Assessment of the expectations

Chapter three presented the empirical expectations derived from theory. In the following, each expectation is evaluated and discussed in relation to the findings, followed by some general remarks on theoretical implications of the findings.

The first expectation derived from theory was: “The trend of obstructions is pointing downwards in the ratification phase”. Evident in figure 1, the results are indicating that the opposite occurred. The number of Saudi obstructions increased toward the meetings in 2018 after a downward trend in 2016 and 2017. Isolated, this downward trend is in line with theoretical suggestions. As pressure increases on delegates, the cost of behaving obstructive increases as well since talks are progressing in a negotiation climate where consensus about the problem is established. The theory implied that parties are approaching the stage of a mature game in the ratification phase (implementation phase in this study) (Downie, 2014, pp. 171-174). This suggests that as negotiations evolve in the ratification phase, the conditions for obstructionist behavior are worsened compared to the earlier stage of the negotiations. During the ratification phase, the pressure from external factors can be supplemented with pressure from constructive management by NGO’s. An important and powerful actor in this respect is the Climate Action Network (CAN), a global network of 1.300 NGO’s, representing 120 countries. During COP24 in 2018, CAN awarded Saudi Arabia and its coalitional partners three “fossil of the day” in a row for opposing scientific findings from the IPCC (CAN, 2018). These awards are made public by daily newsletters which is distributed to delegates and observers on every morning during the negotiations. There is therefore a certain degree of shaming in obstructing progress in the phase where such actors can align their lobby with improved scientific findings.

Yet, the obstructions increased in 2018 as the rules of implementation was to be adopted. These findings suggest that the constructive management of interested actors and networks, as well as the influence from external factors, did not have the intended effect on Saudi Arabia’s obstructionist behavior. Thus, the empirical findings in this study are not in line with the first expectation derived from theory.

The second expectation was “The number of obstructions is highest in the bargaining phase”.

Downie suggested that in the first phase of the negotiations, when parties engage in talks concerning a tentative agreement, cost-benefit calculations are intangible. Additionally, stakeholders are not

completely mobilized and the political stakes are much lower here than in the ratification phase (Downie, 2014, p. 169). Conditions for obstructions are therefore more favorable in this phase, as it is easier to obscure them in procedural concerns where the cost of obstructive behavior are

considerably lower compared to the mature game. Furthermore, some additional circumstantial indications favor this expectation. Saudi Arabia was considered to be a systematic obstructionist prior to the launch of the negotiations on the Paris Agreement in 2012 (Depledge, 2008). This suggests that when time is accounted for, Saudi Arabia’s systematic obstructionism should be more prominent in 2012 than in 2018. Additionally, the bargaining phase in this thesis contains of four years with negotiations, while the ratification phase containts three. Thus, it is more likely that the number of obstructions were higher in the ratification phase, once these circumstantial and theoretical considerations are taken into account.

As table 2 demonstrated, the opposite occurred here as well. The number of obstructions in the bargaining phase was 22, while the implementation phase consisted of 23 instances. Although the difference is modest, separated by one instance, it contradicts both the theoretical propositions and the circumstantial indications that suggested the opposite. Related to the previous expectations, the amount of obstructions in 2018 determined much of the outcome. As the amount of obstructions had steadily reduced or remained stable in all sessions in 2016 and 2017, the amount increased again to the same level as in 2015, ultimately amounting to ten observations. As demonstrated in figure 1, obstructions in both COPs and other sessions increased as the process culminated to finally adopt the rulebook to operationalize the Paris Agreement. Additionally, as the number of obstructions was close to equally distributed between the phase, it lends supports to the notion of systematic

obstructionism, characterized by the sustained and aggressive use of tactics over time (Depledge, 2008, p. 10). Thus, the empirical findings of this thesis do not support the second expectation either.

Depledge (2008) defined systematic obstructionists as the “sustained and aggressive use of obstructionist tactics over time, targeted at the general thrust of the negotiations” (p. 10). She suggests they are seeking as little progress as possible and would prefer that the negotiations do not lead to an agreement. However, the analysis demonstrated that there are indications pointing towards a balancing act, coined by Glozman et.al (2015). Additionally, the Paris Agreement and its rulebook was agreed upon within both deadlines in 2015 and 2018. If Saudi Arabia preferred no agreement, it suggests that they failed with their obstructionist campaign. On the other hand, as there are evidences to suggest that Saudi Arabia is engaging in a balancing act, they would indeed prefer agreement but one that sustained their national interests. This is an important distinction, because it alters the way obstructionists behave compared to those actively seeking the negotiations to fail. Obstructionists engaged in the balancing act are deploying both cooperative and competitive tactics in order to preserve cooperation but avoid agreement that would potentially harm their national interests. This further complicates the issue of diagnosing obstructionism, because no countries would be content with an agreement that harms their national interests. Section 5.3 will resume these points in a broader discussion on obstructionism and its ambiguity.

The third expectation turns the attention away from quantitative considerations and focus on how the obstructions occurred, and how they potentially sustained the Saudi position. The expectation was “Saudi Arabia’s preferences are fluid”. In theory, this propositions rests upon the belief that state preferences are socially constructed, and thus manipulable by actors and networks engaged in the cooperative constellation (Downie, 2014, p. 174). During prolonged negotiations, state preferences will ultimately change as a consequence of these influences. This assumption also represents, to some extent, the necessary theoretical conditions needed in order to adopt the understanding of how state preferences and behavior occur in prolonged negotiations. In order to investigate these perceptions, a study was conducted on how the obstructions were distributed. The result of this procedure was summarized in table 3.

The findings illustrated that Saudi Arabia obstructed on issues that appear to maintain their oil interests, both domestically and internationally. As mentioned in chapter one, this is an important

reason for why Saudi Arabia has more to gain by staying at the negotiation table, rather than pursuing efforts to influence process from outside. In order to influence decision-makers and the regulation adopted towards the global energy market, the UNFCCC represents a vital institution to obtain such strives. There are two important reasons for this. The first is that the UNFCCC is a defining feature on the global energy landscape in terms of reducing demand of fossil fuels and improve the prospects for renewable energy. Secondly, all efforts to pursue such intentions relies upon scientific reviews by the IPCC. The reviews inform parties, and the world, about the status of our climate in relation to intended climate action and ambition levels. These features combined send strong signals of how our global energy future should look like, and which measures needs to be taken in order to preserve our climate in the process. This may produce ripple effects in terms of long-term investments in energy industries, as well as the competitiveness of renewable resources in the fossil based global energy system. For instance, future projections are favoring renewable sources of energy relative to fossil fuels. According to the latest report from the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA), it concludes that renewable energy will be competitive in pricing, capacity and installed cost within the range of 2020 to 2022 (IRENA, 2018, p. 57).

Additionally, as the analysis demonstrated, IMO launched their first climate action strategy in 2018 in order to curb emissions from the global shipping industry within 2050. In order to achieve this, a key tool was to enhance energy efficiency (IMO, 2018).

The UNFCCC thus represents an important player in terms of global energy supply and demand.

For this reason, Saudi Arabia has historically participated in the regime in order to preserve their oil interests internationally, by securing demand and prevent efforts to reduce global consumption (Depledge, 2008; Krane, 2019). Domestically, they have lobbied the regime for special provisions destined for oil-dependent developing countries. These provisions are framed as adaptation needs in the form of technical and financial assistance (Depledge, 2008, p. 15).

In light of recent negotiations, this notion of Saudi Arabia’s behavior appeared to be present today as well. As table 3 illustrates, the majority of obstructions identified related to four key agendas.

Adverse effects of response measures were one of these agendas. It represents the core of the special provisions demanded by Saudi Arabia in previous years of negotiations, were the analysis found that obstructions sought to increase the saliency of the issue. On the other hand, science appeared to be obstructed in order to reduce its saliency and impact. Eight obstructions appeared in 2015, close to the deadline of the Paris Agreement were Saudi Arabia refused to join consensus on a 1.5 degrees threshold. Furthermore, in 2018, Saudi Arabia followed up some of their obstructions from 2015 as they refused to adequately recognize the 1.5 degrees special report from IPCC. Obstructions deployed on bunker fuels are another key target that has been historically pursued by Saudi Arabia.

The findings suggested that the initial purpose was to block efforts to promote industrial energy efficiency targeted at key carbon intensive industries. Finally, the last agenda identified where obstructions occurred most frequently was termed “adaptation vs mitigation”. It referred to the way Saudi Arabia blocked or delayed progress on mitigation in order to improve talks on adaptation. It thus impinges on one of the special provisions traditionally demanded by Saudi Arabia. One important issue in this respect was that economic diversification should be considered as mitigation efforts.

Based on the findings in this thesis, Saudi Arabia’s preferences appears to be consistent and pre-determined by their national interests in oil. There are not any evidences in the data to suggest that Saudi Arabia changed their position, which would lend support to the notion of fluid preferences.

Their position on adaptation, response measures and bunker fuels proved to be prominent throughout negotiations from 2012 to 2018, as it has been in previous years as well. Additionally, the Saudi position towards science did not change in despite of increasing pressure from several actors, chairs and other parties. Thus, in relation to the findings of this thesis, the third expectation is not supported as Saudi Arabia remained consistent in the objections and maintained their traditional positions.