Moral Responsibility in Market Relations: A Care-Ethical Enquiry

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Moral Responsibility in Market Relations

A Care-Ethical Enquiry

Louisa Gjersøe Bond

Master Thesis in Philosophy

The Department of Philosophy, Classics, History of Art and Ideas The University of Oslo

Supervisor: Professor Tove Pettersen December 2014

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MORAL RESPONSIBILITY IN MARKET RELATIONS A Care-Ethical Enquiry

Louisa Gjersøe Bond

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Moral Responsibility in Market Relations: A Care-Ethical Enquiry Louisa Gjersøe Bond

http://www.duo.uio.no

Printed by CopyCat Forskningsparken, Oslo

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ABSTRACT

Can care-ethics provide an argument for the moral responsibility of economic agents? In mainstream economic theory it is standardly assumed that economic agents are largely rational, self-interested and driven by the pursuit of profit or individual utility. In this light, there seems to be little room for ethical considerations, let alone the values of care-ethics.

Yet, I maintain in this thesis that the notion that economic activities lie firmly outside the realm of morality is both false and problematic. In fact, I argue that there is an implicit normative standard present in the general economic outlook that I call market thinking. In consequence, rational, self-interested and individualistic behaviour is not only generally ex- pected but also implicitly accepted in economic decision-making. By contrast, the care-ethical emphasis on relationships and human connection opens for a profoundly different view of the relevance of ethics to economics. Not only are economic activities the results of human decisions and human-made structures, but economic constraints also have a real impact on people’s lives –– including their opportunities to care.

Thus, I set forth a care-ethical argument for the moral responsibility of economic agents, based on the care-ethical emphasis on relationships and an active commitment to care and avoidance of harm. My proposition is not that economic activities and market relations are the same as caring practices and caring relationships. Rather, I maintain that economic activities are already deeply embedded in particular human relationships or larger relational structures. A care-ethical interpretation of responsibility as relational would therefore hold economic agents responsible through the particular relational context of their activities.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank my supervisor Professor Tove Pettersen for thorough feedback and gen- erous use of her time throughout the process of writing this thesis, and not least for introduc- ing me to the field of care-ethics through her courses on Gender and Philosophy and Feminist Ethics. I would further like to thank Professor Karine Nyborg at the Department of Economics at the University of Oslo, who very kindly took the time to read through an earlier version of chapter one, and gave me some useful pointers on the current state of research in behavioural economics.

A very special thanks goes to my mother, who has not only proofread the whole thesis but also read through many of my earlier drafts with sincere interest and encouragement. I am also very grateful to my husband for all the background support and care that has made it possible for me to see this project through to the end. Again, thanks to my mother and also my mother-in-law, for spending many evenings caring for our little daughter so I could study those extra hours every week.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION 1

Chapter One

THE FUNDAMENTALS OF MARKET THINKING 5

Economic Markets 6

Economic Man 8

Evaluating Economic Outcomes 10

Unrealistic Assumptions and Behavioural Economics 11

Chapter Two

THE FUNDAMENTALS OF CARE-ETHICS 15

The Origins and Themes of Care-Ethics 16

Defining Care 19

The Scope of Care 21

Dangers of Dominance 24

Problems of Altruistic Care 25

The Social and Political Relevance of Care-Ethics 27

Chapter Three

A CARE-ETHICAL CRITIQUE OF MARKET THINKING 31

Self-Interest and Rationality 32

Independence versus Caring Responsibilities 36

Structural Inequality 39

Unrealistic Assumptions 40

The Normative Implications of Market Thinking 42

Economics is not a Separate Sphere 44

Rethinking the Purpose of Economic Life 47

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Chapter Four

A CARE-ETHICAL INTERPRETATION OF RESPONSIBILITY 53

Our Moral Obligation to Care 54

Social Responsibility 58

Social Welfare versus Privatised Care 60

Shared Responsibility and Structural Injustice 63

Tools for Thinking About Responsibilities 67

A Care-Ethical Interpretation of Responsibility 68

Chapter Five

MORAL RESPONSIBILITY IN MARKET RELATIONS 71

From Social Welfare to Business Responsibility 72

Engster’s Argument for the Moral Responsibility of Businesses 74

The Problem of Free Riding on Care 75

The Problem of Businesses’ Moral Personhood 77

The Problem of Profit Maximisation 81

The Root of the Problem 86

An Alternative Care-Ethical Argument 89

CONCLUSION 95

BIBLIOGRAPHY 99

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INTRODUCTION

The puzzle I want to address through the course of this thesis is that economic activities and considerations seem generally presumed to lie outside the realm of ethics. In mainstream economic theory, it is standardly assumed that economic agents are largely rational and self- interested, and seek maximised profit or individual utility. In this respect, it is difficult to see how any ethical considerations could have any real influence on economic decision-making – – least of all care-ethics. After all, while economics seems to be all about rational calculation and individual gain, care-ethics emphasises the value of human connection and relationships, the fact of human dependence, and suggests an active commitment to care and avoidance of harm. On the other hand, economic decisions and an economic frame of mind seem deeply ingrained in many aspects of our everyday lives. For instance, people’s access to wage- earning work and other basic goods, the distribution of wealth and global patterns of consumer relations are all questions relating to economics. In fact, I will argue that given the fact that economic conditions set important constraints on our choices and opportunities –– including our opportunities to care –– it should be acknowledged that economic considerations are not separate from, but deeply relevant to, the realm of ethics.

How might care-ethics influence our thinking around economic activities and market relations? Could care-ethics provide an argument for the moral responsibility of economic agents? Looking at the question of moral responsibility through the lens of care-ethics opens up a very different approach compared to that of the general economic outlook I call market thinking. With care-ethics, the focus shifts from an individualistic ontology highlighting individual independence to a relational ontology highlighting the relational context of persons.

This makes it possible to bring forth concerns relating to dependencies and relational ties, and see the possibilities of interpreting responsibility as shared or distributed.

However, approaching the question moral responsibility in market relations through the perspective of care-ethics also entails the challenge of balancing a descriptive theory with a normative framework. The field of economics is largely a descriptive discipline, while care- ethics is a moral theory. Not least, they each comprise a large and diversified body of re-

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search. My method, therefore, is to first extract the main features and assumptions of economic theory and care-ethics respectively, allowing me to compare the two as distinct theoretical perspectives with fundamentally different ontologies. In many ways it is precisely the tension between the underlying assumptions and methodology of care-ethics and economics that makes this an interesting discussion. A care-ethical interpretation of responsibility has the potential of profoundly informing our whole thinking around responsibility in market relations, by providing a different and fresh approach to the topic. This is an enquiry, then, that both challenges our standard approach to economic questions and investigates the boundaries and application of care-ethics as a moral theory.

Thus, I begin by setting the scene in the first two chapters with general introductions to the main themes of economic theory and care-ethics. The first chapter presents the basic assumptions and principles of mainstream economic theory that underlie the general economic outlook that I call market thinking. This is a framework for thinking about human behaviour and decision-making in economic terms. Chapter two presents the main themes of care- ethics, which include a focus on the importance of care, the fact of human dependence, a sensitivity to context and an emphasis on relationships to particular others. I suggest that care can be defined as a practice and a value, as Virginia Held (2006) proposes, although I see Tove Pettersen (2008; 2011) as providing the best description of the normative value of care as a balance between the principles of extended non-maleficence and restricted beneficence. I also look at Daniel Engster’s (2007) account of care and discuss the difficulty of setting a precise boundary to the scope of care-ethical activities. Finally, I address the criticisms that care- ethics mandates dominance or paternalism or makes caring a self-sacrificing altruistic act.

In chapter three I present a care-ethical critique of market thinking. I argue that market thinking involves the dichotomy of self-interest and altruism, and rests on an assumption of individual independence. From a care-ethical perspective, this ignores how being dependent on others’ care or having caring responsibilities for others may affect one’s position in the competition for goods in the market. Market thinking also overlooks the possibility of structural differences manifesting over time. This discussion rests on the analyses of care-ethicists Eva Feder Kittay (1999) and Joan Tronto (1993; 2013), and political theorist Iris Marion Young (2011). I conclude by arguing that market thinking involves an implicit normative standard, which I suggest cannot be contained within the imagined boundaries of a pure economic sphere. Not only do economic events often have real impact on people’s lives, but economic events are in turn the results of human-made structures and human decisions. Thus, I suggest many economic questions have an influence on care-ethical concerns, and that care- ethics in turn can challenge our thinking around economic activities and relations.

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In chapter four I approach the subject of moral responsibility. I look into three alternative arguments for accepting the moral obligation to care, as presented by Kittay (1999), Eng- ster (2007) and Pettersen (2011). I then discuss what a care-ethical interpretation of responsibility might entail, and suggest that it would be grounded in the notions of reciprocity, shared commitment, the equal worth of the parties, and the relational ontology of care-ethics. This would open for an understanding of responsibility as arising within relationships and relational structures, similar to Young’s (2011) notion of shared responsibility.

In chapter five, I move on to discuss the relevance of a care-ethical interpretation of responsibility to market relations. I examine Engster’s (2007; 2011) argument for the moral responsibility of businesses, which forms the basis for his proposal for a care-based stake- holder approach to business. However, I see several potential problems with Engster’s account, and as a consequence I propose an alternative care-ethical reading that could avoid these problems while contributing to a meaningful interpretation of the moral responsibility of economic agents. I suggest a care-ethical interpretation of responsibility would hold economic agents responsible to the extent that they take part in particular relationships or larger relational structures. While I want to avoid interpreting economic activity as a caring practice, I nevertheless propose that the normative values of care would be able to inform and restrain economic activity within its particular relational context.

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CHAPTER ONE

THE FUNDAMENTALS OF MARKET THINKING

The purpose of this chapter is to introduce the standard assumptions and principles of mainstream economics.¹ Together these form the general economic outlook I call “market thinking” — a framework for thinking about human behaviour and decision-making in economic terms. The standard assumptions of mainstream economic theory are that economic agents are rational and largely self-interested, and interact through competitive markets. Corporations seek to maximise their profits, and consumers seek to maximise their individual utility.² The historical roots of these basic economic ideas go back to the 18^th and 19^th centuries with the works of Adam Smith and John Stuart Mill. Smith (1776 [2004]) famously portrayed the workings of the market as an “invisible hand”, where the self-interested decisions of many individuals tend to promote those economic outcomes that are most efficient. Mill (1844 [1992]) described the essential characteristics of the “economic man”, as rational and motivated by a desire for material wealth.

Of course, the standard assumptions about economic agents and markets are not true representations of reality. The occurrence of market failures are recognised and studied phenomena, and insights from behavioural economics have shown that the assumptions of full rationality, self-interest and willpower in many cases do not hold. However, the fact that market failures occur does not necessarily undermine the market ideals themselves. Nor do behavioural economists completely abandon the established framework of mainstream economic theory. Rather, the standard assumptions serve as a useful starting point for economic modelling, to which more substance and detail can later be added. Indeed, the basic assumptions and principles of mainstream economics seem to be largely accepted as saying something essentially true about economic decision-making and the workings of the market.

1 I will use the term “mainstream” to refer to economic theory as it is predominantly taught at leading universities worldwide, and as presented through standard introductory textbooks in economics such as Bernheim and Whinston, 2008; Mankiw and Taylor, 2008 [2011]; and, Blanchard, Amighini and Giavazzi, 2010 [2013].

2 As an economic term “utility” refers to an individual’s satisfaction of preferences or wellbeing, and is represented by a numeric value (Bernheim and Whinston, 2008, p. 114). A greater utility value represents a higher level of satisfaction. I will come back to the notion of utility later in this chapter.

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Economic Markets

Mainstream economic theory is usually divided into two major categories: microeconomics and macroeconomics.³ Microeconomics deals with the economic decisions of individuals and firms, and how these decisions together reflect the aggregate supply and demand of markets.

Macroeconomics has a wider scope and includes a national and global perspective of economic activity, for instance looking at monetary and fiscal policies and other structures that affect the economy at large.⁴ One could say that microeconomics provides the basics: It represents

“the trunk of the tree” from which numerous other subfields of economics have branched (Harberger, 2008). Therefore, the focus of this chapter is mainly on the micro perspective, looking at human behaviour, motivation and interaction through the basic microeconomic assumptions.

In microeconomics, markets are often assumed to be perfectly competitive, and are thought to be efficient means of allocating scarce resources.⁵ In perfectly competitive markets, each agent will have full access to information and no single agent will be large enough to influence the market prices. This means that the relevant information needed to make in- formed decisions is readily available. The market prices will then reflect the market equilibri- um, which is the point where the consumers’ willingness to pay for a good exactly matches the price the producers are willing to charge for that good. The various market prices are de- termined by the value assigned to the various goods, reflecting the standpoints of both the buyers and the sellers (Harberger, 2008). In short, the market prices reflect the demand and supply in the market. Organising economic activity through markets is efficient as it allows for specialisation, enabling different people to put their efforts and talents into different projects.

The generalisations of standard microeconomic theory listed above are usually la- belled “neoclassical”, referring to the heredity of the classical economic theories of the 18^th and 19^th centuries. Smith’s (1776 [2004]) often quoted statement about the “invisible hand”

seems to have been especially influential, providing part of the intellectual foundation for

3 I am here ignoring what might be thought a third major branch of economics, econometrics, which applies empirical data and statistical methods to economic models (Hausman, 2013, 1.2).

4 Monetary policy is the control of money supply by a nation’s national bank, which affects interest rates, inflation and economic activity. Fiscal policy is a government’s use of taxes and/or, public spending to influence economic activity. See Blanchard, Amighini and Giavazzi, 2010 [2013], p. 91- 95, 567, 570.

5 For an overview of the central assumptions and themes of mainstream microeconomic theory, see for instance Bernheim and Whinston, 2008; Harberger, 2008; Hausman, 2013; Mankiw and Taylor, 2008 [2011]; and, Weintraub, 1993.

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neoclassical economic theory.⁶ Smith describes the workings of the market as an invisible hand:

“[The individual] generally, indeed, neither intends to promote the public interest, nor knows how much he is promoting it. […] he intends only his own gain, and he is in this, as in many other cases, led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of his intention. Nor is it always the worse for society that it was no part of it. By pursuing his own interest he frequently promotes that of society more effectually than when he really intends to promote it. I have never known much good done by those who affected to trade for the public good.” (Smith, 1776 [2004], p. 300)

The context of the statement is Smith’s discussion of, and argument against, protectionism, where domestic goods are favoured over foreign. The idea of the invisible hand is that when combined, the individual decisions of the various agents in the market tend to promote those economic endeavours that are most advantageous and efficient. Smith’s statement has often been taken as an argument for free, unregulated markets: Markets are most efficient when left alone because the decisions of many self-interested agents tend to promote the welfare of society as a whole (Mankiw and Taylor, 2008 [2011], p. 10). This interpretation of Smith’s theory has left a deep impression of the efficiency of unregulated economic markets. This is a concept of markets as independent, self-correcting entities, functioning best when obeying their own rules, and of the people operating in the markets as fundamentally self-interested and independent individuals.

In macroeconomics there are two major schools of thought. One is new classical macroeconomics, which rests solely on the neoclassical microeconomic foundations. The other is the Keynesian, or new Keynesian, approach to macroeconomics, which is developed from the work of John Maynard Keynes.⁷ New classical economists are generally sceptical to market intervention and see short-term dips in the economy as necessary, at least in theory, in order for markets to correct themselves. There is here a deep-rooted faith in the ability of market mechanisms to price goods correctly and to repair any imbalances in the levels of prices, production, employment and so on, restoring them to their “natural” levels (Mankiw and Taylor, 2008 [2011], p. 10). New Keynesian theory, on the other hand, explains slumps and recessions as resulting from market failures and low overall demand. New Keynesians argue against the new classical view that prices and wages adjust immediately. Rather, prices are

6 For a comment on the influence of Adam Smith’s idea of the invisible hand for contemporary economics, see Mankiw and Taylor (2011, p. 10) and Nelson (2011, p. 38-39). Friedman (1962 [2002], p.

133) also refers to Smith’s quote in his argument against the social responsibilities of businesses.

7 Keynes’ major work The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money was published in 1936.

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thought to be “sticky”, adjusting slowly and in stages, and wages are often thought to be con- nected to the efficiency of the workers so that cutting wages implies lowering productivity (Mankiw, 2008). Because prices and wages adjust slowly, there is here an argument for government intervention in the form of monetary and fiscal policies (Mankiw, 2008). However, in practice and broadly speaking, it seems that the divide between new classicists and new Keynesians is not so deep. Although they disagree on various issues, such as the remedies for unemployment or the causes of recessions, there seems to be general agreement on the fundamentals. The new Keynesians have adopted the idea of rational agents and efficient markets, and new classicists generally agree that prices and wages do not, in fact, adjust immediately, and that monetary policies do work (Hoover, 2008; Krugman, 2009, p. 2). In both ap- proaches, the basic microeconomic assumptions of economic agents and markets are used as starting points for economic modelling.

Economic Man

Economic agents are standardly assumed to be rational and self-interested, embodied in the notion of the “economic man”, homo economicus. The term is often associated with Smith, and in The Wealth of Nations he famously comments: “It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest” (1776 [2004], p. 12). Smith points out that it is self-interest, not benevolence, that is prevalent in the economic decisions of individuals. If the butcher or baker had given away their goods in the name of benevolence, there would be nothing left to sell and their businesses would crumble. A businessman aims to make his business thrive and the businessman’s driving force is his own, not other’s, success. The point is that self-interest is thought to be an important driving force in trade.

Although the concept of the economic man is often associated with Smith, it first came into use in the 19^th century (Nelson, 2011, p. 38). In his early work on political economy, Mill (1844 [1992]) sought to define the field of economics as an independent, scientific discipline.

Its aim should be to study man “... solely as a being who desires to possess wealth, and who is capable of judging of the comparative efficacy of means for obtaining that end” (Mill, 1844 [1992], p. 137). Here, Mill expresses the two basic assumptions about economic agents: They are motivated by material desire, and the rationale of seeking the most efficient means towards that aim. In the same passage Mill states that the economic man always chooses a larger portion of wealth than a smaller. Further, the desire for wealth is only checked by two per- sistent principles: first, an aversion to labour, and second, a desire for immediate satisfaction.

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The purpose of economics is therefore to study and predict the behaviour of people in society as if these desires and principles were their “absolute ruler[s]” (Mill, 1844 [1992], p. 138). On Mill’s account, economics deals only with a limited picture of human agency, but he does not pretend that this provides a full description of humans. He writes: “Not that any political economist was ever so absurd as to suppose that mankind are really thus constituted, but because this is the mode in which science must necessarily proceed” (Mill, 1844 [1992], p. 139).

The concept of the economic man serves as an abstraction for the purpose of economic analysis. In order to understand human agency, the idea is that one must begin by studying each aspect of the complex mix of desires and aversions that influence a person’s actions. The field of economics, according to Mill, should deal only with those parts of human conduct where the acquisition of wealth is the leading aim (Mill, 1844 [1992], p. 139).

The legacy from Smith and Mill is still present in contemporary economics, with the standard assumptions of economic agents as rational and generally motivated by self-interest (Bernheim and Whinston, 2008, p. 7-8; Hausman, 2013, 1.1). The assumption of rationality is usually interpreted as the agent’s ability to consistently rank the alternatives he or she faces with reference to individual preferences, so that for every alternative they face they are able to determine whether they prefer it more or less to another, or are indifferent (Hausman, 2013, 1.1).⁸ It is worth noting that the assumption of self-interest does not necessarily follow from the assumption of rationality. The concept of individual preferences is meant to represent all the considerations, feelings or motives relevant to a person’s choices (Hausman and McPher- son, 1996 [2006], p. 46). That is, a person’s preferences are supposed to include whatever that person cares about. So, while many persons pursue individual material gain, others may choose to donate to charities or to a political cause. In principle, altruism is not be ruled out in economic theorising, though material self-interest is still usually assumed to be the key motivation (Bernheim and Whinston, 2008, p. 7; Hausman, 2013, 1.1; Hausman and McPherson, 1996 [2006], p. 79).

What it means for corporations to be rational and self-interested is that they seek to maximise their profits. Consumers are assumed to maximise their individual utility, meaning that they will choose what they most prefer within the constraint of their budgets. Consumers will want a range of goods, including things like food, clothing, housing, medicines, wages, and leisure time. What sort of specific goods consumers prefer and how these are ranked in relation to one another, will vary from person to person. However, it is assumed that consumers generally prefer more to less (Bernheim and Whinston, 2008, p. 95; Mankiw and Taylor, 2008 [2011], p. 440). Furthermore, they are likely to want a variety of goods, not just one

8 Though see Sen (1987, p. 13) for an argument against defining rationality as internal consistency.

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type, and a certain balance between different types of goods. Some prefer apples to bananas, but no one will want to live only on apples or only on bananas. Trade-offs are unavoidable.

Buying more of one good means there is then less left to spend on another good, and the more the consumer has of one type of good, the less she will be willing to pay for more of the same (Bernheim and Whinston, 2008, p. 95, 109-110; Mankiw and Taylor, 2008 [2011], p. 441- 443).

Following the assumptions of rationality and self-interest, trade will come about only when it is mutually beneficial to the trading parties (Bernheim and Whinston, 2008, p. 111).

This basic economic principle of mutually beneficial trade echoes Smith’s description above of the butcher, brewer and baker all going about their businesses with regard to their own interest (1776 [2004], p. 12). The assumption that consumers prefer more to less, and are generally motivated by self-interest, is a continuation of Mill’s description of the economic man who seeks evermore material wealth.

Evaluating Economic Outcomes

When a consumer compares two bundles of goods, the bundle that better represents her individual preferences has a greater utility value. The utility value is a numeric value indicating the degree of satisfaction of individual preferences (Bernheim and Whinston, 2008, p. 114).

The utility function is then a mathematical representation of the utility values of different bundles of goods. This is simply a way of representing each agent’s ranked preferences (Hausman and McPherson, 1996 [2006], p. 48-49). The use of the term “utility” in economic theory indicates the historical links to utilitarianism, yet few contemporary economists would claim they are utilitarians. Utilitarianism comprises the moral theories that set the maximisation of total or average utility as the final good, where utility may be defined as happiness, pleasure, or wellbeing. In economics, utility or wellbeing is usually taken to mean the satisfaction of individual preferences, instead of a mental state like happiness (Hausman and McPherson, 1996 [2006], p. 105). A person’s preferences can then simply be seen as a given set of considerations, and thus economists avoid the normative discussion of what people’s preferences should be. Economists will sometimes evaluate economic outcomes in terms of whether they make people better off, or increase overall welfare. However, this requires add- ing up individual welfare and drawing up a comparison on a single scale, and economists are generally wary of interpersonal comparisons of utility (Hausman and McPherson, 1996 [2006], p. 100, 135). The problem then is that if an individual’s satisfaction of preferences

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cannot be identified as being better or worse than another’s, then one cannot say much about the overall economic welfare either.

However, another way of comparing economic outcomes is to use the principle of Pareto efficiency. An outcome is Pareto efficient if no one can be made better off without someone else being made worse off (Bernheim and Whinston, 2008, p. 588; Hausman and McPherson, 1996 [2006], p. 136-137). Still, Pareto efficiency says little about the distribution of wealth, for instance, or the general level of welfare. Imagine an initial economic distribution of extreme wealth inequalities. If the very poor cannot be made better off without reduc- ing the wealth of the very rich, even by a small amount, then the proposed change would not be a Pareto improvement. Yet one would think that a small amount of money would have substantially higher value in the eyes of the poor than the rich.

The remaining tool in the economist’s toolbox is cost-benefit analysis. This approach builds on the basic economic principle of opportunity cost: The cost of something is what you give up to get it, and the value is the benefits forgone (Mankiw and Taylor, 2008 [2011], p. 5- 6). In a cost-benefit analysis, value is set to the costs and benefits of economic policies or outcomes, based on people’s willingness to pay for the proposed changes. This is then used as the basis for a comparison. Again, a problem with cost-benefit analyses is that the criteria for assessing the value of economic outcomes is set by people’s willingness to pay. People’s willingness to pay depends on their ability to pay, and so the preferences of the wealthy will weigh more than the preferences of the poor (Hausman and McPherson, 1996 [2006], p. 149).

Unrealistic Assumptions and Behavioural Economics

Mill was explicit in his scientific methodology, seeking first to determine the major causal factors, the laws, that work on individuals as they pursue their economic aims, and then studying the combined consequences of these (Hausman, 2013, 3.1; Mill, 1844 [1992], p. 139).

Mill argued that because there are so many causal factors in play when determining economic phenomena, one cannot simply compare, say, two national economies and hope to arrive at a precise conclusion as to which is the best. Instead, Mill thought that economic theory must focus on simpler domains and, from the results found here, deduce the consequences in more complex situations (Hausman, 2013, 3.1). On Mill’s account, economics is not a precise science. Its conclusions are based on what are thought to be the main causes of economic behaviour, and derive from observations of simpler domains. In fact, Mill suggested that the conclusions of economics must be adjusted by other causes of human agency, apart from the desire for wealth, in order to be fully explanatory and predictive (Mill, 1844 [1992], p. 140).

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Contemporary economists also point out that the standard assumptions made about economic agents in mainstream economic theory are meant for methodological purposes only.

In consumer theory, for instance, the consumer’s decisions are construed as a problem of op- timising preferences within constraints. This is not an attempt at a full description of human decision-making, but serves as a model for describing implicit psychological factors relevant in economic analysis (Mankiw and Taylor, 2008 [2011], p. 460-461). There is a deliberate simplification of human agency, leaving only those factors thought most relevant to an expla- nation of economic behaviour. The basic approach is to start with simple generalisations and build on from these. Part of what it is to be a skilled economist is the ability to discern which features of the real world to include when building a model (Mankiw and Taylor, 2008 [2011], p. 26). Economist and Nobel laureate Milton Friedman, a prominent advocate of neoclassical theory, famously defended the “unrealistic” assumptions of economic theory. Fried- man argued that one should judge an economic model on the basis of its predictability, not on the realism of its assumptions. What marks a model as good, on his view, is its ability to abstract all factors that are not relevant, so that the model explains “much by little” (Friedman, 1953, p. 8).

However, the last few decades have seen a wave of research within behavioural economics, where the standard assumptions of full rationality, complete self-interest and unwa- vering willpower have been questioned. Relying on controlled experiments and insights from psychology, behavioural economists argue, for instance, that a substantial portion of people are not exclusively self-interested but care about fairness and reciprocity. Experiments that go under the name of the Dictator Game and the Ultimatum Game are well-known in this context. In the Dictator Game, one participant, the dictator, is given a certain amount of money that she can divide between herself and a passive recipient. The Ultimatum Game is similar, but here the recipient can accept what is offered or reject it. Rejecting the offer means that neither player gets anything. In accordance with the neoclassical assumptions of economic behaviour, one would expect the dictators in the Dictator Game to keep their whole initial sum for themselves. One would also expect the recipients in the Ultimatum Game to accept any offer, however low, because a small sum would leave them better off than they would be with nothing. Yet, results show fairly consistently that small offers, below 20% of the initial sum, are rejected about half the time, suggesting that the recipients are reacting with indigna- tion or are influenced by a sense of fairness (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2002, p. C5). Comparing the results from the two experimental games shows that the offers of division in the Ultima- tum Game are substantially higher than in the Dictator Game, which suggests that the propos-

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er in the Ultimatum Game anticipates the other player’s reaction and adjusts her behaviour accordingly (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2002, p. C5).

Behavioural economics can potentially soften the standard assumptions of mainstream economic theory with insights into the limitations and biases that occur in decision-making.

Still, as behavioural economist Matthew Rabin (2002) explains, this field of research does not represent a complete break with the methods and assumptions of neoclassical economics.

Rabin writes: “This research programme is not only built on the premise that mainstream economic methods are great, but also that most mainstream economic assumptions are great. It does not abandon the correct insights of neoclassical economics, but supplements these insights with the insights to be had from realistic new assumptions” (Rabin, 2002, p. 658-659, his emphasis). The behavioural economist’s stance is that many people’s actual behaviour departs in significant ways from the standard neoclassical assumptions, and furthermore that these departures are important for economic analysis. Yet, the general framework of mainstream economics is largely kept in place. The debate seems no longer to be about whether the insights of behavioural economics should be taken seriously in mainstream economics, but rather how they can be incorporated into formal economic modelling (Rabin, 2002, p. 672- 673).

Nor are economists merely interested in perfect market conditions; they also study market failures where some of the standard assumptions about economic agents and markets do not hold. Externalities, for instance, occur where the costs or benefits of a transaction affects others than those directly involved in the exchange. Examples are the cost to society of pollution from the production of certain goods, or the general benefit to society of education (Mankiw and Taylor, 2008 [2011], 198-204). As Olivier Blanchard and his co-authors write, economists no longer think of the economy as a machine: “Unlike a machine, the economy is composed of people and firms who try to anticipate what policy makers will do, and who re- act not only to current policy but also to expectations to future policy. Hence, macroeconomic policy must be thought of as a game between the policy makers and the economy […] ” (Blanchard, Amighini and Giavazzi, 2010 [2013], p. 499, their emphasis). The reference here is to game theory, and the suggestion is that we should think of economic decisions as strate- gic games.

While insights from behavioural economics and game theory add more substance and detail to economic analysis, an important element of the economic method is precisely to extract formal models and analyses from the confusion of reality. Granted, the standard assumptions of economic agents being rational and self-interested and of markets being perfectly competitive may be stylised and unrealistic compared to the complexity of the real world.

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Still, these assumptions provide the starting point for theoretical analysis, to which one can later add more detail and accommodate various “failures”. The question is what exactly, and how much, to include as relevant. Nevertheless, the standard neoclassical assumptions and principles do seem largely accepted as pointing to an essential truth about human behaviour and the workings of economic markets. It is this fundamental starting point, these basic assumptions and principles, that make up the general economic outlook I call market thinking.

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CHAPTER TWO

THE FUNDAMENTALS OF CARE-ETHICS

The focus of care-ethics is on relationships and activities of care. Caring takes place within relationships, and the emphasis is on particular attachment and actual situations instead of universal or abstract principles. Dependency is acknowledged as a basic human fact. As care- ethicist Virginia Held comments, all people are dependent on others’ care at various stages of their lives, for instance as an infant or child, when old and frail, ill or disabled (2006, p. 10).

The focus of care-ethics is therefore on interdependency and the relational context of persons, not on complete independence or self-sufficiency. Emotions, like attentiveness and empathy, are considered to be valuable guides to moral insight, accompanied by reflection and cultiva- tion. Care-ethics thus stands in stark contrast to the dominant moral theories of deontology, utilitarianism and political liberalism, where rationality, impartiality, and the appeal to universally binding principles are important features.

This chapter serves as an introduction to the main themes of care-ethics. I begin by tracing the origins of care-ethics to Carol Gilligan’s (1982 [1993]) In a Different Voice and the broader feminist endeavour to put women’s perspectives on the agenda. Looking at the general care-ethical critique of the dominant moral theories of deontology, utilitarianism and political liberalism reveals care-ethics as a very different moral theory. I see the relational ontology of care-ethics as especially important in this regard.

The core normative value of care-ethics is care, and I follow Held’s (2006) description of care as a practice and a value. This opens for an understanding of care as including many different practical activities, while at the same time grounding care as a normative value.

However, I suggest the normative value of care is best captured by Tove Pettersen’s (2008;

2011) description of care as a balance between extended non-maleficence and restricted beneficence. I go on to discuss the scope of care-ethics, as in where to draw the line between potentially caring activities and other activities. Next, I address some criticisms levelled at care-ethics that see the focus on care as hovering dangerously between paternalism and dominance, on the on the one hand, and altruistic self-sacrifice, on the other hand (Hoagland, 1992;

Narayan, 1995; Silvers, 1998). Concerns related to differences in power, dependencies and needs are recurring themes within care-ethics (Noddings, 1984 [2003]; Ruddick, 1989 [1995];

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Held, 1993, 2006; Tronto, 1993, 2013; Kittay, 1999). I suggest care-ethics is able to handle the problems of dominance and self-sacrifice as long as care-ethics is interpreted as a relational ethic and in line with a notion of mature care (Gilligan, 1982 [1993]; Pettersen, 2011;

2012). Finally, I look at the broader social, political and global relevance of care-ethics. The normative value of care and the relational ontology of care-ethics allows for broad analyses of a wide range of relational structures. This sets the scene for the discussion of market thinking and moral responsibility in market relations in the following chapters.

The Origins and Themes of Care-Ethics

Care-ethics arose as part of the broader feminist effort to put women’s experiences on the agenda. It was with Gilligan’s (1982 [1993]) book In a Different Voice that the concept of an ethic of care was first introduced. Through her psychological research on moral development, Gilligan found that the girls and women she interviewed typically displayed a different kind of moral understanding to the male participants. The alternative voice Gilligan heard in many of her female participants was characterised by a special attention to care, to relationships developing over time, and to the responsibilities established within relationships. Gilligan saw this focus on care and relationships as falling outside the scope of the standard conception of morality and moral development. The dominant theory of moral development was focused, not on care and relationships, but on the concept of justice and the impartial nature of universal moral laws. Gilligan found that while the male participants in her studies typically re- sponded well to the dominant moral framework of justice, the female participants often seemed evasive, unsure and timid in their responses. As a consequence, a significant portion of the female participants were standardly rated as displaying lower levels of moral development than their male counterparts. However, Gilligan suggested that the typical female response, which seemed evasive and muddled in light of the dominant moral framework, in fact displayed an alternative ethic of care (Gilligan, 1982 [1993], p. 24-32). She argued that this alternative moral viewpoint, an ethic of care, should be recognised as being of equal importance to the dominant ethic of justice. Though Gilligan’s empirical findings linked a caring ethic to women, she did point out that the distinction between the two moral frameworks — that of care and that of justice — need not be an essentially gendered difference (Gilligan, 1982 [1993], p. 2).

Care-ethicists have since continued to develop and refine the idea of care as a normative basis for moral theory, emphasising the importance of relationships, the fact of human

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dependency, and paying attention to differences in power.⁹ Care-ethicists have also articulated a general critique against the dominant moral theories of utilitarianism, deontology and political liberalism (Gilligan, 1982 [1993]; Noddings, 1984 [2003]; Held, 1993; 2006; Kittay, 1998). In these dominant moral theories the emphasis is on universal and abstract principles, impartiality and rationality. Deontology, like Kantian ethics, sees the moral law as absolute and universally binding, necessarily acknowledged by all rational beings. Utilitarianism advo- cates the moral good on the basis of impartial calculations of aggregate happiness, utility or welfare. Political liberalism, in line with John Rawls’s (1971) Theory of Justice, focuses on the contractual agreement between equally positioned, rational and disinterested persons.

Care-ethics, on the other hand, focuses on the needs and vulnerabilities of particular others and the actual context of relationships, where emotions are included as important to moral decision making.

The care-ethical critique of the dominant moral theories is not only directed at the normative values of these theories, but also at their epistemological and ontological frameworks — that is, their general method for acquiring moral moral knowledge and their fundamental view of the moral agent. The normative focus of deontology is on duty and the moral law, utilitarianism focuses on overall welfare, and political liberalism on justice and fairness.

While the normative values of deontology, utilitarianism and political liberalism are different, their epistemological and ontological foundations of are fairly similar (Pettersen, 2011, p. 54- 55). The moral epistemology of the dominant moral theories involves relying on only a few universal and abstract principles and attaching great importance to impartiality and rationality.

Care-ethicists have found it problematic that the complexities and nuances of actual moral dilemmas are left out, and that emotions and particular attachments are seen as obstacles, not insights, to moral decision making (Noddings, 1984 [2003]; Held, 1993; 2006; Kittay, 1999).

In care-ethics, emotions like empathy and attentiveness are considered, alongside reason, to be valuable for moral judgments. The context of actual situations and relationships matter, as this will likely affect what kinds of needs and vulnerabilities arise and the appropriate ways to deal with them. Further, the broader social and political context may shed light on whose needs are typically noticed, and who is generally expected to meet them (Tronto, 1993; 2013;

Kittay, 1999). The rational deduction of dominant moral theories from a set of universal principles is replaced in care-ethics by a focus on actual experiences, the relational context, and ongoing dialogue and self-reflection (Pettersen, 2011, p. 55).

9 Some important contributions to care-ethics include Nel Noddings’s (1984 [2003]) Caring; Sara Ruddick’s (1989 [1995]) Maternal Thinking; Virginia Held’s (1993; 2006) Feminist Morality and The Ethics of Care; Eva Feder Kittay’s (1999) Love’s Labor; and Joan Tronto’s (1993; 2013) Moral Boundaries and Caring Democracy.

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The moral ontology of the dominant moral theories is individualistic. The moral agent is seen first and foremost as an independent and self-sufficient individual, standing on equal terms with others. However, from a care-ethical perspective, this ignores the fundamental importance of human relationships, the unavoidable human fact of dependence and the caring responsibilities that arise within the relationships we are part of. With care-ethics, the perspective shifts to a relational ontology, where the basic starting point is every person’s relational context (Gilligan, 1982 [1993]; Pettersen, 2008; 2011; 2012; Kittay, 1999; Held, 1993; 2006).

From the outset, all persons are situated in various relationships to others, beginning with that to the birthing mother and continuing through life as we each form new relationships, and maintain, change, repair or end others (Held, 2006, p. 52). Care-ethics sees the relational context as importantly influencing people’s lives through the experiences they have, the choices they are able to make, and the expectations they form and are met with. The dichotomy of egoism and altruism seems to follow from the individualistic ontology of the dominant moral theories. As a result, moral problems are often seen as a conflict between the interests of the individual, on the one hand, and the interests of humanity in general on the other (Held, 2006, p. 12). Care-ethics challenges this dichotomy, and focuses instead on relationships being what binds each of us to particular others.

The feminist perspective of care-ethics has led to a critique of the history of Western moral philosophy. Held (1993), for instance, points out the gendered dichotomies that have deeply influenced moral theory. As she writes, reason was traditionally associated with mas- culinity and placed above feminine emotion. The activities of the public sphere, like culture, politics and production, to which generally only men had access, were set above the private sphere associated with women’s natural reproduction (Held, 1993, p. 43-63). Arguing that a gender-neutral ethic should value the experiences of women as equally significant for moral theory as those of men, care-ethicists began examining and evaluating the activities traditionally assigned to women, and the moral dilemmas they faced. Thus, concerns associated with the private sphere, such as caring responsibilities in close relationships and child rearing, were brought to the forefront. Questions also arose concerning inequalities in dependence and vulnerabilities, power relations, and the dangers of dominance (Noddings, 1984 [2003]; Ruddick, 1989 [1995]; Held 1993; 2006; Kittay, 1999). Care-ethicists have found that the activities traditionally assigned to women were often deeply infused by moral dilemmas and moral reasoning. Furthermore, these insights are seen as truly important to moral theory, relevant far beyond the initial focus of close relationships in the private sphere. Care-ethics discards the dichotomous thinking of the philosophical tradition, which has seen reason as opposed to emotion, the public sphere versus the private sphere, culture versus nature, egoism versus

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altruism. Instead, it is suggested that we should investigate the area in between these ex- tremes.

Defining Care

At the core of care-ethics lies the moral value of care, but what does care, in this context, really mean? As there is no clear consensus among care-ethicists, I will bring together elements from a few different theorists as the care-ethical position of this thesis. I want a definition that sees care as both a value and a practice, so as to capture the moral significance of care and allow for different activities of care (Ruddick, 1989 [1995]; Held, 2006). In determining the normative value of care, I will lean on Tove Pettersen’s (2008; 2011) suggestion of seeing care as a balance between active non-maleficence and restricted beneficence. I further want a framework for analysing the broader social, political and economic context of care, and will later use this as the basis for the discussion of moral responsibility in market relations. In this regard, I will look to Kittay (1999) and Tronto (1993; 2013), who both discuss the structural consequences of differences in power and dependencies, and the distribution of caring responsibilities. I will also look into Daniel Engster’s notion of care. He proposes a specific care- based business approach, which will be discussed in the two last chapters.

In care-ethics the need for care is seen as basic to all humans, and necessary for human survival, development and flourishing. The appropriate activities of caring will vary according to the specific situation, the type of relationship and the particular needs that require attention.

Think of the range of activities involved in feeding an infant, teaching a class how to read or write, dressing a wound, or helping an elderly person get up in the morning. The care relevant to care-ethics must encompass all these activities as potentially caring. However, the importance of care for human development and survival will be nothing more than a descriptive fact unless care is also given moral significance. There must be a way of evaluating care as good or bad with reference to a normative standard or value. As Held comments: “[…] we need an ethics of care, not just care itself” (2006, p. 11, her emphasis). So, the care relevant to care-ethics must also capture the normative value of care. I suggest therefore that Held (2006) is right to describe care as both a practice and a value, meaning that care involves the practical activities of caring, but also a moral value or ideal of care that we should strive to meet.

When Held (2006) defines care partly as a practice, she is building on Ruddick’s (1989 [1995]) initial description of the care involved in mothering as formed by the maternal practice. According to Ruddick, the maternal practice is as other practices; it is defined by certain aims and sets certain requirements for the practitioner. Ruddick writes that just as “re-

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spect for experiment is imposed on scientists and racing past the finish line is imposed on jockeys”, the mother is required to preserve the life of the child, foster its growth and raise it to be an acceptable person in light of its social group (1989 [1995], p. 17). Defining care as partly a practice stands in contrast to Noddings’s (1984 [2003]) initial description of care as an attitude and ideal.¹⁰ Here, Noddings describes caring as meeting and receiving the other, and tuning into the other’s projects and ends. She differentiates between natural and ethical care, where the first arises naturally as with the mother’s overwhelming impulse to respond to her child, while ethical care involves the choice to respond to the other and to sustain the relation through an ideal of care (Noddings, 1984 [2003], p. 30-33, 80-83). Noddings’s account was criticised for laying too much weight on care as a personal ideal, and also for focusing too much on one-to-one relationships. The concern was that if care is seen as a private dispo- sition and limited to personal relationships, it would lead to a romantic and sentimental notion of care that would fail to take into account the work involved in caring and the relevance of care to a broader set of relationships (Tronto, 1993, p. 103, 118; Held, 2006, p. 16).

Caring, then, can take the form of many different activities, and has relevance beyond personal relationships. Yet, as Held writes, the practice of care is more than “a series of individual actions”, for it also includes normative standards for evaluating care (2006, p. 36, 38).

There are certain values, requirements and standards that are common to all caring activities and mark them as caring. Held suggests that caring practices are defined by attentiveness, sensitivity, and responding to needs — from basic survival needs to more subtle cultural, emotional and psychological needs (Held, 2006, p. 36-43). Tronto initially listed attentiveness, responsibility, competence and responsiveness as the values or ideals of care, later add- ing plurality, communication, trust, respect and solidarity (1993, p. 127-136; 2013, p. 34-35).

Engster similarly describes the ideals of care as comprising attentiveness, responsiveness and respect (2007, p. 30). While all these values seem relevant to care in different ways, it seems unsatisfactory to ground the practice of care in a long list of positive-sounding ideals. Why, for instance, are these particular values chosen above others? I believe a deeper foundation for the normative value of care is found in Pettersen’s (2008; 2011) reasoning.

Pettersen (2008; 2011) suggests that the normative value of care resembles the principles of non-maleficence and beneficence. She refers to Gilligan (1982 [1993]), who initially describes the ethic of care as a commitment to non-violence, to not hurting others, and as a commitment to good, to wellbeing in relationships, and to human flourishing. Building on Gilligan’s work, Pettersen interprets the normative basis of care as involving first the princi-

10 See also Michael Slote’s (2010) Moral Sentimentalism for an alternative account of care-ethics as a form virtue ethic.

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ple of non-maleficence where it is extended to include active intervention, and second the principle of beneficence where it is restricted to prevent systematic self-sacrifice. Pettersen argues that simply refraining from actively harming, as the principle of non-maleficence implies, is not always enough, as care-ethics entails an active involvement in others’ wellbeing and a commitment to maintaining good relationships. On the other hand, the principle of beneficence may in its extreme form lead to self-sacrifice, whereas Gilligan initially pointed to the importance of caring for oneself as well as others (Pettersen, 2008, p. 33-34, 40-43; 2011, p. 54).

I prefer Pettersen’s proposal of grounding care-ethics in the principles of extended non-maleficence and restricted beneficence, because this reflects both the core focus and the key dilemmas of care-ethics. Caring implies doing good, actively helping particular others and being attentive to their needs; it also implies avoiding damage, hurt and pain. This reso- nates with the principles of beneficence and non-maleficence. On the other hand, the dilemmas of caring involve balancing care for others with care for oneself, the care for one person with care for others, and awareness of the potential damage of neglect, ignorance and lack of involvement. The principles of extended non-maleficence and restricted beneficence

acknowledge the limits to our care resources and the importance of active involvement.

The Scope of Care

While caring activities may take very different forms, not all activities are caring. The question is where to draw the line. Tronto (1993) gives perhaps the broadest definition of care as the “activity that includes everything we do to maintain, continue, and repair ‘our world’ so that we can live in it as well as possible” — as Tronto explains, ‘our world’ includes our bod- ies, our selves and the environment. She follows up by pointing out that this extends to caring for objects (1993, p. 103). Held comments that Tronto’s definition of care could include many forms of economic activity from retail sales to house construction and professional cleaning, and she therefore sees it as “almost surely too broad” (Held, 2006, p. 31-32). Held touches on an important point: If the definition of care is stretched too wide, the meaning of care is dilut- ed. If everything we do is caring, then there seems to be nothing very special about care.

Tronto’s examples of caring activities range from providing food for starving children to tuning a piano (1993, p. 106-107). She readily agrees that her definition is broad, but she also suggests that some activities are not generally caring, like playing, pursuing pleasure, creative activity, production and destruction (1993, p. 104). On the other hand, Held includes very different activities in her examples of caring practices, for instance, organising global food aid

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and hanging up curtains to decorate a room (2006, p. 39). In light of her criticism of Tronto, it is surprising that Held mentions hanging up curtains as a potentially caring activity.

An important difference between Tronto’s definition and other care-ethicists’ descrip- tions of care, is that Tronto includes caring for objects and ideas. When Held mentions hanging up curtains as caring, this is meant as an example of an attentive and sensitive response to someone’s more subtle cultural need for a cosy home (2006, p. 39). Imagine someone helping a frail elderly person who is unable do this herself. On the other hand, Tronto’s example of the tuned piano is about caring for the piano itself. She writes of the “object of care” responding to the care it receives, as the piano sounding better after being tuned (1993, p. 107). How- ever, the piano can only “respond” to being tuned in the sense of a forced mechanical change.

There is no dialogue, communication or live response in a relation to an object. It is of course possible to care about an object in the sense of repairing a bike or cherishing a book, and to care about an idea, like the political idea of democracy. Still, I agree with Engster that the moral dimension of care demands interaction between human, or at least living, beings (Eng- ster, 2007, p. 21). Engster gives no satisfactory answer as to why this is so, but I suggest this is implied through the relational ontology of care-ethics, where the focus is on care in relationships. This implies some level of communication, reciprocity and commitment. I see this as demanding a living relationship in some sense, and so excluding care for objects or ideas from the ethics of care.¹¹

Engster (2007) limits caring activities to those that are directly aimed at meeting a person’s biological and developmental needs. To care, on his account, is to help meet the vital biological needs of individuals, foster their basic capabilities and alleviate unnecessary pain or suffering. According to Engster, a person’s vital biological needs include access to food, clothing and shelter. Next, fostering basic capabilities means helping to maintain and develop a person’s innate capacities for movement, emotion, affiliation, reason, speech, and so on, and in most societies today, literacy and numeracy (Engster, 2007, p. 26-31). In sum, Engster’s definition includes a minimum of abilities that enable persons to function in society and care for themselves and others. When considering whether or not an activity is caring, Engster poses the test question: Could the activity be successfully completed without meeting the direct aims of caring? Housebuilding and economic production are generally not caring activities, on Engster’s view, as these are usually not directly aimed at meeting the biological or developmental needs of persons. Rather, the direct aim of housebuilding is the transformation

11 This is not an easy question. Does this limit the care of care-ethics to relationships between living beings, and so exclude care for future or past generations? What about care for non-human beings, like other mammals? What about care for insects and plants, who presumably cannot communicate, recip- rocate or commit to relationships with us, yet are important to our natural environment?

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of building materials into housing, and the direct aims of economic production are more generally the manufacturing, transport, shipping or selling of goods. Still, Engster suggests that housebuilding, for example, could be caring if it were done for the explicit purpose of providing shelter for the homeless. In this case, the aim of the housebuilding would not be successfully completed until it housed the homeless, which would involve meeting their biological need for shelter (Engster, 2007, p. 29, 32-33, 121-122).

I see a potential problem with Engster’s account in that the direct and indirect aims of an activity are not always easily distinguishable. Engster suggests that housebuilding can be caring if the activity is part of a larger caring aim, as providing shelter for homeless, though generally it is not caring as the usual aim is transforming physical material and making money. Engster must mean that the direct aim of the housebuilding activity is significantly different in the two cases — shelter for homeless or sale on the market. Yet, the building will likely house somebody either way, thus meeting some person’s biological need for shelter. Engster clarifies that it is not the activity as such, but the aims and virtues of the activity that make it caring. Nor has the distinction to do with whether the work is paid or not (Engster, 2007, p.

33, 121-122). So, Engster is not simply arguing that housebuilding is caring when it is a vol- unteered non-profit activity, while generally not caring when it is a for-profit business activity. The need for shelter is obviously very acute for the homeless, but Engster’s reason for seeing housebuilding as caring in this example is the direct aim of the activity, not the urgency of the need.¹² It may be true that housebuilding generally involves creating human shelter, and as such it may perhaps be a more caring than other building projects. However, if the purpose of the finished building is seen as being part of the direct aim of the building activity, then it seems that all building activity directed at the purpose of housing would be caring. Yet, Eng- ster’s stance is that housebuilding is not generally caring. As I see it, Engster’s example con- fuses the questions of who the building is meant to house and how housing is distributed. All people have a biological need for shelter. The homeless, however, are not able to gain access to housing through the usual means of buying or renting through the market. Providing housing for the homeless involves an economic cost however it is organised, whether it is a result of social volunteerism, governmental subsidies, or private initiative. These are concerns of whose needs are prioritised and how basic resources are distributed.

This discussion shows how difficult it is to make a sharp distinction between caring activities and other activities. It also shows how care-ethical concerns are closely tied to the prioritisation of needs, fairness and the economic distribution of the basic resources necessary

12 Engster does also discuss how to distribute care resources in accordance with the urgency of the need, among other considerations, and I will come back to these principles of prioritisation towards the end of the thesis (2007, p. 56-58).

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for care. Nevertheless, we can draw out some clear characteristics of caring activities. Caring activities are part of a care-ethical practice, which I suggest is grounded on what Pettersen (2008; 2011) sees as the normative core values of care: extended non-maleficence and restricted beneficence. Further, care is relational which I interpret as excluding care for objects or ideas from the care-ethical notion of care.

Dangers of Dominance

Philosophers Uma Narayan (1995) and Anita Silvers (1998) have each pointed to the dangers of paternalistic care, where those who have the role of carer have authority and power to control the relation, leaving those cared for vulnerable to domination and exploitation. Narayan sees the traditions of Western colonialism as infused by a discourse of care. She argues that colonialism was generally morally justified as being for the good of the colonised — it was the “white man’s burden” to civilise and Christianise the dark corners of the world (Narayan, 1995, p. 134-135). Silvers (1998) argues that persons with disabilities who are dependent on the care of others may find themselves stuck in dominant or abusive relationships. Because many disabled persons crucially need the care of others, ending an abusive or dominant relationship with their carers may not be an option. On the other hand, dominance is not only a potential problem for the person cared for. Philosopher Sara L. Hoagland (1992) argues that altruistic care involves self-denial on the part of the carer, who is constantly attending to the other’s needs before one’s own. In this type of caring relationship it is the cared-for who has power over the carer, and it is the carer who is vulnerable to manipulation and dominance. In short, care-ethics has been criticised for setting too little weight on equality and individual autonomy, and too much weight on vulnerability and the meeting of needs. The argument is that those providing care may be mistaken in what they perceive as needs, or wrong in their approach to meeting them. They may be abusive or dominating. Again, those in a position to claim others’ care may be manipulative or inconsiderate.

Many caring relationships are asymmetrical in terms of differences in power, authority and dependency. This fact is recognised within care-ethics. The relationship between mother and child, for instance, has served as the prime example of a caring relationship where the parties have very unequal standing (Noddings, 1984 [2003]; Ruddick, 1989 [1995]; Held, 1993; 2006). Although the mother is the one who has superior physical power and authority in the relation, this is of little use when the aim is to empower the child and encourage its development into a responsible person (Held, 1993, p. 209). As Held writes: “We are accustomed to thinking of power as something that can be wielded by one person over another, a means