A Foreign Policy Crisis in Japan
A Critical Analysis of why Japan yielded to Chinese pressure in September 2010
Corey Landon Perkins
Master’s Thesis – Peace and Conflict Studies
University of Oslo May 2012
A Foreign Policy Crisis in Japan
A Critical Analysis of why Japan yielded to Chinese pressure in September 2010
Corey Landon Perkins
Master’s Thesis – Peace and Conflict Studies
University of Oslo May 2012
© Corey Landon Perkins 2012
A Foreign Policy Crisis in Japan
A Critical Analysis of why Japan yielded to Chinese pressure in September 2010 http://www.duo.uio.no/
Trykk: Reprosentralen, Universitetet i Oslo
Summary
The overall purpose of this thesis is to contribute to knowledge on non-military dispute escalation and de-escalation, the ever changing and complex nature of Sino-Japanese relations, and on decision making within the Japanese government. The specific task of this thesis is to analyze contributing factors which influenced the Japanese government in a dispute with China in September 2010. There are two research objectives in this case study. The primary objective is to uncover the reasons why Japan yielded to Chinese pressure after over two weeks of ignoring China's demands to release an arrested Chinese fishing boat captain. The secondary objective that precedes the primary research
objective is to analyze what kept Japanese decision makers from yielding earlier than they did.
Evidence from online news sources, scholars, and personal interviews with Japanese foreign policy experts suggests that while there were a number of important factors in the minds of Japanese decision makers, the importance of Japan’s economic dependence on China, as perceived by Japanese decision makers, played the largest role in influencing the Japanese government to yield. Secondarily, but still largely important in influencing the Japanese government, was the role Chinese assertiveness played in exploiting Japan's economic vulnerabilities and dependence through various forms of unofficial economic sanctions.
Acronyms
ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations DPJ Democratic Party of Japan
EEZ Exclusive Economic Zone JCG Japanese Coast Guard GDP Gross Domestic Product
JETRO Japan External Trade Organization LDP Liberal Democratic Party
NDPG National Defense Program Guidelines NIE Newly Industrialized Economies PLA People's Liberation Army
PLAN People's Liberation Army Navy PM Prime Minister
PRC People's Republic of China ROC Republic of China
SDF Self-Defense Forces
UNCLOS United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea US United States
Figures
Figure 4.1: “GDP and trade statistics for China and Japan (1980-2010)”...69-70
Acknowledgments
This thesis would not have been possible without the wonderful patience, knowledge, constructive criticism, and experience of my thesis supervisor Dr. Stein D. Tønnesson.
From Oslo, Norway he would faithfully meet me on Skype to assist me in my research which was being conducted from Nashville, Tennessee. Unfortunately, as I usually had to wake up very early because of the time difference, he had to endure the dreaded 'morning Corey' particularly when I would roll straight out of bed to meet online.
I would also like to thank Dan Sneider & Dr. Min Gyo Koo for taking the time to answer my questions during phone interviews. Your expert opinions and responses greatly informed my thesis. Also an additional thanks to Dr. Christopher Hughes, Dr. Michael Yahuda, Dr. Ryosei Kokubun, Dr. Glenn Hook, Dr. Hugo Dobson, Dr. Julie Gilson, and Dr. Paul O'Shea for responding to emails with insight and opinions.
I would finally like to thank my wonderful, beautiful love Helena for patiently waiting on me while I was constantly busy throughout this time. Summer is finally here. I would also like to thank my friends and family who have been there for me during this process to ask questions and motivate me. Last but not least, I would like to apologize to my
guitar... whom I've neglected.
Corey Perkins
Nashville, 10 May 2012
Table of Contents
1. Introduction...1
1.2 Hypothesis...6
1.3 Relevant Japanese Foreign Policy Literature...9
1.4 Theory...11
1.5 Methodology...13
2. The September 2010 Crisis...18
2.1 Conflicting Views...18
2.2 Japan's Argument...21
2.3 China's Argument...23
2.4 A Concluding Precursor to the Crisis...25
2.5 Escalation of Events...26
3. Why the Wait?...37
3.1 Introduction...37
3.2 The 1st Phase – Before the Election...38
3.3 The 2nd Phase – After the Election...42
3.4 Conclusion – Weighing the Factors...50
4. Why did Japan Yield?...54
4.1 Introduction...54
4.2 The Timing of the Yield...55
4.3 Why Factors...57
4.4 Conclusion – Weighing the Factors...75
5. Conclusion...78 6. Works Cited...86
1. Introduction
In September 2010, a serious but non-militarized dispute occurred between Japan and China. It began on September 7th when the Japanese Coast Guard (JCG) arrested a crew of Chinese fishermen in the East China Sea, near the Senkaku Island of Kubajima after reported collisions took place between the JCG and the fishing trawler (Yoshida 2010). The Senkaku Islands in Japanese, or Diaoyu Islands in Chinese, are claimed by both Japan and China and have been and continue to be a source of friction between the two countries. The Chinese government quickly protested the Japanese Coast Guard's arrest and continuously increased the pressure on the Japanese government to release the captives as time passed through political and economical threats, sanctions, and leverage.
Eventually, on September 24th, Japan yielded to Chinese pressure and released the fishing trawler captain with no legal indictment (Kubota 2010b).
Yet, at the beginning of the dispute, Japanese officials calmly and cogently
informed the Chinese government that the arrest of the Chinese citizens would “strictly”
be processed in accordance with Japanese domestic law (Wada 2010). In doing so,
Japanese officials not only ignored Chinese protests but also implicitly communicated that they do not respect Chinese claims to sovereignty over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. The islands are Japan's, according to Japanese official statements. For over two weeks the Japanese government did not budge and release the captain of the fishing trawler, despite strong protests and tension ratcheting from China. My two research questions were born from the seemingly paradoxical nature of Japan’s crisis behavior. The overall most important question to answer is after communicating to China that it would handle the matter domestically, and after holding the captain of the Chinese fishing trawler for over two weeks – why did Japan then yield to Chinese pressure? In order to answer this question, another question must first be asked as well. What kept decision makers from yielding earlier in the dispute?
Case study research into this specific incident and incidents like it are immensely relevant in today's international climate. It has become almost common knowledge that the focus of power, politics, and economics is moving from the 'West' (North America &
Europe) towards and across the Pacific – leading many to predict this century will become the 'Pacific Century'. At the heart of this shift are East Asia's two major powers: China and Japan. The importance of a non-militarized Sino-Japanese crisis comes from the fact that one is a rising superpower and the other a major power allied with the biggest
superpower and when one side yields in a dispute, it is remembered. It can cause resentment and may lead to more toughness next time around. And, it is safe to predict that there will be further incidents between China and Japan concerning both the Senkaku Islands and the maritime border, as China’s economic and naval power continues to rise.
Understanding the complexity of cooperation and rivalry between these two states
remains an imperative for International Relations and Peace and Conflict Studies scholars.
The relationship between China and Japan will be of great significance to not only peace and stability in the East Asian region, but also the future of Sino-American
relations. No overarching and general study of Japanese security policy can ignore the role of the United States, who is greatly involved in the region and remains bound under a security treaty to protect Japan from military infringements to Japanese sovereignty. The 'nuclear umbrella' of the United States is no small consideration in policy making circles in Japan.
Complexities with multiple actors to national and regional security demand a corresponding complexity in scholarship. International Relations as a study was thrust to life during the bi-polar order of the Cold War, where 'traditional' dyadic studies of power, diplomacy, and military capabilities ruled the day. However, in today's Post Cold War International Relations circles, things have changed. There are a majority of scholars who believe we are headed from the uni-polar order of the first Cold War period towards a multi-polar order (often thought of as the most dangerous), although some dispute this notion and argue that we now have or are entering a no-polar system. Regardless of
which side of the debate one is on, as we all know, China is 'on the rise'. Consider this economic forecast:
“By 2020 there will be a major shift in the global balance of economic power compared to 2010….Emerging economies will rise in importance and China will have overtaken the USA to lead the list of the world’s top ten largest economies by GDP measured in PPP terms.” (Euromonitor.com 2010).
Case studies that examine different elements of behavior in the Post Cold War era can shed light upon states' actions and help to strengthen more generalizable theories.
Specifically, this case study will analyze why Japan at first stood firm, and then yielded to Chinese pressure in September 2010. This could be used to establish more generalizable theories on the types of conditions that make states stand firm or yield so as not to
escalate interstate disputes to military conflicts. This case study could also be used on more specific studies and theories on Sino-Japanese relations. Thus this case study can be potentially useful for dyadic analysis of foreign policy crisis behavior, and could be important for sensitive foreign policy decision making.
With a wide variety of definitions for what a crisis is, it is important to define what I mean when referring to the Senkaku Islands crisis as a non-militarized foreign policy crisis. Singer and Diehl note:
“Not all such disputes reach the level of belligerence that we associate with a militarized interstate crisis. If, for example, one state reacts forcefully to a perceived transgression by another, and the matter is quickly resolved with an apology from the presumed transgressor or through a clarification of a misunderstanding, there is no interstate crisis, although the situation may become a foreign policy crisis” (1990:228)
Most interstate crisis research has focused on conflicts that escalate into a situation where states are prepared for war. Russell Leng's influential book Interstate crisis
behavior, 1816-1980: realism versus reciprocity, systematically analyzes militarized interstate crises where both parties have clearly indicated their willingness to go to war, or
“the last stop on the road to war” (1993:1). Yet if there is a tense escalation that stops short of directly indicated warfare willingness or preparation can this not be a non- militarized crisis in its own right? This question is very important for crisis studies because as militarized escalation increases the potential for “national decision-makers to respond to crises in a non-rational manner” could also increase (1993:11). A point can also be reached where “costs and risks can no longer be justified by the initial stakes, not just because so much already has been committed to the effort and there is hope for success..., but also because the political stakes now are much higher” (Leng 1993:16).
Other questions surface as well. Can one side not experience the urgency of a crisis more than the other – or, can one side experience a crisis while the other does not?
This takes us to a type of classification that is not highly researched. Brecher and Wilkenfeld define a foreign policy crisis as a crisis for an “individual state” that requires three conditions based on the perceptions of “the highest level decision makers” (2000:3).
These three conditions are: (A) “a threat to one or more basic values, (B) an awareness of finite time for response to the value threat, and (C) a heightened probability of
involvement in military hostilities” (2000:3). This type of study then “concentrates on the perceptions and behavior of a single state” and its “decision makers” while it also looks at interstate interaction as well since “crisis decisions are usually made in response to
threatening physical and/or verbal acts by another state” (2000:3).
Regarding the three conditions listed above, much attention is given to clarifying the third condition – a heightened probability of involvement in military hostilities – which is of great importance here. Brecher and Wilkenfeld state that:
“This probability can range from virtually nil to near certainty. For a crisis to erupt, however, perception of war likelihood need not be high. Rather, it must be qualitatively higher than the norm in the specific adversarial
relationship. This applies both to states for which the 'normal' expectation of war is 'high' and to those for which it is 'low'” (2000:3).
Since this paper examines Japanese decision making and not Chinese, I will be using Brecher and Wilkenfeld's definition of a foreign policy crisis when I refer to the events and tension escalation that occurred in September 2010 as a crisis. This definition enables the urgency of a crisis and the benefit of focusing on one party to the dispute without necessarily having to be militarized. This will allow for a necessary distinction with literature like Leng's which draws its conclusions from militarized crises. However, this will be done with two important conceptual caveats. The first is that unlike Brecher and Wilkenfeld's interest in placing the behavior of one state's leaders and decision makers at a premium for analysis, which could come at the potential expense of not analyzing the interaction between states more thoroughly, this study will not structurally downplay the potential that state-to-state interaction could hold in the explanation of why Japan yielded to Chinese pressure. In other words, I will be using their three-point
definition listed above to enable the label of a crisis, but will analytically choose and focus on which areas of the crisis that seem to best give answers to my research questions.
It is because there are many conceptions of how to define a crisis that this section and definition was added. I will not follow Brecher and Wilkenfeld's framework for analysis and am only using their definition for a foreign policy crisis, as the purpose of this study is to analyze Japanese decision making while integrating theory throughout the process.
Second, much of the scholarship done in even Brecher and Wilkenfeld's book, other studies, and even other works by Brecher on foreign policy crises seems to center on disputes that move from non-military to militarized. Here again I will take this concept down a narrower path. As Enterline and Williams point out, some foreign policy crises can also be characterized as “non-military in nature” (2010:12). The Senkaku crisis of 2010 did not become militarized – the dispute eventually became a crisis. By the end of the twenty-four day episode there were open-ended threats from the highest levels in
Beijing to Japanese decision makers that China would stop at nothing to ensure its citizens would not be prosecuted by Japanese authorities. Yet at the beginning there were only low-level diplomatic protests. In this sense what started as a dispute became a non- militarized crisis. Thus, I will define this as a non-militarized foreign policy crisis for Japan in which the escalation and perception of war likelihood became higher than the norm between the two countries even though the overall perception of war likelihood probably remained relatively low.
1.2 Hypothesis
In order to test why Japanese leaders first held firm for over two weeks, and then yielded, I will gather evidence and analyze a set of factors to answer the above stated research questions. After evidence has been collected, I will critically analyze these sets of factors in Chapters 3 and 4 to see which of them most support an explanation. The method will be the classical one of seeking to falsify each explanation, and see which ones survive the test. In Chapter 3 I will explain what kept Japan from yielding earlier in the dispute, and then why it yielded in Chapter 4. Part of the benefit of this structure is that it allows a focus on variables, or perceptions, that may have changed over time with implications for their effect on decision making.1
The factors to be analyzed in Chapter 3 for what kept Japan from yielding earlier are as follows:
1) Japan's leadership elections 2) Legal procedures
3) The level of Chinese pressure on the Japanese government 4) Public opinion
5) The concern for not weakening the Japanese legal argument in the sovereignty
1 - More information about the structural process of my research can be found in my methodology section below.
dispute over the Senkakus
6) A Japanese desire to improve on its legal title in the sovereignty dispute.
The first factor is the role of the Democratic Party of Japan's leadership election and how it may have affected a willingness to yield. The second factor is legal
procedures that may have prevented decision makers from yielding. The third factor is the effect of China's assertive pressure on Japanese decision makers. The fourth is the role of domestic public opinion in Japan. The fifth is a potential concern for defending the Japanese legal title to the Senkaku Islands and their surrounding waters. The sixth factor is a possible actual desire to utilize the dispute to gain leverage in the legal dispute, or improve on Japan’s legal title.
The following factors will be analyzed to see why Japan eventually did yield to Chinese pressure:
1) US non-support
2) Japan's fear of China's military modernization and US security abandonment 3) The level and credibility of China's threats
4) A genuine desire for peaceful relations due to the complexities and resentments left over from the historical legacies of imperial Japan
5) A desire or need to get back the four Japanese citizens detained in China and whether China could use this as leverage
6) Economic dependence
These six potential explanatory factors will be investigated, analyzed, and weighed before a general answer is given. The first is the influence of the US. Could the USA have dissuaded Japan from further upping the ante? The second factor is Japan's fear of China's military modernization and the US abandoning their security treaty with Japan.
These two fears are so strongly related to each other that they cannot be discussed in
separation. The third is a Japanese assumption that the detention of four Japanese citizens in China might be connected to the Senkaku crisis. The fourth is the level and credibility of China's threats. The fifth is a general Japanese desire for peaceful relations in view of the two countries’ violent past. Finally, the sixth factor is Japan’s economic dependence on China.
My overall hypothesis as to why Japan yielded to Chinese pressure places the most emphasis on number six above – the economic dependence on China. This was my assumption from the start, and this is also the factor that proved to best withstand my test of each hypothesis – or evaluation of each explanatory factor. Both countries heavily invest in and trade with each other, yet the continuation of this relationship for Japan seems more vitally important for the Japanese economy than it is for China. Allowing a military conflict to disrupt trade would in the view of Japanese decision makers hurt the Japanese economy more than holding firm over the fishing trawler dispute would benefit Japan in other ways. In essence, we must assume that decision makers in Tokyo weighed the costs and benefits of each action – escalating the dispute further or yielding to protect the Japanese economy – and decided that their lucrative and productive financial ties to China were too valuable to allow them to be damaged.
Skeptics of economic interdependence’s pacifying effects point out that often when a country’s leaders feel dependent on another country they will act in a “defiant” manner (1993:13). Russell Leng cites this “psychological reactance” when his study finds “a strong tendency on the part of states to react in a defiant manner to attempts at coercion, particularly military coercion” (1993:13). Indeed there are many studies to support this theory. Yet, when China continuously raised its threats until Prime Minister Wen Jiabao openly stated China would not back down no matter what the costs and China unofficially economically sanctioned Japan in numerous ways, Japan was not defiant – it was
compliant. Thus the argument of my hypothesis is that it was this perceived dependence on economic ties with China that led decision makers to yield to Chinese pressure.
1.3 Relevant Japanese Foreign Policy Literature
Since I am doing a specific case study of one foreign policy crisis in Japan, it is necessary to provide some background on its international relations and foreign policy.
There is a massive body of scholarship covering these topics, so for brevity's sake I will only briefly draw on some of the most relevant literature. There is no better place to start an overview of Japanese relations than with Michael Yahuda's textbook, The
International Politics of the Asia-Pacific – Third and Revised Edition (2011).
Yahuda traces the beginnings of an emerging, “active,” “independent” Japanese foreign policy back to the Cold War period of 1971–1989 (2011:169). Largely in
response to the 1973 oil crisis and the “relative decline” of “American hegemonic power”
– including the abolition of the American gold standard – Japan sought out the “access to as many markets and sources of supply as possible” to “minimize vulnerability in the event of closure of any one source” (2011:169-170). The promise of American security, however, remained the major fulcrum in Japanese security (174). With the division of the Cold War era and the threat of Soviet expansion, Japan was able to normalize independent relations with China and Southeast Asia through “modified,” “neomercantilist policies” - including economic assistance and development aid, and trade (170-174). These policies would energize the Japanese economy to becoming one of the largest in the world.
The Post Cold War era brought many changes and challenges for Japanese foreign policy, yet one major staple remains relatively the same – the importance of the American security guarantee (337). There are still notable challenges to the present day Japanese- American relationship. Chief among these challenges are the fears of US security abandonment and the weariness of “being entrapped by American demands that it
participate actively” in American wars like in Iraq and Afghanistan (337). North Korean nuclear weapons and the intensification of Chinese “military modernization” also bring insecurity to Japanese foreign policy (337). Since the end of the Cold War Japan has
attempted to “balance” the increased economic “interdepen[dence]” with the guarantee of American security (324). China has become Japan's biggest trading partner. Yet, China’s rising power and military modernization have coincided with a deterioration of trust between the two nations, a flaring of nationalistic sentiments on both sides, and Japanese public opinion of China has significantly worsened since the early 1990s (324-326).
Caroline Rose traces many of the problems of the Sino-Japanese historical legacy in her book Sino-Japanese Relations: Facing the past, looking to the future? (2005). In it, she examines the reconciliation between the two states and the problems of the Yasukuni Shrine and Japanese textbook and historical revisionism which have caused major
protests, outrage, and concerns in China. She concludes by noting a disconnect between government policies and grassroots movements “who see their struggle as incomplete,”
and that although reconciliation has been effective on some levels, “there is still a long way to go” (127). Without a doubt the atrocities of World War II, the expansion of Japan's Self Defense Forces (SDF) and the Chinese military; and the issues of whether Japan has adequately apologized, whether China uses the apology card for foreign policy leverage, and the amount of bitterness and resentments these sentiments in turn have on the younger generation of Japanese officials and citizens create a significant strain on relations and bi-lateral perceptions (Yahuda 2011:324-328).
Another textbook which is vast and comprehensive is the third edition of Japan's International Relations:Politics, economics and security by Hook, Gilson, Hughes, and Dobson (2012). Throughout this essential resource Japan and its international relations are examined through its US, East Asian, European, and global institutions
relations. The authors interestingly address the often argued view that Japan's foreign policies are described as “capricious” (6-7). Yet they find that Japan's foreign policy:
“can be best understood as a range of consistently low-risk and low-profile international initiatives, leading to the characterization of Japanese
diplomacy as “quiet”. This choice of 'quiet diplomacy' as characteristic of Japan's behavior goes hand in hand with the continuing influence of the
United States on Japanese government policy. Japan is thus a normal state, with normal modes and means of deploying differing forms of power, given the structure of the international system and the role of the United Sates, the policy-making agents and other political actors involved, and the domestic and international norms which inform their behaviour” (70).
Finally, Mike Mochizuki's article Japan's shifting strategy towards the rise of China describes the end of what he refers to as 'friendship diplomacy' as Japan's China security policy now generally oscillates between “cooperative engagement with a soft hedge” and “competitive engagement with a hard hedge” (2007:739). He argues that the Tiananmen Square incident in 1989, China’s 1992 territorial seas law suggesting it could use force over the Senkaku Islands, a “series of nuclear tests in 1995,” and “military exercises in the Taiwan Strait” in 1996, “caused Japan to question whether China really had benign intentions” (749-750). Thus, “Japan started to shift away from ‘commercial liberalism’ toward ‘reluctant realism’ in its China policy” (750). However, this reluctance did not keep Japan from heavily engaging in China's economy (750-752). Mochizuki's theory of an oscillation between levels of cooperative and competitive economic
engagement on the one hand, and soft and hard security hedging with US on the other, gives us a tool to conceptualize Japan's general China security policy as time and different events and administrations pass.
1.4 Theory
The theory most relevant to my main hypothesis is that of economic
interdependence. The general theories are presented well in Dale Copeland's article,
"Economic Interdependence and War: A Theory of Trade Expectations," and will be borrowed, cited, and fashioned in a similar way here. The “core” of the liberal argument is that through deepening ties of trade states will generally become closer and will not want to use military force to achieve their objectives because they have become dependent
upon each other for well being (Copeland 1996:8). As Copeland states, “A dependent state should therefore seek to avoid war, since peaceful trading gives it all the benefits of close ties without any of the costs and risks of war” (1996:8). While Immanuel Kant wrote about the potential for trade to pacify states, Richard Cobden's theory is more relevant and efficient for this section. He asserted in the mid-1800s that trade “unites, by the strongest motives of which our nature is susceptible, two remote communities,
rendering the interest of the one the only true policy of the other, and making each equally anxious for the prosperity and happiness of both” (Cobden 1878:127). If two states are connected in trade then “how can the extension of our commerce call for an increase in our armaments,” he inquired (1878:127).
Realists argue that contrary to liberal arguments on the peaceful effects of trade on states, an increased dependence on another state can actually lead states into war
(Copeland 1996:9). The general argument that realists such as Kenneth Waltz and John Mearsheimer would no doubt agree with is that:
“States concerned about security will dislike dependence, since it means that crucial imported goods could be cut off during a crisis. This problem is particularly acute for imports like oil and raw materials; while they may be only a small percentage of the total import bill, without them most modern economies would collapse. Consequently, states dependent on others for vital goods have an increased incentive to go to war to assure themselves of continued access of supply.” (Copeland 1996:9)
This argument is rooted in the mercantilist imperialism writings of the 17th century, which assert that mercantilist powers will be “locked into a competition of relative
power” which will drive them to expand their imperial empires to gain more control over international supply and demand (Copeland 1996:9). Copeland summarizes this argument well by stating “imperial expansion – the acquisition of colonies – is driven by the state's need to secure greater control over sources of supply and markets for its goods, and to
build relative power in the process” (1996:9).
It is near impossible for there to be a completely equal relationship of
interdependence, meaning that one state will almost always be more dependent than the other – or perceive itself to be more or less dependent than the other. Such factual and perceived asymmetries in dependence are an important focus in both the realist and liberal theories (Copeland 1996:9-10). Copeland summarizes this difference in the direction at the point of departure from the two schools of thought by stating, “liberals argue that the more dependent state is less likely to initiate conflict, since it has more to lose from breaking economic ties; realists maintain that this state is more likely to initiate conflict, to escape its vulnerability” (Copeland 1996:9-10).
The debate between the two schools of thought has continued since Copeland wrote his article in 1996. Many authors have since argued that there are a plethora of conditions under which either the realist or liberal theories can be confirmed, and much research has gone into attempting to identify these conditions. The theory of economic interdependence also informs other theories such as the Democratic Peace Theory and the Capitalist Peace Theory. While the debate has moved into other fields to match the fluidity of international events, the question remains however – was it a feeling of
perceived economic dependence on trade with China that caused Japan to yield to Chinese pressure?
1.5 Methodology
The idea behind the method used in this thesis is to first examine collected
evidence and then continuously create an explanatory theory from that evidence to answer the question of 'why did Japan yield to Chinese pressure'? If the evidence is first
examined without applying a prior overarching theory, then more accurate conclusions can be drawn as to why actors behave in certain ways. While it is nearly impossible for one to personally avoid the use of theory while first examining evidence, dogmatically
relying on a specific theory as a lens to interpret events puts the researcher at risk of missing important factors which could have an impact on findings. Thus it is with the intention of creating an original and meaningful analysis that I chose this research design.
I also intentionally picked a foreign policy crisis which had a short lifespan and had a definite ending. This is opposed to a protracted conflict which could continue for years.
There are multiple benefits of examining a short-lived event with a definite ending. A protracted or lengthy conflict or crisis requires a larger amount of generalization for one researcher's theory to explain events or decisions in a meaningful way. However, a shorter event allows the researcher to explore more detailed evidence which has a potential bearing on the strength of his or her theory. Since the researcher is able to go into more detail, he or she is also able to bring up evidence that has not already been analyzed by other political scientists. Thus, I hope to contribute to new knowledge. This more detailed evidence could in turn influence conclusions drawn particularly from studies that use more generalized and less specific theories. The case study informs the theory. Finally, having an event that has a definite conclusion to analyze allows one to focus energy on specifically researching why that event happened as it did. If one
chooses to analyze the aspects of an ongoing, fluid process then the researcher is left with the tricky decision of picking which spot of the event is most important to start the
analysis from and which spot serves as a useful stopping point for analysis. Fortunately, I was not faced with this dilemma.
The bulk of the evidential source material for this paper comes from online newspaper articles, where there is an abundance of easily accessible material. This will be readily apparent in Chapter 2 where I trace the history of the crisis. This approach was beneficial because I was able to quickly consume and organize large amounts of
information – making the research process more efficient and chronology of events easier to compile and organize. A personal weakness to this approach stems from the fact that I can not read Japanese or Chinese sources, so my insights are left to information that has been translated by others. Admittedly, this can lead to false conclusions if a translation
was slightly misleading or overly biased. Another weakness came from the lack of finances that prevented me from traveling to do interviews with Japanese decision makers. Of the online newspaper sources, the Reuters news database had the largest accessible archive for events during this time period and seemed most reliable in
presenting consistent objective information. Thus it is used heavily in Chapter 2. Also heavily used in this paper will be The New York Times, BBC News, and The Japan Times - among others.
Despite these weaknesses however, I still should be able to provide an interesting study on Japanese decision making given the evidence that I was able to compile. Online newspaper sources are good at reporting physical events and governmental statements, both of which lend themselves to interpretation by researchers. To supplement the online newspaper articles I purchased and read through as many of the most relevant and
influential books on Japanese foreign policy and Japanese China policy that I was able to find within the constraints of the thesis time period. Inevitably, there will be other
sources that I was not able to read due to time constraints that might have provided a different angle or insight.
I also tried to compensate for the above by emailing a few experts and authors on opinions related to my research topic. This allowed me to construct a precise question, was quickly fashioned behind the computer, and proved to be cost-effective. The
downside to this, however, is that responses are not guaranteed, the format is impersonal, and often respondents may not answer your question or answers may not be relevant and usable in your paper. These types of occurrences also happened when for instance I received a reply but was referred to someone else or the respondents said they were not knowledgeable about the specifics of my research topic. However, on the other hand, in this case it is positive to be informed by experts on their ignorance to the specifics of my research question because that means that I can successfully contribute to knowledge on this subject. Only some of the responses I received via email have influenced my
conclusions, and in those cases I explicitly refer to their opinions with reference to our e-
mail exchange.
The other method I used was to set up phone interviews with experts. This method actually worked quite well. While it would be easy to imagine that some experts could be hard to reach, both people that I called were easy to reach (their numbers were listed online), and were extremely friendly and more than happy to help and be interviewed. A phone interview is a strong method because you can have a list of questions in hand to ask the expert, but you can as well allow the conversation to go in natural directions if you find an interesting topic and the interviewee seems like he or she wants to talk about it in more detail. This happened both times and both sets of responses were very helpful and informative. It was also a bonus to interview one expert on Japanese foreign policy because he (Dan Sneider) had personally interviewed many members of the Democratic Party of Japan about very similar topics, so his insight from the interview became invaluable and also compensated for my weakness in not being able to read and speak Japanese fluently to conduct these types of interviews myself.
The fact that one can use online media sources to examine state behavior says much about the intensification of social interconnectedness. Even social media sites such as Twitter and Facebook have become an important mobilizer for collective action across the world. Yet, even with as much information that exists on the web, academics must remain scientifically rigorous and must always seek to use valid sources and supplement valid web-based information with other credible, academic sources. Thus the method employed in this thesis is to use online news sources for evidential research, and well- reviewed, relevant, and informative scholarly books and interviews with experts to allow firm and credible reflections on causality.
The structure of the thesis was fashioned in a neat, simple, straight-forward manner at the request of my supervisor. While many of his straight-forward structural ideas at first seemed different to how I have structured papers in the past – and how I imagined structuring this one before hand – I have found his suggested methods to be very
approachable, easily manageable, and most important, very wise and efficient. Much can
be lost with senseless complexity.
Finally, I chose to use the Peace and Conflict studies' recommended method of citing so that the university standard could be quickly recognized by those grading this thesis. In the process of doing so, however, there were some ideas which came to mind that would have made citing more simple and logical. Yet, since the university has a recommended template, I chose to follow the guidelines of citation even at the expense of perhaps some novel ideas in presenting and fashioning my citations in more creative and efficient ways.
2. The September 2010 Foreign Policy Crisis
2.1 Conflicting Views
The Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands are located around 110 square nautical miles (nms) from both the coast of Taiwan and the Japanese islands of Yonaguni and Ishigaki which are part of the Ryukyu Islands chain in the East China Sea (Drifte 2008:6; McCormack 2011). This is about 215 nms southwest of Naha, which is Okinawa’s main island (Drifte 2008:6; McCormack 2011). The Senkakus themselves “consist of five uninhabited islets and three barren rocks” (Drifte 2008:6). While Japan 'exercises administrative control' (Wada 2010) over the Senkaku Islands, both China and Japan claim sovereignty over them and their 12 nm territorial sea, and sovereign rights to resources in any additional maritime zone that might be generated from them (Tanaka 2010).
Based on these assertions of sovereignty, when the fishing boat was arrested the Japanese government claimed that it had been fishing illegally in Japanese territorial waters and had obstructed the coast guard from doing its duties (Tanaka 2010). Territory in this case refers to “the area of the sea within twelve nautical miles of [the Senkaku island] Kubajima,” as this was the island closest to the fishing boat (2010). However, from the Chinese official perspective a Chinese boat was arrested in China’s own
territorial waters by a Japanese patrol boat (2010). Thus it is easy to see the nature of the dispute between the contending parties. Taiwan also claims sovereignty over the islands.
The ROC (Taiwan) has the same claim as the PRC, but since Taiwan was not actively involved in the September 2010 dispute, and in order not to complicate matters too much, I will barely discuss the role of Taiwan.
The dispute over the Senkaku Islands, the question of whether or not they can generate an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and continental shelf of their own, and also the maritime border demarcation between the Ryukuyu Island chain and the Chinese coast
in the East China Sea (following either the median line or the natural prolongation principle) are complicated by the fact that the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) leaves room for debate about which side has the most persuasive legal argument on the last two matters (Emmers 2010:51). Under UNCLOS, features that qualify as “islands” can generate not just a 12-nautical mile territorial sea, but a 12- nautical-mile contiguous zone, a 200-nautical-mile EEZ, and a continental shelf as well, but “rocks” that cannot sustain human habitation or an economic life of their own cannot have more than a 12 nm territorial sea. An important part of the dispute over the
Senkakus is thus whether in a legal sense they are an “island” or a “rock” (Tønnesson 2012 [personal correspondence]). If they are given a right to extended maritime zones and Japan has sovereignty to them, then this would extend Japan's maritime border further westward from the Ryukyu Islands. Emmers (2010: 51) has an informative, precise, and well worded summary of this complex situation:
“Japan argues that the Senkaku/Diao yus can be considered as [habitable]
islands capable of generating both an EEZ and a continental shelf. Tokyo extends its claims to the East China Sea by using the islands as its base points and takes the Okinawa Trough as merely an incidental depression in the East China Sea's continental shelf. As a result, it advocates that a median-line division be used to determine the maritime boundary between itself and China. Significantly, while the Senkaku/Diao yus are beyond the territorial seas of China and Japan they lie on the western side of the trough...[I]f the islands are rightfully Japanese, the trough would 'probably not pose an obstacle to linking the maritime zones generated from the Ryukyus and the Senkakus'. Sovereignty over the islands is therefore imperative to Japan's larger seabed claims” (Emmers 2010:51).
China claims that the Diaoyu Islands are uninhabitable rocks (Emmers 2010:51).
If this were to be legally supported, the islands would not have a right to their own extended maritime zones. In that case the sea area around the Senkakus would end up in
China’s (or Taiwan’s) EEZ, and the seabed might become a part of China/Taiwan’s continental shelf either because of its distance from Taiwan or because China’s
continental shelf is naturally prolonged all the way to the Okinawa Trough – which is to the east of the Senkakus (Tønnesson 2012 [personal correspondence]) . This indeed would push the maritime border much closer to Japan than Japan itself envisages while giving China (or Taiwan) a greater share of the East China Sea. China claims that its continental shelf should be based on the concept of natural prolongation, which allows states to claim sovereign rights to the resources under the seabed out to a distance of 200 nm – and under certain geomorphological conditions (to be determined by the United Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf) even further out than that (Tønnesson 2012 [personal correspondence]). Japan in turn “argues that the EEZ of both sides overlap because the width of the ECS [East China Sea] is less than 400 nm,” and thus once again, a median-line should be drawn equidistant between the two (Drifte 2008:9) both for the EEZ and the continental shelf.
At the heart of the debate is a competition over the potential oil and energy resources located in the central area of the East China Sea. Both Japan and China are massive economies which consume and desire large amounts of oil and gas. Particularly tempting is the perceived “possibility of the hydrocarbon potential” of the seabed
surrounding the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands (Pan 2007:72). An agreement has been reached on joint development of resources in disputed parts of the East China Sea – although no joint exploration has yet materialized (Drifte 2008:4). Japan has protested China's
“relentless exploration” of hydrocarbon and extraction of oil and gas in the “immediate vicinity of Japan's proposed maritime border” (Drifte 2008:4) and has expressed fear that
“China's exploration for natural gas in the East China Sea threatens gas beds extending under what it deems Japan's maritime zone” (Buckley 2010). Japan has also accused China of violating the joint development agreement (Blanchard & Sieg 2010).
As stated above, the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands are claimed by both China and Japan.
The disputed sovereignty to the Senkakus could have an impact on maritime zone
delimitation, but only if the Senkakus are given a right to their own EEZ and continental shelf. This could then have implications for gas and also for the ability of the Chinese Navy to exit through the East China Sea within China’s own EEZ (Drifte 2008:10; Hsiao 2010; McCormack 2011; Wada 2010). These “overlapping” maritime zone claims and interests have “made finding an acceptable solution to the sovereignty controversy more challenging” (Pan 2007:72). This makes what was potentially at stake in the crisis of September 2010 all the more important and does much to explain the relevance and
tensions of the events from Sept. 7th-24th 2010. Before providing a detailed account of the crisis, I will first briefly present the differing perspectives on the contrasting historical claims to sovereignty over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands as such. As is usual both sides use historical evidence to underpin their claims.
2.2 Japan's Argument
One of Japan's arguments is that the islands were uninhabited at the time of discovery in 1884 by Koga Tatsushiro and still “not occupied by any power, or terra nullius,” when Japan formally claimed sovereignty over them in 1895 (Lee 2011; Wada 2010). The hesitation to formally act during the eleven year gap between the supposed discovery and formal claims to sovereignty was due to the Japanese government's
apparent uncertainty as to whether the islands could have belonged to China at some point in the past (Lee 2011). It is argued that the Japanese government at this time undertook a
“thorough 10-year investigation...that started in 1885...,” and “...confirmed that the islands had been uninhabited and showed no trace of having been under the control of China”
(Kawaguchi 2010).
It is also noteworthy that when the government of Japan decided to officially incorporate the Senkaku Islands Japan was winning the Sino-Japanese war – a time that
“Japan no longer felt any need to consider the reaction of China” (Wada 2010).
While there are ancient Chinese documents which are used to support the claim that the
Diaoyu Islands were used for Chinese fishing routes long before 1884, these documents do not necessarily substantiate claims of effective control over the territory (Kawaguchi 2010; Wada 2010). Furthermore, according to Wada and most legal scholars (2010) what
“matters more is how these islands have been handled in the modern period, which gave birth to the concept of national territory.”
After the end of WWII, the “Senkaku Islands were not returned together with Taiwan to China [because of the Japanese perception of the Senkaku Islands as being terra nullius when discovered]” (Wada 2010) and “were administered by the US as part of their occupation of Okinawa” (Drifte 2008:6). The islands “were returned to Japan along with Okinawa” in the 1972 reversion, and have been under Japan's administrative control since then (The Japan Times 2010). Though the US did not specifically state that it was
transferring sovereignty when they returned administrative rights of the islands to Japan, Japan's government passed a resolution in 1970 to declare the islands part of its sovereign territory (Lee 2011). This led to protests from Taiwan and China (Lee 2011). Such protests are important because they weaken the Japanese claim. If there had been no protests the Japanese claim would have gained much in validity.
Drifte (2008:6) notes that China's interest in the South China Sea Island disputes seemed greater than in the East China Sea dispute, as China made formal claims over the Spratly and Paracel Islands as early as in the 19th century. Many on the Japanese side of the dispute assert that the Chinese government did not claim sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands until 1970, and issued its first official documentation of that claim in 1971 (Drifte 2008:6). This was only after “Japan and Taiwan had started talks on jointly exploring the energy resources around the Senkaku Islands..., the US had agreed to return the
islands...,” and perhaps most importantly, after a committee under the auspices of the United Nations “conducted a geophysical survey in 1968” and reported that “the
continental shelf between Taiwan and Japan may be extremely rich in oil reserves” (Drifte 2008:6).
Thus, the other main point of the pro-Japanese argument is that the government of
China, since the Treaty of Shimonoseki in 1895, through WWII, and all the way up to 1971 did not “object to Japan’s acquisition of the Senkaku Islands” (Kawaguchi 2010). It was only after the UN report of 1968 which said there might be large economic resources to be harvested that China officially protested Japan's claims to sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands. The historical argument that the Senkaku Islands were “terra nullius”
when discovered, combined with the argument of China's inaction in regards to officially protesting claims up until 1971 leads Japanese officials to often officially claim that there is no dispute over the sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands – implying that they are simply a part of Japan (McCormack 2011; Wada 2010).
2.3 China's Argument
The Chinese argument contends that, far from being “terra nullius” when the Japanese supposedly discovered and incorporated the islands, China had controlled the Diaoyu Islands as part of its sovereign territory for centuries (Lee 2011; McCormack 2011; Pan 2007:77). Chinese historical records “detailed the discovery and geographical feature of the Diaoyu Islands as early as in 1372,” and “incorporated” the islands for
“maritime defense” in 1556 (Pan 2007:77). Lee (2011) contends that the first mention of the Diaoyu Islands is recorded “in a 15th-century document now held at the Bodleian Library in Oxford.” Also according to Lee (2011), by the 17th century Chinese documents and sources had already “clearly named the maritime boundary between the
Senkaku/Diaoyu islands and the Ryukyus as the Heishuigou (‘Black Water Trench’), an area of high turbulence which we now know marks the edge of the continental shelf.”
Also important is that in 1893, “just two years before Japan's claim” (Pan 2007:77), Empress Dowager Cixi “awarded three of the disputed islands” to a pharmaceutical businessman who was harvesting herbs which the Chinese then used to “manufacture pills to prevent high blood pressure and relieve pain because of dampness” (Lohmeyer
2008:63-64).
While Kawaguchi and other pro-Japanese commentators and historians assert that Japan undertook a thorough investigation and came to the conclusion that there was no evidence of China or Taiwan's claim to ownership of the islands, there are documents which suggest that at least a few people in Japan were concerned that China might have already claimed the islands (Lohmeyer 2008:58-64). In a letter to the National Home Secretary from the Magistrate of Okinawa in 1885, Nishimura Sutezo expressed his concerns over Japan potentially incorporating the islands by stating:
“...due to their differences in terms of topography from the earlier reported islands Daitojima, the possibility must not be ignored that they are the same islands recorded as Diaoyutai, Huangweiyu, and Chiweiyu in the Zhongshan Records. If they truly are the same islands, then it is obviously the case that the details of the islands have already been well-known to Qing envoy ships dispatched to crown the former Zhongshan King and already given fixed (Chinese) names and used as navigation aids en route to the Ryukyu Islands.”
(Lohmeyer 2008:60-61).
Those who support the Chinese side also claim that China was in no position to protest the Japanese acquisition of the Diaoyu Islands because this happened at a time when China was losing the 1895 war (McCormack 2011). Thus it “was understandable for the Chinese side to acquiesce to any unfair and irrational requests of imperial Japan”
(Pan 2007:78). China was also forced to cede the whole of Taiwan to Japan at the time (2007:78). It is implicitly argued however that China did protest Japan's ownership when it protested against not being invited to the San Francisco Peace conference in 1952, which resolved a number of sovereignty issues in the aftermath of WWII and “provided the basis for their [Senkaku Islands] inclusion in Japan’s territories” (Pan 2007:79; Wada 2010).
Pro-Chinese supporters also point out that even some Japanese historians have
concluded that the Diaoyu Islands should be under Chinese sovereignty (Pan 2007:78).
One such historian, Inoue Kiyoshi, after reviewing the history of the dispute is quoted to have said, “Even though the [Senkaku] islands were not wrested from China under a treaty, they were grabbed from it by stealth, without treaty or negotiations, taking
advantage of victory in war” (McCormack 2011). Thus, according to the Chinese author Pan (second name) Kiyoshi reasoned that, “these islands are territory of the People’s Republic of China,” and the “People’s Republic of China alone has title to them” (Pan 2007:78).
Finally, while pro-Japanese analysts are quick to note that China only began protesting after the UN announced that there could be potentially lucrative deposits of oil and other resources in the East China Sea, the Chinese side begs to differ. Pan (2007:79) asserts that it was not the prospect of finding oil in the East China Sea that brought Chinese protests to the forefront, but the fact that the US handed over the administration of the Senkaku Islands to Japan, which was in China’s view an illegal act. Moreover, in the Reversion Act of 1972, the US avoided stating that the Senkaku Islands were Japanese territory, leaving the issue in an ambiguous limbo (Lee 2011).
2.4 A Concluding Precursor to the Crisis
In 1978, four years after they had normalized their relations, Japan and the
People’s Republic of China signed a Peace Treaty, but in the process both parties agreed to ignore the Senkakus topic for the time being – a gesture due to each side’s wish to have beneficial, peaceful relations (Wada 2010). The issue was somewhat successfully
'shelved' until the 1990s, where after arguments, nationalistic protests, and spats over attempts at erecting sovereignty markers on the islands by both sides have periodically if not consistently erupted (Pan 2007:75). The tensions between the two sides have been charged by nationalistic sentiments and references to the historical legacies of WWII.
Japanese policy makers have become more anxious over China's military modernization
(“Asia-Pacific” 2011:348). In April 2010, China's navy dispatched a large flotilla to waters near the islands of Okinawa. In May 2010, the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) protested “China’s pursuit of a Japanese research ship operating near the median line of the two countries’ disputed overlapping Exclusive Economic Zones” (“Asia-Pacific”
2011:348). It is also important to point out that Sino-Japanese relations had already been significantly strained by quarrels concerning the history of Japanese atrocities in WWII and visits by Japan’s prime minister to the Yasukuni Shrine (Wiegand 2011:95). Under these circumstances and with the historical memories and perspectives above, I will now turn to the events of September 2010.
2.5 The September 2010 Events
The events which eventually triggered an escalating crisis began on September 7th when the Japanese Coast Guard reportedly had multiple collisions with a Chinese fishing trawler (Yoshida 2010). The event occurred 6 to 8 nm north of one of the Senkaku islands known in Japanese as Kubajima in the East China Sea, thus well inside the territorial sea of the Senkakus (Tanaka 2010; Yoshida 2010). According to The Japan Times Online, the coast guard ship warned the fishing trawler that it should leave, and, after the two vessels were involved in a small collision of sorts, three coast guard boats had to chase the fleeing trawler before another collision occurred and the trawler captain, the trawler itself, and his crew were taken into Japanese custody (Yoshida 2010). The captain, Zhan Qixiong (The New York Times 2010), was arrested under suspicion of obstructing official coast guard duties and was taken to Ishigaki Island of the Ryukyu Islands for questioning (Ito 2010). His fishing trawler and fourteen member crew, who were not arrested, were moved to the Ishigaki port to wait for their captain and the
ensuing investigation (Ito 2010). As other reports began to surface, there were more than a few suggestions and suspicions that one of the Japanese Coast Guard boats was
'rammed' intentionally by the fishing trawler, (Tanaka 2010; Wada 2010).
Foreign ministry official Akitaka Saiki quickly stated the common stance the Japanese government would repeat for much of the crisis – that the Japanese government would handle the situation according to its own domestic laws (Asia Pacific News 2010).
Foreign Minister Okada Katsuda also claimed early on that because the incident occurred in Japanese territorial waters it would be handled “strictly by domestic law” (Wada 2010).
This is a particularly important point because it supports the official Japanese position that
“a territorial problem does not exist,” echoed by Chief Cabinet Secretary Sengoku on September 8th (Asia Pacific News 2010; McCormack 2011). Seiji Maehara, the then
“Minister of Land, Infrastructure and Transport” was responsible for the arrest of Mr.
Zhan as the coast guard was under his command at that time (Cheng 2011:254; Wada 2010). 2
Despite the Japanese Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshito Sengoku calling on China to remain calm and also claiming that no dispute existed, both the Chinese government and large groups of nationalist Chinese citizens quickly began to show their disapproval and condemnation of the arrest through protests (Asia Pacific News 2010). The government in Beijing quickly “urged” the Japanese ambassador to halt what it called an 'illegal interception' of a Chinese fishing boat (BBC News 2010). On Thursday September 9th, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Jiang Yu began diplomatically warning and threatening Japan to release the fishermen by stating that Sino-Japanese relations could be hurt if the situation were not resolved (Buckley & Graham-Harrison 2010). She went on to also say that, “The Diaoyu islands are China's inseparable territory and the Japanese side applying domestic law to Chinese fishing boats operating in this area is absurd, illegal and invalid, and China will never accept that” (2010). She also stated that a “law enforcement ship” had been sent to protect Chinese fishermen in the area (Zeenews 2010).
Expert on Sino-Japanese relations at Renmin University, Huang Dahui, prophetically observed that, “The Chinese public will feel it’s wrong to make any
2 Maehara would become an important figure later as he was appointed foreign minister in Naoto Kan's new cabinet after the September 14 DPJ leadership election.
concessions, as will Japanese opinion, and that could make this a difficult point of friction'” (Buckley & Graham-Harrison 2010). Indeed, by the end of the crisis, the nationalistic pressure from both sides' domestic publics made concessions difficult.
Already by September 9th considerable sections of the general public began passionately voicing their disapproval in various media outlets, and Chinese protests started outside the Japanese embassy with fifty Chinese citizens protesting Japan's arrest of Chinese citizens (Masami 2010; Zeenews 2010). On that same Thursday amidst the worsening tensions Japan released a white paper on defense which stated Japan's growing concerns over China’s rapid military modernization and lack of transparency (Takenaka 2010).
Cheng (2011: 254) points out that the arrest was perceived by the Chinese
government “as an attempt to create a judicial case to force China to accept the legality of Japan’s occupation of the islands.” In other words, in the Chinese perception, allowing the fishermen to be prosecuted in Japan “would tacitly signal Chinese acceptance that the disputed islands are, in fact, Japanese” (Wiegand 2011:106). On Friday, September 10th the Chinese Foreign Minister demanded that the Japanese government release Mr. Zhan, his crew, and the trawler and “emphasized” China's “firm and steadfast” determination to stand by its sovereignty claims (The New York Times 2010b). By this time the Chinese government had already summoned the Japanese ambassador three times to implore Japan to release the fishermen and warned of a “serious impact” on Sino-Japanese relations if the situation could not be resolved quickly (BBC 2010b; The New York Times 2010b).
Yet, hours after the demands were made, a Japanese court ruled that Mr. Zhan would be held in custody to decide whether or not to officially press charges over the fishing incident (BBC 2010b).
China's Foreign Ministry reacted on Saturday, September 11th by calling off talks that were scheduled with the Japanese government intended to “settle their dispute over East China Sea gas fields” (Buckley 2010). China also once again issued diplomatic threats by stating, “If Japan continues in this reckless fashion, it will taste its own bitter fruit” (Buckley 2010). Japan's only reaction was that a source in the prime minister's
office expressed regret at China's 'unilateral' action to cancel the gas meeting and a
Foreign Ministry official said Tokyo “cannot accept (China's move) to link the incident to the gas field issue'" (The Japan Times 2010b).
Also on September 11th a Chinese Oceanic Administration vessel requested that a Japanese Coast Guard (JCG) vessel “stop” its operations 151 nm northwest of Naha Island (Buckley 2010b). The coast guard vessel informed the Chinese vessel of its
“operations”, overlooked its request for it to stop its “activities”, and continued in the area for another two hours (The Japan Times 2010c). The Chinese Foreign Ministry accused the JCG of trying to recreate the events of September 7th to “furnish evidence” (Buckley 2010b). Japan in return lodged its “protest” to China regarding the incident through
“diplomatic channels” (The Japan Times 2010c).
The escalation continued on Sunday, September 12th, when Chinese State
Councilor Dai Bingguo, who advises China's leaders on foreign policy and outranks the foreign minister within the Communist Party, got involved and demanded the release of the crew and the captain (BBC News 2010c). He for the fourth time summoned the Japanese ambassador, and the BBC reported that it was very rare for someone as senior as the state councilor to intercede (BBC News 2010c). The continued escalation of events began to stir more nationalist sentiments in China, as a group of Chinese citizens, who were planning to take a boat from the coastal city of Xiamen to the disputed islands, had to be stopped by the Chinese government (Buckley 2010b).
Japanese ambassador Uichiro Niwa reaffirmed to China that Japan would handle the situation according to its domestic laws, and urged China to act 'calmly and carefully' so as not to affect overall bilateral relations, citing the principle of maintaining 'strategic relations of mutual benefit' (Buckley 2010b; The Japan Times 2010d). On the same day the Japanese Coast Guard took the boat and its crew out to sea to recreate the
circumstances of the collision to help investigators (BBC News 2010c). Also on the same day, Japan's chief cabinet secretary, Yoshito Sengoku, criticized the Chinese government for linking the arrests with the issue of jointly developing resources in the East China Sea
(The New York Times 2010d).
On Monday, September 13th, Japan released the crew of the fishing boat, along with sending it back to China but held on to the captain, Mr. Zhan (Blanchard & Kubota 2010). According to Japanese law, Japanese prosecutors could order the police to hold Mr. Zhan for up to 20 more days while deciding whether or not to press charges
(Blanchard & Kubota 2010). The Chinese Foreign Ministry, however, stated that releasing the crew but not the captain “was not good enough,” and urged Japan to
“immediately release him” (Blanchard & Kubota 2010).
The DPJ government had been rather quiet and unresponsive presumably because the DPJ was focusing on its party leadership election on September 14th which would determine the choice of a new prime minister since the DPJ was in power (Fujioka & Sieg 2010). Prime Minister Naoto Kan won the election and retained his post as the most powerful man in Japan. The leadership race, which had been under way since before the September 7th incident dealt heavily with economics. Japan was struggling with a divided parliament, a strong yen, weak economy, and a huge public debt already twice the size of the $5 trillion economy (Sieg 2010), by far the highest in the world. Kan's platform, along with stimulating the economy and battling the yen deflation with hints of a potential currency intervention, also dealt with the issue of strengthening Japan-US ties and the location of the US military bases in Okinawa (Nishikawa 2010). Dealing with the rising tensions with China did not, however, seem to be evident in the topics surrounding the leadership race. When asked what “message” he wanted to give regarding the building dispute, Kan only said, “'It is necessary for both Japan and China to make an effort to securely advance our strategic, mutually beneficial ties'” (Blanchard & Kubota 2010).
On the same day Prime Minister Kan maintained his position in Japan's driver’s seat, Chinese protests once again intensified. On Tuesday, September 14th, the Chinese government canceled an official visit to Japan by the vice chair of the Standing
Committee of the National People's Congress, Li Jianguo, who had been invited to the Japanese lower house of parliament (BBC News 2010d). Japan's Chief Cabinet Secretary
