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Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City

What Can Financial Stability Reports Tell Us About Macroprudential Supervision

Jon Christensson, Kenneth Spong, and Jim Wilkinson Banking Research Department

Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City

Presentation to the Research Conference on “Government intervention and moral hazard in the financial sector”

Norges Bank September 2, 2010

The views presented here do not necessarily represent the views of the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City or the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

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Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City

• The financial crisis is spurring many reform ideas.

• One key idea is macroprudential supervision.

• Most central banks already perform a similar role through their financial stability reports (FSRs).

• Our paper looks at what FSRs can tell us about macroprudential supervision.

What Can Financial Stability Reports Tell Us

About Macroprudential Supervision

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Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City

• Overview of macroprudential supervision and FSRs

• Summary of the financial crisis

• Review of FSRs in five countries – UK, Sweden, the Netherlands, Spain, and Norway

• Evaluation of FSRs and their implications for macroprudential supervision

Outline of our Paper

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Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City

Its goal is to ensure stability of financial system in its entirety – Crockett (2000) and Borio (2003)

A systematic approach as opposed to an idiosyncratic one

More attention to largest institutions, counterparty risk, and imbalances and shocks to economy

New tool kit – indicators based on financial data, market prices, gaps, etc., and macro stress tests

What is Macroprudential Supervision?

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Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City

• Countercyclical regulatory policy – build up more capital, reserves, and liquidity in prosperous times

• Control of contagion risk – stronger supervision of systemic firms, significant counterparty

exposures, and financial infrastructure

• Discretionary policies – timely actions to address imbalances and large risk exposures developing in the financial system

Policy Steps under Macroprudential Supervision

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Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City

• Goal of FSRs is to promote financial stability by identifying risks, imbalances, and adverse trends that might threaten the financial system.

• Ideally, FSRs provide timely information that allows public authorities, financial institutions, and market participants to understand and

respond to such risks and imbalances.

• In 2005, almost 50 central banks published FSRs (Čihák 2006).

What are Financial Stability Reports?

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Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City

• Most FSRs look at three broad categories of

risk: (1) macroeconomic conditions or sectoral imbalances, (2) financial sector risks, and

(3) external or global risks.

• Among the approaches or tools FSRs use are financial indicators or ratios, market-based

indicators, qualitative indicators and analysis, and scenario and stress testing.

What are Financial Stability Reports?

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Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City

• Long period of prosperity led to a substantial underestimation of the inherent risks in many financial activities.

• Initial impetus was declining house prices in US and some other countries and collapse of subprime mortgage market.

• These events cast doubt on the value of many financial instruments and the condition of

financial institutions.

Overview of the Financial Crisis

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Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City

• Through a variety of channels, the crisis

spread globally, creating liquidity, capital, and public confidence problems and leading to

breakdowns in financial markets and bailouts of large institutions.

• The deterioration in financial markets further contributed to more general economic

problems.

Overview of the Financial Crisis

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Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City

Countries Effect on the Economy (OECD statistics)

Effect on the Financial

System Policy Actions

United Kingdom

6 Quarters of GDP decline, Unemployment increased

from 5% to nearly 8%

Significant losses at FIs, funding concerns, collapse of

several large FIs

Takeover of some FIs, central bank rate lowered and lending

liberalized, fiscal stimulus

Sweden

3 Quarters of GDP decline, Unemployment rose from

about 6% to 9%

Liquidity and longer-term funding issues, increase in

bank loan losses

Repo rate cut to .25%, state guarantee of bank liabilities,

more treasury bills issued

Netherlands

5 Quarters of GDP decline, Moderate rise in

unemployment

Losses on mortgage-related securities, collapse of Fortis

Fortis takeover, bank debt guarantees and capital

injections

Spain

6 Quarters of GDP decline, Unemployment increased

from 5% to 20%.

Liquidity and real estate lending problems, two takeovers of savings banks

Fiscal stimulus, deposit and debt guarantees, and bank

capital injections

Norway

Several Quarters of mild GDP declines, Moderate increase in

unemployment

Funding problems for banks relying on foreign sources,

declines in bank earnings

Central bank policy rate lowered significantly and lending increased, capital injections, bond exchanges

Table 1A - Effect of the Financial Crisis

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Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City

Country Low interest rates/spreads

Increasing Asset Prices

Increasing Debt Levels

Trade Imbalances

Risks from the

U.S. Other Risks

United Kingdom

“if risk premia rose abruptly, asset prices would

fall sharply”

July 2006 FSR

Asset prices high relative to expected income

streams

Households strong in aggregate, but signs of stress

July 2006 FSR

“there is a risk of disorderly

unwinding”

July 2006 FSR

U.S. sub-prime market not large

enough to be systemic

April 2007 FSR

Large FI’s expanding rapidly with wholesale funds

Sweden

Risk premiums historically low—

risk of rapid price corrections

Dec. 2006 FSR

Rapid increases in house prices and debt cannot

continue

Dec. 2006 FSR

Property companies’

borrowing is at a high rate

Dec. 2006 FSR

Baltic current account deficits

substantial

Dec. 2007 FSR

Weakening of US economy expected to hurt

euro area growth

June 2008 FSR

Pronounced economic slowdown in

Baltics, financial infrastructure

Netherlands

Persistent risk tolerance reflected

in low credit premiums

March 2007 FSR

House prices outpace inflation by 5%

in early 2006

Sept. 2006 FSR

Household debt high when

compared internationally

March 2007 FSR

Disorderly cor- rection of global

imbalances not implausible

March 2007 FSR

Liquidity squeeze linked

to subprime crisis

Sept. 2007 FSR

Oil prices, complex credit

products, spillovers from U.S. and others Spain Added to a greater

risk appetite

May 2006 FSR

Trend of house price growth

still high

Household debt levels are a

concern,

U.S. negative savings rate and

trade deficit

Slowing real estate activity in

the U.S.

Use of whole- sale funding to replace deposits

Norway

Risk premiums historically low – increases vulnera-

bility to shocks

Dec. 2006 FSR

Growth in debt and asset prices may be source

of instability

June 2006 FSR

Household debt and house prices

at historically high levels.”

June 2006 FSR

Global trade and capital flow imbalances are

increasing.

June 2006 FSR

US housing market is a

source of uncertainty.

Dec. 2006 FSR

Commercial property, lower

capital under Basel II, avian

flu

Table 1 --What Risks Did the Countries Identify?

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Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City

Countries Financial Indicators and Ratios

Market Based Indicators

Qualitative Indicators, Surveys, and Specialized Data

Other Tests

United Kingdom

Ratio and trend analysis of global, corporate, household, and financial sectors

Extensive use of a range of market based data

Data on large FI counterparty exposures,

market and systemic risk surveys

Projected market values of mortgage-backed securities, modeling household distress, etc.

Sweden

Ratio and trend analysis of banks and their customers -- companies, households, and foreign borrowers

Price data on equities, bonds, real estate, CDS,

etc.

Household finance data, KMV expected default frequencies, risk survey

of market participants

Major counterparty failure, household debt servicing ability

Netherlands

Charts and tables of selected economic and financial data (More are on Bank’s website)

Selected charts on equity prices, CDS,

credit ratings, etc.

Bank lending survey

Housing correction, vulnerable households, avian flu, macro model of liquidity stress

Spain Trend and ratio analysis of

financial and regulatory data Used to a lesser extent Data on all loans over

€6,000 made in Spain

Comparisons with U.S.

mortgage markets, quality of Spanish MBS

Norway

Ratio and trend analysis of companies, households, and banks

Equity and real estate prices

Bank lending and liquidity surveys, counterparty exposure

survey

Gap indicator analysis, bank failure

probabilities, house price estimates

Table 2 -- What Did the Countries Use to Evaluate Risk?

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Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City

Country Type of Model Financial Institutions

Included Assumptions Used

in Stress Tests General Results

United Kingdom

Macro forecasting model – models added for household, corporate, and

banking sectors

Major UK banks

2006 severe scenario:

1.5% decline in UK GDP 25% drop in house prices 35% drop for com. prop.

Losses equal to 15% to 30% of Tier 1 capital (Used more qualitative approach after 2007)

Sweden Loan portfolio model Four largest banks

2009:1 Test – 2 years of annual loan losses of:

1.3% on loans in Sweden 10 % on loans in Baltics 30% on loans in Ukraine

All 4 banks still meet Tier 1 capital standard, but several have large capital declines

Netherlands Macro forecasting model -- individual banks also

run stress tests

Banks, insurance companies, and

pension funds

Varies by FSR – severe test included 2-year drop in GDP of 6.3% and home prices of 30%, unemployment at 9.7%

At large banks, Tier 1 capital fell by 4% points but remained well above minimum standards

Spain Credit risk model All depository institutions

4 consecutive declines in GDP similar to 1993 levels. 2 years before previous growth rate resumes.

Considerable increase in credit risk, but “would not jeopardize the strength of Spanish institutions.”

Norway

Macro model -- models added for household, enterprise, and financial

sectors

Five or six largest banks

Varies by FSR -- most severe test similar to last crisis and assumed sharp fall in exports, oil prices, and foreign funding

Banks have a capital shortage under most severe test, but

adequate capital in other tests

Table 3 - What Stress Tests Were Used?

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Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City

• The FSRs for our five countries provide a

systematic approach to tracking key economic and financial risks and are an important step in efforts to mitigate or respond to crises – which is the role we want macroprudential

supervision to play.

• These FSRs did succeed in identifying many of the risks and unsustainable trends behind the financial crisis.

Evaluation of FSRs and the Implications

for Macroprudential Supervision

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Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City

• But some of these risks were regarded as low probability events and several identified risks did not play a direct role in the crisis.

• Identifying the timing and magnitude of these risks and their effects on the financial system proved to be a greater, if not impossible,

challenge.

Evaluation of FSRs and the Implications

for Macroprudential Supervision

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Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City

• Several of the stress tests and other tests in the FSRs succeeded in capturing the capital needs of banks and the ensuing economic downturns.

• However, banks and public authorities may

not have heeded these warnings because some were described as low probability tail events.

• A key benefit of the FSRs is that they may

have given the central banks a better picture of financial markets and the type of assistance

needed during the crisis.

Evaluation of FSRs and the Implications

for Macroprudential Supervision

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Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City

“It is difficult to estimate the probability and price the risk of all possible outcomes in

financial markets. This particularly applies to events that occur rarely and have not occurred for a long time…In the long term, public

authorities have an important role to play in maintaining a collective memory of previous crises.” – Norges Bank’s May 2009 FSR

Evaluation of FSRs and the Implications

for Macroprudential Supervision

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Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City

• This experience with FSRs carries a number of implications for macroprudential supervision.

• First, it is unrealistic to expect macroprudential

supervision to be the missing piece in our ability to prevent the next financial crisis – a role many

politicians are now giving to it.

• There are dangers both from underestimating the treat of a crisis and from overestimating and

overreacting to such threats.

Evaluation of FSRs and the Implications

for Macroprudential Supervision

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Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City

• Macroprudential supervisors will need strong evidence to overcome political, public, and

industry pressures when attempting to curtail credit booms and asset bubbles.

• There must be a close linkage between those

analyzing the macro risks and those supervising.

• It may be even more important to have

macroprudential supervision focus on creating a financial system that is more resilient and less crisis-prone in the first place.

Evaluation of FSRs and the Implications

for Macroprudential Supervision

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Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City

• Macroprudential supervision is of much interest now with such recent steps as the European

Systemic Risk Board and the Financial Stability Oversight Council in the US.

• FSRs are a worthwhile exercise in identifying and monitoring important financial trends and

emerging risks and understanding financial

markets – which will also be essential elements in macroprudential supervision.

Concluding Comments

Referanser

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