in Ethiopia Impacts on Women and Strengthened Land Rights

(1)

Strengthened Land Rights and

Impacts on Women in Ethiopia

By

Stein Holden

(2)

ER FOR LAND TENURE Strengthened Land Rights and Impacts on Women in Ethiopia

(3)

CENTER FOR LAND TENURE

www.umb.no

Ethiopia – map

Strengthened Land Rights and Impacts on Women in Ethiopia

(4)

ER FOR LAND TENURE

www.umb.no

Research Questions:

 1) How has land registration and certification affected female- headed households in Northern Ethiopia?

 Hypotheses:

– H1a: Land certification has in particular enhanced the food and calorie availability of female-headed households

– H1b: Land certification has enhanced land renting and this has stimulated agricultural production and improved food security

 2) How has joint land certification affected the land-related decision-power of women in Southern Ethiopia?

 Hypotheses:

– H2a: Wives who stand up and claim their land rights benefit by gaining influence in land-related decisions in the household – H2b: Uncooperative husbands block the strenthening of wives’

land rights

(5)

www.umb.no

Background

 The Radical Land Tenure Reform of 1975 and the Derg Period

– All land is state land

– All residents in a community have a constitutional right to access land

– Land was distributed in an egalitarian way within communities – Maximum farm size of 10 ha

– Land and labor markets were illegal

– Land redistributions to maintain the egalitarian land distribution

 1991 Change in Government and More Market Friendly Reforms

– Land remained state land

– Land renting and labor markets were allowed

– Land sales and mortgaging of land remained illegal

5

(6)

ER FOR LAND TENURE

www.umb.no

Background, continued

 Tigray Region, Northern Ethiopia: Land Registration and Certification 1998-99

– Low cost approach

– Granted user rights to land into perpetuity

– Gave land certificates in the name of the head of the household (mostly men)

 Oromia and SNNP Regions, Southern Ethiopia:

Joint Certification of Husbands and Wives 2005- – Low cost approach

– Gave land certificates to households with names of both husband and wife (wives)

– Land laws emphasizes equal ownership rights

(7)

www.umb.no

Land certificates in Tigray

 Simple one-page certificates

– Name of head of hh (husband not wife usually)

– Name, size and

location of plots

and names of

neighbours

(8)

ER FOR LAND TENURE

www.umb.no

Literature review: Land certification in Ethiopia

– Increased investments and productivity

• Holden, Deininger and Ghebru (AJAE, 2009)

• Deininger, Ali, Holden and Zevenbergen (WD, 2008)

• Deininger, Ali and Alemu (LE, 2011) – Reduced land border conflicts

• Holden, Deininger and Ghebru (2010)

– Increased land rental market participation

• Holden, Deininger and Ghebru (JDS, 2011)

• Deininger, Ali and Alemu (LE, 2011)

– Positive welfare impacts (food security and nutrition)

• Holden and Ghebru (2011)

• Ghebru and Holden (2013)

(9)

www.umb.no

Conceptual model 1

9

Sources and effects of tenure insecurity

-

State Private Unclear

borders Encroach-

ment Conflicts

Expropri- ation Redistri-

bution

Sources of risk

Tenure insecurity of owners

User rights

Transfer rights Mort- gaging

rights

-

- Limited

land transfers Limited investment

Production inefficiency Limited

access to credit Rights

(10)

ER FOR LAND TENURE

www.umb.no

Conceptual model 2

State Private Unclear

borders Encroach-

ment Conflicts

Expropri- ation Redistri-

bution

Tenure security of

owners

User rights

Transfer rights Mort- gaging

rights

Land transfers Investment

Production efficiency Access to

credit Low-cost land

registration and certification

-

+

+ +

Food security

-

Rights Sources

of risk

+

(11)

www.umb.no 11

Data

 Panel household survey

– Data from 1998-2010 (400 households reduced to 300 due attrition) for

household level analysis of impacts on food availability

– Data from 2006 and 2010 for assessment of impacts on children’s nutrition status

(12)

ER FOR LAND TENURE

www.umb.no

Calorie availability of male- and female-headed households in 1997-98 and 2009-10

0 .00 02 .00 04 .00 06 .00 08

De nsi ty

1800 Kcal

daily_calorie_intake2

female headed HHs 1998 male headed HHs 1998 kernel = epanechnikov, bandwidth = 172.0371

(A) Calorie supply comparison - 1997/98

0 .00 02 .00 04 .00 06

De nsi ty

1800 Kcal

daily_calorie_intake2

female headed HHs 2010 male headed HHs 2010

(C) Calorie supply comparison - 2009/10

(13)

www.umb.no

Calorie availability of landlord, tenant and autarchy households in 1997/98 and 2009/10

13

0 .00 02 .00 04 .00 06 .00 08 .00 1

De nsi ty

1800 Kcal

Kcal/day/consumer unit

Autarky Landlord Tenant

kernel = epanechnikov, bandwidth = 186.1271

(A) Calorie supply (intake) comparison -1997/98

0 .00 01 .00 02 .00 03 .00 04 .00 05

De nsi ty

1800 Kcal

Kcal/day/consumer unit

Autarky Landlord Tenant

kernel = epanechnikov, bandwidth = 276.6674

(C) Calorie supply (intake) comparison -2009/10

(14)

ER FOR LAND TENURE

www.umb.no

Share of farm rented out by female landlords in 1997 (before land certification) and in 2006

.5 1 1 .5

kd e n si ty ro sh a re

.2 .4 .6 .8 1

Share of land rented out

Female landlords 1997 Female landlords 2006

(15)

www.umb.no

Impact of land certification on calorie avail. ^{(on log}

of calorie availability per consumer unit), HH FE models 1

15

Variables 1997-2010 2000-10 2003-10 2006-10

Years with certificate 0.031* 0.035* 0.070**** 0.053*

(0.010) (0.010) (0.020) (0.030) Sex of household head

Female=1, Male=0

0.096 0.126* 0.133 0.253**

(0.060) (0.070) (0.080) (0.120) Farm size per consumer unit 0.081** 0.065 0.051* 0.016

(0.010) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) Sex of household

**head*Years with certificate**

0.013* 0.020** 0.020* 0.015 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.030)

Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes

Constant 7.069 7.021 6.688 6.879

(0.100) (0.130) (0.180) (0.310)

Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000

Number of observations 1459 1161 863 565

R-squared 0.252 0.244 0.157 0.049

(16)

ER FOR LAND TENURE

www.umb.no

Impact of land certification on calorie avail. ^{(on log}

of calorie availability per consumer unit), HH FE models 3

16

Variables Tenants Landlords Pure

owner- operators

All

Years with certificate -0.012 0.058 0.037 0.031***

(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) Sex of household head -0.183 0.135 0.148 0.097 Female=1, male=0 (0.25) (0.12) (0.09) (0.06) Farm size per consumer unit 0.183** 0.150 0.055* 0.082****

(0.04) (0.03) (0.02) (0.01) **Sex of household head*Years**

with certificate

0.056 -0.005 0.006 0.014*

(0.04) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) Operational holding

size/Farm size: Tenants

0.068 0.076*

(0.03) (0.03)

Operational holding size/ -0.137 -0.027

Farm size: Landlords (0.15) (0.07)

Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes

Constant 7.313 6.823 6.977 7.006

(0.27) (0.23) (0.17) (0.12)

Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000

Number of observations 326 370 784 1459

R-squared 0.259 0.325 0.280 0.257

(17)

www.umb.no

Northern Ethiopia: Conclusions

– Land registration and certification has enhanced tenure security

– Food availability has been improved through enhanced investment and land productivity on owner-operated land

– Female-headed households have benefited through increased rent-out of their land with sharecropping contracts

– Food availability has been enhanced through increased access to land through the land rental market for tenant households

– Child nutrition has been enhanced by enhanced land productivity and access to food and land through the land rental market

17

(18)

ER FOR LAND TENURE

www.umb.no

Women have a particularly weak position in relation to land in Southern Ethiopia

 Holden and Tefera (2008). From Being Property of Men to Becoming Equal Owners? Early Impacts of Land Registration and Certification on Women in Southern Ethiopia. UN-Habitat-report

– Evidence of weak position of women:

• Patri-lineal system, women moves to husband’s village/home upon marriage

• Arranged marriages where girls/brides had little influcence, with bride prizes

• Kidnapping marriages quite common in the past

• Widows are required to marry the brother (or other relative) of the late husband or they have to leave the land

(19)

www.umb.no

Correspondence of stated marriage type by spouses

19

Marriage type: females’

responses Marriage type:

males’ responses Parental arrange ment

Parental and bride agree- ment

Love marri- age

Wife ex-

change

Kidnap- ping marri- age

Total

Parental arrangement

60 7 11 1 4 83

Parental and bride

agreement 14 81 7 1 3 106

Love marriage 11 12 132 0 11 166

Wife exchange 0 1 2 5 0 8

Kidnapping marriage 1 1 2 0 18 22

Total 86 102 154 7 36 385

Generosity and social distance in dictator game field experiments with and without a face

(20)

ER FOR LAND TENURE

www.umb.no

Oromia and SNNP Regions:

Joint Land Certification

 Indicator of women’s empowerment:

– Extent of participation in a set of land- related decisions, including crop choice and land renting decisions, and whether wives’ participation in such decisions has led to a change in the decisions

(21)

www.umb.no

Effects of land certification on household decision-making

21

Husbands’

responses

Wives’

responses

Responses in 2012 Numb

er

% Numb

er

%

More discussion on land renting decision 115 21.6 103 20.5 More discussion on crop choice 212 39.8 236 47.0 More discussion on work division on each

plot

52 9.8 50 10.0

More discussion on investment decisions such as tree planting

69 12.9 51 10.2

More discussion on construction of houses on the land

55 10.3 49 9.8

More discussion on giving land to children 20 3.8 13 2.6

Total 533 100 502 100

(22)

ER FOR LAND TENURE

www.umb.no

Wives’ stated preferences for

strengthened women’s land rights

 Generated from the response to three questions:

– Wife can deny husband to rent out land = 1, = 0 otherwise;

– Wife expects joint land certificate = 1, = 0 otherwise;

– Wife expects equal sharing of land upon divorce = 1, = 0 otherwise;

 Aggregate index of wives' attitude is the sum of the above three variables

(23)

www.umb.no

Husbands’ expressed negative attitude towards land law reform elements:

 Generated from the response to four questions:

– Wife cannot deny land rent out = 1, = 0 otherwise

– Disagree with joint title = 1, = 0 otherwise

– Disagree with equal share of land upon divorce

= 1, = 0 otherwise

– Wife's name on certificate has no effect =1, = 0 otherwise

 Generated an index summarizing the scores of the above four questions.

23

(24)

ER FOR LAND TENURE

www.umb.no

“Wives’ land rights attitudes”- index distribution by year

Index score 2007 2012 Total

0 74 36 110

11.9 5.8 8.9

1 78 14 92

12.6 2.3 7.4

2 222 127 349

35.8 20.4 28.1

3 246 446 692

39.7 71.6 55.7

Total 620 623 1,243

Note: Pearson chi2(3) = 141.3057, Pr = 0.000 for difference in distribution from 2007 to 2012.

(25)

www.umb.no

“Husbands’ attitude towards

wives’ land rights”- index in 2012

25

Index score Freq. Percent Cum.

0 249 40.0 40.0

1 225 36.1 76.1

2 124 19.9 96.0

3 25 4.0 100

Total 623 100

(26)

www.umb.no

Factors affecting wives’ involvement in land-related decisons

26

Results from ordered probit models OP1 OP2 OP3

Wives' land rights attitude index 1:0 0.895* 0.975* 1.025*

Wives' land rights attitude index 2:0 1.232 1.304 1.245

Wives' land rights attitude index 3:0 1.393 1.519 1.492

Husbands' land rights attitude index 1:0 -0.326 -0.349* -0.340***

Husbands' land rights attitude index 2:0 -0.361 -0.382 -0.383**

Husbands' land rights attitude index 3:0 -0.551 -0.600 -0.652**

Sex of household head 0.248 0.258 0.239

Age of household head 0.003 0.002 0.001

Household size 0.009 0.014 0.018

Average education level in hh. 0.03 0.034 0.028

Male work force -0.058 -0.066 -0.056

Female work force 0.017 0.011 0.018

Polygamous household, dummy -0.055 -0.01 0.007

Household has land certificate, dummy 0.404* 0.463*

Years of land certificate ownership 0.044*

Farm size, ha 0.047 0.042 0.039

District Fixed Effects Yes No No

Village Fixed Effects No Yes Yes

(27)

www.umb.no

Husband and wife waiting for the outcome of the coin toss

27

(28)

ER FOR LAND TENURE

www.umb.no

Explaining the Hawk-Dove game to a Respondent

(29)

www.umb.no

Social experiments were used to tease out the relationship

between husbands and wives

 We found evidence of mutual generosity between spouses in dictator games

 We also found evidence that many wives were more ”hawkish” than their husbands when they played Hawk-Dove games with their spouses

– This indicates that many of them dear to stand up and demand their rights

29

(30)

ER FOR LAND TENURE

www.umb.no

Overall conclusion

 We have found strong evidence that the Ethiopian land registration and certification reform has been very successful also in

improving the conditions of women:

– Strenthened tenure security, income and food security of Female-headed households in Northern Ethiopia

– Strenthened land rights and empowerment of wives in male-headed households where joint land certification has been implemented in

Southern Ethiopia

(31)

www.umb.no

Thank you for your attention!

31