Political parties and War

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Political parties and War

Political Parties, Audience Constraints and International Conflict: A Panel Study

Nora Vedå Scheel

Department of Political Science Faculty of Social Sciences

UNIVERSITY OF OSLO

Word count: 25,599

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Political parties and War

Political Parties, Audience Constraints and International Conflict: A Panel Study

Nora Vedå Scheel

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Political parties and War

http://www.duo.uio.no/

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Abstract

This thesis examines the association between party institutionalization and various conflict outcomes across regime types. It argues that the institutionalization of political parties strengthens domestic audience constraints which in turn restrain leaders’

belligerence. Institutionalized parties are furthermore argued to be seen as more credible and eager to settle disputes peacefully. I call these three mechanisms through which party institutionalization affects conflict outcomes the audience constraint mechanism, the credibility mechanism, and the culture mechanism. Using different indicators for disputes and war, and data on 192 states between 1816 and 2014, this thesis examines within- and between-state effects of party institutionalization, militarized disputes, and war. Although past research has shown that domestic institutions restrain belligerence in democracies and that political elites restrain belligerence in autocracies, this study finds mixed results as to the effect of party institutionalization on state conflict patterns.

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Acknowledgements

I want to start this thesis by thanking my thesis supervisor Professor Tore Wig at the University of Oslo, for his excellent guidance and encouragement during the past year.

I also want to thankStiftelsen Fritt Ordfor giving me a student scholarship.

Thanks to Sigbjørn, Anna, Isak, Julie and Milana.

Nora Vedå Scheel Oslo, June 2021

Replication data and R-files can be found on GitHub¹ or provided upon request at:

nora_vedaa@hotmail.com

1https://github.com/NoraScheel/Thesis.git

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List of Figures

1.1 The development of Party institutionalization scores for Germany (1850-2019) . . . 5 3.1 A model of the relationship between audience constraints by political

elites (top-down) and the public (bottom-up) on the likelihood of dispute initiation by leaders . . . 28 3.2 Figure showing state-years where a state has initiated more than 5 milit-

arized interstate disputes, with corresponding party institutionalization index value (1816-2014). . . 31 4.1 Frequency of MID initiations and fatal MID initiations (1816-2014) . . . . 41 4.2 Overview of average Party Institutionalization Index scores by state

(1789-2019) . . . 45 4.3 Regional developments in Party Institutionalization index scores (1789-

2019) . . . 47 4.4 Distribution of hostility level for MIDs included in Data set 2 (1821-2014) 52 4.5 Distribution of outcome for MIDs included in Data set 2 (1821-2014) . . 53 4.6 Distribution of War outcome by coding scheme (1816-2007) . . . 56 4.7 Percentage missing by V-Dem variable by decade (1789-2019) . . . 60 4.8 Percentage missing on PI index variable by state’s averaged polyarchy

score (1789-2019) . . . 60 4.9 Percentage missing on PI index by state (1789-2019) . . . 60 5.1 Interaction effect between bottom-up in State i and bottom-up in State j

(model 2.1) . . . 70 5.2 Marginal effects Outcome (Model 4.4) . . . 77

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5.3 ROC curves for the logit models of MID initiation (H1/H2). The red line is generated for extensive model with the PI index (AUC=0.955).

Light blue line for baseline model with the PI index (AUC=0.941). Dark blue line for extensive model with top-down an bottom-up indices (AUC=0.957). . . 81 5.4 ROC curves for logit models of UseForce1 (H3). The red line is

generated for the extensive model with the PI index (AUC=0.645). The blue line is generated for for the extensive model with top-down and bottom-up indices (AUC=0.652). . . 82 5.5 ROC curves for logit models with UseForce2 (H3). The red line is

generated for the extensive model with the PI index (AUC=0.640).

The blue line is generated for the extensive model with top-down and bottom-up indices (AUC=0.653). . . 82 5.6 ROC curves for logit models with MID outcome (H5). The red line

is generated for the extensive model with the PI index (AUC=0.756).

The blue line is generated for the extensive model with top-down and bottom-up indices (AUC=0.759). . . 83 5.7 Change in the party institutionalization index (extended) and indi-

vidual variables in Germany from 1933 to 1950. . . 88 A.1 Comparison of the original PI index (Original) and the recreated index

following Bizzaro’s guidelines (Imputed). . . 104 A.2 The correlation between the Extended PI index (where missing PI index-

scores have been collected from the Imputed variable (seen in Figure A.1) and the original PI index . . . 105 A.3 Histogram of the distribution of PI index scores in the Original PI index. 106 A.4 Histogram of the distribution of PI index scores in the Extended PI index.107

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List of Tables

3.1 Summary of the hypotheses presented in Chapter 3 . . . 33

3.2 Summary of the predicted associations between party institutionalization scores and the various conflict outcomes . . . 34

4.1 Overview of data sets and corresponding hypotheses . . . 36

5.1 Descriptive Statistics for Data set 1 (Dyadic MID) . . . 62

5.2 Descriptive Statistics for Data set 2 (Monadic MID) . . . 63

5.3 Descriptive Statistics for Data set 3 (Monadic War) . . . 64

5.4 Party Institutionalization and MID initiation (1816-2014) . . . 66

5.5 Top-down and Bottom-up effects and MID initiation (1816-2014) . . . 69

5.6 Party institutionalization and use of force in MIDs (1816-2014) . . . 71

5.7 Top-down and bottom-up indices and the use of force in MIDs (1816-2014) 73 5.8 PI index, top-down and bottom-up indices and MID outcome (1816-2014) 74 5.9 Party institutionalization and war outcome (1823-2006) . . . 76

5.10 Top-down and bottom up indices and war outcome (1823-2006)) . . . 77

5.11 Proportions of leaders ousted within two years by, by war outcome (Croco/Weeks) . . . 79

5.12 Confusion matrix with proportions of correctly classified war outcomes (PI index). The model classification accuracy is 43.1 percent for model 4.3 and 64.52 percent for model 4.6. . . 84

5.13 Confusion matrix with proportions of correctly classified war outcomes (top-down and bottom-up indices). The model classification accuracy is 54,84 percent for model 4.15 and 44,26 percent for model 4.18. . . 84

5.14 Overview of the six hypothesis and the degree to which the empirical analysis supports them . . . 86

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B.1 Party Institutionalization and MID initiation (1900-2014) . . . 109

B.2 Table 5.8 (Chapter 5) with the inclusion of Party Platforms . . . 110

C.1 AIC test for hypothesis 1 (Model 1.6) . . . 112

C.2 AIC test for hypothesis 2 (Model 2.3) . . . 113

C.3 AIC test for hypothesis 5 (Model 5.3/5.6) . . . 114

C.4 AIC test for hypothesis 3 (Model 3.6/3.12) . . . 115

C.5 AIC test for hypothesis 4 (Model 4.3/4.6/4.18) . . . 116

C.6 Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) scores in selected model from hypothesis 1 and 2. . . 117

C.7 Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) scores in selected model from hypothesis 4, 3 and 5. . . 117

D.1 Robustness checks for hypothesis 1 (Model 1.6) . . . 119

D.3 Robustness check for hypothesis 5 (Model 5.3) . . . 121

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Chapter 1 Introduction

In the early spring of 1933, the far-right nationalist Adolf Hitler, a man formerly incarcerated for a failed coup d’état, was invited to power by establishment politicians in Germany. In a desperate attempt at regaining power, the establishment politicians sought to draw support from Hitler’s growing popularity and co-opt him at the same time. In the wake of World War I, Germany had been troubled by the economic and social disorder which lead to the elected government collapsing in 1930. To sideline communists and Nazis, President Hindenburg attempted to appoint an intermittent chancellor, but the minority government failed and a political stalemate ensued. As a last resort, they decided on Hitler. Within half a year of his appointment, Hitler had dissolved or overtaken political parties and political institutions, thereby smothering any constraints on his power. Six years later Nazi Germany invaded Poland on Adolf Hitler’s command, starting WWII (Levitsky and Ziblatt, 2018: 15; Jones, 2011: 215).

This leads me to the empirical puzzle inspiring this thesis; what opportunities and incentives do political parties have for affecting leaders’ conflict behavior? Recent papers have shown that various domestic elites influence leaders’ conflict behavior (Wig et al., 2020; Weeks, 2014). In Cui Bono? Business Elites and Interstate Conflict, Wig and colleagues explore how business elites influence state conflict behavior. This thesis picks up on their work by extending it to additional types of domestic elites. In particular by exploring how party elites, for which there today is little understanding, influence interstate conflict.

WWII is estimated to have killed around 65 million people making it the deadliest war known (Braumoeller, 2019: 3). Moreover, it is estimated that Nazi Germany killed

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around 20 million people, even excluding military combat or war deaths. The sheer vastness of the numbers prompted a scholar to exclaim that “power kills, absolute power kills absolutely” (Rummel, 1992: 11; Rummel, 1998). The citation alludes to what scholars callthe Democratic Peace, the empirical discovery that democracies have a minuscule likelihood of fighting other democracies, and that when democracies do decide to initiate wars they are shorter, less deadly, and more likely to end in victory compared to autocracies (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006: 218; Reiter and Stam, 2010). The idea that democracies operate under inherently different constraints than autocracies dates back to the 18^th century (Kant, 1795/2006). Though it is an old theory, research efforts intensified after a sociologist discovered that democracies indeed have a dismal likelihood of starting wars with other democracies (Babst, 1964). Consequently, much of the research on national constraints on leaders has been explored through the lens of regime type (De Mesquita et al., 2003; Gandhi, 2008; Weeks, 2014; Hegre et al., 2020; Hyde and Saunders, 2020). Needless to say, domestic level factors alone cannot explain the whole picture of why states chose to engage in wars, and research has revealed that many factors present at the individual, national and international level increase states’ likelihood of initiating war and military interstate disputes (Horowitz et al., 2015; Vasquez, 1995; Oneal and Russet, 1997 ; Levy and Thompson, 2011).

What some of the most impactful theoretical contributions on domestic factors have in common, is the use of audience constraint theory¹to explain the mechanisms that inhibit state leaders’ belligerence (Hyde and Saunders, 2020; Fearon, 1994). Past research has shown that various national-level factors often seen in democracies, like social, horizontal, and vertical accountability, are related to lower conflict initiation amongst democracies (Hegre et al., 2020). Other empirical contributions show that certain autocratic elites are as averse in their conflict initiation preferences as democratic voters (Weeks, 2012). Central to these arguments of constraints is the idea that state leaders rely on support coalitions to retain their position (De Mesquita

1The concept of audience costswas first popularized by Fearon. Audience constraints is a broader concept than audience costs in two ways; first, it includes many types of different domestic actors, and secondly, it applies to a more general set of issues than merely backing down from a threat in crisis bargaining as initially advanced by Fearon.

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et al., 2003). Most state leaders have political goals they want to achieve whilst in office, but a prerequisite for achieving these is that they manage to hold on to their power (De Mesquita et al., 2003). States vary in whether or not domestic audiences have the power to constrain leaders. Some leaders are largely insulated from being deposed by domestic agents, like the Kims in North Korea, and can do as they please (Weeks, 2014; 40). Other leaders are to varying degrees relying on domestic support groups. Whether it is a broad or a narrow coalition, a formal or an informal coalition, these coalitions force leaders to consider their preferences, which means they can inflict audience constraints. It is this dependency on domestic support or support coalitions that create the domestic political constraints that leaders face. For democratic leaders, the support group is often considered the electorate, which can punish leaders for unpopular choices in elections (De Mesquita et al., 2003). Other leaders face smaller domestic support groups, which range from social or military elites to business elites (Weeks, Wig). Clearly, regime type and the corresponding domestic political institutions they bring with them set default levels of constraints that leaders have to navigate (Hyde and Saunders, 2020).

Historically, the research field has been divided along the lines of regime type, and only recently begun to uncover types of domestic constraints present in both democracies and autocracies (Hyde and Saunders, 2020). Yet, past research has shown that certain types of autocracies achieve similar foreign policy outcomes as democracies (Weeks, 2012). Consequently, there is a growing interest in using characteristics that cut across regime type to explain similarities in policy choices and international outcomes (Hyde and Saunders, 2020). This thesis seeks to build on this insight, and investigate whether aspects of political parties affect states’ dispute and conflict behavior, across regime types. More specifically, I will use an audience constraints framework to explore how features of political parties can strengthen audience constraints, both directly by political parties and indirectly by citizens, and how this in turn influence states international conflict behavior. My research question is as follows:

Research Question: How does the institutionalization of political parties affect their motivations and ability to influence leaders’ decisions about interstate war and conflict?

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Focusing on the belligerence of both democratic and autocratic states, this thesis argues that features of political parties also play an important role in shaping states’

foreign policy in a more peaceful direction. Building on former theoretical frameworks from the audience cost literature, this thesis will analyze how states’ level of party institutionalization strengthens potential audience constraints posed by party elites and party members, and how this, in turn, affects conflict initiation. The argument presented and tested in this thesis can be synthesized as follows; certain features of political parties shape their incentives for – and capabilities of – constraining leaders’

decisions about war and peace. Even though there are many domestic actors which can exert or strengthen audience constraints (i.e., civil society organizations or the media), I argue that political elites have an especially important role in this (Hegre et al., 2020; Hyde and Saunders, 2020). I hypothesize that there are several mechanisms through which political parties can affect regimes’ conflict patterns. For one, political parties and politicians often have strong cultures for solving disagreements and reaching mutually beneficial agreements, which makes negotiations a preferred way to solve disputes with other countries. Political parties also have the ability to sanction party members that stray from party lines, either ex-ante or ex-post (Snyder Jr and Ting, 2002: 93; Levitsky and Ziblatt, 2018: 20). Moreover, political parties nominate their leaders and ministers, which enables them to filter out erratic and dangerous individuals. This is why, in How democracies die, Levitsky and Ziblatt argue that political parties and political elites are “the gatekeepers of democracy” (Levitsky and Ziblatt, 2018: 20). Clearly, Hitler’s choice to dismantle existing political parties was an efficient way to eliminate constraints on his power.

To evaluate features of political parties I use a new measure from the Varieties of Democracy(V-Dem) data set; the Party Institutionalization index (Bizzarro et al., 2017).

The V-Dem Party Institutionalization index is an indicator that evaluates the degree to which political parties are stable, imposes long-term goals, and engage with the public (Bizzarro et al., 2017). It allows for exploring various features of political parties, such as how coherent parties are and whether or not they are well connected with citizens.

Another interesting feature of the Party Institutionalization index is the possibility of dividing these features into top-down and bottom-up features, which allows for the testing of other more fine-tuned predictions. Figure 1.1 shows the development in

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Figure 1.1:The development of Party institutionalization scores for Germany (1850-2019)

Party Institutionalization index scores after Hitler rose to power in 1933.² The Party Institutionalization index displays a lot of variation, especially so among autocracies, which aligns with Week’s finding that autocracies also vary in their levels of domestic audience constraints (Weeks, 2012).

To test whether party institutionalization strengthens audience constraints which in turn affect leaders’ belligerence, I employ a theoretical framework and research design inspired by Week’s book Dictators at War and Peace and Wig et al.’s article on business elites (Weeks, 2014; Wig et al., 2020). In this regard, I propose three mechanisms by which party institutionalization affects conflict: theaudience constraints mechanism, the credibility mechanism, and the culture mechanism. I theorize that when parties are highly institutionalized the mechanisms of audience constraints are strengthened both by members of political parties, which I refer to as party elite constraints, and the demos, termed citizen constraints. In accordance with much of the literature, I assume that thedemosare averse to war, but that elite preferences may vary depending on whether or not they are accountable to the public (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006; De Mesquita et al., 2003; Weeks, 2014).

The results of the empirical evidence presented in Chapter 5 provides mixed support for the theorized audience constraints stemming from institutionalized parties. There are indications that leaders in states where parties are highly institutionalized, and where political parties are more engaged with – and attuned

2The Party Institutionalization index is not coded during the period from 1935 to 1950 due to legislatures not being in session. I discuss this issue and potential solutions in detail in Chapter 4.

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to – the preferences of citizens, are indeed more constrained in their belligerence. The empirical analysis consequently provides ample avenues for future investigations into the relationship between political parties are leaders’ belligerence levels.

1.1 Outline of the thesis

The structure of this thesis is as follows; Chapter 2 introduces and reviews the scholarly debate on some of the key concepts relevant to this thesis; the democratic peace, domestic political institutions, and party institutionalization. Chapter 3 outlines the theoretical framework, from which a number of empirically testable hypotheses related to the effects of party institutionalization on conflict initiation are derived. Chapter 4 presents the quantitative research design I employ to test these hypotheses. The results of the analysis are reported and discussed in Chapter 5, along with robustness checks. Lastly, Chapter 6 offers concluding remarks on this thesis as a whole.

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Chapter 2 Literature Review

The theoretical framework of my thesis builds on three research fields in International Relations; theories on theDemocratic Peace, Theories of Domestic political institutions and audience constraints, and Theories of Party Institutionalization. What explains states’ propensity to engage in war and militarized conflict? The discovery of the democratic peace unleashed a tsunami of research on domestic level factors, which to a large degree has viewed democracies and autocracies and inherently different in their levels of belligerence. A relatively new area of research has been that of domestic political institutions and audience constraints, which show that democratic and autocratic leaders often face similar constraints, depending on the domestic audiences they rely on for their continuation in power. Political parties constitute such a domestic audience, and have been explored in relation to authoritarian leaders’

belligerence (Weeks, 2014; Gandhi, 2008), and in democracies (Hegre et al., 2020).

However, there is still a lack of research on the constraints of domestic elites that cut across regime type (Hyde and Saunders, 2020), and particularly so when considering party elites.

2.1 Theories of the Democratic Peace

International relations scholars have long tried to explain the difference in states’

belligerent foreign policy choices. Early scholars had a strong focus on system- level variables in their study of war. Later, in the 1970s, scholars began uncovering organizational- and individual-level factors influencing states’ likelihood of initiating

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war (Levy and Thompson, 2011: 84). In 1964, an important contribution to the field was made by sociologist Dean Voris Babst, with the discovery that between 1789 to 1941, “no wars had been fought between independent nations with elective governments” (Babst, 1964: 10). Solving simple fractions, Babst also showed that democracies regularly fought against autocracies, and engaged in colonial wars.

Babst concluded that diplomatic efforts to increase the number of democracies could increase the chances of maintaining peace (Babst, 1964: 14). Today, the scholarly understanding of the ‘democratic peace’ has been expanded to include a handful of other empirically established findings. Compared to autocracies, democracies are more likely to win wars, they fight shorter wars when they initiate conflicts, they experience fewer battle deaths, they more often engage in conflict-management when disputing other democracies, but they also fight non-democracies with regularity (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006: 218).

The democratic peace has been probed and tested with various critiques and explanations since its proposition. The early debate on the democratic peace proposition centered around its actuality, with some contributions contesting this (Small and Singer, 1976), but later contributions reaffirmed the initial findings of Babst (Doyle, 1983: 213). Controversies in the 1990s included realist critiques positing that domestic features of states should have minimal influence in states’ foreign policy behavior, and cultural critiques which stemmed from the discomfort that the findings could serve as “a scientific permit to missionary foreign and security policies by Western democracies” (Maoz, 1997: 163). Today, the controversy around the democratic peace centers not around whether it is an empirical fact, but rather, which causal mechanisms explain it (Dixon and Senese, 2002:547; Maoz, 1997: 162; Oneal and Russet, 1997; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006: 218).

Even so, the discovery led to an increasing interest in understanding societal- or domestic-level factors influencing belligerence among states. Since the 1990s, various explanatory models have been proposed. One such being the democratic norms and culture model (Rasler and Thompson, 2005: 7). The causal logic of the norms model is that democracies socialize political elites and leaders to follow the norms of non- violent conflict resolution and negotiation and that democratic states respect and trust each other for adhering to the same norms as themselves (Rosato, 2003: 586). However,

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the explanation that democracies externalize domestic norms in their foreign relations has been strongly critiqued, seeing that they engage in imperialist wars and sometimes even covert interventions in other democracies (De Mesquita et al., 2003: 221; Rosato, 2003; Downes and Lilley, 2010: 303).

Another emerging explanation for the democratic peace was the democratic institutional constraints model. Here, specific democratic features such as checks and balances, the dispersion of power, and the free media, constrain belligerence as democratic leaders have to secure broad support from constituents (Levy and Thompson, 2011: 110). Freedom of the press and open political processes make it easy to sanction leaders, and hold them accountable when they stray from what the public wishes (Rosato, 2003: 587). However, like the democratic norms model, the democratic institutional constraints model fails to explain why states engage in imperial wars. The model also assumes that leaders have a more warlike nature than their constituents, though later research has shown that leaders vary greatly in their propensity to use violence (Levy and Thompson, 2011: 110; Horowitz et al., 2015; Weeks, 2014).

An alternative institutional explanation was proposed by Bueno de Mesquita and his colleagues in their seminal book The logic of political survival (De Mesquita et al., 2003). Their selectorate model introduced the concepts of aselectorate, consisting of all residents who can vote, and a winning coalition, the subgroup of the selectorate who maintain the incumbent in office and in turn receive beneficial payoffs. The authors were puzzled by why political institutions shape the goals of some leaders to produce peace and prosperity, whilst for others, institutional arrangements fail to discourage

“war, misery, and famine” (De Mesquita et al., 2003: 9). The reason, they argue, is that a leader’s main goal is to stay in office, which reflects on their policy choices. When the winning coalition is small compared to the selectorate, leaders can make payoffs in terms of private goods to ensure continued support. When the winning coalition is large compared to the selectorate, leaders shift to distributing public goods to ensure continued support. States with large winning coalitions, typically democracies, are more sensitive to war outcomes. This is because war diverts resources away from the provision of public goods by which leaders are evaluated. The selectorate model also explains other features of the democratic peace; for example, that large winning- coalition states will invest more to win wars, and avoid fighting if they expect to

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lose. Small winning-coalition states are better off investing less in war and more into their winning-coalition, which typically means they lose more wars but face a lower risk of being deposed if defeated (De Mesquita et al., 2003: 224-225). And because democratic leaders benefit from successful wars, they have no issue with engaging in wars with weaker autocracies or in imperial wars where the balance of power often is asymmetrical (Levy and Thompson, 2011: 113). Another great feature of the selectorate model is that it explains belligerence using concepts that vary both in democracies and autocracies, unlike the former models.

2.2 Theories of Domestic Political institutions and Audi- ence constraints

The selectorate model posits that the politics of survival in office is the essence of politics because it is every leader’s primary goal. It is a prerequisite for achieving other political goals (De Mesquita et al., 2003). To ensure their own survival, leaders choose and implement policies that increase their chance of staying in power.

Consequently, leaders face domestic political constraints derived from the preferences of their constituents (Weeks, 2014: 14). These political constraints take two general forms. Ex-ante constraints can prevent a leader from choosing or implementing certain belligerent foreign policies at all (Weeks, 2014: 14). However, ex-ante constraints can also prevent leaders from swiftly responding during times of crisis, so most leaders have a certain room for action. Ex-post accountability, on the other hand, manifests as either punishment or reward based on the outcome of the conflict. Examples of rewards include being reelected or having a boost in popularity, whilst punishments include a drop in popularity or even a potential ouster from power.

States vary in which groups or audiences have the power to constrain leaders.

This division of power can be the outcome of both formal and informal processes.

In their book Economic origins of dictatorship and democracy, Acemoglu and Robinson merge formal and informal when they argue that intermittent shifts ofde factopower to the public can weaken thede jurepolitical power of the political elite (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006). Central to their theory is the argument that political institutions are

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an important middle step between power and policy outcomes, as they regulate the future allocation of political power between various social groups. To secure formal political power, citizens will try to use the leverage of shifts inde factopower to have the elite set up political institutions which translates the public’sde facto power into long-termde jurepower.

The early contributions on audience constraints often regarded the constraints on power in democracies as inherently different than in autocracies, due to the formal institutional power held by citizens. Kant develops this idea in his book from 1795, where he discusses the possibility of the perpetual peace and argues that if the agreement of citizens is required for leaders to wage war, then citizens will be very reluctant to “enter such a terrible game” (Kant, 1795/2006: 75). However, if the leader of the state is not a ‘citizen’ but ‘the owner of the state’, he may decide to go to war for insignificant reasons, because such decisions do not influence his ability to continue his lavish lifestyle. Yet, recent research has shown that constraints are present in both types of regimes. Weeks show how dictators, which frequently lack constraints stemming from political institutions, often face constraints from social elites (Weeks, 2014). Moreover, she finds that dictators constrained by social elites, a group argued to be as averse to war as broad democratic audiences, are no more likely to initiate conflict than leaders in democracies. A more recent contribution by Wig et al. shows that even business elites have particular preferences that influence states’ interstate conflict behavior (Wig et al., 2020). Consequently, how power is divided institutionally matters when assessing the likelihood of conflict, but so does who holds the power vis-a-vis the leader.

So far, domestic political institutions have been argued to distribute and secure de jure power among constituents, and enable elites to give credible commitments of future allocations of power to the public (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006).

However, in her book Political Institutions under Dictatorship, Gandhi finds that nominally democratic institutions (i.e., legislatures and political parties) play an important role in the operation and survival of authoritarian regimes (Gandhi, 2008).

Rather than securing peace and promoting welfare, autocratic leaders often rely on political institutions as a beneficial tool for organizing regime cooperation, extracting information, and making concessions to groups that threaten their survival.

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What differentiates the domestic political institutions in democracies versus those in autocracies? The fact that democratic and autocratic leaders often achieve similar levels of domestic constraints and similar international outcomes, as shown by Weeks, has led to questions of whether binary regime types are at all useful differentiations when predicting variations in conflict initiation (Weeks, 2014). Hyde and Saunders’

recent contribution argues that regime types - domestic political institutions that govern the interaction between leaders, elites, and the mass public - indeed matter, as they set divergent default levels of domestic audience constraint (Hyde and Saunders, 2020). But, the authors also point to another emerging cluster of studies that explain similarities in policy choices and international outcomes using characteristics that cut across regime type (Hyde and Saunders, 2020: 369). This thesis seeks to add to the audience constraints literature, by arguing that political parties also matter, both as a political institution and as a source of elite preferences and constraint.

2.3 Theories of Party institutionalization

Political parties are complex organizations that differ from each other in many ways, but one simple definition states that political parties are organizations composed of political elites which engage in election activities and manage political power (Bizzarro et al., 2020: 3). Political parties can have vastly different functions, as past research on political parties in autocracies has revealed. For example, Gandhi finds that democratic institutions (i.e., political parties and legislatures) can be useful in authoritarian regimes, for example by helping leaders manage elite conflicts or by facilitating the distribution of concessions and spoils (Gandhi, 2008). The existence of local party branches can help mobilize support and be used to monitor or suppress opposition groups. Well-organized parties are also a must for organizing fraudulent activities, like ballot-box stuffing, and gaining legislative control, which can be used to further solidify authoritarian rule (Levitsky and Way, 2010: 61-63; Gandhi, 2008;

Wilson, 2017).

The concept of party institutionalization was developed to better capture differences between parties. Party institutionalization is a much-used concept in international relations literature, though there has been less clarity or consistency as to

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what institutionalization involves (Randall and Svåsand, 2002). Various dimensions have been proposed to encompass the term; adaptability and systemness (coherence/complexity) (Panebianco, 1988), ‘value infusion’ (Levitsky, 1998), external institutionalization (Janda, 1980) and autonomy (Huntington, 1968).

Moreover, party institutionalization and party system institutionalization are two distinct and differing concepts. The former refers to countries where individual parties are institutionalized, but there can be few parties or be unrealistic for others than a specific party to win. Partysysteminstitutionalization, on the other hand, extends from party institutionalization in that it has both an internal and an external component, which includes even competition amongst parties based on a “fair distribution of public subsidies, access to media and legal protection” (Randall and Svåsand, 2002:

8). The two concepts can be at odds. For example in China, where the Communist Party of China is highly institutionalized, but since there is no real opposition the party system institutionalization is low (Randall and Svåsand, 2002). A different example is Sri Lanka, where the Sinhalese majority group attained a ‘deep hegemonic’ power, as the state’s major source of institutional party strength was based on a majoritarian and exclusive ethnic group (Rampton, 2011). In this case, a high party institutionalization monopolizes the electorate and hinders party competition.

In the past, party institutionalization has been shown to support regime survival in autocracies (Gandhi, 2008), economic growth, and the adoption of extensive and universal welfare policies in both democracies and autocracies (Bizzarro et al., 2017;

Rasmussen and Knutsen, 2017), and income redistribution policies in autocracies (Pelke, 2020). Weeks finds that leaders in autocracies that are constrained by civil elites, which could be monarchical or political party elites, have lower rates of conflict initiation (Weeks, 2014). Some scholars have also explored how political institutionalization influences the risk of civil conflict in autocracies (Fjelde, 2010).

Past research consequently indicates that political parties influence various types of domestic developments; from the adoption of extensive welfare policies across regime type, to lower rates or international conflict in autocracies.

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Chapter 3 Theoretical framework

This chapter presents a theoretical framework for how party institutionalization affects states’ conflict patterns. It begins by defining the main concepts and building blocks used to construct the framework. Next, lending from various international relations theories, the theoretical framework, and accompanying hypothesis are presented.

Through the lens of audience constraints theory, it explores who the actors are, what their preferences are, and whether they are able to inflict audience constraints. It then goes on to use this framework to theorize how institutionalized parties affect leaders’

foreign policy choices across various types of conflict outcomes. The overarching argument presented in this chapter is that the institutionalization of political parties strengthens their abilities and incentives to avoid militarized conflicts.

3.1 Main Concepts and their definitions

The main concepts used in this thesis are; political parties and party institutionalization, domestic audience constraints, and international militarized conflict.

3.1.1 Political parties and Party institutionalization

Schumpeter defines a party as a “group whose members propose to act in concert in the competitive struggle for political power” (Schumpeter, 1994; 283). This is a minimalist’s definition, and later contributions underline that political parties are complex organizations that at the very least are composed of political elites, engage in

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election activities, and manage political power (Bizzarro et al., 2020: 3).

Comparing political parties across regimes is challenging, but a recent way to conceptualize differences between parties has been to ask about parties’ degree of institutionalization (Bizzarro et al., 2017; 2020). The workings of political parties are then scored against an “ideal type” of a party that is stable, imposes long- term goals instead of individual elites’ short-term goals, and engages and connects with the public (Bizzarro et al., 2017). Since 2017, the V-Dem data set includes a party institutionalization index which measures states’ party institutionalization by evaluating the degree to which parties have permanent organizations and permanent local branches, distinct party platforms, party cohesion (i.e., whether members vote with their party), and what the most common linkages to constituents are (Bizzarro et al., 2017; 2020). When using the concept of party institutionalization I refer to Bizzaro’s definition (Bizzarro et al., 2017).

3.1.2 Domestic audience constraints

The concept of audience cost was first popularized by Fearon, in his articleDomestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes (Fearon, 1994). Fearon argued that international conflicts are “public events in which domestic audiences observe and assess the performance of the leadership” (Fearon, 1994: 577). If leaders back down from – or lose – conflicts, they suffer audience costs. Moreover, greater audience costs improve states’ ability to commit and signal resolve to fight, as empty commitments spark negative reactions, especially among politically active citizens (Fearon, 1994: 581). According to Fearon, relevant domestic audiences have included kings, opposition politicians, politburos, and the mass public informed by mass media (Fearon, 1994: 581).

Fearons’ definition of audience cost views domestic political institutions and the following audience costs as relatively sticky. In a more recent contribution, Hyde and Saunders argue that domestic political institutions provide leaders with a default level of domestic audience constraints, but that leaders can increase or decrease these (Hyde and Saunders, 2020). A leader’s ability to shape audience constraints means that autocracies and democracies can become temporarily more

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or less constrained without changing regime type. However, opening up for higher audience constraints does pose risks for regimes. Especially so for autocracies, where increasing audience constraints are more likely to trigger regime change. In essence, this means that audience constraints are both based on institutions and malleable by leaders. Hyde and Saunders’s concept of “domestic audience constraints” builds on Fearon’s “domestic audience costs”, but diverts in two ways. First, it considers many types of different audiences, ranging from opposition politicians to the mass public’s informed by the media, or as in Weeks framework; elite constraints (Hyde and Saunders, 2020: 370; Weeks, 2014: Weeks, 2012). Second, by looking at audience constraints instead of audience costs, Hyde and Saunders go beyond looking at costs of backing down from threats in crisis bargaining, as described by Fearon. When using the concept of audience constraints, I refer to Hyde and Saunders’s definition (Hyde and Saunders, 2020).

3.1.3 International Militarized Conflict

The focus of this thesis is both on the onset of militarized interstate disputes and on interstate war. By interstate war, I refer to a “sustained, coordinated violence between political organizations” (i.e., states), where the element of violence separates it from other types of interstate conflict (Levy and Thompson, 2011: 5).

Many international conflicts operate at lower levels of intensity, and militarized interstate disputes are conflicts that stop short of war. To define militarized disputes, I use Maoz’ definition of Militarized Interstate Disputes (MIDs), defined as a “set of incidents involving the deliberate, overt, government-sanctioned, and government- directed threat, display or use of force between two or more states” (Maoz et al., 2019:

812; Gochman and Maoz, 1984: 587). MIDs range from high-level hostile acts such as attacks, to low-level hostile acts such as threats to use force.

3.2 Party institutionalization and conflict

Using the concepts outlined above, I will now create a theoretical framework for how party institutionalization affects conflict and war. Past empirical research has

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shown that informal elites and formal institutions are related to conflict initiation in states (Weeks, 2014, Hegre et al., 2020). Yet, these contributions look at factors present in either democracies or autocracies, instead of characteristics that cut across regime type. Comparing the levels of institutionalization of parties is a way to explore audience constraints in both democracies and autocracies. According to Hyde and Saunders, audience constraints include both structural and strategic sources of constraint, and political parties are what Hyde and Saunders call structural sources of constraint. They are “relatively durable domestic institutional forces that set a default level and range of constraint associated with a given regime type” (Hyde and Saunders, 2020: 371). In addition to structural sources, strategic sources of constraint can be present. Strategic sources include various actions leaders can take within the institutionally defined range to “alter the size, composition, information or political activation of relevant domestic audiences” (Hyde and Saunders, 2020: 371).

In this regard, I propose three mechanisms by which party institutionalization affects conflict: the audience constraints mechanism, the credibility mechanism, and the culture mechanism. The first mechanism is theaudience constraints mechanism; In states with higher party institutionalization, leaders face higher domestic constraints on power. The more powerful the domestic audience, the more likely leaders are to be punished or removed from power if making unpopular decisions about war and conflict. This will result in leaders being pickier about entering a conflict, engaging only when victory is ensured, and investing more in winning when they enter.

Second, these higher audience constraints also induce the credibility mechanism; the presence of audience constraints means that opponents will view a state as more credible in its signals of intentions and capabilities in conflict, limiting escalations due to miscalculations about capabilities or intentions, or misunderstandings due to disunited regimes sending mixed signals. Third, institutionalized parties engage the culture mechanism; in addition to providing constraints on leaders, institutionalized political parties develop cultures for negotiating and reaching mutually beneficial agreements which they can apply in the international context. In disputes with similar states, they are more likely to misinterpret actions or interpret them as hostile which facilitates peaceful negotiations.

These mechanisms have implications for states’ monadic and dyadic behavior in

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conflict and their general conflict patterns. I will now explain each mechanism in more detail before I present the dyadic and monadic predictions.

3.2.1 Audience constraints mechanism

To develop the argument of the audience constraints mechanism, I first detail a framework that explores what types of domestic constraints leaders face, how these relate to party institutionalization, and how these translate into potential costs or benefits of using, or not using, military force abroad. The presence of domestic audience constraints requires thata) a leader faces an audience,b) that these audiences have their own preferences (that may deviate from the leaders), and c) that the members of this audience have the power to impose costs on the leader (Weeks, 2014;

Hyde and Saunders, 2020). Moreover, Hyde and Saunders’s framework stipulates that domestic audiences need the information to judge what is happening, and enough concern about the issue for it to be politically relevant (Hyde and Saunders, 2020: 370).

Relevant audiences and actors

So which are the relevant audiences in this theoretical framework? I consider three types of audiences in the political party sphere; the executive leader (and central leadership), political elites, meaning politicians across political parties, and the political audience, which consists of individual voters or party constituents.

Depending on the size of the electorate, this could be the general public or a subdivision of the public that is larger than the political elite but smaller than the general public.

All democratic leaders, and some authoritarian leaders, are accountable to some domestic groups which support their continuation in office. This support coalition can be the general public and political elites, which is common in democracies, or some smaller powerful domestic audience, which is more common in autocracies (Weeks, 2014: 5; Hegre et al., 2020).

In states with party institutionalization scores at the lower end of the spectrum, the competition between audiences and concessions by leaders are done outside the political party sphere. These audiences are likely to be informal elites and include

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various compositions of elites from the military, businesses, or civilian elites (Weeks, 2014; Wig et al., 2020). These elites can form from having some characteristics in common, such as being from the military, belonging to certain ethnic groups, or simply being rich and resourceful (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006). In states with party institutionalization scores at the higher end of the spectrum, the norms for competition between audiences and concessions by leaders are done within the political party sphere. In this case, the audiences are likely to be formalized political elites with stated preferences and their constituents.

Their preferences

Which preferences do political elites and political audiences have? In the literature on audience costs actors are assumed rational, meaning they are not unequivocally opposed to military conflict on normative grounds, but form preferences based on the perceptions of the potential benefits and costs of fighting (Weeks, 2014: 15).

Determining their preference for war, actors evaluate and weigh the positive and negative aspects of a specific war. Potential positive aspects include the likelihood – and potential benefits – of winning. Potential negative aspects to be considered include the cost of fighting, the potential costs of a military defeat, or even potential sanctions by other states.

Early insight from Kant, has led many scholars to argue that mass democratic public’s are averse to the use of force because it is viewed as materially costly and/or morally undesirable (Weeks, 2014: 16). Yet, wars can also be used to boost the popularity of incumbents and engage the public to support wars, by so-called “rally

’round the flag”’ effects, if only for a short time (Levy and Thompson, 2011: 100). Even so, wars are costly endeavors that can disrupt trade and destroy infrastructure and redirect spending that has formerly been spent on common goods, and citizens often bear the burden of these costs (Weeks, 2014: 21). States that are highly institutionalized and where the electorates’ ability to inflict audience costs are higher are expected to be more attuned to the wishes of the average voter (Rasmussen and Knutsen, 2017), which is an audience perceived to be averse to military conflict initiation. However, it is also worth noticing that democracies often manage to finance wars in ways that conceal the actual costs for the electorate, which ties into Hyde and Saunders’

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argument about leaders being able to strategically alter audience constraints (Hyde and Saunders, 2020; Flores-Macıas and Kreps, 2013).

For party elites, their preferences are likely to differ, depending on whether or not they in turn are accountable to the general public. In states where the electorate covers a sizable share of the population, the preferences of party elites are likely to converge with that of the mass public (De Mesquita et al., 2003). If the electorate they rely on is small, it will be easier for party elites to insulate themselves from the negative consequences of war. In states where the electorate covers a small share of the population, the preferences of party elites are likely to converge with that of the elites or winning coalition in the regime. Earlier contributions argue that leaders in autocratic regimes are more willing to use force because they are less accountable to ordinary citizens (Weeks, 2014: 2). It is easier for autocratic leaders to ensure the necessary payoffs for elites (i.e., a small winning coalition) even if they redirect resources to the conflict. So long as leaders ensure payoffs to the elites, they are less likely to experience negative audience costs of initiating conflict (De Mesquita et al., 2003). However, Weeks argues that autocratic leaders have differing abilities to initiate conflict, as different types of elites have different types of preferences concerning using military force, which in turn shape constraints on leaders. Amongst authoritarian elites, Weeks argues that civilian elites¹ have the highest aversion to war, on par with that of democratic audiences, and therefore the highest constraining effect on leaders. The reason being that elites are likely to feel the negative impacts of war, as their economic interests are likely to be negatively influenced by the disruption to infrastructure and trade (Weeks, 2014: 21). Party elites’ preferences concerning war are therefore likely to vary with regime type, type of elite, and whether or not the elite is constrained by political audiences.

Though many of the most notable contributions to the audience constraint literature make similar assumptions about how audiences view the costs and benefits of using force, to infer audiences’ preferences (Weeks, 2014; De Mesquita et al., 2003),

1Weeks argues that the costs and benefits of winning are evaluated differently by different domestic audiences. She distinguishes between civilian and military elites. Civilian elites can be political parties or monarchical families, which are more skeptical about resorting to violence. Military elites consist of military officers, which are more likely to view the use of military force as routine and low-cost.

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this is a simplification of the real world. As of now, the literature seeks to explain preferences through “material factors” (i.e., benefits and costs), but there are research initiatives underway to better understand how cultural norms, which may vary between cultures, affect audiences’ acceptance of and support for uses of violence.²

Their ability to inflict audience constraints

So far I have outlined the preferences of the actors and argued that citizens are averse to militarized conflict and that elites are too when accountable to the public. But do they have the ability to inflict costs on leaders? The ability to inflict audience cost necessitates that domestic audiences have the power to do so. Power can be fleeting if it is obtained de facto (i.e., attained due to wealth or violence). Political power is solidified when audiences acquire de jure political power, which happens when power is conceded to domestic audiences and institutionalized. As such, party institutionalization strengthens both the party elite’s and citizens’ power and ability to inflict costs today and in the future. In The Economic origins of Democracies and Dictatorships, Acemoglu and Robinson argue that institutional arrangements can be a benefit or a draw from the perspective of the ruling elite, citizens, and support coalitions as it shifts the distribution of power among actors (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006).

Features of party institutionalization shift the power in favor of the preferences of citizens, strengthening their ability to exert audience constraints. For instance, political parties that have a broad geographical presence (i.e., local party branches) are better adept at aggregating voter preferences which in turn will influence which policies are pursued. Local party meetings allow citizens to voice their opinions on political matters and steer party policy in their preferred direction. The way in which political parties reward constituents also matters. Parties can form clientelistic linkages, where they provide money or goods in return for constituents’ support, or they can form programmatic linkages, where constituents respond to a party’s position on a topic or general visions for society. These differences between parties influence the policies

2The University of Oslo is currently planning a project to uncover what citizens actually think about the general morality of using violence for political ends, and how this relates to the occurrence of violence (MoViCon).

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they pursue. Moreover, local elections and local party branches also enable citizens to voice their dismay and punish politicians that stray from the negotiated line of policy by retracting their support or vote. In turn, this impacts state leaders, through the aforementioned power political parties have vis-à-vis leaders, as well as directly through elections.

Features of party institutionalization also shift the power in favor of political parties, strengthening their ability to exert audience constraints vis-à-vis leaders. For instance, parties with a strong party organization are better able to monitor and sanction party members. Political parties can both engage in ex-ante filtering of party members and party leaders based on their suitability for office (Levitsky and Ziblatt, 2018: 24), and ex-post by sanctioning or rewarding members by their adherence to the established culture (Adair and Brett, 2004:158). Institutionalized parties are also more adept at negotiating agreements amongst themselves and with other parties, making rash decisions about conflict less likely. A higher degree of political institutionalization gives more stable parties that pursue the parties’ long-term goals instead of short- term individual goals. Consequently, institutionalized parties are less likely to seek out militarized conflicts, both because they pursue long-term goals and because they aggregate citizens’ preferences.

In their article from 2017, Rasmussen and Knutsen name these features the top- down and bottom-up mechanisms. Top-down refers to parties’ ability to discipline members and attain party coherence. Bottom-up refers to parties’ ability to aggregate preferences – and interact with – citizens (Rasmussen and Knutsen, 2017). Even in settings where both elites (via top-down mechanisms) and citizens (via bottom- up mechanisms) have the ability to inflict audience costs in highly institutionalized countries, political elites have an especially important role to strengthen these mechanisms. InHow democracies die, Levitsky and Ziblatt argue that political parties and political elites are “the gatekeepers of democracy” (Levitsky and Ziblatt, 2018: 20).

First off, political elites and political parties serve as filters for the selection of good leaders (Levitsky and Ziblatt, 2018). Secondly, citizens often rely on political elites for cues to form their decision-making on political issues. They do this both because issues are complex, but also as a way to save time and effort when forming their opinions (Gilens and Murakawa, 2002). Thirdly, leaders are aware of these cue-giving

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mechanisms and can influence which cues reach the public by trying to accommodate or bargain with advisers (Saunders, 2018).

Consequently, the mechanisms which tie party institutionalization to audience constraints can be summarized as follows; firstly, party institutionalization increases citizens’ ability to co-determine policy and punish leaders after unpopular decisions regarding conflicts. Secondly, it increases party elites’ ability to co-determine policy choices and punish leaders. As party institutionalization activates audience constraints, leaders of these states will be more careful in choosing which wars and conflicts they initiate, as losing a conflict can unleash punishment. For these reasons, leaders have strong incentives to align their foreign policy choices with the preferences of the elite and citizens.

3.2.2 Credibility mechanism

As states reach higher levels of audience constraints other states are likely to view them as more credible in their threats and resolve to fight (Fearon, 1994). Whilst the audience constraint mechanisms theorize how audiences can constrain leaders internally in a country, the credibility mechanisms affect conflict externally (i.e., in relations to other states).

Firstly, states, where parties are highly institutionalized, are more likely to allocate ample resources in winning because a defeat is likely to affect their reelection opportunities (De Mesquita et al., 2003). These states are therefore better able to send credible signals about their intentions, which makes it easier to avoid conflict since conflict is often due to miscalculations about an opponent’s capabilities (or intentions), which in turn distorts the cost-benefit calculus (Levy, 1983: 80). Other states consequently know that if a conflict or a war is initiated, leaders of states with highly institutionalized parties are willing to go far to achieve a favorable outcome to please their domestic audiences. Similarly as has been shown in democracies, I argue that this makes states with high party institutionalization both pickier in which conflicts they enter and more difficult to defeat (Reiter and Stam, 1998: 11).

Moreover, party institutionalization is likely to increase the costs of reneging on international (and domestic) agreements, which makes their commitment to peaceful

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resolutions more credible (Fearon, 1994; Fang and Owen, 2011). Fearon argues that democratic and authoritarian leaders should have an incentive to convince others that they will pay added domestic costs when making escalatory moves in disputes because greater audience costs signal commitment and resolve (Fearon, 1994: 581). In fact, the signaling and commitment value of a strong domestic audience helps a state on average, by making potential opponents more likely to shy away from contests and more likely to back down once in them. This is why both democratic and authoritarian leaders would want to be able to generate significant audience costs in international contests (Fearon, 1994: 585). The presence of audience constraints in states with highly institutionalized parties increases the possibility that leaders become locked in their commitment as reneging in front of domestic and international audiences would be politically costly.

Lastly, institutionalized parties are more likely to reach consensus-based agreements. Bureaucratic conflicts within political parties have been a source of confusion in foreign policy as they can send mixed signals about a state’s resolve or intentions in a conflict (Levy and Thompson, 2011: 173). For example the July crisis in 1914, where weak political coherence resulted in mixed signals from the German chancellor and the German Chief of staff about Austria moving against Serbia, which led to the confusion by Austrian politicians of whether or not Germany wanted Austria to preserve the peace (Levy and Thompson, 2011: 174).

3.2.3 Culture mechanism

Party institutionalization is also likely to affect conflict through what I call the culture mechanism. In short, I argue that highly institutionalized political parties develop a culture for negotiation which means they are less likely to seek to solve conflicts by military means. First of all, institutionalized parties develop a culture for solving the conflict by reaching agreements about an outcome or building long-term relationships, a culture which in turn affects the norms politicians have for what is appropriate and inappropriate behavior for negotiating disputes (Adair and Brett, 2004: 158). The need for reaching mutually beneficial agreements and policy goals necessitates cooperation and the ability to give concessions to actors that disagree, both within parties and

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between parties. This means that politicians become well-versed in negotiating.

These skills and this method of solving disputes are likely to be applied also in the international context, with other states with which disputes and disagreements are likely to arise. These norms of conduct are likely to enable states to reach agreements instead of resorting to escalating conflicts, to the point where they ultimately can reach military conflict. For the same reason, legislatures and political parties often play an important role in the survival of authoritarian regimes, as these institutions allow for efficient and cost-saving bargaining, and the disclosure of preferences of the groups that leaders sometimes rely on for support (Gandhi, 2008: 78).

Moreover, when two states with institutionalized party systems have conflicting interests, they are more likely to view the opposing party as having the same expectation of what acceptable negotiating behavior is. This expectation makes negotiating a peace agreement more likely, even if the process of doing so is challenging (Dixon and Senese, 2002 : 529). Dyads with high party institutionalization are therefore less likely to misconceive opponents’ actions or interpret them as hostile, which makes it easier to avoid conflicts (Levy, 1983: 80).

3.2.4 Other relevant domestic features

I theorize that political institutionalization affects conflict outcomes through the audience constraints mechanism, credibility mechanism, and culture mechanism. But there are other domestic features of states which might enlighten us about the various parts of these audience constraints (Hyde and Saunders, 2020: 370). I will briefly touch upon them in this section and discuss them again when motivating extensive controls in Chapter 4.

One such feature is the presence of free and robust media. To exert audience constraints citizens need the information to judge what is happening, and enough concern about the issue for it to be politically relevant (Hyde and Saunders, 2020:

370). Political elites, on the other hand, often have better access to information about conflicts and are therefore less vulnerable to favorable framing by leaders.

Political elites and the media also function as cue-giver to the public (Weeks, 2014:

22). Moreover, if the number of parties present in a regime is few or limited to

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one, it challenges the audiences’ ability to exert audience constraints, as they have no other options for which to vote (Hyde and Saunders, 2020: 377). Opposition parties moreover function as watch-dogs, as leader’s mistakes in handling international disputes can be used to draw voters to their party (Fearon, 1994: 581). Beyond this, the share of political suffrage and election participation is important. The exclusion of domestic groups results in only a share of the population being able to influence policy and inflict audience cost, thereby distorting the preferences of the public to something that more resembles that of the elite (De Mesquita et al., 2003). Lastly, the presence of strong and diverse civil society organizations can strengthen the public’s audience constraints by enabling citizens to combine their voices and lobby for their views. Hegre, Bernhard, and Teorell call this social accountability and argue that civil society organizations can enable citizens to exert costs also in-between elections and mobilize action (Hegre et al., 2020: 33).

3.3 Regimes, party institutionalization, and conflict be- havior

Using the theoretical framework outlined above, I will now describe how party institutionalization connects with various aspects of conflict and war. The discussion above suggests six general hypotheses to be explored. The first section details how higher party institutionalization affects MID initiations in dyads. As dyads with institutionalized parties have higher audience constraints, are more credible, and have a culture for negotiating, I predict that states with highly institutionalized parties will initiate fewer MIDs on average against similar opponents, I also predict that these effects will be more present in dyads where bottom-up mechanisms are higher.

The next section details how party institutionalization affects various aspects of states’ monadic MID behavior. As states with institutionalized parties have higher audience constraints and are more credible in their signals or intents and capabilities, I predict that states with higher levels of party institutionalization will display fewer actual uses of force and that they will win a higher share of the MIDs they chose to initiate.

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The last section details how party institutionalization affects various aspects of states’ monadic war behavior. As states that are highly institutionalized have higher audience constraints, I predict that states with high party institutionalization will win a higher share of the wars they initiate and that rates of leader punishments in states with party institutionalization are higher.

Audience constraint theories allow for the exploration of various outcomes of war; which include initiations of militarized interstate disputes, conflict outcomes, and political survival after conflict (De Mesquita et al., 2003; Weeks, 2014). I take inspiration from these frameworks and develop similar predictions to test my theoretical framework.

3.3.1 Dyadic conflict initiation

I predict that high levels of party institutionalization affect the initiation of military interstate disputes in dyads. Firstly, regimes that have parties that are more institutionalized – meaning stable, long-term oriented, and connecting and engaging with the public – are more constrained by the audience constraint mechanism. This makes them invest more to achieve a beneficial outcome if they enter a conflict, and be more selective about the conflict they enter (Reiter and Stam, 1998). Secondly, these audience constraints strengthen the credibility mechanisms of states (Levy, 1983). Reneging on agreements have higher domestic costs for leaders of states with institutionalized parties, which makes them more credible in negotiations (Fearon, 1994; Fang and Owen, 2011), and more credible in their signals of capabilities and intents. Lastly, the domestic features of institutionalized political parties activate the culture mechanism. Political parties develop a culture for negotiating and reaching mutually beneficial agreements, which is likely to be applied also in the international context (Adair and Brett, 2004. States with institutionalized parties are less likely to interpret each other as hostile or misconceive opponents’ actions, which better enables them to negotiate disputes peacefully, even if the process of doing so is challenging (Dixon and Senese, 2002; Levy, 1983).

Therefore when two states with high party institutionalization have a conflict, they will have the incentives and capabilities to resolve disputes peacefully. This argument

Political parties and War

Political parties and War

Political Parties, Audience Constraints and International Conflict: A Panel Study

Nora Vedå Scheel

Department of Political Science Faculty of Social Sciences

UNIVERSITY OF OSLO

Word count: 25,599

Political parties and War

Political Parties, Audience Constraints and International Conflict: A Panel Study

Nora Vedå Scheel

Abstract

Acknowledgements

Contents

List of Figures

List of Tables

Chapter 1

Introduction

1.1 Outline of the thesis

Chapter 2

Literature Review

2.1 Theories of the Democratic Peace

2.2 Theories of Domestic Political institutions and Audi- ence constraints

2.3 Theories of Party institutionalization

Chapter 3

Theoretical framework

3.1 Main Concepts and their definitions

3.1.1 Political parties and Party institutionalization

3.1.2 Domestic audience constraints

3.1.3 International Militarized Conflict

3.2 Party institutionalization and conflict

3.2.1 Audience constraints mechanism

3.2.2 Credibility mechanism

3.2.3 Culture mechanism

3.2.4 Other relevant domestic features

3.3 Regimes, party institutionalization, and conflict be- havior

3.3.1 Dyadic conflict initiation