials, the national security doctrine regards domestic political struggles as an expression of a basic East-West conflict and sees Marxist penetration and insurgency as an all-pervading presence of a new type of enemy fighting a new type of war. Civilans are also warriors, ideas a different form of weapon. Democracy and politics cannot lead the fight against Marxism (indeed, they often pave the way). Neither can they
coordinate all national resources effectively so as to achieve
modemization and economic development, pilars of a modem notion of national security. It is the professionals of national security - the military - who can ensure that both objectives are achieved, and this can only be done by controlling the power of the state. Since the war on Marxism is an insidious one, unorthodox methods are called for, inc1uding torture and extermination of irredeemable political activists (Zalaquett 1985: 18-19).
From the above quote we may deduce that Marxism is the principal enemy
of the state, both in terms of ideology and as an alternative economic
mod eL. Furthermore, it is the duty of the armed forces to protect the state
and the nation against such enemies, as well as to introduce an economic model which makes society impermeable to the doctrine of Marxism. The national security doctrine was explicitly developed in Brazil at the Escuela de Guerra (War School) by the military after the overthrow of the populist government of J oao Goulart in 1964, although the antecedents date back to
1954 with La Declaración de Caracas (The Caracas Declaration). The
Brazilian military's adoption of systematic repression from 1968 onwards introduced a new trend in Latin American military dictatorships in that itassigned a new and important role to the military in what was formerly
considered the sphere of civilian polities. In short, the Brazilian military did not see itself as an interim government. It presented, on the one hand,
long-term goals for national policy and a model for economic development, and,
on the other hand, a strategy to fight leftist opposition and align itself with the West. Thus, the national security doctrine was developed by the military
to giv e ideological justification for its own role in society. The security of
2 Accordingly, those Latin American military governments takng an anti-communist stance were likely to be supported, directly or indirectly, by the USA.
the state was placed before the security of the individuaL. The doctrine was formulated to justify military intervention in civilian politics on the grounds that the military were to protect the "national security" of the country when
the country was "threatened". It is a circular definition in that the army
decided both what the content of national security was to be at any time, and also when the country' s security was threatened and hence needed the military' s protection. This new ideological and political alternative to democracy embodied in the doctrine of national security gave the military regimes in the Southern Cone a sense of mission and stature.
In sum, the doctrine of national security launched a two-sided attack. On the individuallevel, it propagated the extermination of all opposition and
installing fear to prevent the recruitment of new opposition.3 On the
institutionallevel, it sought to eliminate all those structures of civil society
through which oppositional voices could be formulated, and simultaneously make the population unreceptive to Communist ideas through enabling them to enjoy the benefits of new economic policies. This second goal could
only be reached by the military taking full controlover the state by
destroying existing social and economic structures. In the following paragraphs the concrete effects of the adoption of this doctrine in Chile andArgentina will be examined by specifically exploring the mechanisms
contributing to massive gross human rights violations.2.3 The national contexts
The national context of Chile and Argentina at the moment of military take-over may be summed up in two words: political and economic crises. This was a situation prevailing over much of the Latin American continent.
However, most scholars discard the "contagion" effect as the principal reason for the serial overthrows of democratically elected governments in
the 1960s and 1970s. Explanatory factors for the coups should be sought
for in the national, rather than the international context. This is not to say that the international climate did not have a profound and visible impact on national political and economical situations, as it undoubtedly provided an
outer framework for the formation of intern al policies. The adoption of the
national security doctrine by the armed forces in Chile and Argentina, for
3 This involved uprooting all opposition, including also the destruction of any recruitment ground for potential subversive elements; the so-called "cancer theory" (Dealey 1985).
A prevailing opinion within the military - although rarely officially stated - was that it is legitimate to employ unorthodox methods, such as torture and extermination of
political activists.
35
instance, was a direct response to the prevailing climate of increasing
ideological and political polarization accompanied by a severe economic
crisis in both countries prior to the coups. On the national leve!, an