PERE.MILO, sous pilote automatique, cap nord-nord-est à 4 nœuds, pêche et montre ses marques. L'officier de quart de LADY.ÖZGE aperçoit à 12 h 55, 2 milles en avant du travers bâbord, un bateau de pêche dont la route croise la sienne. Outre la langoustine, PERE.MILO cible le cabillaud, la lotte, la sole, le ventre blanc, le moucheron, l'araignée de mer, le crabe et la seiche, à l'aide d'un chalut ou d'une drague de fond.
Il est à noter que, lors de l'inspection du navire PERE.MILO par un inspecteur de l'ANFR, aucun AIS de classe A ou B n'a été aperçu ou porté à sa connaissance, ni l'existence à bord d'un récepteur AIS.
L ADY Ö ZGE
Généralités
Équipements de navigation et de sécurité Équipements SMDSM
Les conditions de manœuvrabilité
4 EQUIPAGES
P ERE M ILO
Il navigue depuis 1986 et cumule plus de 11 années d'expérience effective à bord de navires armés dans la pêche côtière dans les rôles de mécanicien et de matelot. Il est titulaire d'un permis de conduire de moteur marin et d'un certificat de compétence. Il est monté à bord de PERE.MILO un mois avant l'événement en tant que pêcheur qualifié.
Le matelot 2 (pas à bord au moment de l'accident), âgé de 19 ans, a obtenu son brevet d'aptitude professionnelle maritime de matelot en 2007.
L ADY Ö ZGE
Propriétaire propriétaire, 40 ans, titulaire d'un brevet de capitaine de pêche et d'un permis moto. Marin depuis 1988, il totalise 18 années de navigation effective, principalement de pêche hauturière sur des navires lorientais. Le lieutenant, 28 ans, est titulaire du brevet d'officier de quart (officier de quart sur tous les navires dans toutes les eaux).
Le gardien, 44 ans, possède un certificat de formation relais horaire.
5 CHRONOLOGIE
Dès que le marin est déposé à quai, le PERE.MILO poursuit sa route jusqu'à son lieu de pêche. Le chef de quart estime que le PERE.MILO passera à 0,5 milles devant le LADY.ÖZGE. A cette époque, le PERE.MILO était encore à flot et se trouvait aux trois quarts de la barre tribord du LADY.ÖZGE.
CROSS Gris-Nez reçoit l'alerte d'urgence du PERE.MILO du FMCC de Toulouse.
6 CONSEQUENCES
P ERE M ILO
À 16 heures, le commandant de bord fait faire par le second commandant de bord un alcootest aux membres de l'équipage en service au moment de l'accident, dont lui-même.
L ADY Ö ZGE
7 ANALYSE
- Facteurs naturels
- Facteurs matériels
- Facteurs humains
- Synthèse
Il est fonctionnel et son agencement permet au chef d'équipe de travailler assis ou debout avec une bonne vision, aussi bien sur les équipements de navigation qu'à l'extérieur. Lorsque le chalutier est repéré à 2 milles, le chef d'équipe du chimiquier juge que le chalutier est en route et ne l'est pas. Il est également apparu à l'officier de quart que le chalutier avait 0,5 mille pour atteindre sa proue.
Lorsque la situation devient très proche, malgré une représentation vectorielle du risque de collision, le responsable de quart du LADY.ÖZGE n'effectue pas la manœuvre au sens de la règle 17 du COLREG. Le manque de suivi rigoureux de la situation, l'utilisation des équipements disponibles et le manque d'anticipation dans la manœuvre d'évitement sont un deuxième facteur déterminant de l'accident. Le PERE.MILO et le LADY.ÖZGE se trouvent dans une situation où deux navires se croisent.
Le chalutier est donc un navire privilégié au sens du COLREG. Le chimiquier, n'identifiant pas PERE.MILO comme un navire de pêche, se considère également comme un navire privilégié. LADY.ÖZGE n'utilise pas l'équipement dont elle dispose pour analyser et prévoir la situation.
A bord de PERE.MILO, le quart est suspendu pendant une trentaine de minutes et l'équipage ignore qu'il se trouve dans une situation dangereuse. Le marin a réussi à s'échapper de l'épave et a été récupéré par le bateau LADY.ÖZGE.
8 RECOMMANDATIONS
BETWEEN THE FRENCH TRAWLER
P ERE M ILO
AND THE TURKISH CHEMICAL TANKER
L ADY Ö ZGE
TH APRIL 2012
Warning
CONTENTS
BEAmer : Marine Events Investigation Bureau (homologue français du MAIB) COLREG : Réglementation internationale pour prévenir les collisions en mer.
1 CIRCUMSTANCES
2 BACKGROUND
P ERE M ILO
L ADY Ö ZGE
3 VESSELS
P ERE M ILO
- Generalities
- Navigation and safety equipment
- Generalities
- Navigation and safety equipment GMDSS equipment
- Manoeuvrability characteristics
However, some owners voluntarily equip their vessels with an AIS class A or class B (this equipment must then be declared and registered on the radio license) or with an AIS receiver (not registered on the licence). It should be clarified that during an inspection by the French Frequency Agency inspector, no AIS Class A or B was either seen or declared any AIS receiver. Turkey, the flag state, the Document of Conformity, the Safety Management Certificate (ISM Code) as well as the International Freeboard Certificate and the MARPOL Certificates IOPP, IAPP and ISPP.
The time taken to go from port to port is 22 seconds with one steering engine on and 11 seconds with two engines on (see document in Appendix B).
4 CREWS
Seaman since 1988, achieved a total of 18 years of sea service, mainly in deep sea fishing on board ships from Lorient. He has been a sailor since 1986 and has more than 11 years aboard coastal fishing vessels as an engineer and hand. He has been a seafarer for over 11 years aboard coastal fishing vessels as an engineer and hand.
He holds the marine engine operating license and the certificate of proficiency in fishing vessels. 2 engineer officers (chief engineer, second engineer), - 1 boatswain,. 2) This dedicated officer can be replaced by two deck officers holding the GOC, as mentioned in the minimum safe crew document. He has been employed by Net Denizcilik for one year, he joined LADY.ÖZGE on March 13, 2012.
He had previously gone to sea as a cadet aboard oil tankers for 12 months, then as a deck officer aboard oil tankers and ore carriers for 34 months. It has been at sea since 1996, mainly aboard multi-purpose cargo ships and oil tankers.
5 SEQUENCE OF EVENTS
From the "Les Truies" buoy, the skipper handed over the watch to the rating and took a little nap until arriving at the hunting ground. Around noon, when the fish were sorted and the deck cleaned, the PERE.MILO rating went down to the galley to cook lunch; the skipper has been on the bridge since 7:30. According to the watch, the fishing vessel appeared to be heading northeast at 5 knots and her CPA would be 0.5 miles on the bow.
This does not seem to reflect reality as a review of VDR records shows that PERE.MILO was neither targeted nor identified. Finally, if the LADY.ÖZGE AIS signal, as well as that of a number of vessels in the area can be seen in the SPATIONAV records, (cf. Appendix C), the PERE.MILO signal does not exist, confirming that AIS is equipped . in trawlers it did not work as an emitter. However, according to the second officer, standing behind the navigation panel, in front of the radar screen and ECDIS, the fishing vessel's course, CPA and TCPA were monitored on the ARPA.
On board the fishing vessel, the skipper came back to the galley to get a bottle of water or something else. The hand instantly looked back and saw the bulb of a freighter crashing into PERE.MILO. At this moment, PERE.MILO was still afloat and was three points behind LADY.ÖZGE on starboard.
At the same time PHALENE saw a PFD and the other liferaft connected to the upper bridge which did not deploy. Wreck and EPIRB, a life jacket and a PFD were retrieved from the water by the fishing vessels in the area.
7 ANALYSIS
- Natural factors Weather conditions
- Material factors
- Human factors
- Executive summary
On the starboard side, level with the shell above the waterline, friction marks from frame 150 (bow thruster) to frame 125 as well as on the bulb. With the aim, after investigation, to discard factors without influence on the course of events and to retain only those that could with good probability have a real influence on the course of events. The skipper had a direct view of the radar display and the on-board computer.
The hydraulic motor controls for the winches and base firing equipment were located on a control panel at the rear of the bridge accessible to the man in the control seat. It is practical and its layout allows the OOW to work sitting or standing with a good view of the navigation equipment and outside. The observation deck was on the left side and the second officer was facing the navigation panel.
In addition, the OOW estimated that the trawler must cross half a mile on the bow. When the situation became very close, LADY.ÖZGE OOW failed to take any action to avoid a collision as prescribed by Rule 17 of COLREG, despite the danger of collision indicator. In addition, no light or sound signal was made to attract the attention of the trawler.
Please note that the LADY.ÖZGE's commanding officer's standing orders displayed on the bridge state that the CPA should not, as far as possible, be less than 1 mile and that the rudder should be moved to manual control quickly enough to manage any dangerous situations. The lack of rigorous monitoring of the situation using the available equipment and the lack of anticipation of the maneuver to avoid the collision is another causal factor of the accident.
9 RECOMMENDATIONS
The chemical tanker, as she did not identify PERE.MILO as a vessel engaged in fishing, also considered herself a standing vessel. LADY.ÖZGE OOW did not use the available equipment to analyze and anticipate the situation. On board PERE.MILO there was no lookout for about thirty minutes and the crew did not realize that he was in a critical situation.
The rating had been able to escape the wreck and had been taken aboard by LADY.ÖZGE lifeboat.
LISTE DES ANNEXES
Décision d’enquête Enquiry decision
Navires Vessels
Charts
Annexe A
Décision d’enquête Enquiry decision
Annexe B
Navires Vessels
P ERE M ILO
Annexe C
Cartes Charts
Bureau d’enquêtes sur les évènements de mer
