Implications of Norway's Role As Peacemaker In Sri Lanka

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Implications of Norway's Role As Peacemaker In Sri Lanka

Rebekka Øvstegård

Department of Master Thesis 30 credits 2008

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The Department of International Environment and Development Studies, Noragric, is the international gateway for the Norwegian University of Life Sciences (UMB). Eight departments, associated research institutions and the Norwegian College of Veterinary Medicine in Oslo. Established in 1986, Noragric’s contribution to international development lies in the interface between research, education (Bachelor, Master and PhD programmes) and assignments.

The Noragric Master thesis is the final thesis submitted by students in order to fulfill the requirements under the Noragric Master programme “Management of Natural Resources and Sustainable Agriculture” (MNRSA), “Development Studies” and other Master programmes.

The findings in this thesis do not necessarily reflect the views of Noragric. Extracts from this publication may only be reproduced after prior consultation with the author and on condition that the source is indicated. For rights of reproduction or translation contact Noragric.

©Rebekka Øvstegård, May 2008 [email protected]

Noragric

Department of International Environment and Development Studies Norwegian University of Life Science (UMB)

P.O. Box 5003 N-1432 Ås Norway

Tel.: +47 64 96 52 00 Fax: +47 64 96 52 01

Internet: http://www.umb.no/noragric

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II Declaration

I hereby declare that this is my own original work, and applications of all other material are acknowledged. This thesis has not been submitted to any other University than UMB for any type of academic degree.

Signature:__________________

Date:__________

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Abstract

Negotiating in intra-state conflict is a challenging task. Since the 1990’s Norway has promoted itself as a country that is willing to contribute in such negotiations. Norway has a distinct approach to peacemaking and this was applied in the Sri Lankan case. Norway has had successes in peace making and was seen as a valuable mediator when entering as a peace- broker in the Sri Lankan conflict. Protracted conflicts, such as the Sri Lankan conflict, are however not easily solved by negotiation. The Sri Lankan case posed quite a challenging task for the Norwegian mediators as they met a range of obstacles and challenges during the rounds of peace talks.

This study assesses Norway’s approach to peacemaking efforts in general and specifically the case of Sri Lanka. The thesis examines Norway’s role as a facilitator in the fifth peace process in Sri Lanka, in the time period from 2000- 2003. It reviews major challenges in the peace process and Norway’s responses. This is related to existing theory in the field of conflict resolution and mediator conduct. The main conclusions found in this study are that Norway needs to renew its approach to peacemaking, from the outdated rational approach to a conflict dynamics approach. New strategies need to be explored in how to act as a mediator with the tools that Norway have as a small state. Recommendations are given in terms of changes to Norway’s foreign policy in this respect. The study also concludes that a new approach to peace is necessary in Sri Lanka.

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Acknowledgement

The accomplishment of this thesis would not have been possible without help and support from a number of people and organizations. I would first of all like to thank my advisor, Mr.

Shanmugaratnam, for his valuable advice and for being an active discussion partner. He has made a large contribution to my understanding of the Sri Lankan conflict and has given me excellent help in writing the thesis. I would also like to thank my external advisor, Mr.

Uyangoda, who provided me with valuable assistance during my fieldwork in Sri Lanka.

Several organizations in Sri Lanka also contributed to my research, most of all the Social Scientists Association, The National Peace Council and the Center for policy Alternatives.

Mr. Jehan Perera and Ms. Bhavani Fonseka provided me with valuable information in my understanding of the Sri Lankan conflict. Mr. Jon Hanssen Bauer from the Norwegian Ministry of foreign Affairs was very helpful in helping me understand Norway’s approach to peace brokering.

I would also like to thank my family and friends who have been patient during the writing of this thesis. It could not have been possible without all the support everyone has given me. I would especially like to thank Sten, who has spent hours reviewing my thesis.

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Abbreviations

TULF - Tamil United Liberation Front GOSL - Government of Sri Lanka

LTTE - The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam CFA – Ceasefire

IPKF- Indian Peace Keeping Force

NPC- The National Peace Council of Sri Lanka ICG- International Crisis Group

UNP - United National Party SLFP- Sri Lanka Freedom Party MFA- Ministry of Foreign Affairs PA- People’s Alliance

SLMM- Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission

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Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1 Background to the conflict

A protracted conflict has troubled the island of Sri Lanka since the mid 80’s. There have been several attempts to solve the conflict. Norway entered the stage as a facilitator in 1999 in the fifth peace process in Sri Lanka. In 2002, the Norwegian facilitation brought the result of a ceasefire between the Government of Sri Lanka (GOSL) and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (Tigers). The ceasefire (CFA) represented a renewed hope and optimism in finally ending the protracted conflict. A round of peace talks were started, but a peace agreement was never reached. Earlier this year the ceasefire was abrogated and the GOSL has stated that their goal is to defeat the LTTE by military force. The conflict has now intensified and recent developments show little hope of finding a solution to this conflict in the near future.

This study looks at Norway’s role as a mediator in an international context with Sri Lanka as a case. The study aims to contribute to a needed analysis of third party intervention in intrastate conflict, particularly involving small state actors such as Norway. It examines the traditional approaches to conflict resolution and peacemaking and gives a new input to the theory on mediation strategies. Norway’s involvement in Sri Lanka is examined to assess the impact it had on the peace process. Lessons in terms of international peacemaking and

mediation will be unraveled. An analysis of Norway’s responses and actions in the fifth peace process will reveal necessary lessons that must be incorporated in future involvement, both in terms of solving the conflict in Sri Lanka and in terms of Norway’s strategies and manner of involvement in such a context.

To enable a discussion of Norway’s role in Sri Lanka, the thesis will begin with a short introduction to the conflict and previous attempts to negotiate peace. First some short facts about the country will be presented.

1.1.1 Sri Lanka

The Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka is an island located in Southern Asia, off the coast of India. The population is estimated around 20 million people and consists of several ethnic groups: Sinhalese 73.8%, Sri Lankan Moors 7.2%, Indian Tamil 4.6%, Sri Lankan Tamil 3.9%, other 0.5% and unspecified 10%. The island also inhabits several religious

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groups and this is the distribution according to data from the 2001 census: Buddhist 69.1%, Muslim 7.6%, Hindu 7.1%, Christian 6.2% and unspecified 10%. (CIA World Factbook 2008) Sinhala and Tamil are the two native languages and English is the second language of a minority. Almost all Buddhists in Sri Lanka are Sinhalese and Hinduism is the predominant religion among the Tamil population.

(Department of Peacekeeping Operations 2007)

1.1.2 Nature of the conflict

Several aspects have come to characterize the Sri Lankan conflict: ethnicity, the intractability of the conflict, competing nationalisms, determination in terms of military victory and the perseverance of the LTTE insurgency.

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Ethnicity has been a defining feature in the conflict and is rooted in Sri Lanka’s history and political system. The major cleavage in the conflict is between the majority group, the Sinhalese, and the largest minority group, the Tamils. The Muslims, which are the second largest minority group, have also entered the stage in the recent years, making it a tripartite conflict in some aspects. The original conflict was however between the Sinhalese and the Tamil community and they were the main parties involved in the fifth peace process. The relationship between these two groups is rooted in a long history and not only one of rivalry and conflict, but also of peaceful coexistence. They have existed together on the island for many hundred years and have a shared history. However, different group identities developed among the islands population, based on ethnic origin, ancestral territory, language, religion and cultural attributes (Øvstegård, 2007:12). Sri Lanka was colonized over a period of 450 years and gained independence from the British in 1948 (DeVotta, 2003). It was considered a peaceful and prosperous colony. During the colonial era, the British divided the society into ethnic groups as a part of a divide and rule policy. They also deliberately favored the minority group, the Tamils, and this created discontent with the Sinhalese majority. After

independence from Britain in 1948, the Sinhalese majority ruled the country. The Tamils had been given prominent positions under the colonial powers and the Sinhalese were now intent on removing this imbalance. The Tamil community, on the other hand, felt discriminated against due to the policies imposed by the Sinhalese majority post-independence. They felt they were being excluded from the domain of state power as the Sinhalese language and religion became the state’s language and religion. (Ibid) These grievances led to frictions on the political scene and a Tamil movement arose that were promoting the interests of this marginalized group. There were several Tamil insurgent groups at that time. The group that later became the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) was formed in 1972, by Velupillai Prabhakaran. He still remains the group’s leader today. In 1976, the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) put forward a demand of self-determination and secession (Rotberg, 1999:7).

This was also when Prabhakaran’s group became the LTTE. The ethnic conflict had evolved into a Tamil nationalist movement that challenged the legitimacy of the Sri Lankan state (Shanmugaratnam, 2002:115). The claim was for the creation of an independent state for the Tamils: Tamil Eelam. Tamils had been excluded from the political mainstream and felt a sense of being treated as second-class citizens. The Tamil people felt more and more alienated from the unitary state. Language rights, employment and educational opportunities and state – aided land colonization were among the issues that led to the Tamils perceiving a systematic

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marginalization of their minority group (Shanmugaratnam 2002:114-115). In 1979, President J.R Jayawardena decided to crush Tamil militancy by military means. In 1983, The LTTE launched an attack against an army patrol in the North, killing 13 soldiers. This led to a series of anti- Tamil riots. An event later described as “Black July”, which led to the deaths of several hundred Tamils, pushed the fragile situation into a full- blown conflict. This marked the beginning of a civil war between the Sinhalese- dominated government and the Tamil separatists.

Since the mid 80’s this conflict has ravaged the island of Sri Lanka and has had negative effects on the country’s development. The intractability of this conflict has been a defining characteristic of this conflict. Ethnic turbulence, as mentioned above, has had its effect on the resistance to resolution. Ethnic conflict can be described as a situation where one group’s identity is threatened by the demands, behavior or identity of another group. This leads to an incompatibility in goals, at least at a perceptual level (Sahadevan, 1997:24). Misperceptions and deeply rooted hostility can keep a conflict intractable. A strong belief typically develops among the parties that a solution can’t be found without intensifying the struggle. If the parties see the conflict as inevitable and as necessary to pursue at any cost, there is hardly willingness for attempting to solve the conflict. Military violence over time also creates deep emotional scars and a feeling of being victimized by the other party. The way of viewing the conflict will differ greatly between the parties, as one represents a state or at least the majority of that state and the other represents an insurgency or oppressed group. For members of an ethnic minority group, the state is the oppressor that they want to be saved from. The state on the other hand, sees the insurgency as a threat to its sovereignty and claims it has to use force because of the military activities of the adversary. A spiral develops of continued violent acts and growing mistrust. These are part of the features that tend to keep an ethnic conflict intractable and very much describes the features of the Sri Lankan conflict. (Ibid: 25)

Competing nationalisms is another important aspect of the Sri Lankan conflict. Sinhala nationalism began under British rule, as the Sinhalese and Buddhist majority felt humiliated and discriminated against. The Sinhala nationalists view Sri Lanka as the country of the Sinhalese people, Sinhalese language and the Buddhist religion that most Sinhalese belong to.

A report from the International Crisis Group (ICG) from 2007 states that Sinhala nationalism has long been an obstacle to the resolution, especially because of its manifestations in Sri

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Lankan politics. Tamil nationalism began as reaction to the Sinhala control of the state.

Originally, it was a peaceful movement for the rights of the Tamil minority. When a political settlement to the grievances of the Tamil population never was reached, the movement developed into an armed separatist movement. The Tamil nationalist movement became dominated by the LTTE, which is today banned as a terrorist organization by many countries and the European Union. Many Tamils do not belong to this nationalist movement and would settle for home rule in the North and East areas of the island, where most Tamils live. Many Sinhalese would also prefer a resolution and ending to this conflict, rather than prolonged fighting and destruction. However, as in most conflicts, the extreme and nationalist parts of each group are creating much of the friction that is sustaining the civil war today (ICG Report 2007). The goal of extreme minority nationalists is usually defined in maximalist terms, like a separate state, and it typically evokes passionate resistance from majoritarian nationalists, as is the situation in Sri Lanka. This is what makes a compromise so hard, as it has to be made at two levels, among nationalists of the two sides and between two perspectives of state power.

Two competing nationalisms in Sri Lanka are fighting over mutually exclusive outcomes. For the LTTE, a negotiated political settlement is unacceptable if it does not entail a confederation or federal option with the northern and eastern provinces. The LTTE want political autonomy.

Such a settlement would be hard to accept for the Sinhalese community and the GOSL.

Political instability in other regions, such as in the South might change that or the eventual downfall of the GOSL (Rotberg, 1999:161).

Another defining characteristic has been the determination by both parties to achieve military victory. Both the GOSL and the LTTE to have a determination to fight militarily, which is unparallel in any other conflict in the world. At times, the escalation of violence has seemed unrelenting. It appears that both parties think a decisive outcome on the battlefield will have a direct effect on the future political settlement (Rotberg, 1999: 157). It is however hard to envision a situation where one party will win a decisive military victory, as both sides have showed a capacity to recover quickly from military setbacks. The focus has often been on gaining control over territory and inflicting loss on the other party. There seems also to have been a lack of communication when the parties are in armed conflict. In many other conflicts, political settlements have been negotiated during phases of armed conflict, not only when a ceasefire exists. Past experience has shown that temporary cessations of hostility in Sri Lanka have been very fragile. When hostilities have resumed again, after negotiation efforts, the

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communication between the parties has also broken down. (Ibid: 160)

Yet another important feature of this conflict is that Sri Lanka has a minority group which is sizeable enough to pose a threat to the sovereignty of the state (Rotberg, 1999:4). In addition, the Tamils are a majority group in the region as many million Tamils live in Tamil Nadu in India. This is important in terms of the power relation between the parties. Even if the Tamils are a minority in Sri Lanka, they are a majority in the region. A small minority would not have been able to sustain a conflict against the government of the state in such a manner, as the LTTE has been able to. They have also received support from outside, which has

strengthened their claims. Much financial backing to the LTTE came from the Tamil Diaspora who had fled to other countries and who supported their goal if not their methods (Rotberg, 1999:8). The LTTE’s terrorist actions over the years have however created little support abroad and both expatriate Tamils and other countries now view the organization as a terrorist organization that would not be capable of politically managing a Tamil state. This does of course not mean that the claims of the Tamil population should not be addressed. They have a right to an equal participation in socio-economic and political processes in the country they belong to. Achieving a political agreement based on ethnicity- based power sharing and a satisfactory implementation of this, has been suggested as a solution to this protracted conflict.

As explained, the conflict in Sri Lanka is very complex in terms of actors and the long history of friction between the two adversaries. Understanding the basis of the conflict is very

important in any effort to solve the conflict, and these are all aspects a mediator needs to have a thorough knowledge of. The shifting political conjunctures is one of the most challenging aspects in the context of Sri Lanka’s conflict, and will now be briefly explained through looking at the largest political parties and the characteristics of the political system.

1.1.3 Political dynamics

To find a solution to a protracted intrastate conflict one most have an understanding of the political system and the effects of it. The politics in Sri Lanka is very complex with many political actors and changing goals. It’s a challenging task to keep updated on the political situation at all times as politicians tend to change their motives and political alliances. The political system is also important in that a solution might lie in restructuring the state and

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building a new political culture that is not based on the ethnic cleavages in the society.

Studies have shown that post-colonial states often need to rebuild state institutions (Jung, 2003). In Sri Lanka there is democracy, which is often seen as a precondition for peace, but the democracy in Sri Lanka has been flawed since the time of its introduction. The democratic institutions in Sri Lanka tend to favor elite groups in the society and are built on ethnic cleavages. Uyangoda (Rotberg, 1999:166-167) argues that sharing political power among the three largest ethnic groups on the island is the only way to reach a lasting solution. The Sinhalese, Tamils and Muslims would then have to agree on a political vision. The idea of power sharing has regrettably been much resisted in Sri Lankan politics. As mentioned before, it has been difficult for the GOSL and Sinhalese majority to accept a solution involving a confederation or federal option. Political will is a necessary precondition for peace in Sri Lanka in that a compromise can then be reached.

Sri Lanka’s politics are characterized by a mixed executive system and dominance by political dynasties. There is today a de facto two party system (Jayasuriya, 2005). These two parties are the Center- Right UNP (United National Party) and Center- Left SLFP (Sri Lanka Freedom Party). In the General Election in 1977 a new regime took over under UNP and J.R.Jayawardene. This resulted a change in a new form of executive government from 1979.

Sri Lanka had previously had the British Westminster model of majoritarian parliamentary democracy that elected the Head of Government. This means that today, there is a

cohabitation of a President and a Prime Minister. Often these are not from the same political party and this can create frictions and be an obstacle in attempts for peace negotiations. There has also been a consistent inability between the two main political parties in Sri Lanka to agree on a united stance on the conflict issue. This is a major obstacle to the resolution.

The political system in Sri Lanka is flawed in that it favors the majority and the ruling elites of the country. Sri Lanka has long had a political culture of family dynasties where some families have dominated politics since independence from colonial rule. An example is the UNP, which has had many leaders from the families of Senanayake’s, Jayewardene’s and Wickremesinghe’s. The SFLP is also a political dynasty from which Prime Minister Bandaranaike came. His successor was his wife, Sirimavo Bandaranaike, and then their daughter, Chandrika Kumaratunga, who finally came to power as a President and served until 2005 (ICG Report, 2007). A large problem has been that the political elite has been beyond

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popular challenge and accountability. Part of the political dynamic in Sri Lanka is also that the winner takes it all, meaning that the parties in opposition have very little political

influence. This political culture results in a system which is democratic in its appearance, but which is to a high degree exclusive and unresponsive to popular concerns. These elite- led politics have led to violence and rebellion not only from the Tamil minority, but also from other groups within the society (ICG Report, 2007: 2).

1.1.4 Previous peace attempts in Sri Lanka- a brief overview

Since the mid -fifties several attempts were made to make agreements between Sinhalese and Tamil leaders. The most important third party intervention before Norway was India’s involvement. In the early years of the war, India entered the stage as a mediator. Indian- mediated peace talks were held in the capital of the Himalayan Kingdom of Bhutan

(Uyangoda, 2005:5). Up to 1987, India was engaged in active diplomacy and arranging high- level political meetings to find a settlement to the Sri Lankan conflict. But covertly, India was also arming and training Tamil militants (Bercovitch, 1996). In 1987, the Indian Prime Minister and Sri Lanka’s President signed the Indo- Lankan Accord, in which the GOSL made a commitment to give some regional autonomy to the Tamils in exchange for the end of the secessionist insurgency. Part of the Indo- Lanka accord was India’s employment of military forces (the Indian Peacekeeping Force) in the North and the East to enforce the agreement. It was controversial, but was also an officially arranged intervention. A mistake was made in believing that the Indian Peacekeeping Force would be able to contain the LTTE insurgency. The LTTE were not part in signing the agreement and did not agree with the content. This ended with an intensification of the conflict when the Indian Peacekeeping Force entered into war with the LTTE to try to enforce the peace agreement (Uyangoda, 2005). The intervention has later been described as a disaster. India eventually had to retreat and leave much of the controlled territory to the LTTE. (ICG report, 2006)

In 1989 there was another peace initiative, which led to the withdrawal of the Indian army from Sri Lanka. No settlement was agreed on this time either. After a short ceasefire, the parties returned to conflict in 1990. In 1994, the fourth attempt to peace was started. A new government was in place in Colombo, representing a regime change. The new government and the LTTE signed a ceasefire agreement in January 1995 and four rounds of peace talks were held. This peace attempt did not last long and collapsed in April 1995, when the parties

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Timeline of the Sri Lankan conflict

A chronology of key events:

1948 – Sri Lanka gains independence from British colonial rule

.

1949 - Indian Tamil plantation workers disenfranchised.

1956 - Sinhalese nationalism prominent in politics. Official language act makes Sinhala official language, strengthening the Sinhalese state and Sinhala Nationalism. Tamils protest against new laws.

1970s- The birth & rise of youth militancy.

1972 - Buddhism made main religion.

Prabhakaran forms Tamil militant group, which later becomes LTTE.

1976 - Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) formed.

1977 - Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) party wins all seats in Tamil areas and puts forward a demand of self- determination.

1979- President J.R Jayawardena decides to crush youth

militancy by military means.

1983 – LTTE attacks army patrol in the North of the country, leading to major anti-Tamil riots. This marks the beginning of the civil war between the state and the LTTE.

1985 - First attempt at peace talks between government and LTTE fails.

1987 - Government and India signs accords creating autonomy for Tamil areas in north and east. India deploys peace-keeping force.

1990 - Indian troops pull out of the North and East.

1994 - President Kumaratunga comes to power pledging to end war. Peace talks opened with LTTE.

1995-2001 - War rages across north and east. Tigers bomb Sri Lanka's holiest Buddhist site. President Kumaratunga is wounded in a bomb attack. Suicide attack on the international airport destroys half the Sri Lankan Airlines fleet.

2000 Norway is officially invited to broker talks between the parties, after four previous failed peace attempts

2002 February - Government and Tamil Tiger rebels sign a Norwegian-mediated ceasefire.

returned to conflict once again. The post- April 1995 phase of the conflict saw an intense conflict escalation, which lasted for many years until the new breakthrough in 2001- 2002.

(Uyangoda, 2005:5)

1.2 Norway and the fifth peace process Norway had secretly been engaged in talks since 1999. In 2000, Norway was formally invited by President Kumaratunga to broker the peace talks between the GOSL and the LTTE. India, who had been the former mediator, had many vested interests in terms of its geographical proximity, geopolitical interests and its large Tamil population. The Norwegian mediators represented a very different type of mediator, seemingly neutral and powerless and ready to take a strictly facilitating role. Optimism and hope for a final resolution to the conflict was renewed among the people of Sri Lanka and in the international community with Norway’s peace brokering. In 2001 there was a regime change in Sri Lanka, which positively affected the new peace process. President Kumaratunga’s party, the People’s Alliance (PA), lost the general election and the United National Party’s leader, Ranil Wickremesinghe, became the new Prime Minister. A ceasefire agreement (CFA) was achieved in February 2002 with the help of the Norwegian mediators. The new Prime Minister and the leader of the LTTE were the parties signing the agreement. This left the President feeling that she was being bypassed

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and not include in the process. This would later on create problems for the Norwegian mediators. After the CFA was signed, a series of peace talks were started. Six rounds of talks were conducted between September 2002 and March 2003. Norway acted as a facilitator and arranged meetings, acted as a communication channel between the parties and informed the key stakeholder nations outside the country (Moolakkattu in Peace review, 2004:211). Two donor conferences were held in that period to raise money for development assistance to Sri Lanka. The Norway- assisted peace process had from the start enjoyed a great deal of international support, including from the EU countries, India, the U.S and Japan. These were Co- Chairs of the “Tokyo Conference on The Reconstruction and Development of Sri Lanka”

in 2003, and they have continued to support the peace process and Norway’s role as a mediator. The Norwegian mediation met difficulties during the fifth peace process and in 2003 the process entered an impasse. The period between 2000- 2003 is the main focus of this study. The assessment of Norway as a mediator in Sri Lanka will follow in chapter five.

1.3 Research objectives and questions

This study examines Norway’s peacemaking efforts in general and specifically the case of Sri Lanka. The thesis will be assessing Norway’s role as a facilitator in the fifth peace process in Sri Lanka, in the time period from 2000- 2003. It will review major developments in the process and assess how Norway responded to these.

The main objective is to assess Norway’s efforts as a facilitator in the fifth peace process in Sri Lanka. The research questions are:

1.) Is there a Norwegian approach to peacemaking and how was this applied to the Sri Lankan case?

2.) What was the conduct of the mediators and what should be an appropriate mediator conduct in such a setting?

3.) How did Norway respond to developments and challenges in the fifth peace process?

The thesis will provide a critical perspective on Norway’s effort as a facilitator in the fifth peace process in Sri Lanka and put this in context with possible lessons learned for further

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involvement in peacemaking. The aim of this thesis is to bring a new dimension to the analysis of Norway’s efforts in Sri Lanka, through examining the course of events from the Norwegian perspective. The thesis also puts the Norwegian effort in a global context and gives answers on how international mediation in intrastate conflict should be approached.

1.4 Relevance of study

This study hopes to contribute to a better understanding of Norway’s involvement in the Sri Lankan peace process. One goal is to explore and better understand the complex task of a mediator in such a situation. When a country is engaged in peace and reconciliation work in an international context, such as Norway is, it is important to evaluate experiences and incorporate that knowledge into further involvement.

It is hoped that this study will give input to the scholar debate on conflict resolution and the appropriate conduct of a mediator in intrastate conflicts. A larger question is also posed in terms of the value of such efforts on a global level. The nature and dynamics of mediation and peace processes is a research field where there is little systematic knowledge. This study will contribute to this.

1.5 Organization of thesis

The first chapter is an introduction to Sri Lanka and the history and complexity of the conflict. To examine these aspects is important before venturing into an analysis. The nature of the conflict and the political dynamics is explored. The most important peace attempts are mentioned, to give an idea of the events that had occurred before Norway became involved. A short introduction is also given on Norway and the fifth peace process. Then, the research questions and objectives of the study are stated as well as the relevance of the study. The first chapter also includes this section, which describes the way the thesis is organized.

The second chapter gives an overview of the literature on the field of conflict theory and resolution, international peacemaking and mediation in intra state conflict. This provides a basis for the discussion in chapters four and five. There are of course many other aspects that could have been mentioned here, as there is a comprehensive amount of literature on the topics. It has, however, been narrowed down to the most important aspects to get a simpler overview.

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The third chapter is on methodology and contains a description of the methods used in the study. The research strategy, data collection and fieldwork in Sri Lanka and Norway are described to show the reader how the study was conducted and to discuss possible limitations to the study and it generalizability.

The fourth chapter is an analysis on Norway’ s approach to peacemaking. It discusses if there is a consistent Norwegian approach and mentions some of the previous efforts and the history of Norway as involved in international peacemaking. A short critical review of the Norwegian approach then follows. This is part of the analysis of my findings.

The fifth chapter assesses Norway’s efforts in the fifth peace process in Sri Lanka. First, the stages in the process will be examined in relation to Norway’s responses. Then, the strategy chosen by Norway will be discussed in relation to the theory introduced in the second chapter.

Challenges and developments in the peace process are analyzed to reveal choices made by Norway in terms of the role played out as a mediator. Important questions will be posed and answered, such as if being a humble facilitator was the appropriate choice of strategy. This is the second part of analysis of my findings.

Concluding remarks and recommendations will be given in the sixth chapter. The evaluation of Norway’s approach and the efforts made in Sri Lanka will be summarized and lessons learned for further involvement in peacemaking, are presented.

Chapter 2: Conflict theory, international peacemaking and mediation

This chapter will review the existing literature and theory related to the field of conflict theory and conflict resolution. It will examine theory on international peacemaking and mediation as a third party intervention in intra state conflicts.

2.1 Conflict theory and conflict resolution 2.1.1 The concept of conflict

Conflicts are a part of everyday life and we all find ourselves in disagreement with others at times. In the existing literature on the topic, there are many definitions of conflict. Mitchell

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(1981) describes conflict as “ a relationship between two or more parties who have, or think they have, incompatible goals”. Another more complex definition is that conflict is “escalated natural competition of two or more parties who believe they have incompatible goals, and whose aim is to neutralize, injure, or gain advantage over the other party or parties”

(Uyangoda, 2006:3). Wallensteen (2007:15) gives this definition of conflict: “a social situation in which a minimum of two actors strive to acquire at the same moment in time an available set of scarce resources”. Conflicts often arise due to incompatibilities in power, resources, wealth, and status and can result in the breakdown of states, destruction of national economies and the tragic death of many civilians. Conflict reflects differences in values, aims and needs. There are two types of conflict concerning states: inter- state conflicts, between sovereign states, and intra-state conflicts, which are between the state and a group/groups within that state. This study will focus on the latter. Intra- state conflicts have become the most common type of conflict in the Post Cold War era.

A crucial point of conflict is how it is handled. Conflicts can be handled violently, but they can also be expressed through dialogue, negotiation and compromise and in that way turning the win-lose option into a mutually beneficial win-win perspective. In other words, they can be handled in a constructive or destructive way. When there is a conflict, the parties tend to see their interests as mutually exclusive and diametrically opposed and there is often a tendency to seek unilateral gains (Uyangoda, 2006:7). Unilateral victory, where the enemy surrenders, is one of the oldest forms of conflict resolution. The destructive consequences of war are often due to such approaches to conflict. This is not a common solution anymore, as a negotiated settlement is preferred to military victory. Licklider (1995), however, argues that identity- based civil wars are more likely to resume after a negotiated settlement than military victory. The same study also showed that military victory is likely to end in a genocide, which could explain why a settlement is a preferred option. Today, many conflicts have also shown that the defeated party will after a military victory re-emerge and perhaps even with a stronger determination (Uyangoda, 2006:8). A common view among scholars of peace and conflict research today is that conflict resolution must entail seeking joint gains instead of unilateral gains, to find a solution that is acceptable to both parties. Military victory does not remove the problems that were there and that created the conflict. A transformation is needed to change the dynamics of the conflict and to resolve the underlying causes of it.

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When conflicts generate into armed struggle it is a challenge to transform them again into non-violent disputes by rebuilding broken relationships and promoting dialogue and

willingness for negotiated solutions between the conflicting parties (Uyangoda, 2001). This can be achieved through conflict resolution. Uyangoda (2006) describes conflict resolution as addressing the causes of a conflict and seeking to build new and lasting relationships between hostile groups in such a way that the causes for re-emergence of that conflict are eradicated.

The core of this approach is to understand that the resolution of conflict is so much more than just cessation of hostilities.

Wallensteen (2007:47) gives this definition of conflict resolution:

“A social situation where the armed conflicting parties in a (voluntary) agreement resolve to peacefully live with- and/or dissolve- their basic incompatibilities and henceforth cease to use arms against one another”

There are differences between contemporary conflict resolution efforts and the typically realist approaches of the past. Today, a common view is that conflicts are not free of values and feelings and that the challenges of religion, politics and culture must be accounted for.

During the Cold War, conflict was mainly between recognized governments or sovereign states. Today, another kind of conflict is predominant. The new conflicts are often intrastate and between ethno-political groups who are competing for identity recognition and secession.

Typical for such conflicts are the use of terrorism and the existence of low-level violence that threatens security and infrastructure, which is the case in Sri Lanka. (Ellis, 2006:150) The violent acts between the parties on the battlefield are an accepted part of the evils of conflict, but when the parties target the civilian population it is considered an act of terrorism.

Especially the LTTE has been accused of this in the Sri Lankan conflict, as they have engaged in suicide bombings and attacks on civilians. The EU and many countries in the world have banned the LTTE as a terrorist organization, due to their methods in warfare.

2.1.3 Theoretical approaches to conflict and conflict resolution

There are different approaches to analyzing and understanding conflict and conflict

resolution. One possible division is these three perspectives: the conflict dynamics approach,

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the needs- based approach and the rational calculative approach.

The conflict dynamics approach sees conflict as a dynamic process where one actor reacts to what another is doing, which leads to further action. One sequence of events follows another and the conflict escalates. Conflict escalation can evolve into a never- ending spiral. The idea is that conflict is a social phenomenon moving by itself. The focus is on how to change a conflict by affecting the conflict dynamics. Some tools have been developed to analyze such dynamics. (Wallensteen, 2007:32) Johan Galtung created a conflict dynamics analysis in the 1960’s. In Galtung’s version of conflict dynamics, the conflict triangle is used. The triangle consists of three corners: conflict attitudes, conflict behavior and the contradiction itself. The theory suggests that resolving a conflict is a process that never ends (Ibid: 33). Galtung’s view is that a durable resolution is not possible, but that a conflict transformation can happen through transcendence (where goals are met fully for the conflict parties) and withdrawals (where goals are given up). Dynamics are important in this approach as it can be used to make a conflict creative. Galtung does not see it as the most important option to find agreements through diplomatic means. His theory emphasizes the importance of changing conflict dynamics. Negotiations are ways in which a conflict can be transformed, as finding a process that both parties agree on can be a necessary precursor to a solution (Ibid: 33). Galtung’s work is an example of the dynamic perspective on conflict analysis. His work represents an early perspective in terms of conflict analysis and is in many ways parallel to game theory.

Game theory typically illustrates how parties act within the confines set up by the game itself (Ibid: 32). Game theory focuses on predictable outcomes, where the assumption is that the parties follow the rules of the game. The common emphasis in the dynamics approach is on how difficult it is to break the dynamics of a conflict. Conflict resolution’s task is then to change the direction of the flow of events is such a way that escalation is turned into de- escalation. The dynamic approach also emphasizes the importance of establishing a dialogue between the parties and the importance of confidence -building measures (Ibid: 35). This is where a third party can be a valuable assistant, as a mediator or facilitator that helps

communication between the parties. Another aspect of this approach is that parties using non- violent methods are efficient at changing conflict dynamics.

The needs- based approach sees conflict as emerging out of the denial of basic needs and as such the resolution process must entail identifying those needs and finding an answer to them

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(Wallensteen, 2007:37). This thinking belongs to a materialist theoretical tradition and theorists under this approach tend to refer to frustration and deprivation as causes of conflict.

This perspective sees political access as an effective remedy to conflict, as violent acts are a way of expressing what can’t be expressed through the political channel (Ibid: 37). With the needs- based approach, the difficulty lies in meeting an individual party’s need. As long as the conflict can be translated into the needs of the parties, an outcome can be found that will satisfy both parties. (Ramsbotham et al, 2005:18)

The rational calculations approach sees the actors, and not the circumstances, as the reason for conflict. It assumes that actors are rational, make decisions and pursue strategies and, as such initiate the chains of events that lead to war (Wallensteen, 2007:42). It is based on the idea that wars arise from rational calculation, which is an established realist and neorealist explanation of the origins of war. In the rational approach, it is assumed that the parties initiate wars to win them. Internal calculations are made by the parties to show that the benefits are greater than the losses in escalating the conflict to an armed one. However, the initial calculations have to be revised after a while, if no one wins and the costs of war are growing. (Ibid) William Zartmann is a known theorist in this field. In his analysis, the parties look towards the future and want to avoid a “mutually hurting stalemate”. If no reasonably early chance of victory is available, then Zartmann argues that the mutually hurting stalemate will affect the parties and create a “ripe moment” for resolution. Such a ripe moment may create an opening for peace. However, it might also have another result. The parties might agree on a ceasefire to reduce the pain of the hurting stalemate. But this pause can be used, not to try and solve the conflict, but to recuperate and even gain strength and then return to a new offensive. This is considered a dilemma in conflict termination. The optimistic view here is that the stalemate will create an “enticing opportunity” for a settlement, a way out for both parties. A third party can be utilized here to point out that there is a stalemate and help the parties see alternatives for ending the conflict. (Ibid: 43) This approach presents a novel idea in terms of trying to specify when a conflict can be brought to an agreed ending. In the rational approach, the outside world has an active role, especially in terms of conflicts in smaller countries. The concept of rationality entails that if it is rational to end a war, then the parties will end it. The parties can be influenced by outside forces to see the rationality in ending the conflict. As such, this approach legitimates influencing the parties’ through mediation or other tools. Outsiders can influence the calculation rather than the dynamics or

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needs. An outsider can then affect the calculus for conflict and conflict resolution through rewards and punishment. (Ibid: 45) Another country or an international organization, such as the UN or NATO, might get involved in a conflict in a small country to affect the parties to end the conflict. The outsider can promise assistance to the parties if ending the conflict or they can initiate sanctions for not engaging in negotiations. Aid, trade and investments are examples of what might be used as reward or punishment. Such measures are considered legitimate in terms of conflict resolution, but might not always have the wanted effects.

The perspectives presented here contrast each other, but do not necessarily exclude each other. An important question is: who should settle a conflict? According to the dynamic approach, as many actors as possible should be included to make the process as democratic as possible (Wallensteen, 2007:45). In the needs- based approach the opposite is preferred. It favors more secrecy, little media access and a limited number of parties, who act as

representatives, not as individuals. In the rational calculations approach, all parties who count should be in. It is not necessary to always include as many as possible, although sometimes it is preferred. In the rational calculations perspective, timing is very important. The focus is on seizing opportunities, which requires rapid action carried out by a few, determined actors. The dynamic and needs based approaches do not favor such a style, as conflict resolution is viewed as a process that takes time and which can’t be solved by quick action and political maneuvering. (Wallensteen, 2007:46)

This study views all these approaches as being valuable in analyzing conflict resolution. It argues that Norway followed the rational calculations approach when engaging in the fifth peace process in Sri Lanka. This topic will be addressed further in the fifth chapter, which assesses Norway’s efforts in the fifth peace process.

2.1.4 Peacemaking and third party intervention

The end of the Cold War marked a change in the international system. Conflicts went from being between states to mostly being intrastate conflicts. It also became more accepted to interfere and try to make peace when there is a conflict within a sovereign state. Peacemaking can be defined as political and diplomatic efforts to bring a peaceful resolution to a conflict. It does not include using force to make the contending parties find a solution. (Darby &

MacGinty, 2003:435). Peacemaking today comprises of many approaches and methods for

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understanding, managing and hopefully resolving conflicts. Increasing the knowledge of how to solve intrastate conflicts is an important issue today. In our globalized world, people are more dependent on each other than ever and a war in one country can swiftly have effects on other countries. It may also affect countries that are not in the same region, but that are ideologically different, such as in acts of terrorism. Countries are increasingly turning to international organizations and other institutions for help in resolving conflicts. Intrastate conflict can bring instability on a regional and global scale and as such, external agencies have become increasingly involved in peacemaking through mediation and other third party interventions (Ramsbotham, 2005:168).

A trend in the post- Cold war era is the internationalization of intrastate conflict resolution.

This has opened up for donors to be active stakeholders in peace processes in aid-dependent countries. External pressure in the form of threat of sanctions or a peace conditionality for development aid, can play an important role in pushing the government of a country with an internal war to seek a negotiated settlement An armed movement may also come under external pressure from interested governments which threaten or do declare them as a terrorist movement. An international ban of such an organization and the label of terrorist may get the insurgents to consider a settlement, or blocking the flow of money and weapons from outside.

An armed movement may then think and act more politically (Shanmugaratnam, 2008: 1-3).

2.2 Mediation theory

2.2.1 Negotiation and mediation

Negotiation is a strategy that can be a possibility to parties in conflict. In international politics and diplomacy, negotiation has long been a policy tool and a strategic option. In Sri Lanka, the parties have long been talking about what they call a ”negotiated settlement” (Uyangoda, 2006:18). Negotiation is also an everyday skill and as Fisher and Ury wrote in their book, Getting to yes, (1991): “Negotiation is a basic means of getting what you want from others. It is back-and-forth communication designed to reach an agreement when you and the other side have some interests that are shared and others that are opposed”.

In conflict resolution, negotiation is a common practice. The objective of negotiation is to reach a balanced agreement that seems fair to both parties. Negotiation can be defined as a process where the parties in a conflict seek to settle or resolve their conflicts. Uyangoda

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(2000) defines negotiation as “talks between conflicting parties who discuss ideas,

information and options in order to reach a mutually acceptable agreement”. Negotiation is aimed at changing the behavior of the parties involved so that the conditions are there to reach a settlement to the conflict and eventually also a resolution of the conflict. Certain factors are in conflict resolution theory seen as favoring negotiation: the conflicting parties must realize that they are unlikely to get what they want through unilateral action, the conflict must be ripe for negotiation and the representatives of each party must have enough authority to speak for the whole party and commit it to a course of action (Uyangoda, 2000).

Reaching a settlement in a protracted and violent conflict is hard, and a directly negotiated bilateral settlement is rare. It has become more usual for the parties to the conflict to need the assistance of others. When direct negotiations fail, a third party can be called in to assist.

A trilateral negotiating process then begins, with the introduction of a third party to facilitate or mediate (Mitchell in Darby & MacGinty, 2003:77).

Mediation can be described as a form of assisted negotiation. Ramsbotham (2005) defines mediation as the intervention of a third party and sees it as a voluntary process where the parties maintain control over the outcome, although sometimes it is combined with positive and negative incentives. Uyangoda (2006) gives an even simpler definition of mediation:

“mediation consists of influencing the parties to a dispute to come to an agreement by appealing to their own interests”. Christopher Mitchell (in Darby & MacGinty, 2003) gives a definition of mediation as “any action undertaken by a third party with the primary intention of achieving some compromise settlement of the issues at stake between the parties, or at least ending disruptive conflict behavior”.

A mediator can help the adversaries through what is known as a peace process, that start with the parties communicating to find some common ground and possibly a solution. Parties to a conflict are often inclined to see their interests as diametrically opposed. The task of conflict resolution has traditionally been to help parties who perceive their situation as zero-sum to perceive it as a non-zero-sum conflict instead (to see it as a situation where both parties can win or lose), and then help them move in the positive sum direction (Ramsbotham, 2005:15).

This is where a mediator can assist. When two adversaries interact, a spiral of hostility and escalation is likely to develop. The entry of a third party can provide easier communication

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back and forth and filter the messages given. This may stop the spiral of escalation. It is believed that third parties make a positive difference in this respect.

Norway’s role in Sri Lanka is often described as facilitation rather than mediation. The labeling of Norway as a mediator or facilitator was also a major discussion in Sri Lanka before the involvement. This is because the term “mediator” is interpreted as a strong third party that aims to pressure the parties into an agreement. The GOSL wanted a facilitator who could be a messenger back and forth between the parties. Especially after India’s attempt to broker peace, there was desire for an impartial and weaker third party. This study describes Norway’s involvement as mediation, but with employing facilitation strategies. It views this distinction as a theoretical distinction, which is sometimes given other meanings than what it actually entails. This distinction will now be explored to understand the implications of these different mediator roles.

In the scholarly literature and in practice, there is often a division between mediation, facilitation and arbitration. There is a range of choices in terms of third party involvement where the third party can be very passive or highly active in deciding the outcome. Arbitration for example entails a highly active role, where the third party decides the outcome and is given authority by the parties to do so. (Rotberg, 1999: 152) A mediator’s role is often more passive and the third party does not impose solutions on the parties, but can introduce ideas in terms of solving the dispute. Mediator’s can play many types of roles and employ different strategies. William Zartmann and Saadia Touval have divided the different strategies into three categories: communication/facilitation strategies, formulation strategies and

manipulation strategies. (Ibid: 153) Facilitation strategies entail a relatively passive role, where the mediator makes the contact between the parties, tries to gain their trust and arranges communication between them, but doesn’t make inputs. Employing formulation strategies entails the mediator taking on an active role by controlling the meeting environment, the agenda and the procedures for the meetings and highlighting common interests, but not proposing solutions. Employing manipulations strategies is the most active of the three strategies the mediator can take on. It entails making proposals for solutions, pressing parties to show flexibility, promising resources or threatening withdrawal of these, and offering to monitor that the agreements made are being held. (Ibid) Facilitation also tends to be practiced at the unofficial level as a pre-negotiation activity that creates an opportunity for the parties to

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explore ways of addressing the barriers that have kept them from the negotiating table. Such unofficial talks do not have the pressure of producing a binding agreement, which the official negotiations do. (Rotberg, 1999:154) Official mediation can however employ facilitation strategies as mentioned, and this has been Norway’s official approach in Sri Lanka.

Official mediators are usually official representatives of governments, who have been asked to intervene as a third party, by one or both of the parties in conflict. (Rotberg, 1999: 153) Rotberg argues that “the official mediator is more likely or not to have his or her own states interests at stake in wanting to resolve a conflict” and that the role played by the mediator in the resolution very much depends on the nature of the relationship between the represented government and the parties in conflict. (Ibid: 154)

In international mediation the focus is often on finding a settlement as quickly as possible.

One wants to stop the violence and suffering. Transformational change, which takes a long time, often goes on in the background while international mediators work at the macro level to contain the conflict (Ellis, 2006:183). Ellis (2006) refers to three reasons for involvement in such mediation and in finding a quick solution: humanitarian interest, strategic interests and a concern for security and a stable political environment. The humanitarian reason is to make resolution progress as soon as possible to stop human suffering due to the conflict and avoid further disasters. The mediator can then be responsible for securing ceasefires,

coordinating the handling of refugees and assisting relief agencies. Humanitarian aid is seen as a moral responsibility. The second reason is political strategy, in terms of one country acting as a mediator to maintain its relationship to another country or keeping political alliances. Political strategy may be part of the motivation for getting involved in international mediation, as the country then also serves its self- interests. The third reason to mediate can be a concern for security and a stable political environment. Having a stable political environment internationally has positive effects for all countries, as instability can mean terrorism or problems related to refugees to mention some possible effects. One is often also afraid of spillover effects in the region where there is instability, in that conflict can spread to neighboring countries.

2.2.2 How and when to get involved

To start mediation, it requires the willingness of the parties and certain conditions to be in

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place. The timing of the initiative is considered very important. Mediating too soon or too late may have consequences. The mediator must also have enough knowledge of the conflict, the actors and the context. An understanding of and sensitivity to the history of the conflict and the grievances of the parties is necessary. The mediator must also be willing to commit to the process and invest time and resources in this. Persistence and a will to continue the process even if obstacles are there is important. (Elllis, 2006:184)

In conflict theory there is, as earlier mentioned, a notion of “conflict ripeness”. This concept refers to the existence of conditions conducive to conflict resolution. The theory of ripeness was proposed by Zartmann and later elaborated by himself and his colleague Stephen

Stedman. Zartmann argued that a conflict is ripe for resolution when: “ there exists a situation of deadlock that creates a mutually hurting stalemate, that unilateral solutions are blocked and joint solutions are conceivable and that the party that previously had the upper hand in the conflict has lost the advantage and the weaker part has gained in strength” (Uyangoda, 2006:34). These notions are widely supported by policymakers today. As this theory has developed, it is now believed that mediators should “await the development of a hurting stalemate perhaps accompanied with the event of an approaching mutual catastrophe”. (Ibid) Stedman (1991) argues that the model of a hurting stalemate puts too much emphasis on the power relationship between the two parties and fails to take into account changes within the parties or changes in the context. Moreover, it has been argued that there should be a

distinction between ripeness for negotiations to start and for negotiations to succeed. Even if there is a situation of ripeness it can change and the situation can become “unripe” again.

Ripeness is perhaps best seen as a complex process of transformations. (Ramsbotham et al, 2005:167).

Zartmann also argues that for negotiations to succeed the parties must have valid spokespersons, a deadline and a vision of an acceptable compromise. Recognition and dialogue are an important component, as the parties must recognize each other as negotiating partners. (Ibid) Symmetry is also important in this perspective. If there is asymmetry it needs to be reduced, because a more equal power balance between the parties is believed to favor negotiation. (Ramsbotham et al, 2005). In a conflict between a government and an

insurgency, like in Sri Lanka, this would mean that the government has to recognize the insurgent as a negotiating partner.

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There is sometimes a misconception that a mediator can bring two conflicting parties to the negotiating table and impose a settlement on them (Uyangoda, 2006:31). In macro-political conflicts, such a solution would not work as it has shown itself in the Sri Lankan conflict as well. It is the parties themselves that should ultimately find a solution, which is acceptable to both sides. They may however need a third party to make this possible. If the two parties want a settlement, they might still not trust each other enough to work it out on their own and this is where the mediator comes in. A third party can then facilitate communication between the two sides (Uyangoda, 2006:32). Trust is important, especially trust in that the mediator is neutral and does not favor one of the parties. Neutrality is at least seen as a favorable condition for a good result of mediation. The mediator can play a role in working out the settlement agreement and in proposing solutions or alternatives when the parties are

disagreeing. It is important to note that the mediator needs the consent of both parties to the conflict. If not, the mediator might be seen as supporting one party or as threatening the sovereignty of a state (Uyangoda, 2006:33). Trust in the mediator may also be connected to the person/persons acting as a mediator and their interpersonal skills. Important factors include respect, communication skills and strategic skills (Ellis, 2006:184). Communication skills are important in terms of overcoming psychological barriers such as feelings of disrespect and humiliation between the parties (Ibid). Parties to deep-rooted conflict such as in Sri Lanka may find it difficult to work together because they don’t want to confer

legitimacy on one another. The mediators must then find ways of overcoming this. They must gain the trust of the parties and help them build a common understanding.

A mediator or facilitator can help change the pattern and flow of communication between the parties. Ellis (2006) states six core communication responsibilities of a mediator and how they can contribute to a positive peace process. The first one, being that the mediator must have a certain control over the procedures for the meetings. In this lies the responsibility of controlling meeting arrangements and agendas in such a way that it promotes a constructive process. The second is establishing a positive context for the mediation. Bringing in a mediator can change the atmosphere of a conflict by “adding a new voice to the issues, altering the status and attention to the conflict, changing the levels of hopefulness and enthusiasm for resolution” and altering the flow and pattern of communication between the parties” (Ellis, 2006:185). The third responsibility of a mediator is to know how to clarify

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conflicts, so that the parties have a clear picture of the issues. The fourth responsibility that Ellis mentions is the responsibility of anticipating problems and keeping relationships

constructive. This entails recognizing destructive behaviors and to have strategies of handling this. It relies on a mediator’s ability to switch roles and behavior according to the situation.

The fifth responsibility is maintaining the positive face of each party. This entails taking into consideration the need of all parties to receive recognition and confirmation and not loose face. Humiliation can be a major factor in the hardening of positions and maintaining the positive face of all parties can help avoid this (Ellis, 2006:186). The last communication responsibility of the mediator is that the mediator must manage the media and external environments. Protracted conflicts, such as the one in Sri Lanka, are linked to an external environment that includes regional and international audiences. Interested parties or groups can be helpful or cause trouble. Having a smart strategy in relation to the media can help this situation. This will be discussed more in the fifth chapter.

Acting as a mediator entails anticipating and overcoming obstacles that can arise in a peace process. Part of successful mediation is then to be aware of the challenges of conflict resolution. Management of spoilers can be very crucial to the resolution of a conflict and to peace processes. Spoilers can be described as actors that are against the resolution of a conflict, as it is in their interest to continue it (Wallensteen, 2007:46). Stedman (1997) argues that some actors may exist that are not satisfied with the outcome or a peace agreement and can then sabotage the conflict resolution. He argues that there are also ripe moments for destruction of the peace and that spoilers have to be handled before they start attacking the peace agreement and exploit minor disagreements to their advantage. Implementation of the peace agreement is important in this regard. The peace agreement has to be implemented as soon as possible and as unchanged as possible, to avoid the window of opportunity for spoilers. This shows the fragility of a peace process and can be related to the issue of

exclusion of actors in a peace process, as they might be potential spoilers (Ibid). The different approaches that have been mentioned have different answers to the inclusion of such actors in a conflict. The dynamic approach would be positive to the inclusion of potential or actual spoilers and the rational calculation approach would be negative to this. An inclusion of all actors might entail loosing some of the urgency in solving the conflict and energy being spent on including actors that might not have a positive effect on the outcome. One way of solving the problem of including spoilers is to create a second channel for participation of such actors.

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2.2.3 Power and mediation

Many studies on current mediation processes are influenced by the kind of mediation that was traditionally carried out between sovereign independent states. Before the end of the Cold War, the mediators were generally the superpowers that could use pressure to achieve results.

Such a model, the model of the influential and powerful mediator has existed since the world of Greek city –states, where great powers like Sparta would mediate in conflicts between smaller states. But in the nineteenth- and twentieth- century diplomacy, new mediator models have developed. The end of the Cold War changed this typical structure and many variations are common, such as mediation by small states and mediation by eminent persons, such as Nelson Mandela, or organizations like the Jimmy Carter Foundation. The methods and approaches to outside mediation have been debated in recent years. Much of the debate on the role of mediation in intrastate conflicts is on who is the most appropriate in such a role and on which strategies should be employed. (Darby & MacGinty, 2003:77-78)

The question of power and mediation is central to Norway’s role in Sri Lanka, as Norway is generally not seen as a powerful actor in the international context. There has been a trend of small countries acting as mediators in intrastate conflicts, exactly because they are not powerful and will then be more impartial. A mediator with no vested interest in the country and conflict is considered valuable in producing a positive outcome of the conflict resolution process.

There is a division between coercive and non- coercive third party intervention. A powerful mediator is seen as one who has political, military and economic resources. Such third parties try to influence the parties and use persuasion as a tool to find an agreement. They can also alter the power balance and affect the behavior of the parties through using incentives and disincentives. This kind of strategy might create badly designed agreements that are likely to fail (Zartmann& Faure, 2005:280). Most third parties are however not in a position to use that kind of pressure. Mediation using non- coercive strategies is today more common. Non- coercive mediation can entail improving communication and interaction by arranging the surroundings of meetings, being a messenger between the parties and introducing alternative tracks of communication than the official channel. Some scholars have argued that small

Implications of Norway's Role As Peacemaker In Sri Lanka