According to this, the sole purpose of the investigation is to prevent future accidents and malfunctions. The developing close situation between Washington Senator and Lykes Voyager could only be resolved by the early application of the.
FACTUAL INFORMATION
PARTICULARS OF LYKES VOYAGER, WASHINGTON SENATOR AND ACCIDENT
Shortly after the third officer returned to the starboard display, he resumed his position behind her. Shortly before the master's intervention, the third officer had displayed the information available to the target on the starboard bow of the ARPA tote. At 08:00 on 8 April, the third mate relieved the chief mate as OOW on the bridge.
When the third officer received this instruction, he assumed that the master had taken the con. At about the same time as the course change, the 3rd officer informed the master of two distant radar targets on the port bow. The master monitored these targets on the port display and instructed the third officer to also monitor them on the starboard display.
The third officer remembers that the ship turned to port when he did this.
ACTION FOLLOWING THE COLLISION
The ship had manual steering and was going full speed ahead, reaching between 15 and 16 knots above the ground. The planned track was 049° (Figure 2), but due to the large number of small radar targets believed to be fishing vessels, the ship had to change course frequently and generally kept to the east of the intended track. The starboard display was also in true motion, with a fixed origin, but was on a 6-mile range scale and offset to the southwest for a scan about 9 miles ahead of the ship.
A number of the remaining container stacks were also destabilized, notably aboard Lyke's Voyager. 34;Mayday" transmissions on VHF channel 16 were stopped, and replaced with advisory messages informing other ships in the vicinity that the ship was not under command. Supported by technical advice from the ship's commander, work aboard Lykes Voyager continued throughout the day, to stabilize the containers on deck and restore normal power supplies.
The ship was able to resume the passage at 2116 and turn back to Hong Kong, where she anchored at 2130 the following evening.
RECORDED INFORMATION AND TRACK RECONSTRUCTION
In the subsequent VHF radio conversations between the two masters, the master and third officer of Washington Senator opined that the voice of Lykes Voyager's master was identical to that of the person with whom he made the passing agreement before the collision. The collision also caused disruptions to the power supply in Lykes Voyager, and the intrusion of heavy fuel from a sump tank into the engine room aboard Washington Senator. During the period the "Mayday" and advisory messages were being relayed by the female third officer, several cat calls, wolf whistles and lewd comments were heard on the same channel.
The Washington senator was released from the scene at 10:36 a.m. and continued on her way to Hong Kong, where she arrived early the next morning. Reproduced from Admiralty Chart 1767 by permission of the Superintendent of HMSO and the UK Hydrographic Office.
BRIDGE TEAMS .1 Lykes Voyager
In April 2002, the master successfully completed a combined bridge resource management, bridge crew management and ship management course. The master felt that 17 knots was a suitable speed for the conditions and felt no pressure to reach Hong Kong. The master learned to operate the AIS display by reading its operations manual on his previous ship equipped with the same model.
However, the master used AIS with caution because he was aware that not all vessels carried the equipment. The third officer assumed that the master had made a mistake when he was instructed to change course to starboard to avoid the fishing vessel at 0910. The third officer stated that he felt comfortable with the ship proceeding at 17 knots, but if he considered a reduction in speed to be necessary, he would call the master before doing so.
He was informed of the requirement to call the foreman in the event of limited visibility, but he did not define himself.
RADAR AND AIS DISPLAYS, AND VHF RADIO .1 Lykes Voyager
When questioned during the inquest, the third officer was unsure about the ship's maneuvering characteristics in terms of turning circles and braking distance. When the master arrived on the bridge at about 0905, he adjusted both screens to optimize the quality of the radar picture, which was good. Prior to the collision, the third officer was primarily using the starboard display, while the commander was using the left.
Both screens were switched between true and relative motion and between the 3nm, 6nm and 12nm scales. They were also off-centered to the northeast, giving a detection sector from six points on each bow out to an area forward of about 16 nm with the 12 nm scale selected, and about 8 nm with the 6 nm scale selected. The ship was equipped with a Sam Electronics DEBEG 3401 AIS, which has a graphic display (Figures 3 and 6).
A VHF radio was placed on either side of the command console, both set to channel 16.
THE SHIP MANAGERS .1 Lykes Voyager
CP Ships carries out annual inspections on all its ships, separately from the ship operators, covering all aspects of safety, technical and navigational issues in accordance with the ISM Code and company policy ISO 14001. As part of its safety management regime, the company has one DP located at Buxtehude, with a substitute appointed for all his ships. DP organizes annual audits for all ships managed by the company and is supported in his role by a team of 25 qualified internal auditors operating in several locations around the world, together with administrative staff in Germany.
The company predicts that it will increase in size in the future, and plans to develop its own training facility for use by its staff. The company has a procedure in place for reporting accidents, and issues a 'Fleet News' circular every 4 months, which includes a brief analysis of the major accident reports received.
ORDERS, PROCEDURES, AND INSTRUCTIONS .1 Lykes Voyager
Anglo-Eastern had not issued a policy or procedure for the use of AIS in collision avoidance, although the company had advised its ships on the capabilities of AIS, including IMO Resolution A917(22). Calling the Master to the bridge does not transfer the watch officer's connection to the Master. Until the captain actually declares that he has the connection, the OOW must continue to perform its duties as it was before the arrival of the captain.
Once the commanding officer takes over the conn and the incident is recorded, the officer of the watch assumes a supporting role but is still responsible for the actions of his guards.[sic].
INTERNATIONAL REGULATIONS FOR THE PREVENTION OF COLLISIONS AT SEA [COLREGS]
THE USE OF VHF FOR COLLISION AVOIDANCE .1 Lykes Voyager
When taking collision avoidance action, the master of the vessel must be aware of the fact that collision avoidance action using VHF involves risk and potentially serious consequences. The MCA has also issued instructions for the use of VHF at sea in MGN 22(M+F) (Appendix G).
THE USE OF AUTOMATIC IDENTIFICATION SYSTEMS .1 Guidance
The information provided by AIS is divided into: static information related to ship descriptions and includes its call sign and name; dynamic information, including position and heading and speed above the ground; information relating to the voyage, including destination, draft and dangerous goods; and short safety messages. The reporting interval for dynamic information depends on the ship's speed and whether or not it is changing course.
GLOBAL MARITIME DISTRESS AND SAFETY SYSTEM (GMDSS)
ANALYSIS
- FATIGUE
- SEQUENCE OF EVENTS
- THE USE OF VHF RADIO IN COLLISION AVOIDANCE
- BRIDGE TEAM MANAGEMENT - LYKES VOYAGER
- BRIDGE TEAM MANAGEMENT - WASHINGTON SENATOR
- SAFE SPEED IN RESTRICTED VISIBILITY
- THE USE OF AIS FOR COLLISION AVOIDANCE
- THE “MAYDAY”
- LOOKOUT ON BOARD NOTORI DAKE
When the Washington Senator's master determined that the CPA of Lykes was Voyager 2.5 cables, Rules 8 and 19 of the . If proper identification procedures had been followed, the identity of the contracting vessel, likely one of many vessels within VHF radio range, would have been established. It was not the action expected by the captain of the Lykes Voyager, who was unaware of the identity of the target on his starboard bow, and of the agreement made by the Washington Senator. Lykes Voyager's course change to starboard was in accordance with the requirements of Rules 8 and 19 of the COLREGS.
This does not appear to have been the case, and he was not aware of the Washington Senator's radar target until it was visible on radar for about 8 minutes. In the experience of the MAIB, it is likely that many masters in the same situation would have acted similarly to the Lykes Voyager and Washington Senator masters. However, as this was not the case, using the AIS information was potentially useful.
This might have prevented the intervention of the unidentified ship, or if not, it might have prevented Lykes Voyager's third officer from aborting the call, as she did. Second, after the establishment of VHF radio communications, Lykes Voyager's third officer could have used AIS to associate the first call transmitter, Washington Senator, with the relevant radar target. If one of the captains had followed this information, the other ship's maneuvering would have been quickly apparent and the last-minute action taken to avoid the collision could have been taken sooner.
CONCLUSIONS
SAFETY ISSUES
In the period leading up to the collision, the master of the Washington Senator was not informed of the reduced visibility as required by his orders, and between approximately 0910 and 0935 there was a misunderstanding between the master and the third officer as to who had the decoy. The commanders of the Washington Sen. Lykes Voyager and Notori Dake did not find it necessary to reduce speed below the required passage speed when they encountered both limited visibility and a large concentration of fishing vessels. In MAIB's experience, many masters in similar situations would make their speed decisions.
Although AIS information would have provided near-real-time warning of changes in each other's course, this information was not used by either ship. This was probably due to several factors, including the absence of guidance or instruction from the shipmasters and the method by which the information was displayed. "Mayday" was not received by a coastal SAR authority, and although several ships were nearby, only the Washington Senator responded.
There is considerable doubt about the quality of the radar and auditory lookout maintained by Notori Dake during this period.
ACTION TAKEN
RECOMMENDATIONS
