Support for a ban?
An analysis of the Norwegian Labour Party's nuclear policy from 2009 to 2019
Maja Fjellvær Thompson
Masteroppgave i Statsvitenskap ved det Samfunnsvitenskapelige fakultet
Institutt for Statsvitenskap
THE UNIVERSITY OF OSLO
Autumn 2021
Word count: 25 142
Support for a ban?
An analysis of the Norwegian Labour Party's nuclear policy from 2009 to 2019
Maja Fjellvær Thompson
Supervisor: Kjølv Egeland
© Maja Fjellvær Thompson 2021
Support for a ban? An analysis of the Norwegian Labour Party's nuclear policy from 2009 to 2019
Maja Fjellvær Thompson http://www.duo.uio.no
Trykk: Reprosentralen, Universitetet i Oslo
Abstract
The political character of nuclear disarmament has often been overlooked in international relations theory. Another omission of nuclear disarmament theory is the
perspective of non-nuclear weapon states. Between 2005 and 2013, the Norwegian red-green coalition in government, with the Labour Party at its centre, promoted a humanitarian-based approach to nuclear disarmament policy. However, when the TPNW was adopted in 2017 realising the goal of a ban, the Labour Party argued that Norway should abstain from signing the treaty. This indicates an interesting puzzle. Therefore, the research question and aim of this thesis is: how has the Norwegian Labour Party’s support for a ban changed?
To answer this research question, the thesis will applies three theoretical approaches to the political dynamics of the Labour Party’s policy; a neorealist framework based on alliance security dilemma theory; and two competing theories within the constructivism framework; the persuasion model and the rhetorical coercion model. These three theoretical approaches are applied to the empirical case of the Labour Party’s nuclear policy from 2009 to 2019, culminating in the Labour Party Congress of 2019. The case study applies a method of process tracing to the Labour Party’s policy from 2009 to 2019, and includes nine
interviews with Labour Party politicians to contextualise the empirical tracing. The resulting narrative highlights how the Labour Party’s support for a ban has changed.
The thesis concludes that Labour Party’s support for a ban changed with the development of the TPNW. The Labour Party argued that the TPNW conflicted with Norway’s NATO commitments, as the treaty called for unilateral disarmament. The thesis concludes that the Labour Party were concerned about the international security environment.
However, the empirical evidence shows that the limits of rhetorical commonplaces, made supporting the TPNW difficult. The opposition of the TPNW was a result of the leveraging of NATO norms, which left Labour politicians without socially sustainable arguments to defend the ban treaty.
Acknowledgements
I want to thank my supervisor Kjølv Egeland, for invaluable help and guidance both before and throughout the process of writing this thesis. It has been a long time coming!
Thank you for providing the inspiration and guidance I needed to finish this process. The immaculate detail with which you give feedback is priceless.
They say it takes a village. And it turns out that I have a pretty big one. Thank you for unending support, love and encouragement. And for all the jokes on my behalf, this process would not be the same without them.
Finally, I need to express my unending gratitude to Marthe Helene Sandli and Line Fjellvær, my mum. I would not have finished this without your guidance, confidence and endless optimism. And to Martin Brygmann, this process has only further solicited that I am the luckiest girl in the world. Thank you for being my partner through it all.
Table of Content
1 Introduction ... 1
1.1 The background for the research design ... 2
1.2 Case selection ... 3
1.3 Structure of the thesis... 3
2 Theoretical Framework ... 5
2.1 Introduction ... 5
2.2 Realism in international relations theory ... 5
2.2.3 The alliance security dilemma ... 6
2.3 Summary ... 9
2.3.3 Constructivism in international relations theory ... 9
2.3.4 The Persuasion Model ... 11
2.3.5 The rhetorical coercion model ... 12
2.4 Summary ... 14
3 Method ... 15
3.1 Introduction ... 15
3.2 Research design ... 15
3.2.1 Case study ... 15
3.2.2 Within case methods ... 17
3.3 Data generation and analysis ... 17
3.3.1 Semi-structured interviews ... 18
3.3.2 Interview data analysis ... 19
3.4 Conclusion ... 19
4 Results and analysis ... 20
4.1 Introduction ... 20
4.2 Historical context ... 20
4.3 2009-2013: “Creating conditions” for a world without nuclear weapons ... 21
4.3.1 Summary of key features for the period 2009 to 2013 ... 25
4.4 2013-2016: Opposition following the humanitarian initiative ... 26
4.4.1 Summary of key features for the period 2013 to 2016 ... 35
4.5 2017-2019: Opposition to the adoption of the TPNW ... 36
4.5.1 Summary of key features for the period 2017 to 2019 ... 41
4.6 Party Congress 2019: An issue of unilateral disarmament ... 42
4.7 Findings from interviews complementing the 2019 Party Conference ... 46
4.6.1 Relationship to NATO ... 47
4.6.2 Independent disarmament policy in NATO ... 47
4.6.3 The Party Leadership and prominent figures ... 48
4.6.4 The Youth Party ... 49
4.6.5 The disarmament norm... 50
4.6.6 County delegations and their resolutions ... 50
4.6.7 The government’s policy ... 51
5 Discussion... 52
5.1 Introduction ... 52
5.2 A realist explanation ... 52
5.3 A persuasive explanation ... 54
5.4 A coercive explanation ... 57
5.5 Summary ... 60
6 Conclusion ... 62
6.1 Introduction ... 62
6.2 Concluding remarks ... 62
6.3 Contributions and future research ... 63
References ... 64
Appendix ... 73
Appendix I: Interview guide ... 74
Appendix II: Consent form ... 75
Appendix III: NSD Approval ... 78
1 Introduction
“Contemporary global nuclear politics face serious strains and major challenges”
(Rublee & Cohen, 2018, p. 317). Nuclear weapon states (NWS), like the US and Russia, continue to modernise their arsenal, Kashmir remains a nuclear impasse, and arms control efforts are at a standstill (Mecklin, 2021). Amidst this nuclear entropy, the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) entered into force on the 22 of January 2021.
Following years of frustration over the absence of disarmament efforts, the treaty banning nuclear weapons was adopted by 122 non-nuclear-weapon states in 2017.
The political character of nuclear disarmament has often been overlooked in
international relations theory (Burford, 2016). Within the realm of disarmament theory, the perspectives and roles of non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) with regards to nuclear
disarmament are also under-studied and under-theorised (Sagan, 2009). Seeing as the NNWS share responsibility in effectuating disarmament, it is useful to understand the dynamics of their nuclear policies.
Norway is a NNWS that has been proactive in international disarmament policy.
Between 2005 and 2013, the Norwegian red-green coalition in government, with the Labour Party at its centre, promoted a humanitarian-based approach to nuclear disarmament policy.
Labour Party politician and foreign minister of the red-green coalition, Jonas Gahr Støre, made several statements supporting a ban on nuclear weapons throughout the period. At the Labour Party Congress of 2013, the Labour Party “work actively towards a real, total ban on nuclear weapons” (Arbeiderpartiet, 2013). However, when the TPNW was adopted in 2017 realising the goal of a ban, the Labour Party argued that Norway should abstain from signing the treaty (NRK Radio, 2017). In fact, at the Labour Party Congress of 2019, the
international statement concluded that it was “politically impossible” for NATO countries such as Norway to join the TPNW. This indicates an interesting puzzle. Therefore, the research question of this thesis is: how has the Norwegian Labour Party’s support for a ban changed?
To answer this research question, the thesis will apply three theoretical approaches to the political dynamics of the Labour Party’s policy; a neorealist framework based on alliance theory; and two competing theories within the constructivism framework; the persuasion model and the rhetorical coercion model. These three theoretical approaches will be applied to the empirical case of the Labour Party’s nuclear policy from 2009 to 2019, culminating in the Labour Party Congress of 2019. The case study will apply a method of process tracing to
the Labour Party’s policy from 2009 to 2019, and nine interviews with Labour Party politicians to contextualise the empirical tracing. The resulting narrative will highlight how the Labour Party’s support for a ban has changed.
This chapter will look into a few things. First, a brief account of the humanitarian initiative and the adoption of the TPNW will be given. This will briefly regard the choice of theoretical framework and the thesis’ research design. Second, an explanation as to why the thesis chose the case of the Labour Party’s nuclear policy will be given. Finally, the chapter will conclude with the outline and the structure of the thesis.
1.1 The background for the research design
In a seminal article, Egeland (2019) retraces Norway’s nuclear disarmament
diplomacy from 2005 - 2013. Egeland (2019, p. 1) concludes that “the goal of negotiating a new legal instrument outlawing nuclear weapons provided a key aim for the Norwegian centre-left coalition government from 2010 onwards. [..] The humanitarian initiative,
including the pursuit of a new legal instrument, was products of a carefully deliberated policy of strategic social construction”. The thesis has based the timeframe of the thesis, 2009 to 2019, on Egeland's findings. It is useful to the research, to include the beginning of the humanitarian initiative, the basis for the TPNW. The reason why the timeframe is limited to 2019, is that 2019 is the first Labour Party Congress held after the adoption of the TPNW.
The Party Congress of 2019 is therefore a basis from which to understand the Labour Party’s attitude towards the TPNW.
The theoretical framework of this thesis is based on a critical divide in international relations (IR) theory. Traditionally, nuclear governance has been approached through the lens of realist theories grounded in materialist ontologies. When the Cold War ended – largely as a result of arms control and disarmament diplomacy and to the surprise of many realists – other approaches gained greater prominence in the literature. In particular, some argued for the importance of ideas and norms to nuclear policy change. In the late 1990s, constructivist research about how identity and ideas shape state behaviour became popular (Rublee &
Cohen, 2018). This divide presents a substantial basis for a theoretical discussion.
1.2 Case selection
The political character of nuclear disarmament has often been overlooked in international relations theory and the roles of NNWS within this framework are also under- studied. The humanitarian initiative, leading to the adoption of the TPNW, presents an interesting case in international nuclear and disarmament policy. Some argue that the TPNW is a natural tool towards achieving total disarmament. Others see the TPNW as an emotional response to international relations, arguing that it is not realistic (Egeland, 2019). When studying the basis for the adoption of the TPNW, Norway’s impact on the humanitarian initiative is apparent (Egeland, 2019). Egeland (2019) looks at the formation of the TPNW, and argues that laying the basis for the humanitarian initiative was a strategic goal of the Norwegian red-green coalition, with the Labour Party at its centre, from 2005 to 2013.
However, with the adoption of the TPNW, the Labour Party argued that Norway should abstain from signing the TPNW. This presented as an interesting development in the NNWS perspective. This opened up a possibility to bridge a gap in the research; what could explain the Norwegian policy evolution after 2013? With these theoretical perspectives in mind, this thesis chose the Labour Party’s nuclear policy. The thesis incorporates their policy from 2009 to 2013, to account for the causal mechanisms that these years in government may have had.
1.3 Structure of the thesis
This chapter presents the premise and research question of this thesis. The research question is as follows: how has the Norwegian Labour Party’s support for a ban changed? In addition, this chapter has explained the background the thesis bases its research design on.
This chapter has also explained the thesis’ choice of case study.
In chapter two, the theoretical framework for the thesis is developed. The theoretical framework is based on the divide between realist and constructivist international relations theory. The basic assumptions of these theories will illuminate different aspects of the empirical evidence. The theoretical models that this thesis applies are; the alliance security dilemma, the persuasion model; and the rhetorical coercion model.
In chapter three, the research design of the thesis is discussed. The advantages and disadvantages of the single case study is discussed. By applying process tracing to the case study, the thesis can trace causal pathways in the empirical evidence. The thesis is based on primary sources of political documents, and secondary sources like news articles and
scholarly text. In addition, the thesis applies nine semi-structured interviews, to highlight causal mechanisms in the empirical evidence.
Chapter four is the conduction of the case study. The Labour Party’s policy from 2009 to 2019 is empirical retraced. Culminating in the Labour Party Congress of 2019, narrative summaries of the semi-structured interviews are presented in this chapter. Chapter five applies the theoretical framework to the empirical findings to highlight causal mechanisms presented in the evidence. Chapter six presents concluding remarks and the main
contributions of this thesis.
2 Theoretical Framework
2.1 Introduction
Several theories could help analyse changes in nuclear policy. Traditionally, nuclear
governance has been approached through the lens of realist theories grounded in materialist ontologies. When the Cold War ended – largely as a result of arms control and disarmament diplomacy and to the surprise of many realists – other approaches gained greater prominence in the literature. In particular, some argued for the importance of ideas and norms to nuclear policy change. In the late 1990s, constructivist research about how identity and ideas shape state behaviour became popular (Rublee & Cohen, 2018). This thesis will apply three different approaches to understand how the Norwegian Labour Party’s support for a ban has changed. In the first part of the chapter, a realist lens applying the dynamics of the alliance security dilemma will be explained. The second part of the chapter will present the
constructivist angle. Two differing constructivist theories of normative development will be presented.
2.2 Realism in international relations theory
“Liberal institutionalists were right to start their investigations with structural realism. Until and unless a transformation occurs, it remains the basic theory of international politics.”
(Waltz, 2000, p. 41)
As Waltz’ asserts, neorealist thought, i.e. structural realism, is predominant in nuclear weapons IR theory. Neorealism is based on three core assumptions common for materialist thought giving priority to material determinants (Legro & Moravcsik, 1999). The first posits that states are rational, unitary actors in an anarchical world. A defining feature of the international system is that there is no global power. States are sovereign, acting rationally through pursuing policy which best augments self-interest, survival and power. This leads to the second assumption, posing that this international system provokes competition between states over the resources available. State interests are innately conflictual. The third
assumption postulates that relative amount of resources a state possesses will affect how a state behaves. This means that a state’s proficiency in coercing or compelling another state to do something, in a world without a global power, is essential.
Neorealism emphasises that the international structure of states is the blueprint to understand states’ behaviour (Waltz, 2000; Glaser, 2013). The anarchical system produces insecurity and forces states to compete with each other. And what does this imply for the development of national policy? Through this lens, national policy is “a function of system- level structure; they are largely predetermined, static and uniform across all states” (Burford, 2016, p. 20). National policy is derived from the basic assumptions of materialistic state interests.
There are two main paths that neorealist accounts of nuclear weapons scholarship take (Burford, 2016). First, scholars focus on states that have nuclear weapons or consider
acquiring nuclear weapons. Second, the realist track sees nuclear proliferation as an unavoidable or innate feature of a states’ security. According to some scholars, this has created a “nuclear straightjacket”, meaning that states has to choose between obtaining nuclear weapons or becoming a member of a nuclear alliance. For weak states, joining an alliance with a nuclear power engages the concept of extended nuclear deterrence (Sagan, 1997). Extended deterrence means that a nuclear ally provides nuclear retaliation for a non- nuclear weapon ally (Sagan, 1997). This applies to this thesis, as the Labour Party is a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). The thesis will now turn to the question of what determines choice in military alliance.
2.2.3 The alliance security dilemma
According to Glen Snyder (1984, 1997), there are three main ways for states to become more powerful: through armament, expanding their territory and joining together in alliances. (NATO) pledges to protect its members through political and military tools (NATO, 2020). According to Egeland (2020) NATOs nuclear policy has two key features.
Firstly, NATOs nuclear weapon states have decreased their amount of nuclear weapons considerably since the end of the Cold War. This has diminished the importance of nuclear weapons in the alliance (Egeland, 2020). Secondly, “the alliance’s collective endorsement of nuclear deterrence as a shared, symbolic practice has grown more explicit” (Egeland, 2020).
Over time, NATO has increased its focus on the possibility of nuclear use, going from not mentioning nuclear weapons in its first strategic concepts, to the first inclusion of NATO as a
“nuclear alliance” in their strategic concept of 2010.
This thesis will focus on what Snyder (1984) names “the alliance security dilemma”.
Once engaged in an alliance, the alliance dilemma develops into a question of cooperation and defection. A state must choose between being a committed party to the alliance and supporting an ally in the face of a conflict with an adversary (cooperation), or having a weak commitment to the alliance and not supporting an ally in a conflict (defection). Choosing between cooperation or defection, can have good or bad consequences for a state. In the alliance security dilemma, the negative consequences of a states’ actions in the alliance are
“abandonment” and “entrapment”. The positive consequences would be a decrease in the risk of abandonment and entrapment. Abandonment could mean changing alliances or leaving the alliance, not following up on outspoken commitments or not supporting an ally in expected situations. Snyder (1984, p. 467) defines entrapment as “being dragged into a conflict over an ally’s interests that one does not share, or shares only partially”. This means that a state would choose to ensure the survival of the alliance over the harm supporting an ally could cause. These are the consequences a could face in the alliance dilemma. The thesis will now explain what could affect which choices a state makes in an alliance. According to Snyder (1984), the fear of being abandoned creates a greater chance of policy compliance between states.
States have to achieve security themselves, but this can cause other states to question the motives as to why states are advancing their military capabilities (Baylis, 2014). This evolving insecurity between states is called the security dilemma. Wheeler and Booth (1992, p. 30) argue that the security dilemma occurs “when the military preparations of one state create an unresolvable uncertainty in the mind of another as to whether those preparations are for “defensive” purposes only (to enhance its security in an uncertain world) or whether they are for offensive purposes (to change the status quo to its advantage)”. It is hard for states to trust others in this scenario and the intentions of one states’ military preparations’ is
questioned by the other. One can never be completely sure that another state won’t attack.
States will often seek to achieve the same level of military capabilities as their adversaries.
As Snyder argues (1984, p. 492), “The nuclear issue presents the alliance dilemma to the Europeans in its severest form, and it is the issue about which Europe is most ambivalent or divided”. To most of the European NNWS, nuclear abandonment means that they would lose the nuclear deterrent or that its credibility was threatened. Nuclear entrapment would mean that the European NNWS were caught in a nuclear war, particularly if it happened on European soil. Norway risks losing the support of the US or weakening the relationship to Russia.
Snyder (1984; 1997) suggest three variables that determine choice in the alliance dilemma - relative dependence, explicitness of alliance commitment and the degree of strategic interest. What Snyder argues is the most important determinant is the “relative dependence” on support from the alliance, meaning how much allies are dependent on support from alliance and the relative understanding of each other's need for support. This factors in because if a state is more dependent on its allies, the perceived risk of abandonment will outweigh the cost of entrapment. Snyder reduces alliance depency to the military
capabilities, measured by these three components: (1) A states’ need for military assistance;
(2) to what degree the ally or alliance covers this need; (3) the states’ alternative means to cover the need. Military needs are in this thesis viewed in terms of nuclear deterrence. The need for military assistance is understood through Norway’s military capabilities relative to those of an adversary. The degree to which allies cover this need, is determined by the allies military capabilities. Alternative means to cover the need for military assistance through other means, such as finding other allies to cover their needs.
A second determinant of alliance loyalty is the “explicitness” of the alliance’s collective defence rules. Explicitness refers to the clarity or transparency of the security agreement. When security commitments are clearly defined, allies will be less worried about abandonment. However, the flip side of explicit rules is an increased likelihood of
entrapment. After all, an uncertain agreement will increase the ability of allies to define their responsibilities in a way that suit themselves. Commitment can be hard to define, as there varying degrees of commitment. Snyder defines (1997) it as a set of standards that prompts a state to act in a certain way. The principle security agreement in NATO is the North Atlantic Treaty from 1949. This is the legal document that stipulates alliance obligations. In addition to this, there are political alliance commitments to be considered through NATOs strategic concepts and other arenas like the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) (Nystuen et al., 2018).
The third determinant of alliance loyalty looks at state interests. This refers to the extent to which loyalty coincides with strategic interests in a certain topic. For example, a state’s willingness to support its allies against an adversary will be heightened if the state has a prior interest in obstructing the adversary from increasing its power and influence. As Snyder (1984) points out, this differs from dependency because it concerns hindering the opponent’s rise in power because of a prior interest rather than supporting an ally, although he points out that the two are closely related. Relative strategic interests will also increase a state’s fear of being abandoned. When strategic interests are unevenly distributed, the states
guarantee (Snyder, 1984). In a conflict with an opponent, the extent of shared interests between allies will affect the risk of abandonment and entrapment. If the interests between allies highly coincide and are regarded with the same value, it decreases the risk of
entrapment and abandonment. However, if the opposite is true, both allies might worry that the other’s interests could have consequences or that the other ally will choose not to be supportive in a conflict.
2.3 Summary
This section has presented the realist notion of the alliance security model. The following will present the theoretical background for the constructivist theory.
2.3.3 Constructivism in international relations theory
With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, new approaches to nuclear politics developed. Non-materialist accounts emphasised ideas, norms and beliefs in shaping global nuclear policy (Barnett, 2014). Scott Sagan’s article (1997) “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?” highlighted normative reasons as to why states obtain nuclear weapons, capturing the attention of materialist researchers (Rublee & Cohen, 2018).
Since then, social constructivism and ideational research has grown to become a set of influential approaches in IR theory and nuclear diplomacy (Agius & Collins, 2013).
Constructivism asserts that international relations are socially constructed and shaped by ideational factors (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998; Wendt, 1992). “Constructivism is about human consciousness and its role in international life” (Ruggie, 1998, p. 856). The world is social, and ideas, norms, beliefs, values, culture impact the meanings agents give the world (Agius & Collins, 2013).
A basic position of constructivism is that agents and structures are mutually established (Wendt, 1987). Agents shape the world, and the world shapes agents.
Constructivists do not deny the realist notion of global anarchy, but see it in a very different way. When Wendt (1992) says “anarchy is what states make of it”, it means exactly this.
Anarchy is an idea that states believe in, therefore states make the international system anarchic. Anarchy is a social construct, not an innate feature of the international system.
There are two main positions of constructivist thought that have explanatory power.
Firstly, identities matter. National identities say something about how agents behave and which policy preferences they choose to pursue (Burford, 2016). Secondly, norms shape
political preferences and provide a social guide to the international structure (Finnemore &
Sikkink, 1998). For example, Nina Tannenwald (1999) has looked at the “nuclear taboo”, arguing that the norm delegitimizes nuclear weapons and their function in war. The international, systemic taboo stops states from acquiring and using nuclear weapons (Tannenwald, 1999). This thesis will focus on the role norms play in shaping choices in global nuclear governance.
Contemporary research has focused on the role of norms and the “logic of
appropriateness” in international politics (Petrova, 2016). Rublee and Cohen (2018) argue that using norms as a framework to understand global nuclear governance can be a useful analytical tool. According to the authors, the literature that does exist on norms and global nuclear politics demonstrates the potential the framework has“standards of appropriate behaviour among actors of a given identity”. Norms are not simply rules that stipulate what is
“correct behaviour”, but also have moral and social exigencies (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998).
These models of behaviour can prompt actors to consider not only the material consequences of their actions, but also whether the action in question is right or “natural”.
Central to the norms framework is that consequences and cost-utility is not the only base on which agents act, but rather they are prompted by what is referred to as the “logic of
appropriateness” (March & Olsen, 2011). March and Olsen (2011, p. 479) define the logic of appropriateness as “actors following internalized prescriptions of what is socially defined as normal, true, right, or good, without, or in spite of, calculation of consequences and expected utility”. People confine themselves to guidelines and to principles of behaviour that are appropriate to follow in certain situations. The logic of appropriateness provides context to the expectations towards policy makers, and their behaviour in global nuclear governance (Rublee & Cohen, 2018).
Finnemore and Sikkink’s (1998) article became a foundation for scholars to study and assess the norm framework (Burford, 2016). From the research that followed, the field has become a broad spectrum of approaches to how norms occur, develop and underlie policy and policy change (Rublee & Cohen, 2018). The constructivist framework provides two competing theories of normative development that are relevant to this thesis: persuasion and rhetorical coercion. While subscribers to the “persuasion model” assume that policy change is usually a product of changes to actors’ authentically held convictions, subscribers to the
“rhetorical coercion model” assume that actors “often adopt new positions not because they are sincerely convinced of their merits, but because they lack ‘socially sustainable’
counterarguments” (Petrova 2016, p. 387). The following will explain the two models, beginning with the persuasion model.
2.3.4 The Persuasion Model
Finnemore and Sikkink (1998, p. 914) define persuasion as “changing the utility functions of other players to reflect some new normative commitment”. In this definition, actors change their course of action because they wish to follow what is appropriate
behaviour, as they are convinced by the other party’s “better reasoning”. Checkel (2001, p.
562) defines persuasion as “changing attitudes about cause and affect in the absence of overt coercion”. Through persuasion, an actor's policy preferences are changed. The goal is not manipulation, but convincing the other party with the better argument. As quoted in Rublee, the persuadee would say “I now see that argument X is better than Y”. This leads to a change in beliefs. The norms that are put forth by a party, are internalised by other party and guides its subsequent behaviour. According to Petrova (2016), a situation involving authentic
persuasion calls for two parties to view each other as equals. Both parties must be open to the other party having the superior argument which in turn causes a change in opinion.
The key feature of this type of Hambermasion oriented argument, based on the better argument, is the internalisation of the norm and argument (Habermas, 1996). The policy change is a result of a genuine change in beliefs and preferences. As Burford (2016, p. 45) describes it “When a person is persuaded, they pursue norm-consistent behaviour out of a genuine belief in the appropriateness of that behaviour”. When an agent is successful in persuasion, they are able to “frame” their message in a way that message resonates with the other party (Payne, 2001).
It would be naïve to claim that it is always truth or the superior argument which is motivation of actors in international relations. States and policy makers are of course prompted by strategy and strategic interests. In this case, the result of a bargaining or negotiation may be a compromise rather than actors finding the superior solution (Petrova, 2016). This means that instead of being convinced by finding the superior argument, parties simply compromise. This demonstrates the complex levels of persuasion; has there truly been a change in commitment and opinions, or has one simply agreed to compromise?
This logic of the better argument is the causal mechanism that leads to persuasion.
Scholars have criticised subscribers of the persuasion model, seeing as it is difficult to identify situations where there has been a genuine change in interests (Krebs & Jackson, 2007; Payne, 2001). Therefore, this thesis has identified some theoretical conditions that can
be conducive to persuasion. This well help the methodological legitimacy of the theoretical analysis. Lupia and McCubbins (1998) strip the success of persuasion model down to two simple conditions. Firstly, that the persuadee, the party being persuaded, regards the persuader as someone informed or “knowledgeable” on the subject. Secondly, that the
persuader are dependable in that their aims are truthful. The more the persuadee believes this, the more the persuader is likely to be successful. This thesis will therefore incorporate these two conditions in the theoretical discussion of the data.
As explained earlier, a feature of the persuasion model is that the parties must be open to be being persuaded. In addition to this, the thesis will look at points of change in policy in the empirical data. Dietelhoff (2009) defines these “turning points” as periods where changes in policy can be found. The turning points can signify persuasion. However, if alternative explanations for the change exist, and that are possible to identify, persuasion is less likely.
Alternative explanations that are relevant to this thesis are features like power and public pressure. Another condition conducive to identifying persuasion, is the motivation or
justification that parties use to explain their viewpoint (Checkel, 2001). If there is a change in the justification for why parties follow a certain policy, this can indicate that persuasion has occurred. If the justification is consistent in different situations, it further affirms that persuasion has occurred (Checkel, 2001).
To conclude, persuasion is a change in an agent's genuine convictions. The conviction of the better argument, leads to a change in policy. The change happens because the
persuadee wishes to follow the correct behaviour, and internalises this behaviour. Some conditions that can be conducive to identifying genuine persuasion are; being open to the change; turning points that have few or no alternative explanations; changes in justification;
the persuader as a knowledgeable actor and the truthfulness of their aims. The thesis will now look at the persuasion model.
2.3.5 The rhetorical coercion model
“Both coercion and persuasion may lead the target to assent, but the coerced target merely complies, while the persuaded target consents”.
Krebs & Jackson, 2007, p. 59
The “rhetorical coercion model” assumes that actors “often adopt new positions not because they are sincerely convinced of their merits, but because they lack ‘socially
sustainable’ counterarguments” (Petrova, 2016, p. 387).
Several authors have written about rhetorical coercion, but this thesis will mainly focus on Krebs and Jackson’s (2007) model. In a case of rhetorical coercion, an actor presents an argument to an opponent in front of some sort of audience in a rhetorical environment. The argument has a “frame”, meaning a set of key features, and “implications” that accompany the frame (Krebs & Jackson, 2007, p. 43). For example, the Labour Party argues that nuclear weapons have unacceptable humanitarian consequences (the frame), and supports
implementing a ban on nuclear weapons (the implications). The audience is important in the model, because the arguments must be judged by an audience (Krebs & Jackson, 2007). The actor's argument must move the rhetorical grounds on which the opponent bases its
arguments, and as such reducing the opponent's ability to respond or dispute their argument.
The coercion is successful when the opponent is unable to dispute the actor's argument in view of the audience.
As Krebs and Jackson (2007, p. 42) explain “skilful rhetorical manoeuvring can underpin a successful political campaign - not by persuading one’s opponents of the rectitude of one’s stance, but by denying them the rhetorical materials out of which to craft a socially sustainable rebuttal”. This means that the opponent is left without the opportunity to oppose the argument, in fear of losing prestige. The rhetorical coercion is successful when a party is
“backed into a corner”, unable to oppose the argument (Krebs & Jackson, 2007, p. 36).
Eminently, this model does not require normative “internalization”. One follows policy to avoid social costs or gain social prestige. Rhetorical coercion can occur because of two important factors. First, politicians must - in most cases where they wish to promote a certain policy - legitimize their policy. Second, rhetorical environments share “rhetorical
commonplaces”. These commonplaces allow or restrict actors’ rhetorical options. Actors cannot use a completely foreign argument in a debate, as this would, as Krebs and Jackson (2007, p. 44) argue, “fall, almost literally, on deaf ears”. The rhetorical frame of the discussion is locally confined, within which the actors must perform.
The rhetorical coercion model is methodologically useful because it does not need to identify the truthful aims of an actor, but rather look at “what actors say, in what contexts, and to what audiences” (Krebs & Jackson, 2007). What Krebs and Jackson mean by this is that researchers can examine what policy-makers say and do, as it is difficult to “observe”
what people believe. There are two key features that can give rhetorical coercion explanatory significance (Krebs & Jackson, 2007). Firstly, looking at whether an audience is a significant part of the rhetorical environment is important. An actor's rhetorical abilities are based on being able to, or threaten to, make the audience support their argument. The actor's ability to do this, will determine if the opponent is able to oppose the argument in front of the audience or not. Secondly, whether the rhetorical commonplaces are permitting or restrictive can affect the explanatory value of rhetorical coercion (Krebs & Jackson, 2007). As referred to earlier, the rhetorical commonplaces depict the limits to which the actors can base their argument. If these limits are restricted, it is easier to accomplish rhetorical coercion, as it is harder for an opponent to dispute the actor's argument. If the limits are permitting, the opponent can dispute the actor’s argument using a range of arguments.
One note on the Krebs and Jackson’s model, is the assumption that the arguments promoted by the actor and the opponent are judged by the same audience. The reality of political arenas are often much more complicated, where actors may be speaking to different audiences or trying to decide which audience is appropriate (Krebs & Jackson, 2007). This will be incorporated in the discussion of the theoretical framework in chapter four.
2.4 Summary
This chapter has laid the theoretical grounds for this thesis. The thesis applies three theoretical approaches to the political dynamics of the Labour Party’s policy; a neorealist framework based on alliance security dilemma theory; and two competing theories within the constructivism framework; the persuasion model and the rhetorical coercion model.
3 Method
3.1 Introduction
Throughout the entire process of this research project, conscious choices of which
methods and data to pursue have been made. This chapter will explain the path from research question to analysis.
The research question of this thesis asks how the Norwegian Labour Party’s support for a ban treaty changed. To answer this question the main structure of this thesis is built on two main components: a case study method and using process tracing within this case study.
The aim is to carry out a detailed, theoretically-based analysis of a case study of the Norwegian Labour Party’s policy, and identify mechanisms that explain how their foreign policy has changed. This chapter outlines the main research design of this thesis.
3.2 Research design
To understand why/how the Labour Party’s policy changed, this thesis is based on a qualitative research design, combining a case study with process tracing. The following section will discuss methodical issues with choosing a single case study.
3.2.1 Case study
Case studies are a common methodological choice in social sciences, although it has been criticised for its disadvantages. Gerring (2007, p. 6) writes:
"A work that focuses its attention on a single example of a broader phenomenon is apt to be described as a “mere” case study, and is often identified with loosely framed and
nongeneralizable theories, biased case selection, informal and undisciplined research designs, weak empirical leverage (too many variables and too few cases), subjective conclusions, nonreplicability, and causal determinism."
The issues that Gerring (2007) advances should be addressed. The case of the Labour Party’s nuclear policy is part of a broader phenomenon; the conception of political parties or a state's foreign policy. The case represents an insight into how NNWS address the political dimensions of nuclear policy. Followingly, the theory applied in this thesis has a structured and systematic framework, derived from the realist and constructive theories of international
relations theory. A biased case selection should not be an issue in this thesis, considering the detailed explanation in the introductory chapter. The thesis aims to be formal and meticulous in its research design. The fourth issue Gerring (2007) proposes is weak empirical leverage as a consequence of too many variables and too few cases. Although this is a single case study, it relies on several observations which should prevent weak empirical leverage. Using meticulous process tracing should also prevent this issue. There are issues with non- replicability and generalisation in this thesis, and the thesis does acknowledge that it is not possible to generalise observations from a single case study.
There are positive attributes to choosing a single case study, despite the
disadvantages. As the thesis’ main goal is to explain the Labour Party’s policy, the single case study is useful. Some of the positive attributes are; increased internal validity, targeting causal mechanisms rather than causal effects, and the increased ability to tackle equifinality (Gerring, 2007)
Choosing a single case study allows this thesis to increase the level of internal
validity. According to Bryman (2016, p. 41), “Internal validity is concerned with the question of whether a conclusion that incorporates a causal relationship between two or more variables holds water”. This means that internal validity entails a strong basis for claiming that X causes Y (Bryman, 2016). Therefore, the single case study is fitting for this thesis’ research question.
Another benefit to choosing a case study for this thesis is the ability to target causal mechanisms that led to the Labour Party’s changed support for a ban treaty. (Gerring, 2007).
Case studies allow researchers to look closer at “causal mechanisms” or “causal pathways”, rather than causal effects (Gerring, 2007). If this thesis was to look at whether variables have an effect on the Labour Party’s policy, or to which extent, then a cross-case study would be the superior choice. The case study format works well for this thesis purpose’.
Finally, the increased ability to tackle equifinality can be an advantage of a case study.
Equifinality refers to several causal pathways which can lead to the same outcome (Gerring, 2007). When studying nuclear weapons policy, this is an advantage because of the
multifaceted nature of the policy. When done adequately, the single case study makes it easier to distinguish between complex causal connections, allowing the researcher to identify the causal impact of each variable (Gerring, 2007). In this thesis, process tracing is deemed particularly useful for highlighting several causal mechanisms and alternative explanations.
The following will explain the within case method of this thesis.
3.2.2 Within case methods
A key choice of this thesis research design is the use of process tracing. Process tracing can be defined as “the analysis of evidence on processes, sequences, and conjunctures of events within a case for the purposes of either developing or testing hypotheses about causal mechanisms that might causally explain the case” (Bennet & Checkel, 2016, p. 7).
Process tracing entails a comprehensive investigation of sources that determine relations between actors, systems, structures and events, often related to a “temporal sequence” of happenings (Collier, 2011). Its comprehensive nature will strengthen the internal validity of the causal arguments made in this thesis (Bennett & Checkel, 2016). Process tracing will be applied to data for the purpose of identifying causal mechanisms that might explain the Labour Party’s change in policy.
Process tracing is convenient when analysing complex cases that consist of several components interacting at the same time (Gerring, 2007). As Burford writes (2016), this is clear in politics, but especially in nuclear global governance. Nuclear policy is extremely complex, with several, varying forces interacting at the same time. Another advantage of process tracing for the purpose of this thesis is the way the method aims to connect
theoretical inference to causal arguments (Bennet & Checkel, 2016). This means that process tracing will be helpful in pinpointing the theoretical claims made in this thesis to assess how the Labour Party’s policy changed (Bennet & Checkel, 2016).
3.3 Data generation and analysis
This thesis relies on two primary ways of collecting data. In the empirical tracing of this case, the thesis relies on a variety of sources, both primary and secondary sources. This is complemented by interviewing Labour Party politicians who were delegates at the Labour Party’s Party Congress in 2019 and who have been witness to the change in the Labour Party’s change in policy.
In the empirical tracing of this case, the thesis relies on a variety of sources. The primary sources are mainly policy documents and minutes. First, all of the Labour Party’s
international statements from their Party Congress from 2009 to 2019 are applied. In addition to this, all relevant Parliamentary questions and debates regarding nuclear policy between 2009 and 2019 are included in the data. Secondary sources from scholarly articles are used in the cases that there is a lack in data or a internal document that are deemed relevant.
In addition to this, news articles that highlight Labour politicians argument’s and views, where primary sources do not, are included. The media picture also illustrates the public opinions and discussions, relevant to the research question. The empirical evidence will also help support arguments made by respondents in the semi-structured interviews.
3.3.1 Semi-structured interviews
To obtain data portraying the causal mechanisms at play affected this thesis has conducted 9 semi-structured interviews. An interview is defined plainly as “a conversation with a structure and a purpose” (Brinkmann & Kvale, 2015, p. 5). To give insight into the Labour Party’s policy, and the events that unfolded at the Labour Party Conference in 2019, the respondents were chosen from the pool of Labour politicians. The grouping of
respondents were chosen from the 300 delegates to the Party Congress. To ensure a variation of perspectives, the respondents were chosen at random. Each name of delegates of the Party Congress were assigned a number, and the numbers were chosen at random. The delegates were subsequently contacted. This method should be possible to replicate, as the delegates were drawn randomly.
Each respondent was asked to sign a letter of consent, which detailed the purpose and composition of the conversation (see appendix II). The conversations began with the explanation of the main topic of the research and how the interviews would proceed.
Interview guides were used for each respondent, to help structure the interview (see appendix I). The question centred around the delegates’ knowledge of the Labour Party’s nuclear policy and Norway’s relationship to NATO. A main topic was the delegates’ experience at the Labour Party’s Party Congress in 2019 and their view of the debate and the result of the debate. The interview guide was used to structure the conversation. The semi-structure nature of the conversation opened up for follow-up questions on any relevant points made. The conversations were recorded and subsequently transcribed. This was to avoid taking notes during the conversations, maintaining a natural flow. As this is an ongoing debate, the respondents could wish to influence the debate, meaning they are not completely reliable.
Any statements will be triangulated with other the other empirical evidence, to try and counteract this issue.
3.3.2 Interview data analysis
To ensure that the data in the semi-structured interviews is properly portrayed, this thesis sets a strategy for the qualitative data analysis. The first step in the data analysis is to read through the interview transcripts, while writing down general observations and ideas about topics and connection (Maxwell, 2013). The next is organising the data into organisational categories (Maxwell, 2013). These categories give the researcher a way of sorting the data. However, the categories do not highlight the essence of the data.
Subsequently, this thesis follows a connecting strategy. Maxwell (2013, p. 112) defines a connecting strategy as attempting to “understand the data in context, using various methods to identify the relationships among the different elements of the text”.
The benefit of the connecting strategy is that it links the statements and happenings that occur within a set of circumstances (Maxwell, 2013). This linkage creates a logical account of the whole picture. This connection strategy helps to avoid the limitations of categorising.
This thesis will employ the connection strategy through assembling short, narrative
summaries of the data (Maxwell, 2013). The narrative summaries ensure the preservation of the dynamics of the contents of the data, as the data is put into a narrative context.
Nonetheless, they are still summaries as they demonstrate the analytical condensation of the data (Maxwell, 2013). The connecting strategy will be used to analyse the interview data in the following chapter, and the short, narrative summaries of the interviews will be presented in the last part of the chapter.
3.4 Conclusion
This chapter has discussed the research design of the thesis. The advantages and
disadvantages of the single case study has been presented. By applying process tracing to the case study, the thesis can trace causal pathways in the empirical evidence. The thesis is based on primary sources of political documents, and secondary sources like news articles and scholarly text. In addition, the thesis applies nine semi-structured interviews, to highlight causal mechanisms in the empirical evidence. These will be presented as short, narrative summaries, on the basis of a connecting strategy.
4 Results and analysis
4.1 Introduction
This chapter will follow the empirical analysis of the case study and will be structured in the following way. First, a brief historic context to the Labour Party’s policy will be given.
The following analysis is divided into two parts.
The first part is a periodical empirical analysis split of the Labour Party’s policy from 2009 to 2019 split in to three periods; 2009-2013; 2013-2016; and 2017-2019. A summary of the analysis will be given after each period. The second part of the chapter, concerns the Labour Party Congress of 2019. First, a detailed analysis of the events that unfolded at the Party Congress is presented. The second part of this section, is the presentation of the narrative summaries of the semi-structured interviews are presented in this chapter.
4.2 Historical context
The Labour Party has historically been sceptical towards nuclear weapons. At the Labour Party National Conference in 1957, the party stated that nuclear weapons “shall not be stationed on Norwegian territory” (Arbeiderpartiet, 1958, p. 269) and later the same year Norway rejected the US’ offer to place nuclear weapons in Norway. As Egeland notes (2019) Einar Gerhardsen - leader of the Labour Party and prime minister for several periods between 1945 and 1965 (Regjeringen, 2013) - caused a commotion at NATO headquarters when he suggested that the US and Soviet enter into disarmament negotiations (Melissen, 1994). This discerning attitude towards nuclear weapons has stayed with the Labour Party, and is a foundation of the Labour Party’s nuclear disarmament policy from 2005 to 2013 (Egeland, 2019).
Entering into 2009, the Labour Party added a successful contribution to the adoption of the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) to their back pocket. Through highlighting the difference between cluster munitions and nuclear weapons at the Conference on
Disarmament (CD), Espen Barth Eide (2009) emphasised that “there are parallels and lessons to be learned from the humanitarian approach, which could benefit our work on disarmament and non-proliferation”. This enthusiasm toward disarmament was accentuated by efforts like those of US President Barack Obama, who won the Nobel Peace Prize in 2009 for his “work for a world without nuclear weapons” (Nobelkomitéen, 2009). Obama’s (the White House, 2009) iteration of “America’s commitment to seek the peace and security of a world without
nuclear weapons” in Prague 2009, raised nuclear disarmament to the centre of global nuclear policy (Warren, 2011).
It is in this context that the Labour Party began their second term as a part of the red- green coalition in government from 2009-2013.
4.3 2009-2013: “Creating conditions” for a world without nuclear weapons
An important feature of the period from 2009 to 2013 is that the Labour Party was in government. Their nuclear and disarmament policy preferences in government consisted mainly of humanitarian language, the dangers nuclear weapons pose and the importance of an active disarmament policy. Advocating for a ban on nuclear weapons, their time in
government was spent proactively working to “create conditions” for a world without nuclear weapons. There was a need for a new spark in the international disarmament regime.
Focusing on the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons was a way to achieve this.
The Labour Party supported a reduced importance of nuclear weapons in security policy.
The Labour Party made several comments regarding a ban on nuclear weapons during their time in government from 2009 to 2013. The Soria Moria 2 Declaration is the political platform on which the government coalition cooperation was based. Through the declaration, the coalition promised to work actively towards diminishing nuclear weapons’ role in
international politics as it “is a serious threat to international peace and safety around the world” (Soria Moria 2, 2009). The coalition would do this through working towards a
“successful” NPT Review Conference in 2010. The platform then claimed the following: “If this is not successful, we shall consider presenting our own Convention on Nuclear
Weapons” (Soria Moria 2, 2009, p. 7). The declaration makes no mention of what such a
“convention” would entail. The emphasis on “our own Convention”, indicates that this convention would differ from the “Model Nuclear Weapons Convention”, previously
advanced by Malaysia, Costa Rica and several NGOs (Egeland, 2019). As Egeland (2019, p.
472) points out “the word “convention” could be interpreted as any legally binding agreement, including a limited agreement such as a ban on the use, or even first use, of nuclear weapon”.
Another relevant point from the political platform is their view of their relationship with NATO. The coalition aimed to be active during the process of adopting a new strategic concept in NATO:
We shall take initiative to NATO discussions as to how the Alliance can help realise its objective for a world without nuclear weapons, through binding agreements that include all countries around the world. The question of the role of nuclear weapons within the Alliance will be an important part of this work. (Soria Moria 2, 2009, p. 6)
This quote demonstrates that the coalition sought to work towards a diminished role of nuclear weapons in the alliance, and point to the role of nuclear weapons within the alliance. They would do this through “binding agreements”. They do not specify a ban, but agreements reducing the number of nuclear weapons would be important.
In February 2010, Støre held a speech at a Norwegian Atlantic Committee conference called “Disarmament – reframing the challenge”. Støre said that 2010 would be an important year for disarmament, emphasising the upcoming NPT conference. In the speech, Støre said that the NPT should set the course towards full elimination of nuclear weapons. Key players, being the nuclear weapon states, were vital to this process. (Støre, 2010)
“Our aim is to forge a new and more lasting international understanding of how to set a lasting course towards ridding ourselves of the nuclear menace” (Støre, 2010). Støre
emphasised the need for a “new” approach to disarmament, building on the lessons learned from humanitarian disarmament processes related to landmines and cluster munitions and from work on diminishing the role of nuclear weapons in strategic security policy. Nuclear disarmament, Støre said, would enhance nuclear security, not diminish it. “Reframe the challenge of disarmament”, seemed to be the foreign minister’s main message. “We must strive to avoid the perception that acquiring nuclear weapons is a sign of international strength and prestige” (Støre, 2010). Støre said that NATO was not an alliance for
disarmament, it was first and foremost a security alliance, deterrence being one of its tools.
However, more weapons would not mean more security, in Støre’s words. An important focus for the Norwegian government would be to discuss and reconsider NATOs policy on nuclear deterrence. The discussion would be had with Norway’s NATO allies, to set the course towards nuclear disarmament.
Some maintain that consensus is vital when it comes to nuclear disarmament. I am not fully convinced. I believe it would be possible to develop norms against the use of nuclear weapons, and even to outlaw them, without a consensus decision, and that such norms will eventually be applied globally. We cannot leave it to the nuclear weapon states alone to decide when it is time for them to do away with these weapons. Their destructive power would affect us all if put to use – and their threat continue to affect us all – therefore they are
Støre expressed that he would be positive to promote a ban against nuclear weapons even if the nuclear weapons state did not agree with this (Egeland, 2019; Støre, 2010).
Støre’s sentiment was reiterated by Norwegian diplomat Hilde Skorpen (2010) at the CD in 2010.
At the NPT Review Conference in May 2010, Norway took on a particularly active role. Having always been a strong disarmament advocate at the NPT, Norway’s determined participation was still noteworthy being a NATO country, as Müller remarks “never before had Norwegian demands and proposals been so radical and pronounced” (Müller, 2011a, p.
229). The RevCon did adopt a final document, Norway’s main victory being the humanitarian language in the document highlighting the “catastrophic humanitarian consequences” nuclear weapons would have (Egeland, 2019). An internal memo from the Norwegian MFA concerning the result of the Revcon reiterated the Labour Party’s ban language:
“Norway’s overarching goal is a world without nuclear weapons. A legally binding instrument codifying a ban on nuclear weapons is a natural anchoring of this goal. [. . .]
Norway has solid experience in working to establish the conditions to abolish inhumane weapons ” (Utenriksdepartementet, 2010, as cited in Egeland, 2019, p. 474)
As the Soria Moria 2 declaration points to, NATO adopted a new strategic concept in 2010. Norway was an active participant in the deliberations in Lisbon (Müller, 2011b). The Norwegian delegation, together with a few other nuclear-sceptic states, was successful in making sure the strategic concept included a pledge to “create the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons” (Egeland, 2019). However, the strategic concept also, notably for the first time, noted that NATO is a “nuclear alliance” (Strategic concept). This was first used by Hillary Clinton when criticising Germany for wanting the remaining nuclear weapons removed from German soil (Egeland, 2019; Landler, 2010). Clinton’s remarks froze the aspirations of the pro-disarmament states at the Lisbon meeting (Müller, 2011b). Ever since, the label of a “nuclear alliance” has been used frequently as a tool to defend NATOs
maintenance of nuclear weapons (Egeland, 2020).
The campaign for a ban was repeated at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva by the permanent representative of Norway, ambassador Bente Angell-Hansen (2011): “We believe it could be possible to develop norms against the use of nuclear weapons, and even to outlaw them, without a consensus decision, and that such norms eventually will be applied globally”. The humanitarian consequences should be put at the centre of policy “We need to place the humanitarian imperative at the center of our efforts”.
In 2012, the Socialist Left Party asked Jonas Gahr Støre a parliamentary question concerning how he intended to work for a ban and how long he reckoned this would take (Stortinget, sak 3, 17/4, 2012). Støre emphasised the recent work done towards disarmament, through the NPT and in NATO. Prominently, Støre imagined that a world without nuclear weapons would most likely necessitate a new convention. Pushing the humanitarian
narrative, Støre emphasised that working for the adoption of such a convention would need a strong political foundation and a broad commitment. Highlighting the work to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in NATO strategy, Støre underlined the need for cooperation and
decisive steps towards a ban. The Labour Party’s wish for a ban – to be realised through a new convention – would need the political foundation to make it practically possible. This, Støre imagined, would not necessarily have to take too long. To conclude, Støre emphasised the role of NATO and that reducing the role of nuclear weapons in the alliance would be vital to achieve total disarmament. Working toward a “real, total ban”, the Labour Party needed to create a strong political foundation. Notably, Støre connected the humanitarian initiative to the work toward a ban in his speech (Egeland, 2019).
As the Norwegian Labour Party still boasts (NRK Radio, 2017) they played an important part in the foundation for what would come to be known as the “humanitarian initiative” for nuclear disarmament. The humanitarian initiative would eventually lay the basis for the 2017 adoption of the TPNW.
The peak of this humanitarian push by the red-green coalition was the “Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons” hosted by the Norwegian government in March 2013. The conference provided an occasion to talk about the humanitarian
consequences of the use of nuclear weapons (Eide, 2013). The foreign minister’s opening statement – Espen Barth Eide succeeded Jonas Gahr Støre as foreign minister in September 2012 – focused on three key issues: the instantaneous impact of a nuclear bomb on human life, the economic and environmental consequences of a detonation, and the (lacking) ability of states and NGOs to manage the effects of, and protect the civilian population from, a nuclear detonation. The conference was aimed at changing the discourse around nuclear weapons. As 128 countries, the ICRC and several NGOs attended, the conference was deemed a success by the Norwegian MFA (Egeland, 2017). However, the NWS did not attend, which did not seem to worry Labour Party politicians (Egeland, 2017). The
conference is seen by many as the beginning of the process that culminated with the adoption of the TPNW (Wright, 2013; Dear, 2013 as cited in Egeland, 2017).
At their Party Congress in April 2013, the Labour party declared in their international statement that they would “work actively towards a real, total ban on nuclear weapons”
(Arbeiderpartiet, 2013). Adding to this, gradual disarmament including all the nuclear weapon states would be vital to this work. There was no definition of what such a ban would entail, but the phrasing implied that a “ban” would have to be codified by a new legal
instrument – it was a legal move conceptually distinct from the material act of eliminating nuclear arsenals – and that it was different from, and perhaps less encompassing than, the
“Model Nuclear Weapons Convention” championed by Malaysia and Costa Rica, a
comprehensive disarmament plan that would require the buy-in of all nuclear-armed states’ to go into effect (Egeland, 2019).
The humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons was again the focus at the NPT PrepCom in 2013. Norway, together with 74 countries, signed a declaration focused on the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons. The declaration spoke of the unacceptable consequences of nuclear weapons. Notably, the declaration also mentioned the elimination of nuclear weapons. “The only way to guarantee that nuclear weapons will never be used again is through their total elimination”. Although the declaration made no explicit call for a ban, it held that it was in the interest of mankind that nuclear weapons were never used again,
“under any circumstances.” This was seen by many as a rejection of the doctrine of nuclear deterrence – which depends on the credible threat of using nuclear arms under certain circumstances – and again signalled states’ urgency towards the disarmament of nuclear weapons. The Norwegian government, including the Labour Party, again signalled that nuclear weapons should be abolished.
4.3.1 Summary of key features for the period 2009 to 2013
Labour politicians gave attention to a ban against nuclear weapons throughout their time in government. To achieve Norway’s goal of a world without nuclear weapons, a ban was needed, it was a natural tool to reach this goal. Humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons should be the political foundation for a future ban (Gitmark, 2011). Outlawing nuclear weapons would not necessarily need a consensus decision internationally. Consensus in NATO was not something that Støre viewed as vital, and that one could “even outlaw”
nuclear weapons without a “consensus decision”. Referring to recent nuclear actions in North Korea, the international statement at the Party Conference in 2013 pledged to work actively towards a ban.
