Utilizamos em nosso levantamento a mesma lista de bases de dados apresentada na seção D. Procedemos com a busca de textos utilizando as palavras-chave divididas nas áreas: (1a) Philosophy, (1b) Theory, e (1c) Epistemology; (2a) Physiology, (2b) Neuroscience, (2c) Brain, (2d) Cognitive Neuroscience, e (2e) Molecular and Cellular Neuroscience.
Só foram selecionados os textos que contiveram ao menos uma palavra-chave de cada área, seja em seu título, palavras-chave e resumo (no caso de artigos), ficha catalográfica e
8 Mas não só os textos da bibliografia selecionada. Há textos que tratam de temas teórico-filosóficos do
behaviorismo radical que foram utilizados mesmo sem fazer parte da lista dos selecionados. Por exemplo: no capítulo 6 resolvemos apresentar brevemente a definição do operacionismo de Skinner. Moore (1981) é um texto bastante pertinente sobre o assunto e, por isso, o utilizamos. Mas Moore (1981) não trata da relação entre análise do comportamento e neurociências e, por isso, ele não faz parte da lista.
32 capítulo introdutório (no caso de livros). A justificava para esse critério é que, dessa forma, eliminamos uma quantidade significativa de artigos e livros que tratam apenas, por exemplo, de “cérebro” ou de “epistemologia”.
A partir dos parâmetros estabelecidos pelas palavras-chave, chegamos à seleção de 106 textos, entre artigos, livros completos e capítulos de livros:
1. Albright, T. D., Jessell, T. M., Kandel, E. R., & Posner, M. I. (2000). Neural science: a century of progress and the mysteries that remain. Cell, 100, 1-55.
2. Baars, B. J., & Gage, N. M. (2007). Cognition, brain, and consciousness: introduction
to cognitive neuroscience. London: Academic Press.
3. Barendregt, M., & Van Rappard, J. F. H. (2004). Reductionism revisited: on the role of reduction in psychology. Theory & Psychology, 14, 453-474.
4. Bechtel, W. (2001). The compatibility of complex systems and reduction: a case analysis of memory research. Minds and Machines, 11, 483-502.
5. Bechtel, W. (2002). Decomposing the mind-brain: a long-term pursuit. Brain and Mind,
3, 229-242.
6. Bechtel, W. (2005). The challenge of characterizing operations in the mechanisms underlying behavior. Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior, 84(3), 313-325. 7. Bechtel, W. (2007). Reducing psychology while maintaining its autonomy via
mechanistic explanations. In M. Schouton, & H. L. De Jong (Eds.), The matter of the
mind: philosophical essays on psychology, neuroscience, and reduction (pp. 172-198). Malden: Blackwell Publishing.
8. Bechtel, W. (2008). Mental mechanisms: philosophical perspectives on cognitive
neuroscience. New York: Routledge.
9. Bechtel, W. (2009). Looking, down, around, and up: mechanistic explanation in psychology. Philosophical Psychology, 22(5), 543-564.
10. Bechtel, W. (2009). Molecules, systems, and behavior: another view of memory consolidation. In J. Bickle (Ed.), The Oxford handbook of philosophy and neuroscience (pp. 13-40). New York: Oxford University Press.
11. Bechtel, W., & Abrahamsen, A. (2005). Explanation: a mechanist alternative. Studies in
History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences, 36, 421-441.
12. Bechtel, W., & Abrahamsen, A. (2010). Understanding the brain as an endogenously active mechanism. In: Proceedings of the 32nd Annual Conference of the Cognitive
Science Society. Austin, TX: Cognitive Science Society.
13. Bechtel, W., & Hamilton, A. (2007). Reduction, integration, and the unity of science: natural, behavioral, and social sciences and the humanities. In: T. Kuipers (Ed.), General philosophy of science: focal issues (pp. 377-430). Amsterdam: Elsevier.
14. Bechtel, W., & McCauley (1999). Heuristic identity theory (or back to the future): the mind-body problem against the background of research strategies in cognitive neuroscience. In M. Hahn, & S. C. Stoness (Eds.), Proceedings of the 21st Annual
Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society (pp. 67-72). New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
15. Bechtel, W., & Richardson, R. C. (2010a). Discovering complexity: decomposition and
33 16. Bechtel, W., & Richardson, R. C. (2010b). Neuroimaging as a tool for functionally decomposing cognitive processes. In: S. J. Hanson, & M. Bunzl (Eds.), Foundational
issues in human brain mapping (pp. 241-261). Cambridge: The MIT Press.
17. Bennett, M. R., & Hacker, P. M. S. (2001). Perception and memory in neuroscience: a conceptual analysis. Progress in Neurobiology, 65, 499-543.
18. Bennett, M. R., & Hacker, P. M. S. (2002). The motor system in neuroscience: a history and analysis of conceptual developments. Progress in Neurobiology, 67, 1-52.
19. Bennett, M. R., & Hacker, P. M. S. (2003). Philosophical foundations of neuroscience. Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishing.
20. Bickle, J. (1992). Multiple realizability and psychophysical reduction. Behavior and
Philosophy, 20, 47-58.
21. Bickle, J. (1995). Psychoneural reduction of the genuinely cognitive: some accomplished facts. Philosophical Psychology, 8(3), 265-285.
22. Bickle, J. (1996). New wave psychophysical reduction and the methodological caveats.
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23. Bickle, J, (1998). Psychoneural reduction: the new wave. Cambridge: The MIT Press. 24. Bickle, J. (2001). Understanding neural complexity: a role for reduction. Minds and
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25. Bickle, J. (2003a). Philosophy of mind and the neurosciences. In S. Stich, & T. Warfield (Eds.), The Blackwell guide to philosophy of mind (pp. 322-351). Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishing.
26. Bickle, J. (2003b). Philosophy of neuroscience: a ruthlessly reductive account. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
27. Bickle, J. (2006). Reducing mind to molecular pathways: explicating the reductionism implicit in current cellular and molecular neuroscience. Synthese, 151, 411-434.
28. Bickle, J. (2006). Ruthless reductionism in recent neuroscience. IEEE Transactions on
Systems, Man, and Cybernetics – Part C: Applications and Reviews, 36(2), 134-140. 29. Bickle, J. (2007). Who says you can't do a molecular biology of consciousness? In M.
Schouton, & H. L. De Jong (Eds.), The matter of the mind: philosophical essays on
psychology, neuroscience, and reduction (pp. 275-297). Malden: Blackwell Publishing. 30. Bickle, J. (2007). Ruthless reductionism and social cognition. Journal of Physiology,
101, 230-235.
31. Bickle, J. (2008). Cognitive behaviors and molecular neurobiology: explanations ‘in a single bound’. In: J. E. Burgos, & E. Ribes-Iñesta (Eds.), The brain-behavior nexus:
conceptual issues: Proceedings of the 10th biannual symposium on the science of behavior (pp. 13-22). Guadalajara: Universidad de Guadalajara.
32. Bickle, J. (2008). Real reduction in real neuroscience: metascience, not philosophy of science (and certainly not metaphysics!). In J. Hohwy, & J. Kallestrup (Eds.), Being
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34 36. Bickle, J. (no prelo). A brief history of neuroscience’s actual influences on mind-brain reductionism. In S. Gozzano, & C. S. Hill, (Eds.), New Perspectives on Type Identity:
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43. Craver, C. (2001). Role functions, mechanisms, and hierarquy. Philosophy of Science,
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44. Craver, C. (2002). Interlevel experiments and multilevel mechanisms in the neuroscience of memory. Philosophy of Science, 69(3), 83-97.
45. Craver, C. F. (2005). Beyond reduction: mechanisms, multifield integration and the unity of neuroscience. Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical
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50. Craver, C., & Bechtel, W. (2007). Top-down causation without top-down causes.
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51. Craver, C. F., & Darden, L. (2005). Introduction. Studies in History and Philosophy of
Biological and Biomedical Sciences, 36, 233-244.
52. Cummins, R. (2000). “How does it work?” versus “What are the laws?”: two conceptions of psychological explanation. In F. Keil, & R. Wilson (Eds.), Explanation
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54. Darden, L., & Maull, N. (1977). Interfield theories. Philosophy of Science, 44(1), 43-64. 55. Darden, L., & Tabery, J. (2009). Molecular biology. Stanford Encyclopedia of
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57. Finger, S. (2000). Minds behind the brain: a history of the pioneers and their
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58. Gallistel, C.R., & King, A. P. (2010). Memory and the computational brain: why
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