A Appendix: Additional analysis
A.2 Additional tables
Table A1:Treatment-Control Balance (males)
Treatment status
All Control Treated Difference p-value
Age 18.28 18.29 18.27 -0.019 0.913
(0.079) (0.090) (0.146) (0.172)
Household with no parents 0.258 0.236 0.292 0.056 0.053 (0.014) (0.018) (0.022) (0.028)
Access to tv 3.415 3.338 3.468 0.087 0.452
(0.062) (0.093) (0.068) (0.115)
Business stream 0.296 0.238 0.385 0.147 0.289
(0.067) (0.080) (0.111) (0.137)
Business knowledge 0.235 0.272 0.179 -0.093 0.011
(0.020) (0.027) (0.023) (0.035)
Business ambitions 0.143 0.126 0.170 0.044 0.147
(0.014) (0.016) (0.025) (0.029)
O-level failure rate for school 0.573 0.582 0.558 -0.024 0.670 (0.025) (0.026) (0.049) (0.056)
Note:For details, see Table 2.
Table A2: Treatment-Control Balance (females)
Treatment status
All Control Treated Difference p-value
Age 17.62 17.56 17.67 0.116 0.260
(0.052) (0.067) (0.076) (0.101)
Household with no parents 0.257 0.225 0.283 0.058 0.007 (0.011) (0.015) (0.014) (0.021)
Access to tv 3.396 3.318 3.460 0.143 0.262
(0.062) (0.106) (0.067) (0.125)
Business stream 0.452 0.462 0.444 -0.018 0.912
(0.078) (0.118) (0.103) (0.157)
Business knowledge 0.276 0.308 0.250 -0.058 0.240
(0.024) (0.038) (0.031) (0.049)
Business ambitions 0.094 0.088 0.099 0.012 0.622
(0.012) (0.013) (0.019) (0.023)
O-level failure rate for school 0.555 0.565 0.547 -0.018 0.673 (0.022) (0.026) (0.034) (0.043)
Note:For details, see Table 2.
Table A3:Treatment-Control Balance (lab sample)
Treatment status
All Control Treated Difference p-value
Male 0.444 0.513 0.365 -0.148 0.005
(0.028) (0.037) (0.034) (0.050)
Age 17.91 17.94 17.89 -0.064 0.609
(0.061) (0.077) (0.098) (0.125)
Household with no parents 0.254 0.229 0.283 0.054 0.009 (0.011) (0.013) (0.015) (0.020)
Access to tv 3.408 3.348 3.477 0.129 0.228
(0.055) (0.090) (0.055) (0.106)
Business stream 0.385 0.346 0.429 0.083 0.572
(0.073) (0.103) (0.103) (0.145)
Business knowledge 0.264 0.290 0.235 -0.054 0.182
(0.021) (0.030) (0.027) (0.040)
Business ambitions 0.108 0.101 0.116 0.015 0.496
(0.011) (0.012) (0.019) (0.022)
O-level failure rate for school 0.564 0.572 0.554 -0.019 0.697 (0.023) (0.025) (0.040) (0.047)
Note:For details, see Table 2.
Table A4:Treatment-Control Balance (admin sample)
Treatment status
All Control Treated Difference p-value
Male 0.447 0.518 0.371 -0.148 0.006
(0.027) (0.038) (0.033) (0.050)
Age 17.91 17.93 17.89 -0.043 0.727
(0.061) (0.079) (0.096) (0.124)
Household with no parents 0.258 0.229 0.289 0.059 0.006 (0.011) (0.013) (0.016) (0.020)
Access to tv 3.410 3.360 3.464 0.104 0.327
(0.054) (0.090) (0.055) (0.105)
Business stream 0.383 0.345 0.424 0.079 0.587
(0.072) (0.102) (0.101) (0.144)
Business knowledge 0.256 0.288 0.221 -0.067 0.080
(0.019) (0.027) (0.026) (0.037)
Business ambitions 0.113 0.103 0.122 0.019 0.403
(0.011) (0.011) (0.019) (0.022)
O-level failure rate for school 0.564 0.576 0.552 -0.025 0.592 (0.023) (0.025) (0.038) (0.046)
Note:For details, see Table 2.
Table A5:Treatment-Control Balance (long term sample)
Treatment status
All Control Treated Difference p-value
Male 0.447 0.486 0.406 -0.081 0.406
(0.048) (0.062) (0.073) (0.096)
Age 18.06 17.99 18.14 0.159 0.497
(0.116) (0.127) (0.193) (0.231)
Household with no parents 0.271 0.219 0.326 0.107 0.023 (0.024) (0.031) (0.033) (0.045)
Access to tv 3.459 3.361 3.562 0.201 0.236
(0.086) (0.146) (0.080) (0.167)
Business stream 0.363 0.342 0.384 0.042 0.785
(0.076) (0.103) (0.111) (0.152)
Business knowledge 0.253 0.247 0.261 0.014 0.779
(0.025) (0.031) (0.040) (0.051)
Business ambitions 0.106 0.123 0.087 -0.036 0.347
(0.019) (0.027) (0.027) (0.038)
O-level failure rate for school 0.557 0.565 0.549 -0.016 0.756 (0.026) (0.025) (0.046) (0.052)
Note:For details, see Table 2
Table A6:Impact on exposure to the edutainment show, full model
Content question Episodes watched (Incentivized) (Non-incentivized) Edutainment Weekend movie Edutainment Weekend movie Treated (edutainment) 1.700∗∗∗ -1.417∗∗∗ 3.326∗∗∗ -1.575∗∗∗
(0.149) (0.134) (0.271) (0.272)
Treated×male 0.113 -0.023 0.209 -0.143
(0.202) (0.180) (0.318) (0.292)
Male -0.227∗ -0.367∗∗∗ -0.170 -0.069
(0.122) (0.134) (0.181) (0.253)
Age -0.123∗∗∗ -0.170∗∗∗ -0.155∗∗ -0.098
(0.032) (0.036) (0.068) (0.066)
Household with no parents 0.055 -0.095 -0.012 -0.006
(0.087) (0.101) (0.131) (0.129)
Access to tv 0.117∗∗∗ 0.133∗∗∗ 0.142∗∗ 0.134∗∗
(0.036) (0.040) (0.066) (0.065)
Business stream 0.121 0.032 0.442∗ 0.012
(0.119) (0.135) (0.219) (0.191)
Business knowledge 0.032 0.244∗∗ -0.198 -0.161
(0.077) (0.105) (0.175) (0.137)
Business ambitions -0.015 -0.253∗ -0.145 0.136
(0.132) (0.140) (0.203) (0.244)
O-level failure rate for school -1.479∗∗∗ -1.111∗∗ -2.571∗∗∗ -0.929
(0.388) (0.518) (0.910) (0.691)
Constant 6.424∗∗∗ 9.561∗∗∗ 5.974∗∗∗ 5.690∗∗∗
(0.641) (0.693) (1.299) (1.357)
Observations 1898 1898 1850 1882
R2 0.233 0.169 0.326 0.069
Note:Full version of Table 4. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on schools (∗:p<
0.10,∗∗:p<0.05,∗∗∗:p<0.01)
Table A7: Impact on exposure to edutainment show – without control variables/upper and lower bounds on treatment effect
Content question Episodes watched (Incentivized) (Non-incentivized) Edutainment Weekend movie Edutainment Weekend movie Regressions:
Treated (edutainment) 1.713∗∗∗ -1.410∗∗∗ 3.360∗∗∗ -1.575∗∗∗
(0.182) (0.147) (0.311) (0.272)
Treated×male 0.165 -0.021 0.331 -0.143
(0.203) (0.195) (0.314) (0.292)
Male -0.362∗∗∗ -0.514∗∗∗ -0.416∗∗ -0.069
(0.133) (0.156) (0.201) (0.253)
Observations 1915 1915 1867 1882
R2 0.206 0.134 0.298 0.069
Upper and lower bounds on treatment effects:
Male upper bound 2.089 -1.211 4.064 -0.962
(0.193) (0.255) (0.322) (0.215)
Male lower bound 1.695 -1.705 3.577 -1.914
(0.205) (0.250) (0.357) (0.281)
Female upper bound 1.950 -1.239 3.749 -0.914
(0.216) (0.172) (0.347) (0.198)
Female lower bound 1.524 -1.648 3.235 -1.761
(0.186) (0.177) (0.318) (0.292)
Note: Version of Table 4 without control variables and with non-parametric bounds.
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on schools (∗:p<0.10,∗∗: p<0.05,∗∗∗: p<0.01). Upper and lower bounds calculated using the method of Lee (2009). Stan-dard errors for the bounds are bootstrapped with 1000 replications, resampling at the school level.
Table A8:Impact on ambitions, full model
Demand for business training Rating of having Summary Incentivized Self-report own business index
Treated (edutainment) 0.058∗ 0.112∗∗∗ 0.119 0.259∗∗
(0.032) (0.039) (0.084) (0.108)
Treated×male -0.045∗ 0.026 0.078 0.015
(0.026) (0.047) (0.104) (0.107)
Male 0.016 -0.054 -0.041 -0.066
(0.018) (0.040) (0.071) (0.091)
Age 0.007 -0.009 -0.004 -0.003
(0.006) (0.011) (0.019) (0.020)
Household with no parents -0.008 0.065∗∗ 0.011 0.075∗
(0.014) (0.026) (0.043) (0.040)
Access to tv 0.001 0.007 0.027 0.028
(0.005) (0.011) (0.023) (0.027)
Business stream -0.017 0.056∗ 0.031 0.068
(0.026) (0.028) (0.062) (0.074)
Business knowledge 0.004 0.028 0.105∗ 0.142∗∗
(0.019) (0.025) (0.057) (0.061)
Business ambitions 0.028 0.070∗∗ 0.139∗ 0.198∗∗
(0.027) (0.034) (0.078) (0.077)
O-level failure rate for school 0.006 -0.255∗∗ -0.101 -0.484∗∗
(0.079) (0.100) (0.156) (0.238)
Constant -0.052 0.832∗∗∗ 2.784∗∗∗ 1.387∗∗∗
(0.115) (0.195) (0.336) (0.344)
Observations 1898 1893 1847 1843
R2 0.008 0.043 0.014 0.038
Note:Full version of Table 5. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on schools (∗:p<
0.10,∗∗:p<0.05,∗∗∗:p<0.01)
Table A9:Impact on ambitions – without control variables/upper and lower bounds on treat-ment effect
Demand for business training Rating of having Ambition Incentivized Self-report own business index Treated (edutainment) 0.060∗ 0.117∗∗∗ 0.125 0.268∗∗
(0.033) (0.040) (0.085) (0.105)
Treated×male -0.049∗ 0.039 0.070 0.025
(0.027) (0.046) (0.104) (0.114)
Male 0.025 -0.075∗ -0.050 -0.089
(0.016) (0.039) (0.071) (0.091)
Observations 1915 1910 1863 1859
R2 0.006 0.026 0.007 0.022
Upper and lower bounds on treatment effects:
Male upper bound · 0.185 0.266 0.356
(0.046) (0.090) (0.096)
Male lower bound · 0.122 0.094 0.231
(0.042) (0.086) (0.102)
Female upper bound · 0.140 0.181 0.310
(0.048) (0.101) (0.105)
Female lower bound · 0.080 0.040 0.209
(0.040) (0.093) (0.109)
Note: Version of Table 5 without control variables and with non-parametric bounds.
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on schools (∗:p<0.10,∗∗: p<0.05,∗∗∗: p<0.01). Upper and lower bounds calculated using the method of Lee (2009). Stan-dard errors for the bounds are bootstrapped with 1000 replications, resampling at the school level. Incentivized business training is chosen by too few participants for it to be possible to calculate the Lee (2009) bounds for Demand for business training (incentivized).
Table A10:Impact on knowledge, full model Subindices
Macro Business related:
Facts Facts Concepts Practice Knowledge index Treated (edutainment) 0.038 0.049 -0.170∗ -0.110 -0.192
(0.094) (0.054) (0.097) (0.139) (0.243)
Treated×male 0.141 -0.003 0.051 0.098 0.287
(0.113) (0.066) (0.107) (0.159) (0.284)
Male 0.289∗∗∗ -0.053 0.145∗∗ 0.135 0.517∗∗∗
(0.076) (0.053) (0.069) (0.110) (0.188)
Age -0.051∗ -0.019 0.006 -0.098∗∗ -0.162∗∗∗
(0.029) (0.018) (0.016) (0.038) (0.059) Household with no parents 0.124∗ 0.034 -0.008 0.040 0.190
(0.073) (0.037) (0.049) (0.091) (0.144)
Access to tv -0.042 0.004 0.022 0.041 0.025
(0.026) (0.016) (0.018) (0.036) (0.059) Business stream 0.066 0.040 0.260∗∗∗ 0.233∗∗ 0.599∗∗∗
(0.072) (0.039) (0.086) (0.108) (0.205)
Business knowledge 0.084 -0.032 0.026 -0.002 0.076
(0.074) (0.031) (0.047) (0.091) (0.129)
Business ambitions 0.005 0.056 -0.151∗∗ -0.076 -0.166
(0.097) (0.058) (0.064) (0.123) (0.205) O-level failure rate for school -0.187 -0.187∗ -0.623∗∗ -1.155∗∗∗ -2.152∗∗∗
(0.290) (0.099) (0.246) (0.277) (0.736) Constant 3.148∗∗∗ 1.300∗∗∗ 1.525∗∗∗ 6.182∗∗∗ 12.155∗∗∗
(0.462) (0.323) (0.284) (0.657) (1.022) Constant 3.148∗∗∗ 1.300∗∗∗ 1.525∗∗∗ 6.182∗∗∗ 12.155∗∗∗
(0.462) (0.323) (0.284) (0.657) (1.022)
Observations 1898 1898 1898 1898 1898
R2 0.020 0.009 0.047 0.027 0.042
Note:Full version of Table 6. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on schools (∗:p<
0.10,∗∗:p<0.05,∗∗∗:p<0.01)
Table A11: Impact on knowledge – without control variables/upper and lower bounds on treatment effect
Subindices
Macro Business related:
Facts Facts Concepts Practice Knowledge index Treated (edutainment) 0.029 0.048 -0.163 -0.105 -0.192
(0.096) (0.055) (0.111) (0.160) (0.292)
Treated×male 0.176 0.018 0.086 0.166 0.446
(0.111) (0.069) (0.108) (0.171) (0.296)
Male 0.229∗∗∗ -0.076 0.079 -0.010 0.221
(0.075) (0.050) (0.075) (0.114) (0.194)
Observations 1915 1915 1915 1915 1915
R2 0.015 0.004 0.012 0.001 0.007
Upper and lower bounds on treatment effects:
Male upper bound 0.390 0.144 0.020 0.284 0.629
(0.112) (0.068) (0.093) (0.170) (0.298)
Male lower bound 0.050 0.011 -0.180 -0.112 -0.051
(0.109) (0.052) (0.117) (0.167) (0.322)
Female upper bound 0.202 0.125 -0.067 0.095 0.168
(0.120) (0.074) (0.131) (0.186) (0.333) Female lower bound -0.101 -0.008 -0.254 -0.274 -0.498
(0.116) (0.059) (0.118) (0.159) (0.290) Note: Version of Table 6 without control variables and with non-parametric bounds.
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on schools (∗:p<0.10,∗∗: p<0.05,∗∗∗: p<0.01). Upper and lower bounds calculated using the method of Lee (2009). Stan-dard errors for the bounds are bootstrapped with 1000 replications, resampling at the school level.
Table A12:Impact on mindset, full model
Mind-set Risk Patience Compete index Treated (edutainment) 0.145∗∗ 0.164 -0.056 0.114 (0.069) (0.189) (0.107) (0.133)
Treated×male -0.148∗ -0.210 0.083 -0.102
(0.075) (0.162) (0.079) (0.130)
Male 0.091∗ -0.082 0.008 0.050
(0.049) (0.084) (0.062) (0.089)
Age -0.006 -0.022 0.023 0.013
(0.014) (0.029) (0.016) (0.024) Household with no parents 0.026 -0.053 -0.032 -0.038
(0.047) (0.083) (0.022) (0.054)
Access to tv 0.009 -0.038 -0.010 -0.018
(0.018) (0.040) (0.016) (0.030)
Business stream -0.084 0.211 0.107 0.141
(0.063) (0.160) (0.087) (0.099) Business knowledge 0.116∗∗∗ -0.043 -0.061∗ 0.002
(0.034) (0.078) (0.035) (0.062) Business ambitions 0.073 -0.209∗∗ -0.062 -0.095
(0.056) (0.099) (0.037) (0.069) O-level failure rate for school 0.117 0.014 -0.453 -0.435
(0.174) (0.422) (0.294) (0.335)
Constant 1.279∗∗∗ 3.901∗∗∗ 0.245 2.772∗∗∗
(0.279) (0.589) (0.359) (0.458)
Observations 1898 1898 1897 1897
R2 0.015 0.015 0.040 0.012
Note: Full version of Table 7. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on schools (∗:p<0.10,∗∗: p<0.05,∗∗∗:p<0.01)
Table A13: Impact on mindset – without control variables/upper and lower bounds on treat-ment effect
Mind-set Risk Patience Compete index Treated (edutainment) 0.146∗ 0.144 -0.045 0.120 (0.073) (0.193) (0.111) (0.132) Treated×male -0.165∗∗ -0.167 0.092 -0.089
(0.074) (0.175) (0.084) (0.133)
Male 0.102∗∗ -0.153 -0.000 0.022
(0.049) (0.104) (0.070) (0.096)
Observations 1915 1915 1914 1914
R2 0.006 0.007 0.004 0.002
Upper and lower bounds on treatment effects:
Male upper bound 0.088 0.157 0.089 0.208
(0.080) (0.150) (0.099) (0.131) Male lower bound -0.110 -0.230 0.022 -0.062
(0.076) (0.185) (0.100) (0.136) Female upper bound 0.238 0.303 -0.005 0.274
(0.067) (0.229) (0.114) (0.147) Female lower bound 0.067 -0.039 -0.069 0.011
(0.083) (0.182) (0.113) (0.123)
Note: Version of Table 7 without control variables and with non-parametric bounds.
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on schools (∗:p<0.10,∗∗: p<0.05,∗∗∗: p<0.01). Upper and lower bounds calculated using the method of Lee (2009). Stan-dard errors for the bounds are bootstrapped with 1000 replications, resampling at the school level.
Table A14:Impact on social preferences
Treated×male -0.036 -0.051 0.053
(0.021) (0.045) (0.117)
Male 0.028 0.076∗∗ -0.117
(0.017) (0.030) (0.080)
Treatment on males -0.015 -0.017 0.077
(0.019) (0.044) (0.099)
Observations 1898 1898 1893
R2 0.015 0.019 0.005
Statistics on dependent variable (in control group):
Mean 0.619 0.728 3.966
Standard deviation 0.212 0.445 1.550
Note: The table reports linear regressions in which the dependent variable is: column 1, the share of money the participant allocated to him- or herself out of 2000 TSh in a real-effort dictator game; column 2, an indicator variable taking the value one if the participant in a spectator choice decided to divide proportionality (and not equally) in a spectator choice involving two other participants; column 3, the participant’s response to an hypothetical question about whether an income difference between a teacher and a doctor is fair (1-5, 1-the income difference is completely fair, 5-the income difference is completely unfair). Treated: indicator variable for the participant being in the treatment group. Treated×male: interaction variable between Treated and Male.
Male: indicator variable taking the value one if the participant is a male. Also included in the regressions but not reported are the other background variables reported in Table 2. See Table A15 for full regressions including all controls. Treatment on Males: the linear combination of Treated and Treated×male. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on schools (∗:p<0.10,∗∗:p<0.05,∗∗∗:p<0.01).
Table A15:Impact on social preferences, full model Incentivized
Unfairness Money for Proportional of salary
self bonus inequality
Treated×male -0.036 -0.051 0.053
(0.021) (0.045) (0.117)
Male 0.028 0.076∗∗ -0.117
(0.017) (0.030) (0.080)
Age 0.003 -0.027∗∗∗ -0.014
(0.005) (0.009) (0.031) Household with no parents -0.028∗∗∗ 0.019 0.066
(0.009) (0.024) (0.076)
Access to tv -0.002 -0.004 -0.027
(0.005) (0.011) (0.029)
Business stream -0.017 0.041 0.039
(0.017) (0.029) (0.079)
Business knowledge 0.029∗∗ -0.002 -0.039
(0.014) (0.024) (0.083)
Business ambitions -0.035∗∗ -0.007 -0.047
(0.015) (0.028) (0.121) O-level failure rate for school -0.056 -0.268∗∗ -0.437∗ (0.039) (0.120) (0.227)
Constant 0.593∗∗∗ 1.319∗∗∗ 4.617∗∗∗
(0.103) (0.179) (0.596)
Observations 1898 1898 1893
R2 0.015 0.019 0.005
Note: Full version of Table A14. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on schools (∗: p<0.10,∗∗:p<0.05,∗∗∗: p<0.01)
Table A16:Impact on social preferences – without control variables/upper and lower bounds on treatment effect
Incentivized
Unfairness Money for Proportional of salary
self bonus inequality
Treated (edutainment) 0.019 0.034 0.036 (0.021) (0.040) (0.095)
Treated×male -0.041∗ -0.036 0.071
(0.022) (0.043) (0.117)
Male 0.031∗ 0.044 -0.149∗∗
(0.016) (0.028) (0.072)
Observations 1915 1915 1910
R2 0.003 0.002 0.002
Upper and lower bounds on treatment effects:
Male upper bound 0.002 0.015 0.182
(0.023) (0.047) (0.103)
Male lower bound -0.043 -0.051 -0.090
(0.017) (0.054) (0.159)
Female upper bound 0.044 0.053 0.093
(0.025) (0.044) (0.102)
Female lower bound 0.002 -0.010 -0.147
(0.021) (0.045) (0.143)
Note:Version of Table A14 without control variables and with non-parametric bounds.
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on schools (∗:p<0.10,∗∗: p<0.05,∗∗∗: p<0.01). Upper and lower bounds calculated using the method of Lee (2009). Stan-dard errors for the bounds are bootstrapped with 1000 replications, resampling at the school level.
Table A17:Long-term behavior – with and without control variables A. With control variables
Administrative Long-term survey
Passed Have Is Is
final exam started currently currently Have business a student employed moved Treated (Edutainment) -0.233∗∗∗ 0.081 -0.099 -0.073 0.106
(0.067) (0.069) (0.077) (0.064) (0.077)
Treated×male 0.077 -0.059 -0.200∗ 0.067 -0.087
(0.058) (0.109) (0.115) (0.075) (0.094)
Male 0.065∗ 0.001 0.127 -0.084 -0.067
(0.037) (0.062) (0.082) (0.054) (0.076) Treatment on males -0.156∗∗ 0.022 -0.299∗∗∗ -0.007 0.020
(0.064) (0.086) (0.094) (0.056) (0.068)
Observations 2024 281 281 279 281
R2 0.164 0.022 0.141 0.025 0.095
B. Without control variables
Administrative Long-term survey
Passed Have Is Is
final exam started currently currently Have form business a student employed moved Treated (Edutainment) -0.227∗∗∗ 0.088 -0.124 -0.073 0.139∗∗
(0.084) (0.067) (0.076) (0.063) (0.069)
Treated×male 0.103 -0.102 -0.192 0.050 -0.058
(0.064) (0.121) (0.139) (0.077) (0.082)
Male -0.026 0.028 0.020 -0.061 -0.058
(0.047) (0.068) (0.078) (0.060) (0.059) Treatment on males -0.124 -0.014 -0.316∗∗ -0.023 0.081
(0.084) (0.093) (0.122) (0.060) (0.069)
Observations 2039 281 284 282 284
R2 0.038 0.022 0.056 0.010 0.029
Statistics on dependent variable (in control group):
Mean 0.655 0.267 0.610 0.144 0.199
Standard deviation 0.475 0.444 0.490 0.352 0.400
Note:The upper panel in the table reports linear regressions in which the dependent variable is: column 1, an indicator variable taking the value one if the participant passed the final O-level exam; column 2, an indicator variable taking the value one if the participant has started a business; column 3, an indicator variable taking the value one if the participant is currently a student, column 4, an indicator variable taking the value one if the participant is currently employed; column 5, an indicator variable taking the value one if the participant has moved since the short-term survey. Treated: indicator variable for the participant being in the treatment group. Treated×male: interaction variable between Treated and Male. Male: indicator variable taking the value one if the participant is a male. Also included in the regressions but not reported are the other background variables reported in Table 2. Treatment on Males: the linear combination of Treated and Treated×male. The lower panel in the table shows the corresponding regressions without control variables. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on