THE POLITICAL ECOLOGY OF A FARMER-HERDER CONFLICT IN MOPTI, MALI

CONFLICTING LIVELIHOODS AND RESOURCE SCARCITY IN

`THE TIME OF GLOBAL WARMING':

THE POLITICAL ECOLOGY OF A FARMER-HERDER CONFLICT IN MOPTI, MALI

JILL TOVE BUSETH

Department of international environment and development studies (noragric) Master Thesis 30 credits 2009

The Department of International Environment and Development Studies, Noragric, is the international gateway for the Norwegian University of Life Sciences (UMB). Eight departments, associated research institutions and the Norwegian College of Veterinary Medicine in Oslo. Established in 1986, Noragric’s contribution to international development lies in the interface between research, education (Bachelor, Master and PhD programmes) and assignments.

The Noragric Master theses are the final theses submitted by students in order to fulfil the requirements under the Noragric Master programme “International Environmental Studies”,

“Development Studies” and other Master programmes.

The findings in this thesis do not necessarily reflect the views of Noragric. Extracts from this publication may only be reproduced after prior consultation with the author and on condition that the source is indicated. For rights of reproduction or translation contact Noragric.

© Jill Tove Buseth, August 2009 [email protected]

Noragric

Department of International Environment and Development Studies P.O. Box 5003

N-1432 Ås Norway

Tel.: +47 64 96 52 00 Fax: +47 64 96 52 01

Internet: http://www.umb.no/noragric

Declaration

I, Jill Tove Buseth, declare that this thesis is a result of my research investigations and findings.

Sources of information other than my own have been acknowledged and a reference list has been appended. This work has not been previously submitted to any other university for award of any type of academic degree.

Signature……….…..

Date………

Abstract

Contemporary arguments are stating that increased resource scarcity in the Sahel will cause many and severe conflicts in the region in the coming years. These ideas are increasingly seen in relation to global warming today, and have had huge influences among policy makers, within academic circles and not least among the public. This study has been carried out with the purpose of investigating causes behind a farmer-herder conflict in the Sahel, more specifically in the Mopti region of Mali. The study explores ideas of resource scarcity and environmental stress as possible causes behind conflict, but more importantly it draws on political backdrops and structural links between environmental changes and political factors in a political ecology framework to explain the conflict. There has been a large-scale expansion of rice fields in the case study area the last decades. This has resulted in major losses of pastoral land, and can be seen in light of a pastoral marginalization that has prevailed in large parts of Africa the last decades. In the case of this study, land conversion projects also partly led to a loss of agricultural land, due to insufficient maintenance of irrigation systems, and due to a direct confiscation of rice fields. All in all, national agricultural policies and projects have largely resulted in a worsened access to land for mostly herders, but also farmers, and have led to herders and farmers expanding into each other’s land. Ambiguity and diffuseness in land management systems and political administration have contributed in causing the conflict of this case study. This can be seen in light of a ‘political vacuum’ that prevailed in Mali in the aftermath of the decentralization reforms of the 1990s. This ‘vacuum’

opened up for a practice of ‘belly politics’ and rent seeking in natural resource management, and has acted as an obstacle for finding solutions to resource-related conflicts. In the case of this study, the rehabilitation project of a pond exacerbated tensions and eventually caused the outbreak of the conflict, as agreements on its purposes were not properly clarified in advance.

This study demonstrates that structural links between political process and environmental change are crucial to take into account when explaining farmer-herder conflicts. Based on my findings, I argue that political ecology is a far more suitable theoretical approach in explaining resource-related farmer-herder conflicts today, than contemporary arguments of the environmental security thesis. This is especially true in today’s ‘time of global warming,’ as there is a real risk and growing problem that conflicts and problems easily are allocated environmental issues.

Acknowledgements

There are many persons whose contributions and support I could not have been without in the completion of this work. First of all, my sincere thanks goes to my supervisor Tor Arve Benjaminsen for professional guidance, inspiration and practical assistance through the entire process of this study – from the planning of fieldwork to writing up the thesis. Great appreciations also go to my coordinator during fieldwork in Mali, Boubacar Ba. Thanks for logical assistance, practicalities and inspiration. Moreover, this study could not have been completed without the help of my interpreter Hama Diall. Thanks for all assistance during fieldwork, thanks for speaking so many languages, thanks for driving – and repairing! – the moped, and thanks for helping me in all kinds of ways and situations.

I would like to thank the people at MELM in Mali for logistical assistance, great hospitality and friendship. Special thanks from the bottom of my heart goes to Janne Evje Hinderaker and Anne Lise Baltzersen for human compassion and support when I lost my father and had to leave Mali during my first stay. Also thanks to Laila for your truly appreciated friendship during my stay in Sévaré! Moreover, I would like to send my gratitude to the wonderful librarians at Noragric, Liv Ellingsen and Ingeborg Brandtzæg, for probably being the most helpful and dedicated librarians in all Universities of Norway.

This study has been financially supported by a research grant from Noragric and a Freedom of Expression grant, something which is gratefully acknowledged.

I would also like to send the greatest appreciations to my family and friends for being so supportive, tolerant, encouraging and helpful. Thanks to my colleagues at Tanum for stepping in, and thanks to Jenny for excellent computer assistance. Special thanks also of course go to my fellow students at Noragric for cooperation and common backing up through two great years! Finally my greatest gratitude goes to my one and only favourite and beloved; Svein Harald, whose patience, support, encouragement and love made this entire study possible.

Last, but not least, my biggest appreciation goes of course to all my informants in the field for sharing your experiences and for taking your time. I could not have done this without your sincere openness and cooperation, and I truly appreciate getting to know all of you. Tiaboo!

Table of contents

Declaration………….………..………….. p. iii Abstract………...……….… p. v Acknowledgements………... p. vii Table of contents………... p. ix List of abbreviations………..……….... p. xiii Glossary of terms………...……….... p. xv Table of figures………..….……...p. xvii

Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1 Problem statement………... p. 2 1.2 Objectives and research questions………...… p. 3 1.3 Motivations and rationale……… p. 4 1.4 Structure of the thesis……….. p. 4

Chapter 2: Conceptual and theoretical background

2.1 Narratives and global environmental discourse………. p. 7 2.2 Environmental change……….… p. 8 2.2.1 The concepts of land degradation and resource scarcity……….… p. 9 2.2.2 ‘The Sahelian crisis’ narrative……….… p. 11 2.2.3 Global warming and the climate change discourse………..… p. 14 2.3 Farmers and herders in the Sahel……… p. 15 2.3.1 Land, identities and farmer-herder relations……… p. 15 2.3.2 Farmer-herder conflicts……… p. 16 2.4 ‘Belly politics’ and petty corruption in natural resource management…….. p. 17 2.4.1 Belly politics and petty corruption in Africa in a socio-historical context.. p. 18 2.4.2 ‘Rent seeking’ in natural resource management……….. p. 19 2.5 Political ecology………. p. 19 2.5.1 The history and principles of political ecology………... p. 20 2.5.2 The relevance of political ecology as framework for this study………….. p. 23

2.6 The environmental security thesis………... p. 24 2.6.1 Historical roots of the environmental security thesis... p. 25 2.6.2 The argument………...… p. 25

Chapter 3: Contextual background: setting the scene

3.1 Geography and topography………. p. 29 3.2 Ecology and livelihoods in the inland Niger delta………..… p. 31 3.3 A history of land use system and political administration………..….. p. 33 3.4 Description of study area and case……….….. p. 36 3.4.1 Land use and development interventions in Kounary……….………. p. 37 3.4.2 The conflict between Guirowel and Karbaye in 2001……….… p. 40 3.4.3 The legal proceedings………... p. 42

Chapter 4: Methodology

4.1 Research approach and design……….…… p. 43 4.1.1 The case study design ……… p. 43 4.1.2 Reliability and validity……… p. 44 4.2 Methods of data collection and field work……….. p. 45 4.2.1 Sampling procedures……….... p. 45 4.2.2 Data collection……….… p. 47 4.2.3 Field procedures and tools………... p. 50 4.2.4 Challenges during research……….. p. 52 4.3 Data analysis……….... p. 56 4.4 Ethical considerations………..… p. 57

Chapter 5: Analysis and discussion of findings

5.1Main findings: Causes of the conflict:

Environmental and political changes and structures in the case study area... p. 59

5.1.1 Large-scale expansion of rice fields and loss of land…………..…………... p. 60

5.1.1.1 Lower flood levels on the river Niger……….. p. 60 5.1.1.2 National agricultural policies………...p. 61 5.1.1.3 ORM and the establishment of casiers…………...………... p. 62 5.1.2 The pond rehabilitation…….………. p. 67 5.1.3 Political vacuum and ‘lack of governance’……… p. 71 5.1.3.1 Lack of administration and power vacuum……….…. p. 71 5.1.3.2 Belly politics and rent seeking………. p. 72 5.1.4 Summary... p. 75

5.2 Discussion: the political ecology of a farmer-herder conflict... p. 79

5.2.1 Environmental degradation in the case study area…... p. 79 5.2.1.1 Rainfall patterns, resource scarcity and drought……….. p. 79 5.2.1.2 Desertification….………. p. 82 5.2.1.3 Summary………..… p. 83 5.2.2 The political ecology of environmental change

and conflict in the case study area………... p. 84 5.2.2.1 Connections between political and

environmental structures and environmental process….……….… p. 84 5.2.2.2 Resource scarcity vs. resource access………. p. 88 5.2.2.3 Summary……….…. p. 89 5.2.3 Farmer-herder conflicts in ‘the time of global warming’………...……..….. p. 90 5.2.3.1 Challenging the global environmental discourse……….… p. 91

Chapter 6: Conclusion

6.1 Summary of findings………... p. 93 6.2 Concluding remarks……… p. 95 6.3 Future research……… p. 96

References………... p. 97 Appendices………..… p. 112

Appendix I) Interview guide for field research………...……….. p. 112 Appendix II) Interview guide for external stakeholders……… p. 115

List of abbreviations

CIDA - Canadian International Development Agency CIPEA - Centre International pour l’Élevage an Afrique DHS - Demographic and Health Surveys

DNPIA - Direction Nationale des Productions et des Industries Animales DRPIA - Direction Régionale des Productions et des Industries Animales ECACP - The Environmental Change and Acute Conflict Project

(the Toronto Group)

ENCOP - The Environment and Conflict Project (the Swiss Peace Foundation)

IPCC - Intergovernmental Panel of Climate Change IRIN - Integrated Regional Information Networks NGO - Non-governmental Organization

ODEM - Opération de Développement de l’Élevage dans la region de Mopti

ORM - Office Riz Mopti

RESA - Environmental Rehabilitation Food Security Project UNCCD - United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification UNDP - United Nations Development Program

Glossary of terms

Bessema - Traditional chief of the rimaybé and agricultural activities Burgu - Pastoral fodder, lat.: Echinochloa stagnina.

Burtol - Livestock corridor where cattle pass Casier pastoral - Pastoral grazing area

Casier rizicole - Irrigated rice field

Jomsaré - Village chief, head of administrative and political tasks Jowro - Chief of the herders and manager of pastoral land and

activities

Leyde (sing. leydy) - Traditional pastoral management units

Sous-préfet - Head of communes, in this case Kounary, Fatoma and Bassirou Transhumance - Seasonal movements of livestock between well-defined

pasture areas, in this case mostly to drylands far away during the wet season.

Table of figures

Figure 1: Sources and consequences of environmental scarcity……….… p. 27 Figure 2: Map of Africa………... p. 29

Figure 3: Map of Mali………..…... p. 29

Figure 4: Map of the West African Sahelian zone……….……….… p. 31 Figure 5: Map of regions and districts in Mali highlighting Mopti cercle…………. p. 35 Figure 6: Map of Mopti cercle highlighting Kounary commune…………...…….… p. 35 Figure 7: Resource map of study area ……… p. 37 Figure 8: Maximum flood levels on the Niger river, Mopti 1922- 2006………….... p. 60 Figure 9: Photo of the pond………..…...… p. 67 Figure 10: Photo of the burtol and the gardens surrounding the pond……….. p. 69 Figure 11: Local perceptions on whether the conflict is related to political aspects.… p. 77 Figure 12: Factors that are blamed for the conflict within each village……… p. 78 Figure 13: Factors that are blamed for the conflict within each livelihood group….... p. 78 Figure 14: Annual rainfall Mali, 1940- 1998……… p. 80 Figure 15: Annual rainfall in Mopti, 1950- 2008………..… p. 80 Figure 16: Trends in vegetation greenness in the Sahel, 1982- 2003……… p. 82 Figure 17: Local perceptions on whether the conflict is related to natural resources... p. 83 Figure 18: A political ecology of environmental violence……… p. 86 Figure 19: Causes of the conflict between Karbaye and Guirowel in 2001………….. p. 87

1.0 Introduction

Thomas F. Homer-Dixon wrote in 2007 a New York Times article called “Terror in the Weather Forecast.” In this article Homer-Dixon claims that climate change presents a major challenge to international security, in fact “just as dangerous – and more intractable – than the arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War.” Moreover, he claims that:

In the future, that battlefield is likely to be complex and hazardous. Climate change will help produce the kind of military challenges that are difficult for today’s conventional forces to handle: insurgencies, genocide, guerrilla attacks, gang warfare and global terrorism (Homer- Dixon 2007).

There is a substantial – and growing – body of literature supporting these views. The arguments are rooted in the belief that global warming, in combination with population growth, is increasing resource scarcity (e.g. Egeland 2008, Homer-Dixon 1999, IPCC 2007), and will dry out the soil and vegetation people depend on. It is accordingly assumed that people eventually will engage in conflict to secure access to these natural resources (e.g.

Homer-Dixon 1991, 1994). It is, based on this, often believed that climate change will cause many and severe conflicts in the coming years (e.g. Mjøs 2007, Kaplan 1994). Scholars have asserted that this is our time’s greatest challenge, and that “the era of resource wars is upon us” (Klare 2006). Already, many contemporary conflicts have been attributed to resource scarcity and climate change (e.g. Gore 2007, Kahl 2006, Suliman 1998). Dryland areas of Africa, such as the Sahel, are presented as the clearest examples of such conflicts (Mjøs 2007, Sachs 2007), and many policymakers, including United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon, have stated that the crisis in Darfur stems from resource scarcity and environmental pressure (Ban 2007).

Such thoughts have been very influential and powerful, both in academic circles and among the public, and especially among policymakers. Indeed, in 2007, the Nobel Peace Prize was awarded Al Gore and the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), a statement that places climate change as a direct threat to international security:

Unfortunately we can already establish that global warming not only has negative consequences for "human security", but can also fuel violence and conflict within and between states. […] The

consequences are most obvious, however, among the poorest of the poor, in Darfur and in large sectors of the Sahel belt, where we have already had the first "climate war". The wind that blows the sand off the Sahara sets people and camels moving towards more fertile areas. The outcome is that nomads and peasants, Arabs and Africans, Christians and Muslims from many different tribes clash in a series of conflicts. There are many dimensions to this, but it is growing increasingly obvious that desertification is a central underlying factor. […] Large parts of the Sahel belt, from the Sudan to Senegal, are coming under threat (Mjøs 2007).

According to Benjaminsen (2009: 152), these views make up the essence in a narrative that the last few years has gained a lot of influence. This narrative says that i) global climate change leads to drought and desertification that again causes resource scarcity, and that ii) this resource scarcity leads to conflict.

Although these ideas have been widely influential and popular, this ‘resource scarcity narrative’ and the ‘environmental security thesis’ (Homer-Dixon 1991, 1994, 1999) are both largely contested among researchers. Especially during the last few years, these views have been questioned by in particular peace and conflict studies (e.g. Binningsbø et. al. 2007, Gleditsch 1998, Raleigh and Urdal 2007) and political ecology (e.g. Benjaminsen 2008, Benjaminsen 2009, Moritz 2006, Peluso and Watts 2001, Turner 2004). The most common counter-arguments are concerned about how climate change becomes a process or a factor easy to blame for problems caused by other mechanisms, like political and economic structures. In spite of this critique and a large body of research questioning the links between resource scarcity and conflict (Salehyan 2008), contemporary farmer-herder conflicts across arid and semi-arid Africa have largely served as prominent examples of such scarcity-driven conflicts, and still do (e.g. Baechler 1999, Kahl 2006).

1.1Problem statement

This research project focuses on a resource-related farmer-herder conflict in the inland Niger delta in the Mopti region of Mali. I will in the following investigate what causes that lie behind tensions between the involved farmers and herders. I will examine resource scarcity and land degradation caused by environmental change as a possible cause, drawing on contemporary arguments of increased scarcity and ‘environmental violence,’ but more importantly I draw on political structures and development interventions to show how access to natural resources have changed for the people living in the area, and how socio-political

factors and backdrops eventually led to the outbreak of a violent farmer-herder conflict in 2001.

Fieldwork for this thesis was carried out in October 2008, and February- March 2009.

1.2Objectives and research questions

Based on the problem statement above, my objectives and research questions are as follows:

1) To examine a local conflict between farmers and herders, the causes of it, and who are perceived as the ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ in the conflict.

i) Who are or have been involved in the conflict?

ii) Who are perceived as having lost the most from the conflict situation?

iii) What is perceived as the cause of the conflict among the different stakeholders involved?

2) To examine what kinds of changes there have been in people’s access to land in the case study area, the causes of these changes, and whether changes in (access to) natural resources are the cause of the conflict.

i) What kind of changes have there been in access to and amount of natural resources in the study area, and why have these changes occurred?

ii) Have these changes led to resource degradation or scarcity?

iii) Who are perceived as ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ in regards to these changes?

iv) Has competition over land changed during the last few decades, and if so, in what ways and why?

3) To investigate the political aspects of the situation and whether there are any political causes behind the conflict, and identify the different political stakeholders involved.

i) Have any governmental institutions or political actors been involved in the conflict in any ways, and if so – what has been their role?

ii) Have there been policies directly related to this conflict and the situation leading up to it, and if so, what policies?

iii) Have there been any changes in governmental involvement in this situation, and if so, in what ways?

1.3Motivations and rationale

The link between global warming, resource scarcity and violent conflict is an important area of focus in peace and conflict research and development studies as well as in public spheres today. However, the dominating policy discourse is currently being questioned. There is an ongoing discussion on much of the empirical ‘evidence’ made on this link, and more research in this field is highly necessary. Since dryland areas of Africa, such as the Sahel, are viewed as typical examples of areas with resource scarcity-driven conflicts, I find it fruitful to investigate a farmer-herder conflict in this area.

Based on this, I find my research topic relevant for ongoing debates within the academic field.

Potentially, the research and thesis may also be of interest for policy-makers and the public at large in light of the great contemporary interest for climate change related topics.

1.4 Structure of the thesis

I will in the following present my research and thesis through conceptual, theoretical, contextual and methodological frameworks, before I present the analysis, discussion and conclusions of my findings. The thesis is organized into six chapters, in which this introduction is chapter 1. After this chapter, I present the conceptual and theoretical background in chapter 2. Here I present some concepts that are necessary as background and framework for the study. In this chapter I also provide the theoretical foundation and approach of my research and analysis. I will first outline the concepts of narratives and global environmental disourse, before I provide an overview of some topics related to environmental change, like resource degradation and scarcity, the ‘Sahelian crisis narrative,’ and global warming. Subsequently I will present farmer-herder relations in the Sahel, including resource- related conflict between farmers and herders, before I introduce the concept of ‘belly politics’

and corruption in natural resource management in African countries. Finally, I present the theoretical framework for this study, more specifically political ecology and the

environmental security thesis. In this part I present the two approaches in historical and current contexts, as well as in light of socio-political and ecological aspects in relation to this study. In chapter 3, I provide a contextual background linked directly to this case study and analysis. Here I present the study area’s geography, ecology and topography, as well as socio- historical and political aspects, before I introduce the circumstances related to the specific conflict of this study. In Chapter 4, I discuss the methodology used through this research project, from data collection to data analysis, and I also present some limitations of the research, challenges met, and ethical considerations made during the research. In Chapter 5 I present my findings. This chapter is the largest part of the thesis, comprising the analysis and discussion. In this part I seek to answer the objectives of the study. The chapter is twofold;

first of all I present and analyze my findings, before I discuss these findings in light of the theoretical approaches presented in chapter two. Here I will also allow room for the information provided by informants during fieldwork. Finally I sum up my findings and draw some concluding remarks in chapter 6.

2.0 Conceptual and theoretical background

In this chapter I provide a conceptual and theoretical framework, as I find it necessary to outline some background information before introducing the study. I will first present the concepts of narratives and global environmental discourse, as I find these relevant for discussing the environmental issues that this study draws on. Moreover, I will outline environmental change that is related to the topics of this study. Here I will introduce what I call ‘the Sahelian crisis narrative.’ I will subsequently outline farmer-herder relations and conflict, before I introduce the concept of ‘belly politics’ and corruption in natural resource management in Africa.

Finally, I will provide the theoretical background for this study. I have chosen to contrast the study on two theoretical approaches, namely political ecology and the environmental security thesis. As these approaches largely stand in contrast to each other, I will draw on both to illuminate my findings, and as theoretical backdrop for this study.

2.1 Narratives and global environmental discourse

According to Roe (1991, 1995), narratives are stories designed to bring about action and which are resilient to challenge. Roe says that a narrative is like a chronological story, in that is has beginning, middle and an end, or that it can be a full argument with both premises and conclusions (Roe 1991: 288). A narrative, like most stories or myths, has victims, villains and heroes as actors in the scenario (Adger et. al. 2001: 685).

Flynn (2008: 308) argues that narratives dominate the environmental agenda today. He says that environmental narratives are successful because they “conform to a certain literary schematic of how to construct a good narrative,” and that it is “from the combined elements of this schematic that they derive the facility to influence, shape and determine the actions of their ‘readers’” (Flynn 2008: 308). Roe (1991: 288) argues that environmental narratives tell scenarios more than stories, in that they tell what is going to happen more than what should happen. This reflects, as Flynn (2008: 313) says, the idea that if narratives function the way they are supposed to, the “target audience will be in little doubt as to ‘what needs to be done.’” In this way, the narrative is internalised and leads the reader to inevitable conclusions

(Flynn 2008: 313). Discourses are more general in their contents than narratives, and can be referred to as knowledge regimes (Adger et. al. 2001: 683). A discourse is broadly defined as

“a shared meaning of a phenomenon” (Adger et. al. 2001: 683). Discourses of global environmental change are not new, but became more evident in the environmental debate in the 1990s (Adger et. al. 2001: 684), and have perhaps become even more powerful later as we now are dealing with global climate change and environmental issues – and uncertainties related to these – as some of our time’s biggest issues of concern.

Narrative and environmental discourse analysis has a central position in environmental studies, including political ecology (Benjaminsen and Berge 2004: 33), and is largely linked to post- structuralism. An influential thinker in this area was the French philosopher Michel Foucault, whose thoughts were concerned with power, truth and knowledge, and how these elements are deeply interconnected. Foucault addressed questions about where and how meanings are formulated, and who decides what ‘truth’ is (Foucault 1980). Moreover, he argued that many concepts we take for granted and assume to be universally true, simply do not exist in other times and places, and are constructed (Robbins 2004: 109). In this way, an idea or a story can become true because someone powerful claims them to be true. This means that “ideas about ecology and political economy actively shape human perceptions and uses of nature” (Bryant 2001: 162). Many environmental concepts are in this way constructed, and many of them have been created for political or economic purposes. Soil erosion and desertification were for instance both largely constructed phenomena that justified colonial control in West Africa (Benjaminsen and Berge 2000). Many narratives have counter-narratives, but these do not get foothold that easily. Indeed, even though environmental narratives have proven wrong, they still persist, resistant to critique and despite empirical evidence rejecting their principles (Benjaminsen 2009: 152, Roe 1991). Such dominant narratives form the basis of policy agendas and public beliefs. There might be strong interests in keeping these believes, especially among some policy makers, aid donors and organizations, and also within research institutes.

2.2 Environmental change

The terms related to environmental change covers i) natural environmental change caused by for instance rainfall fluctuations, ii) man-made environmental change, such as deforestation, and iii) climate change. Environmental changes such as resource scarcity, land degradation,

drought, desertification and global warming are believed to have severe consequences for both the earth and its people, and are, as mentioned, increasingly regarded as main causes behind conflicts. I will in the following present some of these processes. First I will introduce some different views on land degradation and resource scarcity as background, before I outline ‘the Sahelian crisis narrative.’ I will also present the basics of global warming and the climate change discourse.

2.2.1 The concepts of land degradation and resource scarcity:

Degradation is most commonly regarded as destruction of nature, and for most people, it means impoverishment of the soil or vegetation. The word originates from Latin meaning

“reduction to a lower rank” (Blaikie and Brookfield 1987: 1). Degradation of natural resources may for instance be perceived as loss of nature or natural productivity, loss of biodiversity, loss of usefulness of a resource, loss of resilience, or loss of economic productivity (Robbins 2004: 92- 96). Resource scarcity then, describes a lack of a natural resource in one way or another. A traditional and more economic definition describes a resource as scarce “when it is useful and exists in limited quantity” (Derman et. al. 2007: 4, Montani 1987). Homer-Dixon (1995) argues that one has to take consumption into account, and suggests that resource scarcity must be measured either as relative or absolute, depending on how dependent we are on that exact resource. Most commonly however, ‘resource scarcity’ describes a scarcity of the resources people are dependent on, and it is mostly used as a description of a scenario where the soil is impoverished, where there is a lack of water, or vegetation has disappeared, dried out or been destroyed in other ways.

One of the most common and influential approaches to land degradation and resource scarcity is neo-Malthusianism. These ideas derive from Thomas Malthus’ theories on eco-scarcity and population pressure in the late 1700s. Malthus’ thoughts concern the assumption that population will grow faster than food production; accordingly poor people will ‘impoverish’

the soil and natural resources by overuse (Blaikie 2001: 134- 5, Cohen 1995, Malthus 1798).

Following this scenario, the earth’s population will face crisis through starvation and mortal diseases, while the nature will be destroyed, as its “overused assets are driven past the point of self-renewal” (Robbins 2004: 7). These principles found new forms in neo-Malthusianism 200 years later and were extended to a more specific environmental concern. We see a good example in the Club of Rome’s book “Limits to Growth” from 1972, where several authors present the dismal consequences of a rapidly growing population in combination with a

shrinking resource base (Meadows et. al. 1972), and also in Garret Hardin’s “Tragedy of the Commons” (1968). Hardin’s theory is illustrated by an example from pastoralism. He argues that if all pastoralists, for example, graze their animals in the same pasture without there being any form of common control systems, eventually everybody will act in their own interest at the expense of the collective good. The outcome will hence end up in ‘tragedy,’ and although everybody acted in their own interest, they will only hurt themselves in the longer term as the resource (the pasture) will be overused and hence destroyed (Hardin 1968). This view still has a firm hold, and the scenario is today extended to show how dryland areas exposed to drought and resource scarcity will suffer from conflict, as farmers and herders will not only degrade the resources, but also eventually engage in conflict to secure access to them (Homer-Dixon 1994, 1999).

Concepts like resource scarcity are common environmental narratives often used for different political and economic purposes. Mehta (2007: 654) argues that scarcity of resources is “not a natural condition,” rather it is a relative notion that has been constructed as a “’meta- narrative’ that justifies controversial schemes such as large dams, allows for simplistic portrayals of property rights and resource conflicts and also ignores the cultural and symbolic dimensions of resources” (Mehta 2007: 654). Often it is not an absolute scarcity that is prevailing, but a relative scarcity that has more to do with resource distribution and mechanisms of access and control.

Indeed, these explanations on degradation and scarcity ignore several important factors. The most obvious flaw with Malthus and the eco-scarcity argument, is that the environment is postulated as a finite source of natural resources, and that it will be depleted if we do not

‘control’ the extraction of resources. This assumption has indeed proved wrong through history, as very few communities in the world actually consume the majority of its resources.

It has more to do with distribution than depletion, as the earth’s current resource base is not depleted at any level (Gleditsch 1998). Moreover, high absolute number of people does not automatically imply environmental crisis. A resource becoming scarcer might also lead to a response that averts crisis, for instance better and more efficient production systems. Many critics hold that high number of populations in fact can lead to technological innovation and social transformation, following Ester Boserup’s (1965) principles, which include a possibility that food production might increase as a result of agricultural intensification.

Boserup challenged the Malthusian assumption that agricultural methods determine

population, and stated that instead, it is the other way around; population determines agricultural methods (Boserup 1965). A resource becoming scarcer might also lead to increased awareness, in this way curbing the overuse of it (Robbins 2004: 8). Finally, and most importantly, political and economic structures are largely ignored by Malthus. He and his fellow – and contemporary – believers are blind to the fact that for instance marginalization or bad governance also might lead to loss of natural resources (Blaikie 2001:

135). This is indeed largely the problem in common arguments about scarcity and conflict today as well.

Blaikie and Brookfield (1987) assert that degradation is a perceptual term, meaning that it differs depending on who defines it. This refers to the question of according to whom it is ‘a lower rank’? On the background of this, they argue that land degradation is a social problem with both social causes and social consequences, and that it includes multiple definitions and interpretations. Explanations of land degradation must therefore include economic and political aspects. Indeed, as Robbins (2004: 130) argues; “the ecological process of degradation does not occur in a political and economic vacuum.” Both national and international institutions affect the environment, and environmental process must therefore be seen in political contexts. Robbins (2004: 91) points out that “in many cases, a system’s

‘degradation’ may be a loss of one capacity in exchange for another.” A forest replaced by agricultural land will for instance not be regarded as degradation for a farmer, but it will perhaps be perceived as such for a hunter (Blaikie and Brookfield 1987: 4). It is hence difficult to measure the value of land. This is also because there are strong interests linked to such measurement, and interpretations of environmental change and causes of it can have huge political implications (Robbins 2004). There is in other words a need for a more complex definition on degradation, and Blaikie and Brookfield (1987: 6) suggests instead that degradation is “a reduction in the capability of land to satisfy a particular use.”

2.2.2 ‘The Sahelian crisis’ narrative:

Linked to these assumptions on resource degradation and scarcity is a prevailing ‘Sahelian crisis narrative.’ Africa, and especially the Sahel, is considered as one of the places with most environmental problems and an increasing resource scarcity assumed to be of staggering proportions (Bassett and Zueli 2000: 67).¹ The Sahel is seen as a typical example of an area

1 See also chapter 3.1 for extensive information about the Sahel.

with chains of problems caused by desertification, drought, land degradation and resource scarcity, often in combination with population growth (Baechler 1999). Sahel is a very dry region, and resources here are scattered (Turner 2000). It is hence widely believed that this is one of the places in the world where one can most directly experience effects of global climate change. The Sahel has accordingly the last few years more or less become a symbol of drought, resource scarcity, scattered settlements and natural resources, pastoralism and futile agricultural activities on dry, infertile soils.

‘The Sahelian crisis’ concerns a belief that i) native populations are misusing the land and worsening the degradation process, because land in the Sahel is scarce, that ii) climate change worsens this process by drying out the resources, and finally, that iii) this growing scarcity of natural resources will cause problems of famine, disease, crisis and eventually conflict. These ideas are largely linked to neo-colonial views on land degradation, stating that the main cause of degradation in the south is the ‘primitive pastoralists’ thought to be ignorant, irrational and without knowledge of the harm they are causing the environment (Blaikie 2001). This view goes in line with traditional, yet current, western views on ‘poor countries and their problems’

(Benjaminsen 2009: 155).² These ideas on the Sahel are common, and have become a very strong narrative despite the lack of empirical evidence (Robbins 2004).

The most prominent example of concerned resource degradation in the Sahel is visible through the desertification narrative. Warren and Agnew (1988: 9) define desertification as

“an extreme form of land degradation, which occurs when the vegetation cover falls below about 35 %.” This is, according to the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD), caused by “a variety of factors, including climatic variation and human activities”

(UNCCD 2008: 9). It has since colonial times been widely believed that the Sahara is extending with inconceivable proportions, eating its way into grazing lands and cropped fields as the soil is degraded from drought, overuse and population pressure (Benjaminsen and Berge 2000, Benjaminsen 2008). A study carried out by E. P. Stebbing in the 1930s concluded that i) Sahara was expanding southwards, ii) this was for the most part caused by desiccation, which resulted from iii) the native population’s misuse of land, which in turn was caused by iv) overpopulation (Swift 1996: 74). Stebbing specifically rejected rainfall variability as causes (Swift 1996: 75, Forsyth 2003: 28). Again in 1975, another study on

2 See especially Said (1978) on western views on ‘the other, primitive people,’ in this case ‘the Orient.’

desertification was carried out. The ecologist Hugh Lamprey compared vegetation maps from the wet 1950s with aerial photos taken in the extremely dry 1970s. His conclusions were of course dramatic, he stated that the desert boundaries had moved south by 90- 100 kilometres from 1958 to 1975, which is about 6 km annually (Lamprey 1988, Benjaminsen and Berge 2000: 98). The problem was assumed to be human misuse of land, and drought was only considered to be an exacerbating factor. Both Stebbing’s and Lamprey’s findings were repudiated, and many scientists were critical to the assumptions about Sahara’s encroachment.

They rather concluded that the Saharan shores moved back and forth in line with annual rainfalls (Tucker and Nicholson 1999: 587, Herrmann et. al. 2005: 394, Olsson 1993), and today it is in fact argued that the trend rather is ‘a greening of the Sahel,’ not desiccation (Benjaminsen 2009, Herrmann et. al. 2005, Olsson et. al. 2005).

Scientists have however been largely ignored, and the belief is still a dominating environmental narrative (Herrmann et. al. 2005: 395, Helldén 1991: 379, Benjaminsen 2008).

A recently published UNCCD report argues that the fight against desertification is even more important now under the present conditions of climate change and growing resource scarcities (UNCCD 2008: 5). Moreover, a UN group concluded in 2007 that “climate change is making desertification the greatest environmental challenge of our times” (UNCCD 2008: 7). Swift (1996: 73) argues, however, that desertification largely is a narrative construct that has more to do with “competing claims of different political and bureaucratic constituencies” than with science. Desertification is in fact probably the best example of environmental ideas that have occurred in spite of remarkable scientific uncertainties (Benjaminsen 2002, Benjaminsen and Berge 2000, Herrmann et. al. 2005, Tucker and Nicholson 1999). Indeed, Adger et. al. (2001:

691) argue that this is “an apposite example of how a single narrative has contributed significantly to the institutionalization of a crisis discourse.”

There are several reasons why this narrative still has such has a firm hold. In the beginning, desertification was used as a justification for colonization (Benjaminsen and Berge 2000: 96).

Some states today also see an interest in keeping the desertification narrative strong to assure control over resources and receive aid. In many cases this has led to African governments being able to uphold their restrictive policies on land management, and has also served to justify calls for increased aid flows (Warren and Agnew 1988: 2, 7). Pastoralists have in many parts of Africa been the overall losers in this trend. Mali is, as will be shown, a good example of such governmental intervention and pastoral marginalization.

The problem with this narrative keeping so strong, is that it often has led to an overshadowing of other environmental problems, and it has also largely deflected attention from “more sensitive political and social problems” and made it easy “to blame the environment, when blame should go to human institutions or individuals” (Warren and Agnew 1988: 8, Swift 1996). Nonetheless, today the ideas of desertification and ‘the crisis in the Sahel’ are largely, and increasingly, linked to security concerns, and tensions and conflicts in the Sahel have the last years received increased attention due to these believes (see chapter 2.3.2 and 2.6.2).

2.2.3 Global warming and the climate change discourse:

Most commonly referred to when we talk about environmental change, is climate change.

This term describes the climatic changes that are believed to occur mostly as a result of increased greenhouse gas emissions, which leads to global warming, environmental change, and changes in climate patterns. According to IPCC, climate change is “a change of climate which is attributed directly or indirectly to human activity that alters the composition of the global atmosphere and which is in addition to natural climate variability observed over comparable time periods” (IPCC 1995).Climate change has during the last decade become the biggest environmental issue of global concern.

The one change that is most related to climate change, is global warming. The warming of the earth’s climate is unequivocal, and the temperature increases we are facing can have drastic consequences (McMichael et. al. 2006). Although it is a much debated topic and subject to assumptions and uncertain predictions, its future impacts are largely recognized. There is, according to IPCC (2007: 8), “high confidence” that semi-arid areas, “will suffer a decrease in water resources due to climate change” by the mid of this century. IPCC (2007) regard it as likely that areas affected by drought will suffer from land degradation and widespread water stress, which inherently can have drastic consequences for both farming and herding. These changes are believed to “have no precedent in the history of human civilization” (Barnett and Adger 2007: 640), and the whole population is expected to be affected in some way. Indeed, in his Nobel Peace Prize speech, Gore (2007) stated that “we, the human species, are confronting a planetary emergency – a threat to the survival of our civilization.”

The view on global climate change has become so dominating that it can be considered a global environmental discourse (Adger et. al. 2001). There is a considerable school of scientists and policymakers that disagree with the views on climate change, and its causes and

effects are still largely debated. Nonetheless, these ideas have the last few years received amounts of attention, and have increasingly been related to security concerns.

2.3 Farmers and herders in the Sahel

The relationships between farmers and herders in dryland Africa have been incompatibly characterized as symbiotic, competitive and inherently conflictual (Breusers et. al. 1998, Hussein et. al. 1999). All these descriptions can probably be true, depending on time and place. It is however the latter that seems to be the most common today. The dominating view on farmer-herder relations and conflict today is close to that of a ‘primitive war,’ involving

“two groups with land users that are seemingly chronically in competition over a dwindling resource resulting in occasional flare-ups of severe violence” (Turner 2004: 866).

2.3.1 Land, identities and farmer-herder relations:

The link between livelihoods and identity is striking in many parts of the world, including the Sahel. Social structures are often rooted in the ways people make their livelihoods (Turner 2004). Turner (2004: 872) says that these labels of ‘farmer’ and ‘herder’ traditionally and historically are tied to identities of ethnicity and caste, but most importantly they refer to a way of living and using land. Indeed, as Moritz (2006) argues, the traditional definitions of a herder as a ‘keeper of cattle’ and a farmer as ‘a person involved in agriculture,’ refer to

“people associated with a particular production and socio-cultural system” and “people involved in a specific economic activity at a particular time and place” (Moritz 2006). The labelling of the groups is, however, problematic, because it makes it appear as if farmers and herders are clearly defined and exclusive in their categories. It has in fact in many cases become difficult to distinguish the two groups, as many now are involved in both activities, in this way making the ‘herder’ and ‘farmer’ notions relative and more blurred (see e.g.

Benjaminsen and Ba 2009). It is more related to how they do it, than what they do (Turner 2004: 872). Most farmers and herders live in communities together, and interact on a daily basis. Local networks and cooperation among farmers and herders on both community and household level is common in the Sahel (see e.g. Moorehead 1991). More importantly, farmers and herders often interact on a mutual economic relationship of several types; i) patron-client relationships, ii) as landlord and tenant, iii) as sellers and buyers of milk, manure or grain, or as iv); livestock owner, trader and herder (Turner 2004: 872). Beeler (2006: 7) illustrates this mutual relationship in Mali by explaining how herders graze their cattle on

harvested fields, feeding on millet stalks left by the farmers, and how the farmers accordingly benefit from manure left by this cattle.

2.3.2 Farmer-herder conflicts:

Farmer-herder conflicts have been part of the daily life for farmers and herders in the Sahel for centuries (Breusers et. al. 1998), only reflecting the human need for vital resources.

Mechanisms of resource access are often very intricate in many parts of the world, and especially in dryland areas, where people have adjusted to unstable resource bases and uncertain resource access through centuries. Resource-related conflicts can hence be both a struggle to gain access to resources, or resulting from the use of them (see e.g. Le Billon 2001). The term ‘farmer-herder conflict’ has come to represent many different types of conflicts; interest conflicts, resource disputes, political action, evictions, killings and livestock theft, to mention a few (Hussein et. al. 1999). Single-factor explanations are therefore not sufficient in explaining most cases of such conflicts. How then, can we define farmer-herder conflicts? Indeed, as Moritz (2006) asks;

[a]re only conflicts over natural resources ‘herder-farmer’ conflicts or are all conflicts in which the parties identify themselves or are identified by others as such herder-farmer conflicts? Also, how do we know if conflicts are about natural resources, if they are motivated by ‘a culture of competition’ or articulate with other religious or political conflicts? Could we define herder- farmer conflicts other than by saying they involve herders and farmers?

The most common way of defining farmer-herder conflicts then, is as “low-level, small-scale conflicts between herders and farmers over access to grazing lands and campsites and crop damage” (Moritz 2006). Such tensions are often linked to longstanding insecurity, drought and scarcity of natural resources, and are often portrayed as ‘in-the-moment, instinctive scrambles’ for resources, as the differences between farmers’ and herders’ livelihoods and ways of using the land are seemingly obvious conflict causes. It is believed that tensions erupt easily under a state of constant competition (Turner 2004: 867).

It is believed that violent farmer-herder conflicts have increased during the last decades, due to “i) changing patterns of resource use and increasing competition for resources, and ii) the breakdown of ‘traditional’ mechanisms governing resource management and conflict resolution” (Hussein et. al. 1999: 397). However, important to note, the assumption that farmer-herder relations were in terms of ‘symbiosis’ before, “in an often unspecified epoch in

the past,” but have grown more conflictual the last decades, has been questioned by several researchers (Breusers et. al. 1998, Hussein et. al. 1999). In fact, this idealising of the past is often used by farmers and herders themselves “to impress upon researchers that relations are currently worsening because of increasing resource competition, and that some intervention is required” (Hussein et. al. 1999: 409). This argument is also commonly used by governments to justify intervention (Hussein et. al. 1999: 402), and by scholars to collect support and to

‘modernize’ the notion of resource wars (Turner 2004: 866). Most importantly however, these views have become even more popular in today’s climate change ‘era.’

2.4 ‘Belly politics’ and petty corruption in natural resource management

‘Belly politics’ is a Cameroonian expression implied in the proverb ‘goats eat where they are tethered’ (Bayart 1993: 235, Mbembé 1992). The expression refers to corruption on a lower level, and according to Bayart et. al. (1999: 8), there are different meanings attached to the notions of belly politics compared to that of corruption. Belly politics is not a formalized system, but it is largely institutionalized (Moritz 2006b: 107). It implies a system where officials on different levels systematically exploit political power and authority, and appropriate public resources for their own benefits and purposes, or more specifically;

“accumulation of wealth through tenure of political power” (Bayart 1993: 228- 59, Moritz 2006b). It is also known as ‘la politique du ventre’ (Bayart et. al. 1999: 8).

Belly politics defines the laws and customs practiced besides the formal law, or in other words; “a complex mode of government” (Bayart 1993), in contrast to corruption, which most often is regarded as a sign of a weak state or the opposite of ‘good governance’ (Robbins (2000: 425- 6). According to Robbins (2000: 424) corruption is rather “a system of normalized rules, transformed from legal authority, patterned around existing inequalities, and cemented through cooperation and trust.” He suggests an alternative view, by “examining corruption not as the absence of rules, but instead as the presence of alternative norms”

(Robbins 2000: 426). Cotula (2008: 2) says that local officials largely practice belly politics through ‘customary law,’ which is based on traditional policy structures and systems of decision making. The coexistence between this and the state system is often referred to as

‘legal pluralism.’ However, although ‘the politics of the belly’ are incorporated in systems of negotiations and mediation, Moritz (2006b: 108) argues that it is based on a hierarchy in which “smallholders are steadily losing out to the wealthy, powerful, and better connected

elite, who are much better positioned in these ‘negotiations’.” It is therefore important to note that although the practice is rooted in social traditions, poor people still lose out.

2.4.1 Belly politics and petty corruption in Africa in a socio-historical context:

Belly politics is widely spread in African countries, and is mostly based on clientalism (patron- client relationships) and rent seeking. Such ‘smaller’ types of corruption are termed

‘petty corruption.’ Petty corruption is, according to Olivier de Sardan (1999: 28) “extremely familiar to ordinary mortals” on an everyday basis, either by practicing it or being its victims.

“Everyone in Africa has routine experience in dealing with corruption (and the like), this being a part of the social landscape. It has even become part of popular know-how, […] and is indispensable for survival in the post-colonial milieu” (Olivier de Sardan 1999: 28).Mbembe (1992: 6, 7) says that the practices of corruption and belly politics in Africa are post-colonial, and transformed and recombined elements inherited from the colonial period itself rather than building on pre-colonial traditions. Olivier de Sardan (1999: 26) argues that this practice largely stems from the building of a state-apparatus, for both establishing corruption, and for producing the “cultural embeddedness” of it. Also Bayart (1993: 72) argues that “habits were formed and patrimonies built up, especially since chiefs were legally entitled to retain a percentage of the taxes they collected, and also benefited from various other payments.”

Olivier de Sardan (1999: 36- 43) identifies five behavioural traits engrained in the African social life, that influence the complex of corruption. These are i) negotiation, ii) gift-giving, iii) the solitary network, iv) predatory authority, and v) redistributive accumulation. He argues that “[t]hese logics seem to have […] a certain relation of affinity with ‘corruption’-type practices, but are not in themselves corruption” (Olivier de Sardan 1999: 26).

The first logic, negotiation, stems from corruption being a transaction, or a ‘bargaining act,’

extended to a negotiation over rules and law. Gift-giving, on the other hand, is more difficult to deal with as a product of corruption, as it is deeply embedded in African social norms and life. The giving of small gifts is an exchange that happens thousands of times each day, representing a small thank you for a service rendered or some help received. This is a “moral duty,” and it is important to separate between such legal and illegal commissions, or, in other words; bribery and gifts (Olivier de Sardan 1999: 38). The logic of the solitary network is related to the social capital and moral economy of peasants, in the building of a social network that will ‘catch you’ if something unpredictable happens, like for instance in bad harvesting periods (see also Scoones 1998). Olivier de Sardan (1999: 40) argues that “these

various forms of interrelations […] include an almost general obligation of mutual assistance.” The fourth logic, predatory authority, is more linked to the state than social norms.

Many persons in power-holding positions accord to themselves a right to process extortion of various forms. Related to this is also the last logic; redistributive accumulation. It is expected that a person in some kind of position will appropriate resources and profit from his or her responsibility, and thereafter spread the benefits to relatives. In fact, not “grabbing” such an opportunity is regarded as a waste, or even stupid (Olivier de Sardan 1999: 43). According to Moritz (2006b), such social mechanisms behind different kinds of corruption are most often not explored thoroughly. This is especially true in natural resource management.

2.4.2 ‘Rent seeking’ in natural resource management:

‘Rent seeking’ is a phenomenon largely related to natural resource management, especially in African countries. The term refers to the extraction of values without contributing to productivity, and is according to Benjaminsen and Ba (2009: 72) often associated with corruption and bribery. It is moreover “usually linked to the misuse of governmental authority” (Benjaminsen and Ba 2009: 72, Tullock 1987). The practice of rent seeking includes typically local officials allocating resources and values to themselves, in line with the practice of belly politics as discussed above. This practice is wide-spread in many African countries. Robbins (2000: 424) argues that corruption in fact more often than not is the predominant way of organizing natural resource management.

Moritz (2006b: 107) says that the overall assumption concerning natural resource management in West Africa is that authorities do not engage in rent seeking and that they follow “the laws of land.” However, and more importantly, it is assumed that if rent seeking happens, it is incidental, and not a ‘mode of government.’ The result of these assumptions, Moritz (2006b: 107) argues, is significant failure to explain resource related conflicts. Moritz (2006b: 107) argues therefore that it is necessary to investigate the politics of the state in order to reveal the processes of natural resource management. This is also indeed the case for resource-related conflicts.

2.5 Political ecology

The main theoretical approach I build this study on, is political ecology. According to Blaikie and Brookfield (1987: 17), political ecology “combines the concerns of ecology and a broadly

defined political economy.” The goal of political ecology is in this sense to explain “the social and political conditions surrounding the causes, experiences, and management of environmental problems” (Forsyth 2003: 2). Stott and Sullivan (2000: 2) also emphasize that

“the ‘science’ of environment is socially and politically situated, rather than unambiguous or separable from the subjective location of human perception” (Stott and Sullivan 2000: 2).

Moreover, “for us, this defines contemporary ‘political ecology’” (Stott and Sullivan 2000: 2).

There are many areas of focus within the field of political ecology. These can be summarized in the following four issues of concern, according to Robbins (2004); i) degradation and marginalization, which seeks to explain environmental change in a “larger political and economic context,” ii) environmental conflict, which seeks to explain environmental conflict and access in a larger struggle including aspects of among others gender, class, race and identity, iii) conservation and control, which seeks to explain problems within conservation practice, and political and economic exclusion of environmental conservation, and iv) environmental identity and social movement, which seeks to explain “[s]ocial upheaval”

linking “[p]olitical and social struggles” to environmental issues (Robbins 2004: 14). There are furthermore many different voices and contrasting approaches to it, but in general, according to Bryant and Bailey (1997: 28), most accounts and research within political ecology share a common premise; “environmental change is not a neutral process amenable to technical management. Rather, it has political sources.”

2.5.1 The history and principles of political ecology:

Studies of ecology with a political content emerged in the 1960s, when cultural ecology appeared as a field of influence in studies of human impact on the environment (Forsyth 2003:

4). This approach held that humans are part of a larger system and direct contributors to the development of the environment (Robbins 2004: 28, Sauer 1963). Several approaches, including cultural ecology, contributed to build political ecology as a reference in its early days, but it was during the last twenty to thirty years it arose as an independent theoretical approach. This period can be divided into three phases: i) the early years, 1970s- 1980s, when a typical neo-Marxist influence played a heavy role in forming political ecology, then ii) the mid-1980s- mid-1990s, as a more structural, power-related and agency-focused approach emerged, with the first important publications from recognized authors in the field, and then iii) 1995 onwards, when political ecology took a post-structural turn, placing the focus more on post-colonialism, post-Marxism and discourse analysis (Bryant 2001).

‘Third world political ecology’ emerged in the 1970s and 1980s, when scholars began to explore the relationship between social and political process and environmental change in developing countries. It was largely a reaction to neo-Malthusianism, and was heavily influenced by neo-Marxism and other radical theories. Third world political ecology wanted not only to explain third world poverty, but also to do something about it (Bryant 2001: 153).

There were two important Marxist principles that influenced political ecology in this period; i) the fact that social and cultural systems are based on historical, and changing, material conditions and relations, and ii) that capitalist extraction of surpluses destroys the environment. The latter was heavily influenced by dependency theory (see e.g. Peet and Hartwick 1999: 107- 111). Being rather a theory of underdevelopment, dependency theory held that marginalization of the poor was caused by colonial trade patterns and capitalism.

This holds, as Robbins (2004: 50) says, “implications for explaining ecological transformation in the contemporary world,” as capital accumulation requires exploitation of both labour and nature. Production means extraction, which again leads to degradation. Degradation of the environment was hence seen as the other side of capitalism, in this directly linking the environment to radical political thoughts. Robbins (2004: 45- 6) calls this green materialism, and says it was an important influence combining political economy and the environment.

During the 1980s and 1990s, political ecology found more footholds in theory. Blaikie and Brookfield (1987) were key contributors in this period, with their influential ideas within the fields of degradation and marginalization (see chapter 2.2.1). Their book “Land degradation and society” can be regarded as the first political ecology book, and has become a classic in the field. Blaikie and Brookfield (1987) combined a structure and agency-oriented perspective in their views on the environment. Moreover they had a strong focus on power.

This meant that power-relations, structural political and environmental relations, and different agents were thoroughly examined in explaining environmental process. This implied among others a way of exploring the concept of marginalization through economy, ecology and politics, as a combination of these three showed how marginalization occurred. They sought to show how marginalization was both a result and a cause of land degradations, and wanted to offer new ways of explaining the process that leads to degradation and impoverishment among the poor (Robbins 2004: 76, 77). Moreover, Blaikie and Brookfield (1987) introduced the chain of explanation, which seeks to show why communities are marginalized in