Russian crisis management from Able Archer 1983 to Andøya 1995

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Russian crisis management from Able Archer 1983 to Andøya 1995

Successful avoidance of nuclear escalation or ‘rolling the nuclear dice’?

Amund Sandnes Hatteland

Master's thesis in Political Science Department of Political Science

UNIVERSITY OF OSLO

Spring 2021 Word count: 31 420

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Russian crisis management from Able Archer 1983 to Andøya 1995

Successful avoidance of nuclear escalation or ‘rolling

the nuclear dice’?

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Russian crisis management from Able Archer 1983 to Andøya 1995: Successful avoidance of nuclear escalation or ‘rolling the nuclear dice’?

Amund Sandnes Hatteland http://www.duo.uio.no/

Universitetet i Oslo

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Abstract

Theory on successful crisis management is applied to try to shed light on two important and relatively under-examined nuclear crises and their further implications for Russian nuclear crisis management. By conducting a historical explorative type of thesis, I apply Stephen J.

Cimbala’s four attributes of successful crisis management to explain Russian success at managing the 1983 Able Archer crisis and the 1995 Andøya rocket crisis. The cases are chosen based on their reputation as notable incidents of possible near use of nuclear weapons with huge potential ramifications for at least Norway and Europe. The attributes include

“Communication transparency”, “Reducing time pressure on policymakers and commanders”,

“Ability to offer safety to the adversary”, and “Maintaining accurate perceptions of the adversary's intentions and military capabilities.” The results of the analysis suggest that Russia and the Soviet Union managed the two crises with a different level of success.

Russia’s crisis management during the Andøya rocket crisis appears most successful, although crisis specific differences might explain at least some differences. Communication transparency appears as a problem in both crises because of poor signaling.

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VI

Preface

I am grateful to my first supervisor, Målfrid Braut-Hegghammer, who helped me develop my initial idea of writing about Russia into fruition and suggested doing a case study on the Andøya rocket incident. I am also grateful to my second supervisor, Kristin Ven Bruusgaard, who later followed up on my progress, gave me valuable insights on Russian strategy, and put me on the track of Able Archer 83. I am happy for all the happy moments I got to share with my fellow students, both in St. Petersburg and in Oslo.

I am grateful to my family for their support and their patience. I want to give a special thanks to my father, Øystein, for helpful conversations at key moments in the writing process. A big thank you to my life partner, Caroline, for being there with my all the way and keeping me sane through it all.

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VII

1 Introduction

“Only when we become convinced that there is an incoming attack on the territory of Russia, and that happens within seconds, only after that we would launch a retaliatory strike,” said Russian President Vladimir Putin in October 2018, right after the United States had declared its intention to leave the 1987 INF treaty (Associated Press and Aldersley 2018). “We would be victims of an aggression and would get to heaven as martyrs,” Putin went on to add (Associated Press and Aldersley 2018). The Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union is over, but the threat of nuclear use, stemming from nuclear-capable states’

reliance on nuclear deterrence, remains. The threat takes the form of nuclear deterrence, which, according to Betts (1987: 3) aims to keep nuclear war “entirely theoretical.” However, a problem arises when nuclear decision-makers hold an incorrect conviction that an incoming attack will hit their territory. Should they launch a retaliatory attack or wait and risk losing a large part of their land-based nuclear forces? The process of solving this problem is called nuclear crisis management.

Even after the end of the Cold War, nuclear weapons remain at “hair-trigger alert”, and could be launched and hit their target in about 15 to 25 minutes (Blair et.al. 1997: 77-78).

Historically, there have been several incidents of possibly near accidental usage of nuclear weapons, including some which had developed into crises (Lewis et.al. 2014: 7-23). Estimates show that even the accidental use of single nuclear missile can be catastrophic and that the best way to manage the aftermath of nuclear missile hitting a city is to prevent its use (Helfand et.al. 2002: 68-75). Considering this, it makes sense to investigate which factors influenced how the decision-makers with control over nuclear weapons managed the incidents and crises.

Much has been published about the 1972 Cuban Missile Crisis, while less attention has been given to newer incidents involving late Cold War Soviet Union and post-Cold War Russia.

Allegedly, Russia’s nuclear arsenal, which it inherited from the Soviet Union, was more susceptible to accidental, inadvertent or unauthorized use (Forrow et.al. 1998: 1329). The collapse of the Soviet Union halted the ongoing modernization process of the nuclear arsenal and left Russia with less early-warning radars. Russian government also underfunded the nuclear forces throughout the 1990s (Herspring 2011: 2-6). At the same time, Russia grew more dependent on its nuclear arsenal for deterrence due to having fewer conventional forces

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2 and made changes to its nuclear doctrine and nuclear command-and-control architecture (Herspring 2011: 1-6). Russia's nuclear arsenal is currently the largest in the world and estimated to contain almost 4500 nuclear warheads (Kristensen and Korda 2021: 90-91).

This thesis examines post-Soviet Russia and late Cold War Soviet Union’s success at nuclear crisis management during two nuclear crises often referred to as possible near instances of use of nuclear weapons. The thesis’s research question is as follows:

How successful was the Soviet Union’s nuclear crisis management during the Abler Archer 83 crisis and Russia’s nuclear crisis management during the Andøya rocket crisis?

The research question focuses on applying theories in two case studies on the 1983 Able Archer crisis and the 1995 Andøya rocket crisis. The purpose of the case studies is to “explain cases” of intrinsic importance (Van Evera 1997: 55, 88). The case selection criterion is the cases’ “intrinsic importance” (Van Evera 1997: 55, 88). As I argue, the two cases are notable possible incidents of near use of nuclear weapons with potential huge ramifications for at least Norway and Europe. As a “historical explanatory” thesis, the focus is to explain «the causes, patterns and consequences of historical cases” (Van Evera 1997: 91-92). This approach entails that the aim of the case analyses is not to generalize the findings, but to apply theories to explain cases while also evaluating the explanatory power of the theories on the cases.

Hypothetical implications for developments after 1995 are only discussed in light of the findings of the analysis and are not covered by the analysis itself.

The thesis draws on “Cimbala’s four attributes of successful crisis management” (Cimbala 2011: 121-23) to explain the success of the Russian nuclear crisis management in the two cases. The four attributes are “Communication transparency”, “Reducing time-pressure on policymakers and commanders”, “Ability to offer safety to the adversary” and “Maintaining accurate perceptions of the adversary's intentions and military capabilities” (Cimbala 2011:

121-23). When I apply them to the cases, these four attributes serve as independent variables (IVs) and “successful nuclear crisis management” serves as the dependent variable (DV). The thesis’ prime hypothesis is that “Cimbala’s four attributes of successful crisis management”

causes “successful crisis management.” This does not mean that a state should fulfill all the attributes during a nuclear crisis to avoid war, as the outcome of crises are usually context dependent and affected by the interaction of many variables (George 1991d: 23-24).

However, different requirements for crisis management tend to be more important than others,

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3 depending on the crisis (George 1991d: 23-24). The interest in applying them is mainly in understanding the nuclear crisis management of the chosen cases, in order to better understand my chosen cases, but also to investigate if other variables or theories could contribute to understanding the avoidance of inadvertent war during the two crises.

Crisis management is “both a competitive and cooperative endeavor between military

adversaries” (Cimbala 2011: 118). It happens during a crisis, which is a “time of great tension and uncertainty” (Cimbala 2011: 118). A “nuclear crisis” is a crisis in which at least one of the participating states have nuclear weapons capabilities (Cimbala 2011: 118-19). Crisis management become nuclear crisis management nuclear weapons play a role in the crisis, which scholars assume puts higher pressure on decision-makers due to the potential destruction if the crisis escalates to nuclear use (Cimbala, 2011: 118-119). The aim of the discipline of crisis management is in most cases to guide leaders in how to avoid inadvertent war, including nuclear war, which can break out inadvertently or accidentally (George 1991b:

7-9).

The results of the case study analyses suggest that there were considerable differences in how successful the crisis management of Russia and the Soviet Union were, with Russia fulfilling three of four attributes and the Soviet Union only one. However, some of the differences can be explained by crisis specific dynamics. It is difficult to discern if other escalation

management approaches, or Russia’s nuclear strategy, could explain the observed variation in in the successful crisis management.

In the following paragraphs of this introductory chapter, I describe some of the background on the time periods surrounding the Able Archer 83 crisis in the early to mid-1980s and the Andøya rocket crisis in the mid-1990s. At the end, I shortly describe the structure of the rest of the thesis.

1.1 Background

The concept of escalation gained much attention during the Cold War. This was primarily with regards to the prospect of a crisis between the Soviet Union and the United States. In particular, the concern was directed toward such a crisis having the potential of escalating into a limited war or a world war. While the possibility of limited war escalating into a world war seemed bad enough, the major concern was more specifically escalation leading to the use of

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4 nuclear weapons. The introduction of nuclear weapons, in addition to major advances in airpower technology, greatly increased the risk of escalation quickly leading to catastrophic results. Preventing and calculating escalation based on predictions of the opposite side's escalation thresholds often proved difficult. Examples of this include the problems

experienced by nuclear theorists and Kremlinologists who tried to predict Soviet perceptions and reactions to different forms of escalation. With the end of the Cold War, the high tensions between the Soviet Union and the United States, that included the potential for a deliberate nuclear confrontation, finally ended without any incidents of escalation having resulted in the use of nuclear weapons. However, there had been several close-call incidents of near nuclear use that illustrated the serious threat posed by nuclear escalation. For the United States, the post-Cold War relationship with the newly independent Russian state entailed that the concern for escalation was directed more towards other states. However, the change of focus after the end of the Cold War did not put an end to the danger of sudden escalation with Russia leading to nuclear use (Morgan et al.: 7-8, 12-14).

In fact, both Russia and the United States' nuclear command systems still remain on high alert, which means that both nations operate their nuclear forces as if the danger from the Cold War of a nuclear surprise attack still existed (National Academy of Sciences 1997: 2). In 1994, both countries declared that they would no longer be aiming strategic nuclear missiles at each other on a day-to-day basis, based on a “detargeting” agreement between Clinton and Yeltsin (National Academy of Sciences 1997: 17). However, this did nothing to lower the time it takes to launch a nuclear attack, since targeting is a normal component of launch procedures. Additionally, both the United States and Russia are employing so-called launch on warning doctrines. According to these doctrines, a retaliatory nuclear attack is supposed to be launched when it it is discovered that a perceived nuclear attack is on the way; even before the original attack hits its target (Forrow et.al. 1998: 1326-28). Based on the conditions of the 1990s, several authorities considered a nuclear launch based on a false warning as the most likely scenario of an accidental nuclear attack (National Academy of Sciences 1997: 17;

Forrow et.al. 1998: 1327). For post-Soviet Russia, the dynamic in the relationship with the United States also changed and developed after the end of the Cold War (Pry 1999: xv-xvi)..

However, the fear of sudden escalation caused by an American nuclear first strike attack seems to have remained a considerable security concern for Russia (Pry 1999: xv-xvi).

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1.2 The structure of the thesis

The thesis is structured as follows: Chapter 2 presents the theoretical framework of the thesis.

Chapter 3 presents the methodology and research design. Chapter 4 contains the case study analysis of the Able Archer 83 crisis and 5 contains the case study analysis of the Andøya rocket crisis. Chapter 6 contains a discussion based on the results of the case studies. Chapter 7 presents the thesis’ conclusion.

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2 Theory

This chapter presents the thesis’s theoretical approach. The theoretical framework I apply in this thesis is built on four “attributes for successful crisis management”. Stephen Cimbala applies the attributes (which he sometimes calls “attributes” and sometimes calls

“requirements”, while I refer to them only as “attributes”¹) in a series of articles about the implications of Cyberwar on the nuclear crisis management of states with nuclear weapons capabilities (see Cimbala 2011, Cimabala 2016 and Cimbala 2017). The four attributes, which are the focus of this chapter, are: Communication transparency, Reducing time pressure on policymakers and commanders, Ability to offer safety to the adversary and Maintaining accurate perceptions of the adversary's intentions and military capabilities (Cimbala 2011:

121-23). To keep the text shorter, I refer to them respectively as “Communication

transparency”, “Reducing time pressure” (shortened), “Ability to offer safety” (shortened) and

“Maintaining accurate perceptions” (shortened). Cimbala’s attributes are relevant as they draw on a large and established literature on crisis management, crisis behavior and the dynamics of nuclear crises. I presented this literature towards the end of the chapter, after first accounting for the underlying theoretical and epistemological discussions and assumptions found in the literature on nuclear escalation.

I argue in this chapter that the attributes and the related literature provide fruitful theoretical perspectives for discussing and evaluating the nuclear crisis management of Russia during the Andøya rocket crisis and the Soviet Union during the Able Archer 83 crisis. Additionally, I use the empirical observations in the case studies as an opportunity to evaluate the extent to which the framework can explain how successful the states’ nuclear crisis management in the cases. The thesis might also contribute to the wider discussion of what, if anything,

constitutes “successful crisis management”, and the application of such a theory on different cases of possible nuclear close calls.²

1 While Cimbala seems to employ both terms somewhat interchangeably in his articles, I choose to refer to Cimbala’s four «attributes» of successful crisis management, rather than “requirements”. This is because the complexity of crises makes their dynamics context dependent, meaning that the outcomes of crises are dependent on many variables which often vary from crisis to crisis (George 1991d: 23-24). As George (1991d: 23) argues, defining “requirements” of crisis management does not entail “necessary conditions for successful crisis management”. Rather, they are “general principles” which “if met, are likely to facilitate achievement of one’s objectives in a crisis without unwanted escalation”. I refer to them as “attributes” to avoid the “necessary conditions” meaning of “requirements”.

2 I clarify the «intrinsic importance» of the chosen cases in chapter 4, in the section on «Case selection criteria».

See also the discussion on the «The relevance of nuclear crises» in chapter 1 for further discussion on the

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7 The chapter’s first section contains a literature review on concepts and theoretical debates necessary for applying the theoretical framework. This includes historical and current debates relating to the theoretical concepts of the nuclear revolution, nuclear crises, and nuclear escalation, which. The second section presents the main concepts and assumptions of nuclear crisis management and their relevance for the case studies. And the third section accounts for the four attributes for successful crisis management, as well as the larger literature it draws on.

2.1 Nuclear deterrence and stability

The invention of nuclear weapons, later creation of thermonuclear and hydrogen bombs, and first use at the end of World War II, can be called a revolution because of the unprecedented scale of destruction the weapons were capable of (Brodie 1959: 147-72). According to the thesis of the nuclear revolution, nuclear weapons fundamentally transformed conflict between states (Schelling 1966: 1.34; Jervis 1989: 1-46; Powell 1990: 6-33). A main change brought on by the introduction of nuclear weapons was that states with nuclear capabilities no longer fought wars, which had been replaced by crises (Hoffman 1965: 236). This was related to the early nuclear doctrines developed by the nuclear superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, during the Cold War included the concept of MAD (mutually assured

destruction) (Freedman 2003: 146-61). While the credibility of MAD was questioned (Powell 1990: 12-32), some theorists argued that MAD was more than just strategy: the “state” or condition of MAD emerged between two states with survivable second-strike nuclear forces (Jervis 1989: 74-106). The consequence is that the cost of engaging in war that could escalate to nuclear use became unacceptable and both states rely on nuclear deterrence for self-defense (Jervis 1989: 1-46). Nuclear deterrence is the threat inherent in the possibility of nuclear use that deters aggression (Morgan 1977: 17-25). In the context of this thesis and its focus on nuclear crises, deterrence can be usefully defined in military terms as “discouraging the enemy from taking military action by posing for him a prospect of cost and risk outweighing his prospective gain” (Snyder 1961: 35). The later superpower doctrines included Flexible Response and Lauch on Warning, which was supposed to enhance the credibility of nuclear

significance of incidents of possible near nuclear use/nuclear close calls.

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8 retaliation further by adjusting the scale of the nuclear response and decreasing the time it took to launch a second-strike upon alert (Freedman 2003: 115-162).

While the nuclear revolution thesis has inspired much of the literature on nuclear weapons, there are also debates among scholars about the strength of the stability brought by nuclear deterrence. Some scholars have also questioned the core implications of the nuclear

revolution thesis for stability (like Lebow and Stein 1994: 3-19). However, it is common to assume that nuclear stability remains strong in most cases, especially as long as it prevents war between nuclear powers (Axelrod 1990: 247). The concept of stability is often discussed in strategic literature in connection with nuclear strategy and can be defined in many ways (Axelrod 1990: 247). I present the most relevant concepts and definitions here because they are essential to discuss the relevance of escalation management and crisis management.

Stability in strategic studies often refers to maintenance of peace, which entails the avoidance of war (Axelrod 1990: 249). From a political point of view, it is usually good to maintain peace, but some state leaders might at times favor changing the status quo to achieve political goals over maintaining peace (Axelrod 1990: 248). When discussing crises, the concept of crisis stability is perhaps the most relevant as it describes the presence or absence of incentives to go to war. Scholars have long argued that states will refrain from taking steps toward war if they feel that that they have “assurance against being caught by surprise, the safety in waiting, the absence of a premium on jumping the gun” (Schelling 1966: 235).

Crisis stability, during the Cold War, was when “neither side's weapons present

vulnerabilities that could attract a pre-emptive strike” (Axelrood 1990: 249; Sigal 1983: 106- 33). Some scholars focused on the state of the superpower’s command-and-control systems, for example to evaluate the command-and-controls’ vulnerability to decapitation, the

destruction of nuclear command-and-control capabilities, when discussing crisis stability (Axelrood 1990: 250). A post-Cold War take on crisis stability, shifting away from the superpower’s concern with a preemptive strike, is that it exists when “despite the conflict of interests at hand, no party believes that starting a war would work to its advantage, at least for the time being” (Morgan 2013: 17). Late-Cold War Soviet literature described stability in terms close to the Western concept of crisis stability, but with an additional focus on uncontrolled escalation (Gottfried and Blair 1988). Western scholars have also emphasized the concept of arms-race stability, which is when “neither side fears that its opponent is developing weapons that could endanger strategic stability or crisis stability” (Axelrood 1990:

249; Sigal 1983: 106-33). Strategic stability is when “both sides have sufficient invulnerable

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9 nuclear weapons to inflict unacceptable damage on the other side even after suffering a

nuclear attack” (Axelrood 1990: 249; Sigal 1983: 106-33). This definition draws on the MAD as a condition between states with survivable second-strike nuclear forces, and scholars have engaged in extensive debate about its implications. Kenneth Waltz and Scott Sagan

contributed opposing viewpoints to the debate about the prospect of expanding strategic stability for preventing war between great powers by allowing more of them to become nuclear powers with their own nuclear deterrent. Waltz (1981, 1995) took a more optimistic stance when he argued that the strategic stability generated by more great powers possessing nuclear weapons would deter international war. Sagan (1994, 1995) answered that the spread of nuclear weapons to new states could threaten stability, as in the ability to maintain peace, because of the inevitability of human mistakes. In contrast, the concept of balance of power, or balance of forces, points to the “relative strengths of the two sides” in a conflict (Axelrod 1990: 248-49). This concept often suggests that minor differences in forces can tilt the outcome of who prevails in war (Axelrood 1990: 249). Soviet literature described a similar concept called “correlation of forces”, which implies that measuring each sides’ military forces can help predict who would win in case of war (Axelrood 1990: 249).

2.2 Nuclear crises and escalation

Scholars have studied and debated crises extensively because of their importance (Kroenig 2013: 142). Betts (1987), in his study of nuclear coercion on crisis stability, regarded them as relevant because they are “twilight regions” between war and peace, and the “true test of deterrence” (Betts 1987: 3). Deterrence, in this context, is a strategy to give an adversary a view into the future of what would happen if a war broke out, but its true aim is to keep war entirely theoretical and preserve stability (Betts 1987: 3). Crises are difficult to generalize about as they are characterized by complexity, with many variables determining its outcome, and come in many different variations (Lebow 1984: 7-12; George 1991d: 23-24). However, a common theme is that a crisis, by definition, is “a time of great tension and uncertainty”

(Cimbala 2011: 118). A “nuclear crisis” is a crisis in which at least one of the participating states have nuclear weapons capabilities (Cimbala 2011: 118-19). Scholars have not identified a clear effect of the presence of nuclear weapons on the dynamics of international crises (Cimbala 2011: 119). However, nuclear crises differ from other crises in that escalation to the use of nuclear weapons is a possibility, which puts pressure on decision-makers by increasing

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10 the stakes and the potential for damage if war breaks out (Cimbala 2011: 119). Crises are also associated with the possibility of escalation (Morgan et.al. 2008: 8). They often break out due to escalation and escalation during a crisis can threaten stability and potentially escalate into war (Morgan et.al. 2008: 8). Scholars often view escalation as a natural tendency in any form of human competition in which restrain is shown (Morgan et.al. 2008: 160). When human competition takes the form of military confrontation, pressure to escalate can be intense (Morgan et.al. 2008: 160). This is due to factors such as the potential costs of losing a contest in which deadly force is used, and the weigh placed on the interests and issues that brought the combatants into conflict (Morgan et.al. 2008: 160). During a crisis, the stakes might not be as high as during wartime, and some of the incentives for escalation might seem less powerful or even absent. Unintended escalation is also often considered less likely to occur during a crisis compared to during wartime. However, political reputation and national honor is often at stake during a crisis. And when a crisis breaks out, escalation can be easier to achieve than de-escalation (Morgan et.al. 2008: 36).

Scholars have written extensively on escalation, as it is central to the literature on both deterrence and nuclear strategy (Morgan et al. 2008: 7; Schelling 1966). I include the most useful terms for discussing escalation during crises here. Different forms of escalation, which can overlap, include vertical escalation, which is “an increase in the intensity of armed conflict or confrontation”, and horizontal escalation, which is “expanding the geographic scope of a conflict” (Kahn 1965: 4-6; Morgan et al. 2008: 18). Forms of escalation which do not take these forms, including when states adopt extreme measures or relax constraints that protect of civilians, can be labeled “political escalation” (Morgan et al. 2008: 18). Escalation is “reciprocal” when both parts of a conflict or crisis escalate and “unilateral” when only one part escalates (Morgan et.al. 2008: 160).

Escalation can be both a tool for states to use or deter and a danger to avoid,

depending on the circumstances (Morgan et al. 2008: 8-9). The distinction between escalation states attempt to control as a tool and avoid as a danger can be clarified by distinguishing between escalation that is deliberate, inadvertent and accidental. Because my chosen cases seem to include a danger of inadvertent or accidental escalation³, I start this discussion by describing the theoretical differences between deliberate and unintended escalation more thoroughly. Escalation that is intended can be called “deliberate escalation” (Morgan et.al.

3 More on this in chapter 5, page .

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11 2008: 20-21). States engage in deliberate escalation mainly to gain an anticipated advantage in a conflict or to reduce the chance of losing (Morgan et.al. 2008: 20-21). In this way deliberate escalation is escalation states attempt to control, but which might also cause an unintended escalatory response if the second state misperceives or react in another way than the first state intended. The form of deliberate escalation causing an unintended escalatory response can be called miscalculated escalation, which overlaps with inadvertent escalation.

Inadvertent escalation along with accidental escalation are forms of unintended escalation that states do not control and thus are more of a danger to avoid than a tool to use. Scholars have defined inadvertent escalation in many ways. One way is focusing on the danger of

unintended nuclear escalation during conventional war: inadvertent escalation is “the unintended consequence of a decision to fight a conventional war” (Posen 1982: 29). More generally, it can be defined as “escalation resulting from unintended mischaracterization or uncertainty” (Acton 2020a: 11) or “escalation resulting from military operations or threats that are not intended to be escalatory” (Acton 2020b: 134). Another way to define and describe a difference between deliberate and unintended escalation is to focus on escalation thresholds: “subjective limits that are considered significant by at least one part in a conflict”

(Morgan et.al. 2008: 11). Escalation in relation to escalation thresholds is “an increase in the intensity or scope of conflict that crosses threshold(s) considered significant by one or more of the participants” (Morgan et.al. 2008: 8). Escalation mechanisms are a set of properties that characterizes the different, but sometimes overlapping, forms of escalation: deliberate,

inadvertent and accidental escalation (Morgan et.al. 2008: 19-20). They are mainly

distinguished by the means by which escalation thresholds are crossed and are usually applied to describe escalation in the context of an ongoing conflict (Morgan et.al. 2008: 19-20).

Deliberate escalation occurs when one conflict participant more-or-less intentionally crosses another conflict participant’s escalation threshold by its actions (Morgan et.al. 2008: 20-21).

Inadvertent escalation occurs when one conflict participant’s intentional actions unintentionally cross another conflict participant’s escalation threshold. The actions usually appear insignificant or invisible to the party taking the action but are considered significant violations of escalation thresholds by the adversary. Failure to anticipate the escalatory effects may result from a lack of understanding of how the adversary will view the actions, and it may be the result of incorrect anticipation about the consequences of the actions – or both at the same time. It is not possible to deter inadvertent escalation, because it is the result of the failure of decision-makers to realize that their actions would lead to escalation. To avoid the

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12 actions, the decision-makers have to be enlightened about the escalatory consequences of their actions. This can be problematic in practice for at least two reasons. The first reason is that inadvertent escalation might not be recognized in advance by any of the involved parties, and thus will not seem escalatory to any party before they are performed. The second reason is that admitting or openly acknowledging one's own vulnerabilities might appear risky, for instance because of uncertainty about how the adversary will react (Morgan et.al. 2008: 23- 25).

Like inadvertent escalation, accidental escalation occurs when a crisis participant’s escalation threshold was unintentionally crossed. But while inadvertent escalation is the unintended result of intended actions, the events that caused accidental escalation to cross escalation thresholds were not intended by any crisis participant in the first place. The events might even be pure accidents, or they can be the result of military forces taking actions that were not intended by central decision-makers (Morgan et.al. 2008: 26-27). Accidental

escalation is more prone to occur when military forces are required to respond quickly, as was the case with U.S. and Soviet strategic nuclear forces during the Cold War (Morgan et.al.

2008: 165).

I go through some notable research on how deliberate, inadvertent and accidental escalation can occur below before presenting different theoretical approaches on how to control escalation through escalation management and how to manage crises to avoid war.

2.2.1 Deliberate escalation and incentives for a first strike

Are there circumstances where deliberate escalation to nuclear use could be feasible? Scholars have suggested explanations for the lack of deliberate use of nuclear weapons in conflict since 1945. Some have argued that development of a “nuclear taboo” in the United Sates have stigmatized the use of nuclear weapons, leading to widespread incentives for non-use of nuclear weapons (Tannenwald 1999: 462-65). Others have argued that the non-use of nuclear weapons is a tradition, which would imply that an eventual usage of nuclear weapons could result in more usage as the nonuse tradition would be broken (Press et al. 2013: 15-17).

Evidence based on polling in the United States also show that a majority of the US population in 2015 would support a nuclear strike against Iran resulting in 100.000 civilian casualties in certain war scenarios (Sagan and Valentino 2017: 75). This openness to launching nuclear weapons against civilians runs contrary to the hypothesized nuclear taboo thesis for the

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13 United States but does not say anything for the state of the nuclear taboo in other countries (Sagan and Valentino 2017: 75-76).

Despite what some have claimed, Russia’s escalation threshold for employing nuclear weapons in a conflict is very high (Bruusgaard 2017). Some Western scholars have argued that Russia’s war plans include a “escalate to de-escalate” move of using nuclear weapons early on in a conflict to outmaneuver NATO, but this claim is outdated and sometimes built on Cold War era logic (Bruusgaard 2021: 6-8). It has been argued that Russia instead relied more on nuclear weapons in its deterrence strategy at certain points in times to compensate for when its conventional forces were weaker around the year 2000 and the late 1990s (Bruusgaard 2021: 11-27).

Jervis (1989: 145-48) has suggested how incentives might emerge for a state actor to launch a first strike nuclear attack. These incentives are triggered by psychological factors, such as the emotions and the beliefs of the decision makers, and are thus influenced by the decision-maker’s perceptions. They might come from two sources. The first source is the fear the state has that if it does not strike first, it might not be able to strike at all. This does not give the state a reason to attack in the first place, but it can lead to an undesired war during times of crisis, for instance when the state thinks it is under attack or faces an existential threat. This incentive is considered defensive and might be triggered in decision-makers by moods of despair. This incentive can also be irrationally magnified. The second source of incentives to strike first comes from the hope of being capable of limiting or exterminating the other side's retaliatory or second-strike capabilities. This is considered an offensive strategy that could be triggered in decision-makers by moods of great optimism. Both

incentives can be present at the same time; if one side has one of the incentives, the other side can have the other. However, the belief that war is inevitable will not lead to war if the states believe that they will be better off receiving than giving the first blow. It is when they actually believe that offense would be advantageous and the preferable outcome that escalation to nuclear use can occur (Jervis 1989: 145-48).

2.2.2 Causes of inadvertent and accidental escalation

Under what circumstances do states face the danger of inadvertent and accidental escalation to nuclear use? While nuclear stability remains strong, many scholars have argued that

misperception and miscalculation often play a role in nuclear crises and conflict between states and that uncertainty can impede decision-maker’s ability to make accurate calculations

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14 when escalating or responding to escalation (Jervis 2017: 319-408; Lebow 1984: 101-228, Iklé 1973: 272-76). While deliberate escalation to nuclear war seems unlikely likely, scholars have argued that it is possible nuclear war could break out due to accidental or inadvertent escalation (Sagan 1993: 11-52; Feaver 1994: 501-8). Scholars often consider the notion that conventional war could escalate into nuclear war as the largest threat to strategic stability (Axelrod 1990: 247). There are many scenarios for how conventional war could escalate into nuclear war, and I go through some of the most relevant scenarios here. One scenario is that conventional operations inadvertently can lead to nuclear escalation if they threaten or destroy another state’s nuclear forces (Posen 1982: 28). The Arctic region was a possible theatre for nuclear escalation from inadvertent escalation during the Cold War (Posen 1982: 35-39). This was because of the superpowers’ interests in the region and that both NATO and Soviet nuclear forces located in the area (Posen 1982: 35-39). This led to the possibility that one side could believe that the other’s conventional operation was an attack on their nuclear forces and could respond by escalating to nuclear use (Posen 1982: 35-39). The Arctic is still an area where nuclear powers could come into conflict or risk heightened tensions (Åtland 2014:

146). This is because the region is central to Russia and the United States’ nuclear deterrence strategies and that all of the states surrounding the Arctic Ocean⁴ have continuing economic and national security interests in the Arctic (Åtland 2014: 146). A security dilemma might be emerging in the Arctic because of what appears to be a “persisting lack of certainty about other actor’s peaceful intentions” among these states (Åtland 2014: 146; 150-57). A security dilemma emerges when states seeking security are “driven to acquire more and more power in order to escape the impact of the power of others”, which makes the other states “prepare for the worst” (Hertz 1950: 157). The security dilemma is a debated concept that is associated with different definitions and approaches to international relation studies (Glacer 1997: 185- 89). However, it is often argued in scholarly literature that efforts taken by states to enhance its own security can lead to arms-racing, as states perceive each other’s purely defensive efforts as potentially aggressive (Glacer 1997: 185-89). The “other minds” problem, which can explain the logic of uncertainty that drives the security dilemma, refers to the suggested phenomena that no state can be completely certain about the real intentions of other states (Åtland 2014: 147). This problem can lead to mistrust and insecurity, even when states did

4 The states are Russia, the United States, Norway, Canada and Denmark (Åtland 2014: 145). The three first states’ involvement in the Andøya rocket crisis, where a civilian rocket launched from an area patrolled by US SSBNs caused accidental escalation, makes the implication for the Arctic region (the areas above the Arctic circle) relevant as a reference point for the case study of that crisis.

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15 not originally have aggressive intentions toward each other (Butterfield 1951: 21). Scholars have also argued that it can be difficult to distinguish between offensive and defensive weapons (Mearsheimer 1995/95: 23), but the implications of this difficulty for the security dilemma is subject to scholarly debate (Glacer 1997: 198-99). Scholars have argued that there might be a danger of inadvertent nuclear escalation, here called entanglement, due to the deployment of dual use missiles (Acton 2020a). The reasoning is that missiles with stated conventional purposes can cause other states to fear that they are nuclear weapons if the nuclear missiles are also capable of holding nuclear warheads (Acton 2020a). This can, for instance, be related to Russia’s objections to US forces stationed in Europe and could pose a risk during a crisis or conflict between the NATO and Russia (Acton 2020a). The inadvertent nuclear escalation can happen if adversaries misidentify a conventional missile launch for a nuclear launch and answer by launching nuclear retaliatory strikes or counterforce strikes ().

This could be a concern in a.

Jervis proposed the deterrence and spiral models to explain the outbreak of war

because of states’ misperception of adversaries’ intentions (Jervis 2017: 58-113). I summarize these models here briefly because they are relevant to discussing Russian perceptions of adversary’s intentions, which is relevant for Cimbala’s fourth attribute: “Maintaining accurate perceptions”. The spiral model predicts that states punish other states, mistakenly expecting that the punishment will improve their behavior, when instead the other state responds by showing worse behavior. The model predicts appeasement works better than punishment for improving the behavior of other states. The logic of the security dilemma as a source of misperception, through misinterpretation of other states’ purely defensive actions as aggressive, also contributed to the theoretical foundation of Robert Jervis’ spiral model (Glacer 1997: 171). The deterrence ‘model’ predicts that misperceptions arise when states appease other states expecting they will improve their behavior, when instead they respond by showing worse behavior. This can lead to war if the first state stops appeasing and starts practicing deterrence, but the other state does not believe in the threats and crosses the first state’s escalation thresholds. The model predicts practicing deterrence by threatening punishment works better than appeasement for improving the behavior of other states. The models highlight misperceptions about the other parts intentions, leading to escalation of a conflict because of punishment when appeasement would lower tensions or appeasement when punishment would have lowered tensions. Jervis also makes predictions about which states respond best to punishment or appeasement. Punishment works best against aggressors

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16 that know they are aggressors. Appeasement works best against status quo powers and

aggressors that do not know they are aggressors. Aggressors here are states with larger ambitions than what they admit, while status quo powers are generally satisfied with the current state of affairs. If the other state is strong, it is more dangerous to appease.

Additionally, legitimacy of the first state’s claim and the type of resource demanded can affect whether punishment or appeasement works best (Jervis 2017: 58-113).

The deterrence and spiral models could be in understanding sources of misperceptions in the chosen cases in this thesis, as part of Cimbala’s “Maintaining accurate perceptions”

attribute. For instance, can the theory explain a dilemma on the Russian side to choose between appeasement and punishment in the two cases? One of the main criticisms of the models is that they are not generalizable to every case, as demonstrated by past crises and conflicts in which some of the models’ predictions have been inaccurate (Jervis 2017: 84- 110). Application of the theory should be done carefully, and, as the “other mind” problem reminds us, it is perhaps not possible to be certain about other states’ intentions.

2.3 Escalation management

Can decision-makers control escalation? Scholars have suggested different ways to manage escalation to prevent war or to keep limited war from escalating uncontrollably (Morgan et al.

2008: 160). I shortly discuss some central models, mainly from the Cold War era here, as they offer alternative or complementary approaches to crisis management and because they offer useful insights for discussion of the cases.

Herman Kahn (1965) described a metaphorical “escalation ladder” with 44 rudders where one rudder represents a different scope of escalation in a conflict between the superpowers during the Cold War, with more than half of them involving use of nuclear weapons in some way (Morgan et al. 2008: 14-15). Ladders with rungs ranging from peaceful relations at the bottom, to different degrees of use of force farther up, The different degrees of force often include (). Limited war entails a state of escalation, or rungs on an escalation rudder, in which at least one of the parties show restraint in the form of limits to the use of force (Morgan et al.

2008: 14). Such a war could, in theory, also take the form of limited nuclear war, as opposed to strategic nuclear war without restraints (Morgan et al. 2008: 14). Escalation ladders are

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17 common and are often associated with concepts of controlling or managing escalation,

particularly escalation dominance (Morgan et al. 2008: 14-15). Escalation dominance, according to Kahn (1965: 290), is “a capacity, other things being equal, to enable the side possessing it to enjoy marked advantages in a given region of the escalation ladder.” It is a condition in which a state had the ability to escalate a conflict in a way that is

disadvantageous to the adversary, while the adversary does not have the same ability (Morgan et al. 2008: 15-16). However, escalation dominance has faced criticism for being rarely attainable in practice because most adversaries will have an option for escalating a situation (Morgan et al. 2008: 15-17). Escalation dominance models do not address the problem of uncertainty at all and assumes that both states always know which step of the escalation ladder they are on (Morgan et al. 2015: 83). Regardless, the implications of Kahn’s characterizations continue to influence conceptualization of nuclear war and guide

policymakers. And limited war is seen as, even though it is difficult to guarantee that war can be kept limited. For the viability of applying escalation dominance to explain the cases in this thesis, it is a problem that it focuses on deliberate escalation and that it does not take into account uncertainty. However, it can contribute to the discussion by giving insight into determining the “level of escalation”, and decision-makers possibly considering escalation to limited nuclear war with the aim of controlling it.

Another view, attributed to Thomas Schelling, is that crises and conflicts are a

“brinkmanship” competition in coercive diplomacy and resolve (Schelling 1966: 1-34, 131- 41, Schelling 1960: 53–80; Powell 1990: 33-84). Schelling argued that when nuclear capable adversaries faced a shared risk of escalation, the side that showed it was most willing to escalate to the brink of nuclear war would emerge as the winner in the brinkmanship contest (Schelling 1966: 92-125). The reasoning assumes that both parties want to prevail, but that neither want to cross the nuclear threshold because it would bring an unacceptable level of damage (Schelling 1966: 1-34, 131-41, Schelling 1960: 53–80). They would accomplish this not by explicitly threatening a nuclear attack, but by making a “threat that leaves something to chance” and thus leaving the opponent with a choice to back down or taking steps that raise the risk of inadvertent or accidental nuclear war (Schelling 1960: 187). Critics say this approach is not a as relevant for managing conflicts far below the nuclear threshold, or above it, because it focuses on taking the confrontation to the brink of nuclear war (Morgan et al.

2015: 84). Schelling also argued that uncertainty, which often characterizes confrontation

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18 between states, can be helpful for coercing the adversary in the brinkmanship contest

(Schelling 1966: 92-125).

Other have emphasized nuclear superiority based on the balance of forces: the state with the most nuclear forces has the advantage and prevail in the conflict or crisis . However, studies making this claim have often assumed that the effect is “virtually automatic”, and thus did not identify how the balance of forces affected crisis outcomes (Trachtenberg 1985: 140).

Some have argued that brinkmanship and nuclear superiority together can affect crisis outcomes by arguing that the state with the most nuclear forces would have the most resolve and thus prevail in the brinkmanship contest. However, this approach tends to not always account for uncertainty in international crises (Kroenig 2013: 166-68).

Threshold management is an escalation management concept that accounts for the risks associated with uncertainty in international conflict (Morgan et al. 2015: 29).

Nuclear superpower strategies can very roughly be characterized as variations of the same theme, which involves first-use capabilities and sufficient retaliatory forces (Narang 2014:

14). Scholars have argued that it is not only the possession of nuclear weapons that generates nuclear deterrence, but also the state’s choice of nuclear strategy (Kartha 1998: 15). Some point to the importance of the state’s operational doctrine, which, in contrast to a state’s declared nuclear doctrine, includes when and how to use nuclear weapons, which targets to aim for, and to whom authority over nuclear launching capabilities are delegated” (Narang 2010: 41). Narang (2010: 40-46) has argued that regional nuclear powers’ ability to deter adversaries can vary depending on their nuclear posture and created a typology of three regional power nuclear postures which he argues deter different kinds of conflict: asymmetric escalation, assured retaliation and catalytic. These are used to describe regional nuclear powers, which are states that are not nuclear superpowers, but have developed independent nuclear weapon capabilities (Narang 2014: 3). According to Narang (2014: 251-52, 254), the effects of nuclear posture on crisis behavior is worth further research, as it is a relatively unexplored topic. When it comes to regional nuclear powers, Narang states that there seems to be virtually no relationship between regional power postures and crisis reciprocation, and too few cases for it to be a fruitful topic of study. Only a slight coercive effect of the

asymmetrical escalation posture is found, but it is far from being statistically significant.

Narang thus regards qualitative crisis tests as inherently limited tools for illuminating the intra-crisis effects of nuclear posture. Instead he applies a qualitative approach in his analysis

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19 of intra-state crises. His focus is also different: Instead of examining the effects of posture on reciprocation, his dependent variable of interest is the ultimate level of escalation, which is the prospect of nuclear use. He chooses sets of detailed cases on the basis of quantitative results, and illustrates how the various postures became salient in particular crises by applying qualitative process tracing techniques (Narang 2014: 251-52).

Scholars have suggested that post-Soviet Russia’s regional nuclear deterrence posture shares parts of the logic of an asymmetric escalation posture in its commitment to employing nuclear weapons against conventional forces threatening the survival of the state (Adamsky 2014:

179). This point makes it relevant to briefly describe more about the theoretic asymmetric escalation posture for reference in the later discussion of the Andøya rocket crisis.⁵ A nuclear posture is based on a state’s operational doctrine and can be defined as ”the capabilities, employment doctrine, and command-and-control procedures a state applies to manage and operationalize its nuclear weapons capability” (Narang 2014: 4). Narang’s (2014: 310-11) findings include that “asymmetric escalators” like Pakistan, employing a nuclear posture of threatening nuclear use against conventional threats, more often deter their adversaries during crises and thus seems “uniquely deterrence optimal”. However, asymmetric escalators are also likely more prone to accidental or unauthorized nuclear use due to their commitment to

escalate to nuclear use early on in a conventional conflict, in addition to their more delegative than assertive command-and-control procedures (Narang 2014: 310-11).

2.4 Nuclear crisis management

I apply Cimbala’s four attributes of successful crisis management to explain how successful the Russian crisis management of the Able Archer 83 and Andøya rocket crises was. In the following text, I sometimes use the shortened form “Cimbala’s attributes” to refer to

“Cimbala’s four attributes of successful crisis management”. Focusing primarily on crisis management has advantages and drawbacks contra relying on alternatives such as escalation management or Russia’s nuclear strategy. I start this section by justifying this choice of theoretical approach, as well as the choice of the Cimbala’s attributes, before presenting the theory I apply in the case studies.

5 As described in chapter 2, Russia might have placed empahsis on deterring conventional threats with nuclear weapons at different time 1990s , but consitituion change 1993.

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20 Cimbala’s attributes draw heavily on previous literature, particularly literature on nuclear crisis management (which I present at the end of the chapter), to explain what “successful crisis management” is. I thus start this section by presenting notable research on nuclear (and non-nuclear) crisis management and some of the typical and useful approaches scholars have applied to and tested on real-world nuclear crises. I also discuss factors scholars suggest might affect nuclear crisis management, and thus also successful crisis management, as well as criticism of nuclear crisis management approaches. This leads to a discussion of what assumptions characterizes the crisis management literature in contrast to the escalation management approaches I presented in the former section. I also focus on the specific advantages and disadvantages of applying Cimbala’s attributes to explain my chosen cases instead of other “requirements” or “principles” of crisis management.

Crisis management in the context of nuclear crises is “both a competitive and

cooperative endeavor between military adversaries” (Cimbala, 2011: 118). A traditional crisis management definition of a crisis is that it is “an event” decision-makers perceive “to threaten actors’ high priority goals”, “to restrict the amount of time available” and “to surprise

members of the decision unit” (Hermann 1969: 413). Later crisis management literature have tended to rely on similar definitions of crises, but often replace surprise with serious

uncertainty (Olsson and Verbeek 2018: 277). The difference between “crisis management”

and “nuclear crisis management” is like the difference between a crisis and a nuclear crisis:

scholars have not managed to clearly distinguish the effects of the presence of nuclear weapons on decision-making and crisis management (Cimbala 2011: 119). However, a nuclear crisis can put extra pressure on decision-makers by increasing the stakes and the potential for damage if war breaks out (Cimbala 2011: 119). Because of this difference, unless otherwise specified, I use the term “nuclear crisis management” in this thesis to refer to crisis management during nuclear crises, while I use the term “crisis management” to refer to crisis management during nuclear and non-nuclear international crises between states.

Crisis management is also different from, but overlaps, with the broader concept of crisis behavior. Crisis behavior is state behavior during high-stake international crises (Narang 2014: 251-52). Previous research on intra-crisis behavior has typically been quantitative in nature and focused on measuring reciprocation: whether the target state reciprocated the initiator's threat (Horowitz 2009; Beardsley and Asal 2009). This literature, focusing mostly on crises involving nuclear superpowers, has found that nuclear weapons reduce the probability that an adversary will reciprocate crisis escalation (Horowitz 2009;

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21 Beardsley and Asal 2009). Narang (2014: 253-98) has investigated the effects of regional nuclear posture on crisis behavior with a qualitative approach. However, this is a relatively unexplored topic since relatively few crises have broken out involving nuclear capable states (Narang 2014: 251-52).

Before the establishment of crisis management, historians had long recognized that decision-makers in charge of great power states’ crisis response tend to rush to judgement when a crisis breaks out (Howard 1971: 99–109). Scholars focusing on crisis management has largely aimed at advising new leaders on ways to avoid crises escalating into wars. For

example, according to Alexander L. George, the aim of his research presented in the 1991 book Avoiding War: Problems of Crisis Management, was to develop better knowledge about the requirements of crisis management, and to illuminate major obstacles and threats that are likely to be experienced during crisis management (George 1991a: 3-5).

At the heart of the decision-making process is what is called the “policy dilemma” of crisis management. This policy dilemma entails that once a crisis is set into motion, decision- makers have to deal with two often opposing objectives: protection of one's interest and avoidance of measures that could trigger undesired escalation. When interests are important, they must be weighed against options and actions that can trigger unintended escalation. If either side in a crisis is willing to back away from a confrontation and accept potential damage to its interest, the confrontation between the parties need not develop into a war and the crisis can be considered over (George 1991d: 22-23).

During a crisis, time pressure on decision makers can be intense and the prospect of danger is usually perceived as imminent. To some extent, all crises have a high degree of threat perception, a short time for decision making, and confusion among crisis participants about what is happening. The confusion is often the result of a “fog of crisis”, an expression inspired by the concept of “fog of war” which was first described by the 19^th century military theorist Carl von Clausewitz. The idea is that crisis participants cannot be certain about what is happening, and thus cannot easily make informed judgments about what should be done in the present situation (similar to the uncertainty experienced by war participants due to the

“fog of war”). These basic aspects of a crises are assumed to have an effect on crisis behavior, and particularly decision-making during a crisis. In the study of crisis management, many scholars are interested in how the presence of nuclear weapons influence the decision-making process. However, the influence of nuclear weapons on decision making during crises is not

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22 easy to measure clearly. One problem is that there are many potentially important causal factors that are relevant to decisions concerning war and peace, and avoidance of war can be ascribed to many causes. What is certain, is that the prospect of nuclear escalation during a crisis greatly influences the degree of destruction that can occur should crisis management fail (George 1991d: 23-24; Cimbala 2011: 118-20).

During nuclear crises, the prospect of nuclear escalation can make decision-making extremely hard. Escalation to nuclear use might seem unthinkable, but the potential threat to the state of losing its nuclear deterrence due to an enemy nuclear attack leading to potential decapitation is not a good option. Normally, it is often assumed that crises are the result of deliberate escalation. However, when the fog of crisis occurs, there can be uncertainty about what is actually happening and the escalation mechanisms that lead to the crisis. In some nuclear crisis scenarios, there is a chance that accidental or inadvertent escalation can result in accidental or inadvertent wars. An accidental war can occur as the result of actions not

properly authorized by either central decision-makers or those with legitimate pre-delegated authority in the lower chain of command. An example of the possible start of such a war would be an accidental or unauthorized launch of strategic nuclear weapons, but it can also occur due to an erroneous interpretation of a warning that leads one side to assume that an adversary has launched a major nuclear attack. This latter scenario can trigger a decision to escalate by launching a nuclear retaliatory strike. Of course, the outbreak of war is also dependent on the adversary in turn deciding to retaliate (George 1991b: 7-9).

An inadvertent war, on the other hand, is a war that is authorized during the course of a crisis, even though central decision makers did not expect a war at the outbreak of the crisis.

A variation of such a war can occur when one side initiates a preemptive war due to an erroneous warning that an adversary has decided to attack and appears to be making

preparations to launch a war in the near future. A warning of the preparations for an attack is what is called a strategic warning. This type of warning can be distinguished from a tactical warning, which is the warning of an incoming attack that is perceived to have already started.

Of course, a preemptive attack might also be launched due to a correct warning in the event that the adversary is actually preparing a real attack (George 1991b: 7-9).

2.4.1 Factors that can influence crisis management

A number of variables might influence nuclear crisis management, and thus might also indirectly affect successful crisis management. The choice of offensive or defensive crisis

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23 management strategy (377-94), the role of intelligence (Taylor and Ralston 1991: 407-408), the military’s rules of engagement Sagan (1991: 443-444), and psychological phenomena like crisis bargaining codes (Rogers 1991: 413-14) and crisis-induced stress and fatigue (Post 1991: 471-91).

The decision-makers’ choice of crisis management strategy is important because the strategies constitute a way to deal with the policy dilemma of crisis management (George 1991e: 377). The states’ choice of offensive or defensive strategies to counter each other during the crisis can affect whether a crisis develops into an inadvertent war or war is avoided (George 1991e: 393).

The role of intelligence also plays a part in informing decision-makers of possible dangers. Intelligence also provides updated information to decision-makers they can use during crisis management. Decision-makers can downplay the weight they give to

information from intelligence agencies. Intelligence agencies can also be fallible to bias in their information gathering and their priorities can be affected by the priorities of

policymakers (Taylor and Ralston 1991: 395). There are examples of the role intelligence helping decision-makers in managing crises, but also of intelligence failures where intelligence has made it harder to avoid war (Taylor and Ralston 1991: 407-408).

Rules of engagement are “the set of directives given to commanders in the field to guide them on the circumstances and manner in which force may be used”. Too little room for independent decisions from the military can make military forces more vulnerable for attacks and can make it harder to complete missions. Too much room for independent decisions from the military can make room for the military activities leading to more escalation than

policymakers wanted (Sagan 1991: 443-444).

Crisis bargaining codes can affect how decision-makers engage in nuclear crisis management. Crisis bargaining codes are “constellation of beliefs for a particular policy- maker”. The beliefs of three specific issues: “an image of the adversary”, “beliefs about the dynamics of crisis escalation and the best ways to control it”, and “bargaining rules of thumb for resolving the crisis on terms consistent with the country’s interests”. The beliefs are part of a “cognitive prism” that have an effect on how decision-makers “interprets events and evaluates options”. This concept draws on cognitive psychology and is different from strategies (Rogers 1991: 413-14).

Other psychological factors that can influence nuclear crisis management include crisis-induced stress and fatigue, which could impact the decision-makers’ ability to make

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24 decisions. Prolonged and intense periods of stress experienced during a nuclear crisis could affect the decision-makers’ choice of decision or policy. Long periods of sleep deprivation or the use of medication could also affect the decision-makers’ mental state and ability to think clearly. Old age might affect decision-makers’ decision-making capacity. Additionally, the decision-maker’s personality could affect how well the decision-maker is able to handle stress and make necessary and complicated decisions during a crisis. The personality of decision- makers could also affect their ability to cooperate or work with a small group of people or in an organizational setting, which is often integral for central decision-makers engaging in nuclear crisis management. Such settings might also might decision-makers susceptible to

“groupthink”, as the people surrounding decision-makers could come to conclusions based on a desire to please a decision-maker (Post 1991: 471-91).

This Some have also criticized it for being to reliant on chance to prevent nuclear escalation (Pelopidas). Nuclear crisis management has been criticized because it makes no difference in practice (George 1991a: 3-6) and because the complexity of crisis decision-making makes it more like an “art” than a “science” (Rogers 1991: 437). However, an advantage is that it highlights the complexity of crisis. Rather than offering advice to policymakers, it can also function as a theoretical discipline that highlights the traits of a skilled crisis decision-maker.

Nuclear crisis management is part of “crisis behavior”, which is a more ambiguous term.

Other replacement possibilities include crisis outcomes and escalation theories. However, crisis outcomes are not as interesting for the two cases under investigation in this thesis, as they ended without a clear outcome or before violence broke out. These approaches are also more focused on reciprocal crises, while this thesis investigates one-sided crises.

2.4.2 Why does decision-making matter during crises?

Does decision-making during crises matter? The decision-making process, which is central in crisis management, is one of the levels of analysis suitable for investigating state perceptions during crisis and conflict, in addition to bureaucracy, domestic politics and the international

Russian crisis management from Able Archer 1983 to Andøya 1995

Russian crisis management from Able Archer 1983 to Andøya 1995

Successful avoidance of nuclear escalation or ‘rolling the nuclear dice’?

Amund Sandnes Hatteland

Master's thesis in Political Science Department of Political Science

UNIVERSITY OF OSLO

Russian crisis management from Able Archer 1983 to Andøya 1995

Successful avoidance of nuclear escalation or ‘rolling

the nuclear dice’?

Abstract

Preface

Table of contents

1 Introduction ... 1

2 Theory ... 6

3 Research design and methodology ... 32

4 Case study 1: Able Archer 83 crisis ... 47

5 Case study 2: Andøya rocket crisis ... 61

6 Discussion ... 75

7 Conclusion ... 79

Bibliography ... 81

Appendix ... 92

1 Introduction

1.1 Background

1.2 The structure of the thesis

2 Theory

2.1 Nuclear deterrence and stability

2.2 Nuclear crises and escalation

2.2.1 Deliberate escalation and incentives for a first strike

2.2.2 Causes of inadvertent and accidental escalation

2.3 Escalation management

2.4 Nuclear crisis management

2.4.1 Factors that can influence crisis management

2.4.2 Why does decision-making matter during crises?