The Department of International Environment and Development Studies, Noragric, is the international gateway for the Norwegian University of Life Sciences (UMB). Eight departments, associated research institutions and the Norwegian College of Veterinary Medicine in Oslo. Established in 1986, Noragric’s contribution to international
development lies in the interface between research, education (Bachelor, Master and PhD programmes) and assignments.
The Noragric Master theses are the final theses submitted by students in order to fulfil the requirements under the Noragric Master programme “Management of Natural Resources and Sustainable Agriculture” (MNRSA), “Development Studies” and other Master programmes.
The findings in this thesis do not necessarily reflect the views of Noragric. Extracts from this publication may only be reproduced after prior consultation with the author and on condition that the source is indicated. For rights of reproduction or translation contact Noragric.
©Marte Qvenild, June 2005 [email protected] Noragric
Department of International Environment and Development Studies P.O. Box 5003
N-1432 Ås Norway
Tel.: +47 64 96 52 00 Fax: +47 64 96 52 01
Internet: http://www.umb.no/noragric
Declaration
I hereby declare the originality of my work, and the acknowledgement of all materials other than my own. This work has not been submitted to any other university than UMB for any type of academic degree.
Marte Qvenild, June 2005
Acknowledgment
I want to thank my supervisor, Prof. Cary Fowler, for all his help, advices, and time in the process of planning and writing this thesis. I am grateful that he has been so enthusiastic, inspiring, and that he has been available both in work hours and in his spare time. He gave me the opportunity to join the Feasibility Study Committee on their excursion to Svalbard, which was a very valuable and interesting experience for me both personally and academically.
I wish to thank Prof. Tom Burns for co-supervising my thesis and giving me
incredibly valuable input during the process of writing. Since I use concepts from the Actor-System Dynamics theory, described by Prof. Burn and colleagues, I feel privileged to get his comments.
Sissel Nordheim, one of my fellow students at Noragric, deserves many thanks for her helpful advice and moral support throughout the whole writing period. In addition, I want to thank another fellow student, Siri Veland, for her advices and comments.
The Librarians at Noragric, Liv Ellingsen and Ingeborg Brandtzæg, deserve a big bouquet of roses for their efficient help and advices with searching for and accessing relevant literature.
Finally, I wish to thank all my informants: Gunnvor Berge, Jan Borring, Jose Esquinas-Alcazar, Geoff Hawtin, Ola Heide, Olav Kjørven, Jostein Leiro, Pat Mooney, Inge Nordang, Kåre Ringlund, Stein Rosenberg, Henry Shands, Jane Toll, Dick van Sloten, and Trevor Williams.
1 Introduction 8
1.1 The objectives of the study 9 1.2 Limitations to the study10 1.3 Structure of the Thesis 11
2 Methodology 12
2.1 Theoretical approach 12 2.2 Concepts12
2.2.1 Social actors 13
2.2.2 Institutionalized relationships 14
2.2.3 Intended/ unintended consequences 15 2.2.4 Arenas 15
2.3 Gaining an understanding of the field 16 2.4 Data 18
2.4.1 The first Svalbard proposal 18 2.4.2 The second Svalbard proposal 19 2.5 Techniques 19
2.6 The role of my supervisor 21
3 Background 21
3.1 Interdependence on genetic resources 22 3.2 Genetic erosion 24
3.3 International conservation efforts 25 3.4 Genebank conservation 26
3.4.1 Genetic erosion within genebanks 26 3.5 Legal aspects of plant genetic resources27 3.6 Conflicts over plant genetic resources 28 3.7 The FAO Commission 29
4 Analysis: Comparing the processes of the two Svalbard proposals 32
4.1 The first Svalbard proposal 33 4.1.1 The “permafrost idea” 33
4.1.2 The mentality of the actors involved in the first Svalbard proposal 35 4.1.3 How the actors promoted the first Svalbard proposal 37
International issues of dispute 38
How the actors addressed the political context 39 Legal matters 42
Funding 44
Interaction between arenas 47 Technology 48
4.1.4 Institutional changes 49
4.1.5 Interaction between new and established arenas 51
4.2 The second Svalbard proposal: relevant actors and arenas 53 4.2.1 Strategies to promote the second Svalbard proposal 57
4.2.2 The reception of the second Svalbard proposal 61
5 Reflections 66
6 Conclusion 73
7 References 75
Signpost on a road just outside Longyearbyen, Svalbard warning that Polar bears can be found all over the island. Photo: Henry Shands
Artic landscape at Svalbard. Photo: Henry Shands
List of abbreviations
ADS Actor System Dynamics
CBD Convention on Biological Diversity
CGIAR The Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research CGRFA The Commission on Genetic Resources for Food and
Agriculture
FAO The Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations GRPC Genetic Resource Policy Committee of CGIAR
IARC International Agricultural Research Center under the CGIAR umbrella
IBPGR International Board for Plant Genetic Resources
ICWG Inter Center Working Group on Genetic Resources of CGIAR IPGRI International Plant Genetic Resources Institute
IPRs Intellectual Property Rights
NGB Nordic Gene Bank
NGO Non-Governmental Organization
Noragric Center for International Environment and Development Studies
NSTS Norwegian Seed Testing Station
TAC Technical Advisory Committee of CGIAR
TRIPs Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights
SGRP System Wide Genetic Resource Program of the CGIAR
SIS Svalbard International Seedbank
SNSK Store Norske Spitsbergen Kullkompani, a Norwegian government-
owned coal mining company
UPOV Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants
WEIC World Energy Investment Center
WTO World Trade Organization
Abstract:
Ideas exist within a social context. The chances of realizing an idea depend on the resources available to the human actors and the constraints they face. A proposal in one historical and political context might be viewed very differently than that same proposal made in a different context, a fact that illustrates the importance of
understanding the context and the associated dynamics of decision-making. In 1989 the Norwegian Government offered to construct an international depository for agricultural seeds in the Arctic Archipelago, Svalbard, as a security back up for regular genebanks. The proposal failed due to of lack of funds, as well as political concerns because no legal regime was in place to secure the depositors’ access and control to the material. The actors promoting the proposal were not fully trusted and were suspected by some to have hidden motives. In addition, there were scientific concerns, as the proposed facility did not meet international Genebank Standards of -18 C. Simultaneously the issue of Intellectual Property Rights heated the debates concerning control of and access to plant genetic resources at the FAO arena. The Convention on Biological Diversity gave the “country of origin” the right to grant access to material, and created a restrictive atmosphere with focus on bilateral agreements, which the Svalbard facility did not offer.
In 2004, Norway again proposed to construct an international seed depository at Svalbard. This time the realization of the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture had established the legal status of the most important plant genetic material, and resolved the issues of access and control to these materials. The proposed Svalbard facility would meet international
Genebank Standards. Actors realize the need of such a security storage in case of future disasters and acts of terrorism after 9/11. In addition, the Norwegian
delegates have established a reputation as an ‘honest broker’ at the FAO arena. As a result of these factors, the international plant genetic resource community (at the FAO Commission in November 2004) welcomed the second Svalbard proposal, a very different outcome for this proposal than the first.
1 Introduction
“Greater than the tread of mighty armies is an idea whose time has come”(Victor Hugo)
Agricultural seeds can sleep for hundred years if they are dried and stored at the right temperature. In case of future disasters the Norwegian Government proposed in 1989, to construct a security storage for the most important agricultural seeds of the world in the permafrost of the Arctic Archipelago, Svalbard. The proposal was never realized primarily due to political and technical constraints but fifteen years later a very similar proposal has again come up. This time there is great enthusiasm among actors involved in the field of plant genetic resources for the establishment of such an
international facility at Svalbard. This thesis will address why the two proposals have had such different outcomes.
Plant breeders all over the world need access to a wide variety of plant genetic resources to be able to breed new agricultural varieties that can keep up with evolving diseases and pest attacks in farmers fields. Most food plants depend on human
cultivation to exist, and as agriculture increasingly has become industrialized and specialized all over the world, many traditional plant varieties are disappearing. When diversity within traditional species decreases, valuable plant genetic material is lost for ever. A way to cope with this genetic erosion has been to create genebanks where a wide variety of seeds are stored for future plant breeding and conservation. The standards in many genebanks are often not ideal however, and genetic erosion within genebanks represents a further threat to the global food security (IPGRI 2003:2). In addition, political turmoil has resulted in destruction of genebanks and loss of valuable genetic resources in areas such as Afghanistan and Iraq (Pearce 2005). The Norwegian idea of storing backup samples of the seeds in Svalbard was therefore intended as a way to secure this valuable material in a better way.
In order to answer the question of why the two proposals of creating an international genebank at Svalbard got so different receptions, it is necessary to consider the actors involved in this story and the contexts they operate in. Actors control different
resources and have different abilities to get their will in an institutional context. The actors working within the international plant genetic resource community have to relate to various rules and institutions, which may constrain them. The formal and informal rules may also create opportunities for actors to push proposals they are in favor of on the agenda. Applying the Actor System Dynamics (ASD) theory
described by Prof. Tom Burns and colleagues (1985, 1987, 1988 and 1994) the success – and failure- of initiatives such as the Svalbard proposals will depend on the contexts they are raised in. Institutions and rules change and the actors themselves change, and in this way the contexts now and in 1989 are different.
The dynamics between actors and the context they operate in, as described by Burns and colleagues, has helped me to understand how the same proposal could come up twice in the international plant genetic resource community, why the idea first failed, and then was welcomed fifteen years later.
1.1 The objectives of the study
I will address the following research questions: Why was the initiative to create an international genebank at Svalbard turned down in the beginning of the 1990s? Why is an almost identical proposal welcomed in the international plant genetic resource community fifteen years later?
Other related questions are:
• In what arenas were the two proposals discussed?
• Why did the first proposal fail?
• How did the second proposal get on the agenda of the FAO Commission on Plant Genetic Resources at the Tenth Regular Session in November 2004?
• What actors were and are involved in promoting the Svalbard proposals?
• How have the actors worked to ‘push’ the Svalbard initiatives?
1.2 Limitations to the study
This is a comparative study that will go more in depth in the case of the first Svalbard proposal, as the second proposal is at the time of writing still in the middle of a decision-making process at the Norwegian Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Agriculture and Food, and Environment. The study will focus on the dynamics and processes in the FAO arena, and the bureaucratic arenas of IBPGR/IPGRI and FAO. Because of time constraints, I have not been able to access sufficient data to investigate or describe processes in the Norwegian Ministries. In addition it would have been difficult to access internal documents on the ongoing debates concerning Svalbard, as information on issues that are still in the decision making process normally is
classified as confidential. I have applied for access to archives related to the first Svalbard proposal at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but have been unsuccessful to date in obtaining documents.
To look at power relations and hierarchical structures within the FAO and
IBPGR/IPGRI arenas would also have been very interesting, but again due to time constraints, such a task has been too complex to investigate and address in this study.
Limitation in the application of the ASD theory
The ASD theory is very complex as it includes dynamics relating to societal changes over time. It is of course impossible in this short study to describe the whole context around the two Svalbard proposals. I have therefore tried to pick out key concepts of the theory that have proved helpful to identify key processes and changes.
1.3 Structure of the Thesis
In the Methodology chapter I outline the theoretical concepts from the ASD theory that I am applying in my study to explain the dynamics between the relevant actors and the contexts in which they operate. Further I outline the methods I have used and how I have gained an understanding of my field of study.
Second, the Background chapter focuses on the management of plant genetic resources for food and agriculture, how crops were first domesticated, conservation efforts and the threats of genetic erosion, legal regimes controlling the access and ownership to these materials, and countries’ dependence on non-indigenous crops.
Finally, in the Analysis and Reflection chapters I outline a comparative study of the two Svalbard proposals, the actors involved and the different contexts the proposals were raised in. By focusing on the dynamics between the relevant actors and the context they operate in, I will explain why the first proposal was a “premature” idea, while the second proposal is an idea whose time has been made to come.
Figure 1. Maps of the Archipelago Svalbard
2 Methodology
2.1 Theoretical approach
The process when an idea is brought up and further realized into a project is not
“mechanical” like laws of nature that control the turning of the seasons. Ideas are thought, formulated, promoted or turned down by human actors. We say that ideas can come from “anywhere”, but in fact all ideas appear within a social context as our thinking as well as our abilities to realize our ideas are structured by our
surroundings. Throughout all times, human action and thinking have been regulated and structured by the material and social context, but the constraining factors and opportunities have constantly changed through actor-driven processes. The contexts that structure our behavior are subject to change as actors struggle to control
resources, alter power relations and invent new rules and technology.
2.2 Concepts
To understand the process going on around the two Svalbard proposals, I have found it very helpful to use theoretical concepts taken from the Actor System Dynamics (ASD) theory developed by Tom Burns and colleagues (1985, 1987, 1988 and 1994).
The ASD theory is a synthesis of quite different social theories as it is combining elements from both relatively deterministic systems theories such as Marxism and rational choice theories developed by economists. The theory describes the dynamic between how actors while being shaped and constrained by institutions and rule systems, simultaneously struggle to reshape the contexts they operate in. Human choice and ability to reshape institutions and rules plays an important role within the theory, but even the most powerful and influential actors may experience great constraints when they promote their ideas from existing rules or from constellations of actors holding opposing views. How successful single actors or configurations of actors are in promoting new ideas depends on the susceptibility of the context they operate in and the resources they control.
The importance of contextual factors became apparent when comparing the two proposals for establishing an international genebank or seed depository at Svalbard.
The proposals look similar on the surface but they were received very differently, as the contexts they were presented in were different. The actors, their relationships, the resources that are available to them and the constraints they face all depend on the institutional, legal, cultural and physical contexts (Baumgartner, Burns, et al. 1985:
5). The contexts “structurally condition social action and interaction and their outcomes” (Burns, Flam, et al. 1987:6). This basically means that actors are the products of the time they live in, and they act according to trends or problems they find relevant and use the resources that are available to them. One example of an event that has made actors perceive the issue of security differently at the end of the 1980s and now is the terrorist attacks of on the 11th of September. The incident has made actors in the international plant genetic resources community aware of such threats and as a consequence they take other actions to secure the plant genetic resources collections today than they did fifteen years ago. The idea of an additional security storage at Svalbard thus may seem more relevant to them now than ever before even though the technological equipment they use in genebanks is better than it used to be.
Contexts are constantly subject to change. Creative and innovative actors modify old rules that do not fit new problems, they invent new technology, or as they seek new arenas for interaction and discussions where established power relations are altered.
Also external events such as 9/11, that actors cannot control can lead to change
(Baumgartner, Burns, et al. 1985). But at the center of all processes and developments we find the social actors.
2.2.1 Social actors
ASD regards social actors as creative beings capable of self-reflection and intentional action. A social actor refers to individuals, social groups, organizations, alliances and nations with the capability to make collective decisions and carry out collective actions (Baumgartner,
Burns, et al. 1985). Thus actors can both be individual agents as well as collective actors, such as an organization. In the case of the two Svalbard proposals, actors occupy different roles such as academics, bureaucrats, scientists and politicians.
There were different alliances of collective and individual actors involved in the first and second Svalbard proposal and their motives and influence vary. Many of the same actors were involved to a greater or smaller extent in both proposals but most are involved in different roles and positions and have access to different resources now.
As time passes actors may learn and change their views. Some of the actors that were against the first Svalbard proposal are enthusiastic supporters of the second proposal.
Actors’ influence and the possibility to realize their ideas depend on the resources they command as well as the constraints and opportunities they face. Naturally, actors that control more resources have a greater chance of ‘getting their will’ across than those who control fewer resources. Resources can be material such as money or objects of status or value, but more important in an academic and organizational context are resources like positions, institutional knowledge, social relations and trust from other actors. The actors that possess these resources are easier heard and paid serious attention to, which again give them a chance to move forward with their ideas and proposals.
The actors who are able to bring about change and make a difference are often highly
“institutionally knowledgeable”, which means that they have knowledge about the
“rules of the game”, institutional arrangements and constraints (Burns, Ellig, et al.
1994).
2.2.2 Institutionalized relationships
Why actors choose to act in a certain manner is related to their motives, preferences and resources as well as their responses to opportunities and constraints that are products of the institutional contexts they operate in. They operate within formal and informal institutions or rule systems that structure their action. Social rule systems
“function as grammar” (Burns, Flam, et al. 1987:13) and are both informal and
formal. The work culture and procedures within an organization, norms and values for behavior are all elements of rule systems. In order to function within an institutional context actors need to reproduce and respond to the rules (Burns, Flam, et al. 1987).
When the institutional structures appear unfit to deal with innovations or new trends, actors struggle to change the rules and create new institutions. At the time of the first Svalbard proposal there were no legally binding rules that regulated the access to the
plant genetic resources. There was however, a rule system in place that allowed plant breeders to claim ownership, or intellectual property rights, to improved plant material. The consequence was that seed companies could freely access plant genetic resources in developing countries and then claim ownership to the material they improved so that others were restricted from using it freely. New legal institutions were desired by some to change this situation. The rules are subject to conflict and struggle between those that wish to maintain them and those that wish to change them, and this is why it took many years to get the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture in place. When this rule system was in place, countries were no longer afraid that placing their material at Svalbard would mean losing control over it. A new institution like the International Treaty thus created new opportunities for the actors promoting the second Svalbard proposal. But with a new institution, new problems and new constraints for the actors trying to solve them will occur. Institutions and rule systems are never in equilibrium but constant subject to change (Burns, Flam, et al. 1987).
2.2.3 Intended/ unintended consequences
“Social action and interaction have concrete outcomes and effects. These may be intended as well as unintended” (ibid: 7). As it is impossible for actors to completely control the results of their actions unintended consequences occur. These unintended consequences can be immediate or become apparent after some time has passed. As a result, actors often have to resolve problems that are rooted in actions from the past.
Sometimes these problems can trigger changes in established institutions or rules.
When the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) was negotiated, developing countries saw it as a way for them to control the access to the plant genetic resources originating in their territories. Encouraged by the new convention they could make access agreements with the seed companies that wanted to use the plant genetic materials and achieve benefits from the commercial exploitation. An unintended consequence of this system was increased bureaucracy and often scientists
experienced difficulty in accessing the material (Agres 2003). For most plant genetic resources for food and agriculture it was also very difficult to determine in which country they originated. These developments made many of the actors at the arena of FAO realize that the benefits of the agricultural plant genetic resources were not so much in commercial profits as in having easy access to the materials for plant
breeding. Despite these realizations it took seven years for the actors to agree on a new and functional legal institution for plant genetic resources for food and agriculture (Int. Jan Borring).
2.2.4 Arenas
Actors operate and interact in different arenas. An arena is a ‘meeting place’ where multiple actors discuss, interact and make decisions. An arena is often specialized (e.g. the CBD provides an arena for environmentalists while the FAO Commission provides an arena for matters concerning agriculture). Actors bring their issues to the arenas they are most sure to achieve the intended outcomes. Institutional rules and the configurations of actors will thus vary from one arena to another. Multiple arenas are interrelated so that the developments in one arena affect processes in related arenas.
Developments in the CBD arena affected processes in the arena of FAO. Actors meet in both formal arenas such as meeting or conferences, as well as informal arenas such as dinners or ‘corridor discussions’. What goes on in the informal arenas affects the interactions in the formal arenas and the other way around.
While undertaking my fieldwork, one respondent told me that he had read many social studies of the negotiation process leading to the CBD, which he himself
participated in. He felt that none of the studies or theories used to study this particular process had managed to capture everything going on, especially informal negotiations and discussions, and the role of single actors in the negotiations. It will always be impossible to capture everything in a theoretical paper, but by applying the concepts from ASD I will try to reveal why the time of the Svalbard idea came fifteen years after it was initially proposed.
I will undertake a comparative study of the processes and developments relevant to the first and the second Svalbard proposal. Applying concepts from the ASD has encouraged me to focus on key individuals and institutions that have been central in promoting the proposals. Many social theories, such as Marxist approach or gender studies, tend to explain individual behavior as a product of factors like race, class, gender or societal structures. These are of course important but by only focusing on such factors important alternative or additional explanations may be lost, such as the fact that actors change, learn from past mistakes and do unexpected things. In this study the single actors are important, and I have chosen to use quotes to illustrate
their thinking and way of reasoning. But the actors always exist within a context, and I seek to highlight how actors contribute to changes in the context, while
simultaneously being products of the context in which they operate.
2.3 Gaining an understanding of the field
The field dealing with conservation of plant genetic resources and genebanks is both technical and political. I was lucky to be employed as a Research Assistant from the end of May to the beginning of August on a study directed by Noragric and the Nordic Gene Bank (NGB), to assess the feasibility of establishing an international genebank at Svalbard. My supervisor, Prof. Cary Fowler, was leading the Feasibility Study, which was financed by the Norwegian Agricultural Ministry and the Foreign Ministry. The other members of the Feasibility Study Committee were the Director of the NGB, Bent Skovmand, Dr Geoff Hawtin who is Interim Executive Secretary at the Global Crop Diversity Trust, Dr. Henry Shands who is the Director of the National Center for Genetic Resources Preservation in the USA, and Mr. William George, a Professional Engineer with long experience as a consulting engineer for genebanks in the United States, Russia, India, and for the International Maize and Wheat Improvement Center (CIMMYT). My job, being a Research Assistant, was to check if some of the findings from a previous Feasibility Study undertaken in 1989 still were valid (such as temperature measurements, radiation, types of stone etc in the coal mines at Svalbard). As a part of this work I got the opportunity to visit the NGB’s offices in Alnarp, Sweden. At NGB I got an insight in how a genebank is run technically. NGB has already established a security storage in an abandoned coalmine at Svalbard where they keep duplicates of some of their plant genetic materials. In August the Feasibility Study Committee visited this storage at Mine 3 at Svalbard.
From these experiences I have gained a good technical understanding of how plant genetic material is stored both long term and short term and the processing of these materials. During the Svalbard trip I also attended meetings between the Feasibility Study Committee and local authorities where legal and practical matters were discussed. I have had access to internal documents, emails and reports between the Feasibility Study Committee and Norwegian authorities, and thereby gained an understanding of and insight into the second Svalbard proposal.
The political aspect of plant genetic resource management and conservation is
perhaps more complex and difficult to grasp. The main arena where countries discuss such issues is the FAO Commission on Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture, which holds regular sessions every second year at the FAO headquarters in Rome.
From the 8th to the 12th of November 2004, I attended the tenth regular session of the FAO Commission. During the week in Rome, it was not easy to grasp what was really going on both in the meetings, and outside in the corridors and restaurants where delegates congregated. But what I did understand is that the informal channels are crucial in the decision-making process, and that it is necessary to know the culture of the organization to grasp what is going on. For me it was therefore necessary to rely on information from experienced people who know the FAO and the whole plant genetic resource system well.
At FAO, I attended the special Side Event where Norway presented the Svalbard offer and I got to hear the overwhelmingly positive feedback from country delegates, institutes and NGOs. To understand the significance of such a positive reception I have had to do substantial reading on the history of plant genetic resources
conservation and management in the FAO arena, and the establishment of legal agreements such as the International Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture (1983), the development of the Global Plan of Action (1996) and the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture (2001). These documents are far from easy and accessible reading for a beginner. To grasp the difficult legal environment related to conservation and management of plant genetic resources, I have also had to get an understanding of the Convention on Biological Diversity (1992) in addition to the legal regimes regulating the claiming of patents or Intellectual Property Rights to plant genetic resources through the
Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants (1961, 1972, 1978 and 1991) and the Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights (1994) through the WTO.
Professors Trygve Berg and Cary Fowler held a one month course on this subject at Noragric called Management of Genetic Resources: Law and Policy, which was very helpful for me to gain an understanding of the field.
2.4 Data
2.4.1 The first Svalbard proposal
The first Svalbard initiative came up in 1989 and considering that fifteen years have passed since then, my key sources have been internal documents from FAO and the
International Board on Plant Genetic Resources (IBPGR), which became IPGRI (International Plant Genetic Resource Institute) in the beginning of the 1990s. I have also accessed documents from the NGB and some from the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the period from 1989-1995. From FAO, IBPGR/ IPGRI, I have had access to letters, written correspondence and personal notes, telefaxes and emails, draft reports, terminal and technical reports, Office Memoranda, drafts of
Memorandum of Understanding (related to legal agreements between the actors), the Initial Project Brief on Svalbard, the first Feasibility Study, Note to the File
documents, Status Reports, Minutes from meetings, and the Report of the Expert Consultation on Svalbard International Seedbank.
From NGB I have had access to some newspaper clippings, letters and written correspondence. From the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs I have had access to some letters.
Since a lot of information of what was really going on has been difficult to grasp only from reading the documents, I have interviewed many of the key actors that were involved in the first proposal. Basically I interviewed as many as I could get in touch with. Prof. Cary Fowler introduced some of the informants to me at the FAO meeting in November, as he knows many of the involved actors personally. Others I managed to track down after finding their names in letters and written correspondence. Many of the Norwegian actors are still working at one of the Ministries or at the University of Life Sciences.
A very central and enthusiastic actor involved in the first Svalbard proposal, Mr. Arne Wold, has unfortunately passed away some years ago. His colleagues at the
Norwegian Seed Testing Station (NSTS) describe him as one of the actors that knew most about the first Svalbard proposal in Norway, because of his personal interest for the idea of storing seeds in permafrost. He was experimenting with different ways of packaging and storing seeds under such conditions and was following the process eagerly. Unfortunately a lot of his work has been lost since the office of the
Norwegian Seed Testing Station recently has moved and old documents thrown away.
2.4.2 The second Svalbard proposal
My key source of information for the second Svalbard proposal has been semi- structured interviews with as many of the persons involved as possible. These have been mainly employees at the Norwegian Foreign-, Agricultural and Food, and Environment Ministries. I have also talked to the members of the Feasibility Study Committee, as well as to Pat Mooney who is a central figure from the NGO side, the Secretary of the FAO Commission on Plant Genetic Resources, Jose Esquinas-
Alcazar, and IPGRI staff Jane Toll and Jan Engels. In addition I have interviewed my supervisor Prof. Cary Fowler because, in addition to leading the Feasibility Study Committee, he has been involved in FAO matters since 1979 and has played a role as one of the key people to push the Svalbard proposal on the agenda of the FAO
Commission’s tenth regular session.
Since the process of the second proposal is still in progress, I have not had access to many documents apart from the Feasibility Study, a Confidential Assessment of Likely Political Reactions to a Norwegian Offer by Prof. Cary Fowler, and the Statement by Bjørn Skogmo at the tenth regular session of the FAO Commission.
2.5 Techniques
I have used semi-structured interviews that refer “to a context in which the
interviewer has a series of questions that are in the general form of an interview guide but is able to vary the sequence of questions”(Bryman, 2001: 507). The advantage of the semi-structured interview is that it allows rich and detailed answers. The
technique is flexible and allows the interviewer to follow up on issues that come up during the interview. When interviewing I have allowed the respondents to speak rather freely around quite broad questions. Sometimes new and interesting topics I have not thought about in advance have come up during the interviews.
Simultaneously, the topic I am investigating is quite narrow, and this limits how broad the respondents can be in their answers. I have also followed up with probing and more specific questions in order to get the pieces of information I felt was missing from their first answers.
Triangulation can be defined as “the use of more than one method or source of data in the study of a social phenomenon so that findings may be crosschecked” (Bryman 2001:508). My first set of interviews focused on many of the issues I read about in the
documents, such as “why did the initiative come up” and “why did it fail” to try to capture some of the informal processes which were going on. It turned out that in the documents, the official reason for the failure of the first Svalbard proposal is blamed to be the lack of finances and donor support, while nearly all my respondents have stated that the real reason was lack of trust that such a facility would work among the relevant actors. Many years have passed since the Svalbard issue first was discussed and naturally the actors involved have forgotten many details. I have tried to address this by asking the same questions to most of the respondents to cross-check their answers.
With the second Svalbard proposal I have asked questions such as “what does it take to get a proposal like Svalbard on the agenda of the regular session in the FAO Commission” and “why do you think the timing is better now than fifteen years ago”.
I have used the same techniques of asking the same questions to various respondents in order to cross-check the answers. Since I have not had the opportunity to develop a relationship of trust with most of the respondents, I can never be sure of how open and honest they are about issues such as informal channels and strategies used to push the Svalbard initiative. Prof. Fowler has been very helpful on this matter because he has a long history in the different arenas and knows most of the actors involved.
I have tried to get hold of as many of the people involved as possible. These include people involved at different times, different levels within the FAO, IBPGR/IPGRI and the Norwegian Ministries, different institutes and representing different interests.
To get a complete sample of people has been impossible, both because of time constraints and because some are no longer available. Some of the key informants I have not been able to speak to are Mr. Arne Wold (deceased), Mrs. Grethe Evjen, Mr.
Gerald Moore, Mr. Emile Frison, Ms Marianne Thompson and Mr. Ebbe Kjellquist (deceased). These actors may have added details and aspects to the story I am presenting.
2.6 The role of my supervisor
One of my respondents described Prof. Cary Fowler as one of the key people that has made the second Svalbard proposal possible. He knows, as mentioned, most of the
actors involved in both the first and second proposal both on the NGO side, within FAO and IBPGR/IPGRI and within the Norwegian Ministries. He also knows key people from developing countries who were very skeptical towards the first Svalbard proposal. Being my supervisor, and for a short time during the summer of 2004 also my employer, he has of course influenced my way of thinking about my research topic. This has partly been a great advantage because he has always been available to answer all my questions and he has helped me to get in touch in key informants I doubt I would have been able to access without his help. Because of the widespread trust and good reputation he has within the international plant genetic resources community, I have been allowed to access internal documents of the FAO and
IBPGR/IPGRI. Without him this study would be impossible to do within the required time limits.
Prof. Fowler’s central position in my field of research, as well as my own
involvement in the second Feasibility Study, has made it necessary to be very aware of my own views and approach. A disadvantage of his central position in my field of research is that my understanding of the topic has been influenced by my
conversations with him and also articles he has written on the topic. I have tried to assess his views critically and compare his statements with those of my other
respondents. In addition Prof. Tom Burns has been of great help in co-supervising my work. Prof. Burns is an ‘outsider’ to the field of plant genetic resources and has thereby given me a very valuable ‘external opinion’ of my written work. Prof. Tom Burns has created the Actor System Dynamics (ASD) theory that I am using as an analytical framework for my data. He has helped me in the process of thinking and writing, and has been available for questions concerning the concepts and terms of the ASD theory.
3 Background
“Plant genetic resources for food and agriculture are the biological basis of world food security and, directly or indirectly, support the livelihoods of every person on earth” (FAO 1998:17). Apart from the agricultural products on our tables, plant genetic resources are used as e.g. feed for animals, fiber, clothing, shelter, wood, timber and energy, but the term can also be defined wider than this. Plant genetic resources are “seeds, plants, or plant parts that are useful in crop breeding, research, or conservation because of their genetic attributes” (National Research Council 1993).
Modern biotechnology has created enormous potentials for the commercial
exploitation of plant genetic resources. But while a pharmaceutical company can earn great sums on medicinal qualities identified in a wild tropical plant, the commercial profit from an agricultural plant such as potato or bean can hardly be measured against the value as staple food or as component of plant breeding programs.
Dramatic stories from the past, such as the Irish potato famine in the 1840s, reveal the importance of plant genetic resources for human survival. The story of the Irish potato famine, which resulted in 1 million people starving to death, also illustrates the importance of genetic diversity within a crop such as potato. The potato came to Ireland from the Andean region, and since only a few clones of potato was introduced the genetic base of the potato was very narrow. Crops develop their qualities due to a process of natural selection, which means that they gradually adapt to different environmental conditions and changes. Genetic variation within a crop make it possible for farmers and plant breeders to select crops for specific qualities such as resistance to diseases, taste or tolerance to cold or hot climate (Raven, Evert, et al.
1999). In case of the potato in Ireland the genetic diversity was so narrow that when a blight attacked a huge amount of the potato harvest rotted in the soil, and recovery from the blight was extremely slow (Cooper 2001).
Today plant breeders all over the world are dependent on access and availability to a diversity of plant genetic resources to be able to cope with pests and diseases that constantly threaten the harvests in farmers’ fields.
3.1 Interdependence on genetic resources
Agriculture is a phenomenon that can be dated back to the Stone Age. The
agricultural plants we know today have acquired their qualities through hundreds and even thousands of years of cultivation. Through natural selection most plants had seeds that could go into dormancy for a while to ensure the survival of the species.
Most seed also had a mechanism of seed dispersal, which means, for example that seeds of wheat would ripen and scatter at different times (Harlan 1992). Both seed dormancy and seed dispersal made it difficult for people to cultivate wild, non- domesticated plants because they naturally wanted their harvest to ripen at the same time. The harvestable yield will increase if the plants retain their seeds. Through a
process of selection of the seeds with low seed dormancy and non-shedding seeds, various food plants were domesticated and slowly developed different qualities from their wild relatives (Fowler and Mooney 1990).
As human actors have migrated, interacted and conquered each other throughout history, they have brought their seeds with them to new places and taken exotic seeds back home. Through the “Colombian Exchange” over 500 years ago, seeds from the
“old world” of Europe were brought to the “New World” of the Americas and seeds native to the Americas were taken to Europe (Crosby 1972). Further and extensive exchanges of seeds and agricultural plants have taken place between all the
continents.
Even though seeds have been exchanged extensively throughout history and have acquired their qualities in various corners of the world, for each crop there are one of more centers of origin where it was domesticated (Vavilov 1997). The Russian scientist Nicolai Vavilov developed a theory of crop origin and centers of crop
diversity back in the 1920s. He constructed a map of the centers and with a grant from the Soviet Union he travel across large parts of Asia, Europe, Ethiopia, and the
Americas by foot or on horse back. Through his theories and expeditions he managed to establish the origin of most crops geographically and the areas with most crop diversity (ibid.). Vavilov’s work inspired scientists to research further on the centers of origin. One of his friends and collages in the USA was Harry Harlan. Harlan’s son Jack, who was also a plant scientist, brought new information to Vavilov’s crop diversity theory. The young Harlan found that while there were “centers” in the case of northern crops, this was not so much the case for southern tropical crops. He developed a theory of centers and non-centers of crop origins (Harlan 1971).
Most of the regions Vavilov identified as centers of crop origin are located in developing countries. But even though Central America was the center where maize was first domesticated, it is today grown all over the world. When farmers cultivated maize in North American or Africa, new varieties of the crop adapted to the new environments (FAO, 1998:17). As a result of the historical process of exchange people all over the world depend on food plants for their diets that originate outside their countries. In this manner, we are all interdependent on the world’s plant genetic
resources for food and agriculture. Fowler and Hodgkin explain:
Today, most people from Copenhagen to Kampala eat foods that would have been unfamiliar to the inhabitants of their country not so long ago. This is the result of a kind of botanical chess game that has been played out over
millennia, changing the agricultural and food systems of virtually every land.
Relying on native crops the American hamburger would have to come without a wheat-based bun, without the ketchup, mustard, lettuce, tomato, onion and pickle. (There also would be no beef.) Pasta sauce in Italy could not be tomato based, but there would not be any pasta anyway, nor any wine made from grapes (Fowler and Hodgkin 2004:147).
Various attempts have been made to calculate different countries’ dietary dependency on non-indigenous crops. Results of such estimates show that most countries are highly dependent on crops not indigenous to their territories. A country like the United States is 84% to 99% dependent on non-indigenous crops while a country rich in genetic resource like India is 35% to 47% dependent. Other examples are
Germany, which is 83% to 98% dependent, Rwanda 80% to 94% and Nigeria 46% to 61%. In order to calculate these dependency rates the concept of “food energy
supply” was used in investigating the extent to which indigenous crops contributed to fulfil the dietary supply (Palacios 1998).
3.2 Genetic erosion
Genetic erosion is the “loss of genetic diversity” (FAO 1998:17). This can both mean the loss of individual genes or of a particular combination of genes. Genetic erosion can cause displacement of minor species, and lead to the reduction in the number of varieties of one species (e.g. less varieties of rice) .The main cause of genetic erosion is that improved or exotic varieties and species replace traditional varieties and species in an area. Other causes are changes in land use and cropping patterns, floods, droughts, disasters and land degradation. Modern plant breeding after the Green Revolution has lead to erosion in crop varieties all over the world. One example from China illustrates the extent of varietal erosion within one species:
In China, in 1949, nearly 10,000 wheat varieties were used in production. By the 1970s, only about 1,000 varieties remained in use (FAO 1998:17).
In the 1950s, local varieties accounted for 80% of production in China. In the 1970s the Green Revolution led to the introduction of modern high-yielding varieties and as a result the number of local varieties was reduced to 5% of production (ibid.). The result of genetic erosion is dramatic both because the diversity of varieties of food crops go down, and also because genes that may be of future value are lost forever.
3.3 International conservation efforts
Already in 1936 Harry Harlan and his colleague Martini alerted the scientific world about the dangers of losing of genetic resources that so many years later has been termed “genetic erosion”:
In the great laboratory of Asia, Europe, and Africa, unguided barley breeding has been going on for thousands of years. Types without number have arisen over an enormous area. (…) In the hinterlands of Asia there were probably barley fields when man was young. The progenies of these fields with all their surviving variations constitute the world’s priceless reservoir of germ plasm. It has waited through long centuries. Unfortunately, from the breeder’s
standpoint, it is now being imperiled. When new barleys replace those grown by farmers of Ethiopia and Tibet, the world will have lost something
irreplaceable (Harlan and Martini 1936:319).
Harlan and Martini discovered the process of genetic erosion long before the world community reacted. It was not before the early 1970s that real international efforts to deal with the alarming effects of genetic erosion on plant genetic resource were made.
In 1974 the Consultative Group on International Agriculture Research (CGIAR) set up the
International Board for Plant Genetic Resources (IBPGR), to co-ordinate a plant genetic resource ‘rescue’ program which led to collecting missions of endangered varieties and the establishment of genebanks both nationally and internationally (FAO 1998). The CGIAR was itself established in 1971 on the initiative of the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations and is the parent body of a network of fifteen International Agricultural Research Centers (IARCs). The IBPGR, which in the beginning of the 1990s turned into IPGRI had its headquarters at the FAO but was mainly funded by CGIAR donors (Fowler, 1994). Since 1975 the CGIAR centers, IPGRI and FAO have
built the world’s largest collection of plant genetic resources. These materials are held
“in trust” for the international community and have been under the auspices of FAO since 1994, which basically means that the materials are in the public domain and are freely accessible to all (FAO Commission on Genetic Resource for Food and
Agriculture 1994).
3.4 Genebank conservation
Seeds can be conserved in their natural habitats (in situ) or in an artificial setting (ex situ) such as a botanical garden or a genebank. A seed genebank is a depository where seeds or other plant materials are stored and made available for immediate and future use. A wide variety of cereals, legumes, vegetables, fruit and crops can keep their viability for many years if they are frozen and dried in line with set genebank standards. The conservation capacity to store seeds can be divided into short-,
medium-, and long-term. In the short-term facilities the seeds can survive for a couple of years, while in the long-term facility the seeds can keep their viability for as long as a hundred years, or more. The preferred temperature for long-term storage is –18 C or colder with 3-7% moisture content depending on the species stored (IPGRI 1994).
Today more than 6 million accessions make up the global collection stored ex situ (FAO, 1998).
To maintain the viability and the genetic integrity of the seeds, it is necessary to regenerate them from time to time. This means that the seeds will be grown out in their natural environment and fresh seeds will again be stored in the genebank.
3.4.1 Genetic erosion within genebanks
Many genebanks face serious financial constraints that limit their capacity to manage and conserve seeds in ways that fulfil long-term Genebank Standards (IPGRI
2003:25). As was noted in a review of the CGIAR genebank operations from 1996:
Until extra funding becomes available, several key areas in genetic resource work at the Centers will remain below the necessary level of activity and quality…. (SGRP 1996:24).
To ensure the material against damage or loss, it is important to make duplicates of the stored accession samples. Genebanks duplicate their material and store it elsewhere in case of emergencies, accidents or catastrophes. It is however, not only
poor management or accidents (such as fire, power cuts, etc.) that pose a threat to the stored genetic resources. Many of the most important genebanks in the world are situated in unstable countries of the world such as Ethiopia, Colombia, Nigeria, Syria and Cote d’Ivoire to mention some.
One recent example is Iraq where nearly all the country’s agricultural research centers have been destroyed or damaged after the US-led invasion in 2003. The country’s national genebank, Abu Ghraib, still exists but it is likely that many of its holdings are destroyed or looted (ICARDA News 2003). The consequences of the destruction of the stored seeds become extra grave since a lot of the seeds grown in situ (in their own habitats) are threatened with extinction because of human activity:
Some of the most devastating recent conflicts have been fought in areas where important crops originated, and where most of the genetic diversity essential for future breeding programs still resides. The “Fertile Crescent” stretching from southern Israel to Iraq is the genetic heartland of wheat and barley. Cambodia is home of rice, the world’s most widely consumed grain. In these places, the phrase “killing fields” has a double meaning (Pearce 2005:1).
3.5 Legal aspects of plant genetic resources
For decades extensive work has been done within the FAO system to establish legal practices for the management of plant genetic resources for food and agriculture. The efforts made in FAO to manage and conserve plant genetic resources have resulted in the adoption of the International Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture (1983), the Global Plan of Action (1996), and the negotiation and adoption of the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and
Agriculture (2004). Legal regimes that concern the claiming of patents or other forms of intellectual property rights to plant genetic resources have been developed in the arenas of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants (UPOV) in the form of the Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) and the UPOV conventions. The legal regimes opening for intellectual property rights to plant genetic resources have created debates and conflicts in the FAO arena and during the 1980s and 90s coalitions of actors from developing countries stood against actors from the seed industry and developed countries. The International Undertaking established the concept of Farmer’s Rights
which means “rights arising from the past, present and future contributions of farmers in conserving, improving, and making available plant genetic resources, particularly those in centers of origin/ diversity.” (Resolution 5/89). But while plant breeders’
rights are legally protected, the farmers’ rights are not. Discussions concerning rights and access to plant genetic resources thus created a difficult political environment, which was perhaps the main reason for the lack of success of the first Svalbard proposal. To place an “international” genebank in a developed country without legal clarity about the ownership to the material meant giving the material away in the eyes of NGOs and developing countries. To understand the nature of the conflict we need to take a closer look at intellectual property rights to plant genetic resources.
Intellectual property rights (IPRs)
Plant breeders’ rights regulated through the UPOV conventions (revised in 1972, 1978 and 1991) are the most used type of intellectual property right over seeds. In 2003, Brazil had 122 applications for plant variety protection, while countries like Japan and the USA had respectively 1132 and 1000 applications (UPOV 2003). When a plant breeder develops a variety that is novel, distinct, genetically uniform and stable he or she can apply for the exclusive right to sell that variety on commercial markets. Most developed countries have ratified UPOV, which amongst other things limit the possibility of farmers to exchange and utilize seeds from protected varieties without paying royalties (Andersen 2003/04). The protected varieties can, however be used in research and as a parent in breeding programs (Fowler, Smale et al. 2001). A stronger form of intellectual property rights is the patent. The patent system limits the possibilities to sell or re-sow the patented varieties, and also prohibits research and further plant breeding involving these varieties. All the member countries of the World Trade Organization (WTO) need to adapt national legislation to a minimum standard of Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs), which for most countries means to adapt national legislation to the UPOV. Stricter systems of patents are in force in the USA, Japan and Australia (Andersen, 2003/04).
3.6 Conflicts over plant genetic resources
Critics argue that intellectual property rights mainly benefit the corporate seed industry based in the North which force small-scale farmer to pay royalties for the seeds needed to sustain their agricultural production (Shiva 2004). Patents are often
associated with large commercial companies profiting from and restricting access to improved plant genetic resources that originate in developing countries. Since the age of biotechnology started, the control over access to plant genetic resources has been hotly debated in the international arena. Both making use of patent systems and the exploitation of plant genetic resources in biotechnological research are too costly for most developing countries (Andersen, 2003/04). Developing countries, which are very rich in plant genetic diversity, have hoped to benefit from regulating access to the plant genetic material and to receive a fair and equitable share of the benefit from the commercial use and exploitation of these products.
The Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) was negotiated both to promote sustainable use and conservation of biological diversity and “the fair and equitable sharing of benefits arising out of the utilization of genetic resources” (Convention on Biological Diversity 1992: Article 1). Before the CBD, plant genetic resources were commonly regarded to be the “heritage of mankind”. This meant that these resources were freely available to all, but evolving systems of intellectual property right had already complicated the free access regime. With CBD the “country of origin” was given the right to grant access to the plant genetic resources. It may be possible to identify “country of origin” when it comes to rare medicinal species found in the rainforest, but when it comes to plant genetic resources from agricultural crops it is almost impossible since most domesticated species have acquired their qualities in multiple locations of the world since the Neolithic period (Fowler 2001:22). At the end of the CBD negotiations it was realized that plant genetic resources for food and agriculture need to be treated differently than wild biodiversity in e.g. tropical forests.
This point was addressed in the Resolution 3 of the Nairobi Final Act; “The
interrelationship between the CBD and the promotion of sustainable agriculture”, and the legal status of these materials has thus been negotiated within the FAO
Commission instead of the CBD arena.
3.7 The FAO Commission
Nine years before the CBD, in 1983, FAO established a non-binding International Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources and an intergovernmental Commission on Plant Genetic Resources. The Commission, which in 1995 was renamed the
Commission on Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture, was established to monitor the implementation of the International Undertaking and the international
conservation and management efforts of plant genetic resource for food and agriculture. The International Undertaking was;
…based on the universally accepted principle that plant genetic resources are a heritage of mankind and consequently should be available without restriction (International Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources 1983: Article 1)
At the time there was a conflict between the promoters of intellectual property rights on improved varieties and those who wanted free access and availability for all. The USA, other developed countries, and representatives from the seed industry were opposing the International Undertaking, while most developing countries supported it (Andersen 2003/04). The greatest achievement of the International Undertaking was that twelve IARCs of the CGIAR, of which eleven had genebanks that hold the most important plant genetic resources for food and agriculture in the world, placed their collections under the auspices of the FAO in 1994. In this way over 450,000
accessions were made freely available to plant breeders all over the world on the condition that no recipient of the genetic material should seek intellectual property rights to the material or the relevant information (Fowler 2003).
Developing countries wanted to use the International Undertaking to increase the awareness of the shared global responsibility to cope with genetic erosion, and they wished to raise funds for conservation efforts (ibid.) The long-term goals of the Undertaking were conservation and access to the resources. Because of insufficient international support of the non-binding Undertaking, a “policy vacuum” emerged in the field of plant genetic resources for food and agriculture and little was done to halt genetic erosion within agricultural crops (Andersen, 2003/04:46). The International Undertaking needed revision and renegotiations not to conflict with the CBD. After seven years of hard negotiations the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture was adopted at the FAO Conference in November 2001.
The legally binding Treaty came into force in 2004, and deals with an issue the CBD did not address, the handling of the ex situ collections held in genebanks that have been collected prior to the CBD (including most of the material held in trust by the CGIAR centers.) The CGIAR centers jointly hold the best documented and most widely used collection of plant genetic resources by agricultural plant breeders but valuable collection are also held in national genebanks. The entering into force of the
International Treaty has settled the legal status of plant genetic resource of 35 food crops and 29 forage crops. The parties that have ratified the International Treaty have agreed to place these plant genetic resources in a multilateral system of free access and exchange to these materials. The crops are made available under the terms of a Material Transfer Agreement which prohibit the recipient from claiming intellectual property rights over the material in the form it is received. In addition the recipient must pay a share of the benefits from commercialization of any material obtained from the multilateral system. The income from this benefit mechanism will feed into a fund used for conservation activities and capacity-building in developing countries (Fowler 2003). The International Treaty has brought into place a long needed legal regime that has settled the legal status of the most important plant genetic resources.
This has created a receptive environment for the promotion of the second Svalbard proposal as the main disputes over access and control now have been settled.
Figure 3.1 The second Feasibility Study Committee outside the entrance to
“Frøyhallen” where the NGB’s security storage is situated. Photo: Henry Shands
Figure 3.2 The walk-in container where the NGB’s seeds are ‘sleeping’. Director of the NGB, Bent Skovmand, takes out samples that will be tested for viability.
Photo: Henry Shands
4 Analysis: Comparing the processes of the two Svalbard proposals
The the idea to construct an international genebank in Svalbard was first proposed in 1989. A second proposal that was presenting the same idea came up in 2004. At first glance the two proposals are very similar. They both address the importance of conserving the plant genetic resources the whole world depends on for its food security and emphasize the importance of taking extra security measures for the material that is stored in genebanks. Both proposals investigate different locations at Svalbard where the facility can be constructed, they outline ways of packing, treating and transporting the seeds and they indicate budgets for constructing and running the facility. Advantages of selecting Svalbard as location for the security storage are emphasized. A natural question is, however, why it was necessary to make the second proposal when it was turned down the first time. The fact that the two proposals seem so similar but were received so differently by the actors in the international plant genetic resources community is puzzling. While the first proposal was turned down, almost all the relevant actors received the second proposal with overwhelming enthusiasm.
The first apparent difference between the first and the second proposal is the time dimension, as the first was presented fifteen years before the second. A lot can change with the passing of time. The actors that planned, investigated and discussed the first proposal were acting within a different context than the actors of the second proposal.
I will show in this study that it is precisely the change of contexts that explains the different receptions of the two proposals. I will now take a closer look at the first proposal, the actors involved, the constraints they faced and the reasons why the proposal failed. Then I will go on to investigate how the context changed and how the actors promoting the second proposal grasped the available opportunities to get international backing for the proposal. But first I will explain why such a depository is necessary in the first place and why Svalbard is a unique location for a security storage for plant genetic resources.
4.1 The first Svalbard proposal 4.1.1 The “permafrost idea”
The idea of making an international seed storage in the permafrost was inspired by the NGB, which since 1984, has stored duplicates of their seed collection in an
abandoned coal mine in the Arctic Archipelago of Svalbard. The seeds were originally packaged in airtight glass ampules placed in wooden boxes, which were stacked inside a large, walk-in metal container, but recently the NGB has started to pack the seeds in aluminum bags instead of glass ampules. The container is situated in an abandoned tunnel of a coal mine where the seeds have been ‘sleeping’ for twenty years now. Viability tests show that the germination capacity in most of the seed samples is as good as when they were first placed in the coal mine
(http://www.ngb.se/Seedstore/permafrost/). The advantages of keeping the seeds in such a security storage are many. Firstly, the facility addresses the need to plan for future “worst case” scenarios as it creates a “safety net” if something happens to the genebank where the seeds are originally stored. The Feasibility Study Report (2004) explains in the following way:
In undertaking this study, the Committee recognized and accepted the compelling need of the international community to plan for the “worst case scenario,” the need to ensure the long-term conservation of plant genetic resources, protecting them from both old and new threats, routine as well as
