A Tale of Two Cities
A comparative study of ISIS in Ramadi and Fallujah
Anders Brenna
Department of Comparative Politics June 2017
Abstract
ISIS attacked Ramadi and Fallujah in the early days of January 2014, and while Fallujah fell at once with no visible resistance, it took protracted fighting and a three-day surge by ISIS before Ramadi fell on May 17 the same year. Through the application of social movement theory to the cases, I argue that it is possible to provide an understanding of the processes that led up to the two different outcomes, by looking at the Sunni Protest movement in Anbar throughout 2013. I argue that to understand the rise of ISIS, it is important to look beyond the group itself. It is necessary to include environmental dynamics, intramovement relations and the influence of outside actors in the analysis.
This study finds that internal competition of frames caused Ramadi and Fallujah to develop differently. Fallujah was more receptive to extremist frames, while moderate frames resonated best in Ramadi. State repression and violence confirmed the dominant and extreme frames in Fallujah perfectly. The repression also affected Ramadi negatively, but not as much as in Fallujah. The radical flank effect increased the difference by affecting how the government handled the movement in general and how the government handled the cities specifically.
As the Iraqi security forces pulled away from the cities after clashing with protesters in late December, the local councils inserted themselves as the governing bodies of Ramadi and Fallujah. Because Ramadi had remained relatively moderate, it was not in its interest to cooperate with ISIS, thus siding with the Iraqi security forces in fighting the extremists.
Fallujah, on the other hand, which had been increasingly radicalised throughout the year, had no problem cooperating with ISIS. Fallujah let ISIS into the city, and that is why ISIS was able to enter unopposed in January 2014.
Acknowledgements
First of all I want to thank my wife Kristin for unconditional love and support. This would not have been possible without you.
To my wonderful children Sofie and Sigmund: I hope you forgive me when you grow older and realise that it is unusual for 6 and 8 years olds to learn about Anbari tribal dynamics and insurgents over dinner.
To my supervisor Anne Stenersen: Thank you for all you help and interesting discussions.
Your guidance has been invaluable.
Anders Brenna 01.06.2017
Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI) Kjeller
Contents
Abstract ... 2
Acknowledgements ... 3
List of abbreviations ... 6
Introduction ... 7
Literature review ... 9
Introduction ... 9
Literature describing limited and specific aspects of ISIS ... 9
Literature describing the rise of ISIS ... 10
The Sunni – Shia conflict ... 10
ISIS strategy ... 10
ISIS in Ramadi and Fallujah ... 11
Social movement theory and ISIS ... 12
ISIS and the Sunni Protest movement ... 12
Methodology ... 14
Introduction ... 14
Purpose ... 14
Research design ... 14
The Case study ... 15
Sources ... 18
Social movement theory ... 22
Introduction ... 22
The synthetic model ... 22
Definition ... 23
What makes the Sunni Protest movement a movement? ... 24
Relevance of SMT ... 25
How SMT can be used to study violent movements ... 26
The political process model ... 26
Political opportunity ... 28
Mobilising structures ... 30
Framing processes ... 31
Theory development ... 33
Analysis ... 34
Introduction ... 34
Security forces ... 34
Tribes ... 35
The Sahwa ... 35
The Sunni Protest Movement ... 36
Ramadi ... 38
Introduction ... 38
Mobilising structures ... 40
Political parties ... 40
The clerical establishment ... 41
Tribes ... 42
Radical elements ... 43
Mobilising structures conclusion ... 43
Political opportunity ... 44
State repression ... 44
Creating political opportunity ... 45
Political opportunity conclusion ... 46
Framing processes ... 46
General frames ... 46
Event specific frames ... 47
Framing processes conclusion ... 48
Ramadi conclusion ... 49
Fallujah ... 50
Introduction ... 50
Mobilising structures ... 51
The Military Council of Tribal Revolutionaries ... 51
Political parties ... 52
Tribes ... 52
Former insurgent groups ... 54
Nationalist groups ... 54
Salafi jihadist groups ... 56
Mobilising structures conclusion ... 57
Political opportunity ... 58
State repression ... 58
Creating political opportunity ... 59
Political opportunity conclusion ... 61
Framing processes ... 62
General frames ... 62
Event specific frames ... 63
Framing processes conclusion ... 64
Fallujah conclusion ... 65
Cross case analysis ... 66
Introduction ... 66
Mobilising structures and framing ... 66
Radical flank effect ... 67
Maliki’s actions ... 68
Events ... 69
Conclusion ... 70
Further research ... 72
Appendix A: Map of Iraq ... 73
Bibliography ... 74
List of abbreviations
AQI: al-Qaida Iraq GOI: Government of Iraq ISF: Iraqi Security Forces
ISIS: Islamic State in Iraq and Syria
JRTN: Jaysh Rijal al-Tariqa al-Naqshbandia (The Naqshbandi Army)
Introduction
“It was the best of times, it was the worst of times […]” (Dickens, 1949)
There was careful optimism at the beginning of 2013. Large parts of the Sunni community in Iraq had united around a common cause: Less governmental influence in the Sunni cities. No more discrimination. Protest sites were established in major Sunni cities and the Sunni Protest movement held demonstrations all over the country. However, as the protests intensified throughout 2013, violence became widespread and the Government of Iraq’s handling of the situation became more and more heavy-handed. By the end of the year, one of the cities was still controlled by a faction loyal to the government. The other had descended into insurgency, in the hands of a faction willing to cooperate even with the most extreme group of all: ISIS.
The group I refer to as ISIS in this thesis has changed its name several times, along with its goals, geographic focus and organisational affiliation. Other names are the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), Islamic State (IS) or Daesh. The latter is a derogatory term from the group’s Arabic acronym (Stern and Berger, 2016). When I refer to other groups, I will use the names most commonly used in Western media.
Even though ISIS has been set back militarily over the last years and the flow of foreign fighters has decreased, it is unlikely that the group will be completely defeated in the near term. It will survive in one form or another, and according to NIS (2017), they are trying to create a base or conditions that will facilitate the rebuilding of the movement like they did when the Americans left Iraq in 2011.
ISIS attacked Ramadi and Fallujah in the early days of January 2014, and while Fallujah fell at once with no visible resistance, it took protracted fighting and a three-day surge by ISIS before Ramadi fell on May 17 the same year (Sowell, 2015). The current understanding is that the rise of ISIS in general, and the movement’s success in Eastern Anbar, largely can be explained by a) the Sunni – Shia conflict, assuming that the Sunni population automatically sided with ISIS when faced by Shia dominated security forces, or b) ISIS’ superior military power. Some also argue that ISIS was able to exploit the grievances in the Sunni population towards the repressive regime of Iraq’s prime minister, Nouri al-Maliki (BBC, 2014a).
However, none of these explains why ISIS was able to move straight into Fallujah without
resistance, while being rejected and defeated in Ramadi. The aim of this thesis is thus to answer the following question: why was ISIS able to enter Fallujah unopposed, while being rejected and defeated in Ramadi in January 2014?
Through the application of social movement theory (SMT) to the cases, I argue that it is possible to provide an understanding of the processes that led up to the two different outcomes, by looking at the context in Anbar throughout 2013. I argue that to understand the rise of ISIS, it is important to look beyond the group itself. By looking at the Sunni Protest movement as a social movement, it is possible to include environmental dynamics, intramovement relations and the influence of outside actors in the analysis, and this is important in understanding ISIS. But, before I get ahead of myself, I will have to give a short overview of how this study is constructed.
The first three chapters include a literature review, a chapter on the methodological issues and an introduction to social movement theory. These three chapters provide an understanding of how this study is situated in the literature and how it contributes to the current body of knowledge. I outline how the study is conducted and how I have made sure that it holds water. Lastly, the chapter on social movement theory explains how I apply the theory as well as describing its usefulness in this study. From the theory chapter, I am moving on to the analysis.
The last three chapters is the analysis. First, I conduct two separate case studies of Ramadi and Fallujah respectively, where I provide an understanding of how the two cities developed throughout 2013. Secondly, I conduct a cross-case analysis, trying to compare the two cities and point out why the outcome was so different.
ISIS has fascinated me for quite some time. Their brutality and lightning campaign in June 2014 surpasses fiction, and they have achieved unprecedented levels of media attention.
Needless to say, a lot has been written about ISIS before. In order to find some aspect that had not already been covered, I conducted a thorough literature review of what had been written on the rise of ISIS.
Literature review
Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to provide an overview of the existing literature on ISIS. Because of the vast amount of publications on the topic, I will focus on the most important ones and highlight how these authors have covered different aspects of ISIS. I will then look at how a few scholars have used social movement theory to analyse ISIS. At the end of this chapter I present some perspectives and explanations on the outcome of ISIS approach in Ramadi and Fallujah. Through an increasingly focused literature review, from ISIS in general to ISIS in Ramadi and Fallujah specifically, I will highlight a gap in the existing body of knowledge, and my research question follows as a natural consequence of this gap.
Literature describing limited and specific aspects of ISIS
Ali (2015) looks specifically at propaganda and the recruitment of women, while Berger (2015) and Atwan (2015) describes ISIS’ various recruitment strategies through social media.
Stern and Berger (2016:XX) describes a propaganda video released in May 2014 showing the execution of unarmed Iraqi soldiers as “[…] possibly the most popular jihadist propaganda video of all time.”. Violence has been an important factor in ISIS’ recruitment of local and foreign fighters (Byman, 2016:143). The issue of foreign fighters in general is described by Stern and Berger (2016), McCants (2015) and Fishman (2016), while Arntsen (2016) made an important contribution with his book about the recruitment of Norwegian foreign fighters in specific.
McCants (2015) focuses on the apocalyptic aspect of ISIS and how it influences recruitment.
The apocalypse is central to ISIS as a recruitment tool, portraying their fighters as defenders of the righteous (Byman, 2016:137). Whereas Al-Qaida downplayed the apocalyptic narrative, ISIS embraces the idea that they are currently fighting the unbelievers in the end of times (McCants, 2015). The apocalyptic narratives are also central in the propaganda, as they […] resonate among many Muslims today because of the political turmoil in the Middle East.” (McCants, 2015:461).
The ideological aspect of ISIS is described by Byman (2016). While ISIS is highly ideological, the movement is still pragmatic and the ideology subordinate to strategic goals (Byman, 2016). This makes the ideology seem incoherent and contradictory, and as a
consequence, predicting ISIS’ actions from their ideology is very difficult (Byman, 2016:136). Still, Byman (2016) also views ISIS in terms of agency by looking at strengths and weaknesses of the movement and not the conditions that shape it.
Literature describing the rise of ISIS The Sunni – Shia conflict
The literature describing the rise of ISIS does so mostly in a historical context and with the Sunni- Shia conflict as the main explanation for its rise. Authors such as Weiss and Hassan (2015) and McCants (2015) argue that ISIS attacked the Shia population to escalate existing tensions and provoke a violent response against the Sunni community. The aim was to drag Iraq into a sectarian conflict. This way, the Sunni population would assess that their best chance of protection from Shia security forces would be to align with ISIS.
The Sunni - Shia conflict is very important in understanding the rise of ISIS. However, if used as the main explanation, it suggests that the course of events in Ramadi and Fallujah should have been quite similar, as both cities are Sunni-dominated. ISIS attacked both cities in the early days of January 2014, and while Fallujah fell at once with no visible resistance, it took protracted fighting and finally, a three-day surge by ISIS before Ramadi fell on May 17 the same year (Sowell, 2015). A purely military explanation, that Fallujah was somehow weaker and easier to target, seems less plausible. ISIS had 300 to 500 men in Fallujah (Cockburn, 2015, Abbas, 2014a), a city of 320 000+ inhabitants (PopulationData, 2015) and a history of strong resistance to hostile invaders (International Crisis Group, 2014, Sowell, 2015). Abbas (2014a) also points out that “Tribal gunmen surrounded the al-Qaeda gunmen as soon as they arrived.” Armed tribal militias reside in and around both Ramadi and Fallujah, and in Ramadi the outcome shows that ISIS was an inferior force. ISIS would become a well-armed and equipped force, but this did not happen until it seized large amounts of heavy and modern equipment from the Iraqi army in May-June 2014 (Terrill, 2014). The point is that both Ramadi and Fallujah would have been able to withstand an attack by ISIS, which indicates that the outcome was the result of something else.
ISIS strategy
Many of the publications on ISIS have been written by experts on counterinsurgency (COIN) or other security studies. This is not surprising, as the United States considered Al-Qaida in
Iraq (AQI), ISIS’ predecessor, to be a military opponent and fought a counter insurgency campaign against them for several years. Thus, military theorists became authoritative on how to deal with ISIS. However, this has caused the focal point of analysis to be ISIS as an organisation, studying issues such as strategy and military action. Brian Fishman’s book “The Masterplan: ISIS, Al-Qaeda, and the Jihadi Strategy for Final Victory” (2016) serves as a good illustration of this. Researchers like Knights (2014) and Ryan (2015) also focus on ISIS as a military-like organisation in a military-strategic perspective. They conclude that ISIS strategy is decisive in their success. However, analysing ISIS detached from the local context, existing structures and political opportunities fails explain how ISIS could persuade and recruit as many fighters needed to take military control in Fallujah.
ISIS in Ramadi and Fallujah
Cockburn (2015) mentions that ISIS seized Fallujah and large parts of Anbar, while he in another book mentions ISIS being in control of Fallujah, but does not address the difference between the cities (Cockburn, 2016). Weiss and Hassan (2015) point out that both cities fell to ISIS and underline how much longer it took to take Ramadi. The book argues that discontent about Maliki’s heavy-handed policies and the use of Shia militias ignited a Sunni insurgency that gave ISIS an opening. This explanation takes political opportunity into account, but does not explain the differences in Fallujah and Ramadi.
Knights (2014) looks at the different outcomes in Ramadi and Fallujah, and points to Fallujah’s history as a rebellious and insular city. In Ramadi’s case, he is arguing that the tribes in Ramadi rejected AQI to a larger degree than the ones in Fallujah, thus making Ramadi less susceptible to ISIS than Fallujah. Griffin (2016) argues similarly that the tribal authorities in Ramadi may have feared reprisals because of their participation in the Awakening, a popular Sunni uprising against ISI, ISIS predecessor, in late 2006. However, neither of these explanations are sufficient because the tribes were considerably stronger than ISIS in late 2013 and early 2014, and ISIS did not pose a military threat, although they did conduct several assassinations. The argument of Fallujah as an insular city is partly right, but it does not explain why ISIS seized the city at the time it did. Fallujah has always been an insular city, and still fought off AQI inn 2007.
Social movement theory and ISIS
Ryan (2015) uses social movement theory to present a net assessment of ISIS strengths and weaknesses. He provides insight into ISIS’ framing of issues, how the movement manages political contention and how it builds networks. However, the focus is still on the movement and how it influences its environment. By leaving out political opportunity, the case study fails to address how political environment, mobilising structures and frames influence the development of ISIS.
Pelletier, Gardner, Ligon and Kilinc (2016) use social movement theory to analyse ISIS propaganda. Their aim is to investigate how ISIS uses Islamic Law to support strategic objectives. They find that ISIS frame messaging to strengthen areas where its strategy is consistent with mainstream Islamic Law, use existing contradictions in Islamic Law in ISIS’
favour and reinterpret Islamic Law to mobilise the target audience. The study provides a conceptual framework for analysing ISIS framing in general, but does not take into account how ISIS framing has competed with other groups in providing the most “legitimate”
narrative.
ISIS and the Sunni Protest movement
There are a few articles that describe ISIS in the context of the Sunni Protest movement that dominated the political landscape in Anbar throughout 2013. One of these is Sowell’s Iraq’s Second Sunni Insurgency. The article looks at the failure of the Maliki government in addressing political grievances and how religious, political and tribal factions take advantage of this situation to strengthen their own cause in Anbar. Further, violent events and repressive government actions deepens the divide, cements the struggle as sectarian, and Sowell argues that nationalist insurgents takes advantage of this to reignite a full-fledged insurgency. The article describes how the Sunni Protest movement was radicalised throughout 2013, and provides a more nuanced assessment of ISIS influence in Fallujah by the beginning of January 2014. Sowell provides a good description of the context in Anbar throughout 2013 and a historic account of the events. My study further contributes by using social movement theory to explain mobilisation and radicalisation of Fallujah, while Ramadi mobilises around moderate groups and structures.
The article Make or Break: Iraq’s Sunnis and the State by International Crisis Group was written in August 2013 and, like Sowell’s Iraq’s Second Sunni Insurgency, it describes how
the Sunni Protest movement is radicalised through events in early 2013. It gives a good overview of the participants in the Sunni Protest movement and their bases of support. The article argues that the repressive policies of Maliki have caused a renewed spiral of violence and that this probably will continue towards the 2014 parliamentary elections. This turned out to be correct. The article also makes a point that is central to this thesis, namely that the increased radicalisation and internal conflicts of the movement were used by Maliki to justify the government’s repressive strategy. However, as the article was published in August 2013, it does not explain just how differently the situations in Ramadi and Fallujah would evolve towards the end of the year.
There are many authors that have been cited so far and most of them have on thing in common; they focus directly on ISIS. Sowell’s article Iraq’s Second Sunni Insurgency is one of the few scholarly works that mainly focuses on the context in Anbar when ISIS resurfaced.
He describes the Sunni protests as a movement, but does not apply social movement theory to analyse how the movement evolves. Sowell leaves out how ISIS worked to shape their own opportunities through action and framing of issues, and this is a weakness. Still, his article is central to this study, as it provides excellent insight into the political landscape at the time. He also provides interesting details about the dynamics between the Ramadi and Fallujah protest sites in an interview with Joel Wing, editor of the blog Musings on Iraq.
The scholars referenced in this chapter provide explanations for the rise of ISIS in a historic context and the group’s strategy, in addition to looking at ideology, recruitment and use of social media. Some also point to possible explanations for the different outcomes in Fallujah and Ramadi. My study will contribute to the body of knowledge by analysing the cities using social movement theory, as opposed to a purely historic account of the events. Through the review of different publications it has become increasingly clear that it is necessary to provide a nuanced explanation for the outcome of ISIS’ approach in Ramadi and Fallujah. I argue that studying these two cities is an important contribution to the current body of knowledge, because Fallujah was the first large city ISIS took control of, and central in their campaign to take control in Anbar province. Thus, the research question this thesis is trying to answer is:
why was ISIS able to enter Fallujah unopposed, while being rejected and defeated in Ramadi in January 2014?
Methodology
Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to provide an overview of the methodological choices that have been made in order to answer the research question. This includes the choice of the case study method and why it is suited to provide insight in this study. Additionally, I will point out issues tied to the validity of the study, as well as the use of sources and other potential pitfalls.
But before moving into any of that, I think it is essential to be clear about what the purpose of this study is.
Purpose
The purpose of this study is to contribute to the current body of knowledge on the rise of ISIS in Anbar, by explaining how ISIS was able to enter Fallujah unopposed, while being rejected and defeated in Ramadi in January 2014. The current understanding is that ISIS’ success in Eastern Anbar mainly can be explained by a) the Sunni – Shiite conflict, assuming that the Sunni population automatically sided with ISIS when faced by Shiite dominated security forces, b) ISIS’ superior military power, or c) that ISIS took advantage of, and rose, from the aggrieved Sunni Protest movement, a conflict that developed in Anbar throughout 2013.
However, none of the explanations provide an understanding as to why the outcome was so different in the two cities.
I argue that a combination of the environment, other groups involved, ISIS’ own strategic choices and the actions of the Iraqi government, are central in explaining this difference. To shed light on these dynamics, I argue that it is useful to analyse the outcomes using social movement theory because it provides a methodological middle ground between structural and rational choice models (Robinson, 2004:117). This is relevant in this analysis, because ISIS needs to be understood not just in terms of its own strategy and actions, but also how the environment shapes and influences ISIS.
Research design
My research design is based on the case study method. I will conduct a comparative study of two cases, including within-case analysis guided by the framework I outline in the chapter on social movement theory. According to (George and Bennett, 2005:20), there is an increasing consensus that the “[…] strongest means of drawing inferences from case studies is the use of
a combination of within-case analysis and cross-case comparisons within a single study […]”.
The first case is how the situation in Ramadi developed throughout 2013 and into the first days of January 2014 when militants attacked the city. The second case is how the situation developed throughout 2013 in Fallujah and the reaction in the city when ISIS arrived in early January 2014.
The two cities are located in Eastern Anbar along the Euphrates river, in an area considered the sectarian borderland between the Sunni Arab world and Shia Arab Iraq, backed by Shia Persian Iran (Sowell, 2015). Ramadi is the provincial capital, located about 100 km West of Baghdad, while Fallujah is considered the second city, located about halfway between Baghdad and Ramadi (see appendix A: Map of Iraq). What makes these cases interesting is that even though the cities have a lot in common, the events unfolded differently when ISIS approached them in January 2014; in Ramadi, the local militias sided with the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) in the fight against ISIS. While in Fallujah, ISIS was let into the city and cooperated with local militias in the fight against ISF. When looking closer at these cases, it becomes clear that an exclusively sectarian or military explanation for ISIS success in Fallujah seems incomplete. Before getting further into the details, I will look at some of the key concepts of the research methodology I have chosen; the case study.
The Case study
A “case” is the main subject of analysis in a case study, and defined by (Gerring, 2007a:19) as a “[…] spatially delimited phenomenon (a unit) observed at a single point in time or over some period of time.”. It is usually easier to define the spatial boundaries of a case, such as a nation’s borders, than the temporal boundaries (Gerring, 2007a:19). Still, in some instances such as a terrorist attack, deciding spatial boundaries can be difficult (Gerring, 2007a:20).
Units can vary in size from individuals to nation-states, depending on what the study aims to illuminate (Gerring, 2007a). The cases in this study were not chosen randomly as representative of a population of cases, but by purposive sampling because they have different outcomes. Spatially, the cases are limited to the cities of Ramadi and Fallujah. The period of time under investigation in this study is from early 2013 to early January 2014. ISIS moves on both cities in the first days of January 2014, after yearlong Sunni demonstrations in large parts of Anbar escalate violently and cause government controlled security forces to leave Ramadi and Fallujah to the tribes and local militias.
The definition of a case study is two-fold according to Yin (2014:16), covering both the scope and features of a case study. First, he points out that a case study can be defined as “[…] an empirical enquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon in depth and within its real- world context” (Yin, 2014:16). The intense study of one or a few cases is central to the understanding of the case study methodology (Gerring, 2007a). The method is particularly useful when trying to answer a research question beginning with “how” or “why”, as these questions are largely explanatory and “[…] deal with operational links needing to be traced over time […]” (Yin, 2014:10). The case study rests on an assumption that there is a link between micro and macro level in social behaviour (Gerring, 2007a:1).
Secondly, the case study handles a specific situation with many variables that makes it necessary to utilise a wide selection of sources and to develop theoretical propositions to guide data collection and analysis (Yin, 2014:17). When looking at many sources it is important triangulate; to converge the data to determine the consistency of a finding (Yin, 2014:17). Developing converging lines of inquiry through the use of multiple sources makes a finding or conclusion more likely to be accurate (Yin, 2014:120).
Yin (2014) points out that case study methodology is especially suitable when it is hard to separate the phenomenon from the context. That is very relevant in the two cases in this study. ISIS’ attack on Ramadi and Fallujah respectively happens in the context of rising tension and violence in Eastern Anbar, with several other groups manoeuvring the political and security domain simultaneously. Through Yin’s definition of a case study and by using SMT, the study looks at both context and agency to explain the different outcomes in the two cases.
Even though Yin’s definition of a case study implies a contemporary focus, it is also possible to conduct a case study of historic events, as the method actually relies on many of the same techniques (Yin, 2014). A history relies on primary and secondary documents, artefacts and other historic sources, that also can be used in case studies (Yin, 2014). What sets them apart is not the method itself, but rather the nature of the sources being used, as case study also can rely on direct observation of the phenomenon and interviews of persons involved (Yin, 2014).
This is also possible with fairly recent historic events, and creates an overlap between a
history and a case study (Yin, 2014). My study belongs in the overlapping sphere between the two, as I will rely on a wide selection of documents.
Case study research can incorporate one (single case study) or several cases (multiple case study) (Yin, 2014:50). If there are so many cases that it is no longer possible to study them intensively, the focus shifts to a sample of cases (cross-case study or large-N study) (Gerring, 2007a). There is no specific number that signifies that the study has moved to a cross-case and it is better understood as a continuum, according to (Gerring, 2007a:20). I will look at two cases, placing my study firmly in the end of the continuum where it is possible to study the cases intensively. Conclusions drawn across multiple cases also makes the study more robust, compared to conclusions from a single case (Yin, 2014:57).
The case study research design has faced a lot of criticism and is viewed by many with “[…]
extreme circumspection.” according to (Gerring, 2007a:6). Nonreplicability, informal and undisciplined research design, biased case selection, nongeneralizable theories and subjective conclusions are among the main critiques (Gerring, 2007a:6). However, it is important to not mistake poorly implemented case study methods for a faulty methodology (George and Bennett, 2005:22). Case study research, like other research methods, has its strengths and limitations. It is important to understand the trade-offs and potential pitfalls, and not regard the case study as […] a license to do whatever a researcher wishes to do with a chosen topic.”
(Gerring, 2007a:6).
When discussing the strengths and limitations of the case study method, it is useful to contextualise by looking at certain key expressions. Internal validity is defined by Yin (2014:239) as the strength of a cause-effect link, in part determined by showing the absence of spurious relationships (events that wrongly seem to be causally related) and the rejection of rival hypotheses. External validity is “the extent to which the findings from a case study can be analytically generalized to other situations that were not part of the original study” (Yin, 2014:238).
Historically, the definition of case studies rested on the small number of phenomena being investigated, “small-n”, as opposed to a statistical research design with a quantitative focus,
“large-N” (George and Bennett, 2005:17). The strengths and limitations of case study research can be understood relative to large-N studies (Gerring, 2007a:37). Case studies are
usually limited to a dozen cases or less for practical reasons (Gerring, 2007b:96). As a case study includes only a small number of cases, the possibility to generalize the findings to a larger population is limited (Gerring, 2007a:43). The external validity of a case study is thus weaker than that of a large-N study. However, the internal validity is stronger in a study with few cases, because each case is studied more intensively and this often makes it easier to establish the truthfulness of a causal relationship within the case (Gerring, 2007a:43).
According to Gerring (2007a:12) the strongest defence of case studies is that they are quasi- experimental in nature, as the experiment relies on a small number of “cases” that are closely related and observed at a single point or over time. In an experiment the researcher is able to control the environment and the variables, but it still resembles a case study more closely than a large study with many units (Gerring, 2007a). In this study, the two cases can be viewed as the experiments. In both cases, ISIS tries to take territorial control over a Sunni-dominated city, and while the approaches to the cities are the same, the outcomes are very different.
Generalization is not achieved through a single experiment, but by experiments conducted several times, replicating the phenomenon under different circumstances (Yin, 2014:20). This approach can also be used to understand case studies, as the findings are not representative for a larger population, but can be generalizable to theoretical propositions (Yin, 2014:21). This means that there is no statistical proof that the results are valid in another part of the population, but that results through analytic generalization can be logically extended to other situations “[…] based on the relevance of similar theoretical concepts and principles.” (Yin, 2014:237). This study includes just two cases, which limits the possibilities of extending the results to other situations not included in the study, the external validity.
Reliability is the possibility that other researchers can repeat the study with the same result (Yin, 2014:46). This is maintained through a complete bibliography and use of citations, a thorough description of the research study design and theoretical framework, and maintaining a chain of evidence that enables the external observer to logically link collection, evidence and conclusions (Yin, 2014:127).
Sources
Most of the sources that I have used in this study have been collected from the Internet. It would not have been possible to conduct this study without extensive use of online resources.
When using the Internet it is very important to be critical, and spend time investigating and evaluating the credibility of the sources, as well as the validity of the information they provided. At the same time, the Internet provides an amazing access to resources and information that has made this study possible.
I have used the blog by Aymenn Jawad al-Tamimi (2014a) and Joel Wing’s “Musings on Iraq” (2008) extensively throughout the study. They provide detailed knowledge about the events, overview over the groups involved and the relations between them. Wing and Tamimi both rely on their wide networks in Iraq and have conducted interviews with several of the insurgent leaders relevant to shed light on the events in Ramadi and Fallujah. Both blogs are cited extensively in newspapers, journal articles and books, and are considered reliable.
However, it is important to stay critical and confirm the information through other sources as well where this is possible. Additionally, blog posts are not updated at a later point. This means that old blog posts can contain errors from the contemporary understanding of events that have been rejected later.
Information was spread in several ways during the protests. The most important sources of information were the Mosques, outdoor sermons, demonstrations and flyers that were distributed at the protest sites. Additionally, social media and conventional media, like newspapers and TV, contributed to spreading the information. I have used some contemporary electronic newspaper articles in my study. When it comes to the sermons, demonstrations, flyers, social media and TV-sources, I have not used any directly, but through secondary sources.
The Government of Iraq (GOI) denied journalists and diplomats access to Fallujah, thus, no international media has been able to report from the city (International Crisis Group, 2014:3).
When trying to reach Fallujah, a BBC reporter told International Crisis Group that “[…] an Iraqi army convoy blocked us at the entrance of Anbar province.” (International Crisis Group, 2014:3). Several bloggers and journalists conducted telephone interviews with eyewitnesses inside Fallujah. This has contributed greatly to my understanding of the events, but required triangulation with other sources.
An important newspaper article, “Four armed groups fighting in Fallujah” (Abbas, 2014a), provides detailed information from inside Fallujah after non-governmental armed forces have
taken control. This article is based on an interview with an anonymous member of the Tribal Revolutionaries’ Council, one of the armed groups active in Fallujah. Abbas, the author, has written several articles on events in Iraq and Anbar, and if often cited in journal articles. Like Wing and Tamimi, he also has an extensive network in Iraq that provides highly detailed information. Some of these sources are described in terms of position or function, but most often they remain anonymous.
International Crisis Group (ICG) has written several reports on Iraq and the Sunni repression.
Their analysts have conducted several interviews inside Iraq, and ICG relies less on secondary sources than most other foundations or think tanks. This makes their articles detailed and providing perspectives from civilians in the areas the events are taking place. With the blogs, journal articles and newspaper articles, it is possible to piece together a relatively detailed and (hopefully) accurate picture of what happened in Ramadi and Fallujah.
Conducting research on a geographic area in conflict creates several challenges. First of all, limited access to the area restricts the possibilities of direct observation and to conduct interviews with subjects who witnessed the phenomenon in question. Secondly, a highly violent and rapidly evolving situation such as an attack is in its very nature difficult to get a complete and coherent overview of.
Several of the groups involved in the Sunni Protest movement were violent, anti- governmental groups trying to obtain territorial control through various means, at the cost of the Iraqi government. In such an endeavour, secrecy is for obvious reasons essential. This means that most of the primary sources contain information that the groups wanted to share, propaganda. Other primary sources have been obtained through military raids and other forms of intelligence collection. Some of these have been made available to the public by institutions such as Combating Terrorism Center (CTC) at West Point.
The Sunni Protest movement’s propaganda is conveyed through different means and in different languages. The propaganda used in this study is in English, either because it has been translated or because it was released it in English. As I am not an Arabic speaker, translated propaganda limits my ability to verify the information it contains. I have tried to use sources referenced by other scholars as much as possible to reduce the chance of misinterpreting the source. However, by relying on sources in English, I have been using the
same sources available to every other English-speaking scholar, thus possibly making the same mistakes as others before me and strengthening misconceptions.
The propaganda released in English suggests that it was meant for “the English-speaking world” and not necessarily for the inhabitants of Fallujah and Ramadi. This poses a validity challenge, as this information is obviously meant to portray the Sunni Protest movement, as it wants to be seen by the “outside” world. Thus, propaganda, and especially propaganda that has been released in English, can mainly be used as background information, to highlight different aspects such as ideology and narratives, and to build timelines. In all instances, the information must be checked against other sources.
Secondary sources, like academic articles and newspaper articles, face the same challenges regarding primary sources as described above. Additionally, journalists do not always reveal their sources, which makes it hard to verify the information and avoid circular reporting.
Circular reporting occurs when information seems to come from several sources, but in reality only comes from one. Triangulation with circular reporting creates findings that seem methodologically strong, when they in reality are not. The source a journalist uses can also be biased, trying to establish a narrative that is positive for the tribe or other unity when they know their story will be conveyed to a large audience. Additionally, journalists often work on a tight schedule and in competition with other media. This time pressure can cause bias and factual errors in the reporting.
When using information provided by the state of Iraq, it is equally important to be aware of possible biases, exaggeration of success and underreporting of negative events. A solution to this could be to use secondary sources representing different parties to the conflict, like statements from the protesters, protest leaders and reports from independent observers such as Human Rights organisations.
With regards to sources, it is a weakness to my study that I have only used secondary sources.
It would have been a strength to my study if I had been able to conduct my own interviews and study sources in their original language. However, this has not been possible because of limited time and language skills. Additionally, many of the sources have been collected from the Internet, with all its potential pitfalls. As a result, I have spent much time investigating the different sources, checking their credibility and the validity of the information.
Social movement theory
Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to provide an understanding of what a social movement is, its characteristics and why social movement theory is useful in showing how ISIS could take territorial control in Fallujah, through analysing how the Sunni Protest movement in 2013 evolved. Secondly, this chapter aims to provide the framework for the analysis by describing the political process model and the three dimensions political opportunity, mobilising structures and framing processes, and how these relate to each other.
The synthetic model
The idea of social movements as distinctive forms of political action is nothing new and can be traced as far back as the 1760s (Tilly, 2009:533). However, the research field became increasingly relevant in the 60s and 70s when the American civil rights movement, the women’s rights movement and other forms of collective action and protest movements gained traction (della Porta and Diani, 1999:2). These movements increased the need to understand this new form of collective action of societal and political participation (della Porta and Diani, 1999:2). As the actors in the new conflicts were people who had taken little or no part in traditional politics (youth, women and the coloured) della Porta and Diani (1999) argue that it was difficult to understand them in the context of traditional political cleavages in an industrial society. Additionally, the principal frameworks for analysing social conflict at the time, Marxism and structural-functionalism, were unable to explain the revival of the biggest collective mobilisations since the 1930s. As a response to this, several perspectives on the analysis of social movements emerged, such as collective behaviour, resource mobilisation, new social movements, and political process model (della Porta and Diani, 1999:3).
The key assumption in collective behaviour theory is that structural changes lead to psychological discomfort, which in turn causes collective action (Wiktorowicz, 2004:6). By assuming a linear, causal relationship, this approach was unable to explain why movements would rise in specific situations (Wiktorowicz, 2004:6). Resource mobilisation theory emerged as a response to this shortcoming, assuming that movements are rational, providing a structure for aggrieved individuals and providing resources for collective action (Wiktorowicz, 2004:10). New social movements would introduce the cultural factors of identity, framing and emotion to the field of SMT (Tilly and Tarrow, 2007:445). Framing had
largely been absorbed in the political process model by the end of the 1990s, and made the model less structurally focused (Tilly and Tarrow, 2007:445).
Morris criticises the political process model for being “[…] overly structural and contain[ing]
rationalistic biases.” (2000). He argues that the model’s focus on external forces is its biggest limitation, and that it underestimates a group’s capacity to generate collective action, even as political authorities unleashes heavy repression (Morris, 2000:3). Still, this model has become the dominant synthetic model within SMT (Morris, 2000). Theorists central in developing the political process model claim that these elements together “[…] account for movement origins, the power generated by movements, the energizing cultural content of movements, and movement outcomes” (Morris, 2000).
Definition
A social movement is defined by Gamson and Meyer (1996:283) as a:
“[…] sustained and self-conscious challenge to authorities or cultural codes by a field of actors (organizations and advocacy networks), some of whom employ extrainstitutional means of influence.”
Gamson and Meyer’s definition highlights two aspects that are central to this study; that a movement consists of several actors and that these actors can pursue different strategies through different means.
Adding to the definition provided by Gamson and Meyer, della Porta and Diani (1999) argue that social movements are defined by four characteristics; informal networks, based on shared beliefs and solidarity, which mobilise about conflictual issues, through the frequent use of various forms of protest. Informal networks understood as the interaction between a network of networks, organizations and/or individuals is the basis of social movement. By creating and distributing resources, information and ideas, these networks facilitate mobilisation (della Porta and Diani, 1999:14). Secondly, shared beliefs and solidarity creates a sense of belonging needed in a social movement (della Porta and Diani, 1999:14). This creates the
“[…] existence of a vocabulary and an opening of ideas and actions, which in the past was either unknown or unthinkable.” Gusfield in della Porta and Diani (1999:14). The third trait is collective action focusing on conflicts of a social movement. It is the condition when the aforementioned actors or networks engage in a political or cultural conflict to oppose or
promote social change (della Porta and Diani, 1999:14). The fourth and last part of the definition is the use of protests. This is what sets social movements apart from other social and political actors, as it utilizes public protest and unconventional means of participation, including violence (della Porta and Diani, 1999:15).
I have chosen to include della Porta and Diani’s view on the characteristics of a social movement, because it underlines the importance of shared beliefs, or frames, and the development of these in order to mobilise collective action. Combined with the definition provided by Gamson and Meyer, this accounts for the aspects of a social movement that are most important to this study and provides the best understanding of the Sunni Protest movement.
What makes the Sunni Protest movement a movement?
The Sunni Protest movement fits the definition of a social movement for several reasons.
Even though it is convenient to refer to the Sunni Protest movement, it actually consisted of a field of actors. It was not a general mass of aggrieved individuals who spontaneously took to the streets like a mob, but “[…] an outgrowth of a core division within the organized part of the Sunni community going back to 2003.” (Sowell interview by Musings on Iraq, 2013). On one side was the mainstream clerics, political parties and tribal leaders who had chosen to work within the established political institutions; on the other side, elements of the armed insurgency that lost the civil war from 2004 to 2007, who had survived and now resurfaced (Sowell interview by Musings on Iraq, 2013, International Crisis Group, 2013).
This broad range of actors wanted to achieve different goals and thus followed different strategies, varying from moderate demands for Sunni influence in the political processes to overthrowing the central government and establishing a cross-national Caliphate under the rule of a supreme religious leader (Sowell, 2014, Wicken, 2013, International Crisis Group, 2013). The different strategies also included different means, where mainstream political actors argued in favour of negotiations, peaceful protests and sit-ins, the clerics would hold encouraging speeches during Friday prayer, while the more extreme elements proposed and executed blackmail, violence and other acts of terror (International Crisis Group, 2013, Sowell, 2014, Wicken, 2013).
Authors such as Pelletier et al. (2016) and Ryan (2015) have analysed ISIS using SMT.
However, when trying to explain how ISIS prevailed in Fallujah and not in Ramadi, it is not sufficient to look at just ISIS, their framing and the structural conditions. To understand how ISIS could gain enough support to take control in Fallujah, it is useful to look at mechanisms such as radical flank effect, different goals and competing frames. These mechanisms will be described in detail later in this chapter but what they all have in common, is that they can explain how a movement evolves, assuming the movement is made up by several actors pursing different goals.
Relevance of SMT
The Sunni Protests evolve from peaceful protests to an insurgency in the span of 12 months, causing jihadist groups to take territorial control over large urban areas. Social movement theory can contribute to understanding this development by providing a framework for the analysis of collective action and mobilisation. SMT is useful in showing how existing structures like tribes, political parties and criminal or insurgent networks can frame current issues and opportunities to gain support within an aggrieved population.
SMT mostly uses groups as the unit in explaining collective action, because even though individuals make the choices, this happens does not happen in a vacuum (Robinson, 2004:117). Meso-level groups, like informal networks or organisations are the vehicles through which people mobilise and are the “[…] collective building blocks of social movements and revolutions […]” (McAdam, McCarthy and Zald, 1996:3). Structural changes are important in determining the success of a social movement, but they do not dictate the outcome (Robinson, 2004).
This thesis is trying to explain why the outcomes in Ramadi and Fallujah were so different. In this regard, the comparative aspect of social movement theory, largely developed by European scholars, has shown that SMT is useful in analysing how the same movement develops under different structural conditions (McAdam et al., 1996). Even though the European approach mainly has analysed how the same movement develop in different countries with different structural and political systems, I argue that this approach is relevant.
Throughout 2013, the governmental control over the two cities is reduced, and in late December, the security forces pull out. This causes two structurally different factions to take
control: the Anbar Coordination Committee in Ramadi and the Military Council of the Tribal Revolutionaries in Fallujah.
How SMT can be used to study violent movements
By looking at how SMT has evolved through the works of della Porta (1995) and Wiktorowicz (2004), I argue that SMT can be useful in analysing the Sunni Protest movement. Even though SMT was developed as a response to mostly peaceful protest movements in Europe and North America, della Porta shows how SMT can be used to study political violence and terrorism in her book Social movements, political violence, and the state: a comparative analysis of Italy and Germany (1995). Her work primarily opens up for applying SMT to highly violent movements, but still in a Westernised context.
One of the most important contributors on social movement theory and Islamic activism is Wiktorowicz (2004) Islamic Activism – A social movement theory approach. He argues that Islamic activism can be considered a form of social movement, and that SMT is a useful framework for understanding Islamic activism, even though much of the SMT studies are dominated by research on the US and Western Europe. Wiktorowicz defines Islamic activism as “ […] the mobilization of contention to support Muslim causes” (Wiktorowicz, 2004:2).
He further states that the wide definition is a conscious choice, as it envelops a variety of movements, including “[…] terrorist groups, collective action rooted in Islamic symbols and identities, [and] explicitly political movements that seek to establish an Islamic state […]”
(Wiktorowicz, 2004:2).
In the studies of Islamic activism there has been an inherent tendency to assume that grievances has been the most important driver behind mobilization, and that these grievances have been translated into religious symbols and idioms (Wiktorowicz, 2004:4). While various forms of grievances can play a part in mobilization, social movement theory researchers have shown that factors such as resource availability, framing resonance and changes in political opportunity structures are also linked to mobilization processes (Wiktorowicz, 2004:4).
The political process model
First of all, the focus of this study is how one part of the Sunni Protest movement became dominant, not how the movement first emerged. My argument is that ISIS in Ramadi and
Fallujah did not emerge as a singular movement or arrive as an external group, but is the outcome of how the Sunni Protest movement developed through 2013.
According to McAdam et al. (1996) there is an emerging consensus among researchers on social movements that three dimensions are central in analysing social movements. They are important both when a movement emerges and develop, but this study focuses on the latter.
The three dimensions are:
1. Political opportunities: the structure of political opportunities and constraints confronting the movement
2. Mobilising structures: forms of organisation (informal as well as formal), available to insurgents
3. Framing processes: the collective process of interpretation, attribution, and social construction that mediate between opportunity and action
The political process model is the most relevant analytical framework in my study because it includes both structural and cultural factors, and how they relate to each other. The latter part is also the hardest, as there exists many relationships between the three dimensions, and the importance of these are determined by the research question (McAdam et al., 1996:7).
Although the dimensions are the same, there are some nuances in how they are being utilised in the analysis and how they relate to each other (McAdam et al., 1996).
When studying how and when a movement emerges, changes in the opportunity structure are important explanatory factors (McAdam et al., 1996:13). When explaining how a movement develops these changes are still relevant. However, as a movement has established itself and started to take action, the opportunities become, to a larger degree than before, the result of the movement’s interaction with its environment (McAdam et al., 1996).
When looking at how a movement develops, the availability of mobilising structures is not the main focus, but rather the organisational profile of the groups involved in the movement (McAdam et al., 1996). In this study, these groups or structures, are the established political parties, former insurgent groups, mainstream religious groups and tribes that provided shelter, food and motivational speeches to the protesters. As the initial mobilisation is tied to established structures, new structures usually evolve to secure the sustainability of the movement; Social Movement Organisations (SMO) (McAdam et al., 1996). These groups are
specifically tied to the movement and become the main contestants within the movement as a whole. I argue that it is useful to analyse the main groups and the constellations they create at the different protest sites as SMOs within the Sunni Protest movement. In Ramadi the dominant groups create the Anbar Coordination Committee and in Fallujah the dominant groups create the Military Council of Tribal Revolutionaries. This will contribute to the understanding of how the movement evolved differently in the two cities, and how one of the SMOs could become so radical that it was willing to cooperate with ISIS, while the SMO in Ramadi supressed extremists and fought off ISIS.
Political opportunity
The underlying assumption of political opportunity is that “[…] social movements and revolutions are shaped by the broader set of political constraints and opportunities unique to the national context […]” (McAdam et al., 1996:3). Even though both European and American social movement scholars focused on the relationship between the institutionalised, political system, and social movements, two distinct directions within SMT developed. The American direction, trying to explain the emergence of a specific social movement by looking at changes in informal power relations or the structure of a political system (McAdam et al., 1996:3). The European direction, also known as the new social movements tradition, trying to explain how different political systems influence how a social movement develops and its chances of success (McAdam et al., 1996:3). Several detailed historic accounts of single social movements have been produced by the American direction, while the European has added a comparative dimension to SMT by producing several studies on how the same movement has developed in different countries (McAdam et al., 1996).
Tilly (1978) argues that political opportunity structures influence mobilization, defining opportunity structures as being composed of opportunities and constraints. In other words, political opportunity structures can motivate or demotivate, and make it easier or harder to succeed when collective action is taken. The structures can be the international system, regional dynamics, national politics or even structures within the group itself (Robinson, 2004:116).
According to Morris (2000), movements are likely to gain strength when favourable changes occur. These changes can be a weakening state control, civil war, emergence of external allies or foreign intervention, or any other opening of new space in the political system. However, a
strict interpretation of this makes the theory overly structural, as this leaves the movement at the mercy of the changing environment and dependent on exploiting changes that occur (Morris, 2000:3). To avoid loosing sight of human agency Morris (2000) argues that collective action also can create political opportunity and clear way for further collective action.
McAdam (1996) identifies four dimensions in which the variables that determine political opportunity can be placed:
1. The relative openness or closure of the institutionalised political system
2. The stability or instability of that broad set of elite alignments that typically undergird a polity
3. The presence or absence of elite allies
4. The state’s capacity and propensity for repression
In this study the focus will be on number four, as the development of the Sunni Protest movement throughout 2013 is highly influenced by events caused by the central government’s repressive strategy. The first three are related to the institutionalised political system, which was quite stable in this regard. There was little chance that a Sunni-dominated or very Sunni sympathetic party would sudden obtain power through the political process.
Constant and essentially fixed aspects of political opportunity that are deeply embedded in culture or the political system are not very useful when trying to understand mobilisation and demobilisation, as these are highly dynamic processes (Gamson and Meyer, 1996:277-278).
Thus, the focus in this study will be on the volatile aspects of political opportunity, like shifts in public policy, change in alliances, breakdown of social control, public discourse and national mood (Gamson and Meyer, 1996). The volatile aspects are central in explaining political opportunity, emphasizing the interaction between opportunities and movement strategy (Gamson and Meyer, 1996:277). This is central after a movement has emerged, because the
“[…] structure of political opportunities is now more a product of the interaction of the movement with its environment than a simple reflection of changes recurring elsewhere.” (McAdam et al., 1996:13).
Mobilising structures
McAdam et al. (1996) argues that movements do not emerge spontaneously from the actions of marginal individuals in an unstructured context. Even though political and other institutionalised systems shape how and when social movements develop, this does not happen independent of the mobilising structures through which people organise (McAdam et al., 1996). Rather, movements exist and develop along the lines of existing organisations, institutions or informal networks, like ethnicities, tribes, political parties and even illegal organisations like criminal networks or terrorist groups (McAdam et al., 1996). The pre- existing networks recruit, socialise, indoctrinate and mobilise contention (Robinson, 2004:116). Further, if a movement is unable to allocate resources and direct collective action because of inappropriate organisational structures, it will lead to missed opportunities (Hafez, 2004:40). Morris (2000) argues that mobilising structures are central to understanding movements, because this is where rational actors and human agency figure most prominently in the political process model.
The radical flank effect
Movements sometimes develop a radical flank. A group within the movement that utilises radical rhetoric and radical methods, compared to the rest of the movement (McAdam et al., 1996). The radical flank effect is a dynamic within a movement and between a movement and a third party, in this case, the Government of Iraq. It can affect a movement in several ways, both positive and negative. The positive effect of a radical wing can be that the moderate part of the movement seems more reasonable and a more attractive party to negotiate with (McAdam et al., 1996). This way, the moderates are legitimised and bargaining position strengthened. McAdam et al. (1996) points out that funding the moderates is a way of undermining radical influence.
The negative effects of the radical flank can pressure the moderates to take a more radical stand than first anticipated. Popular pressure to be seen as active and strong, intensified by the media attention a radical flank often gets, can cause a radicalisation of the entire movement.
Additionally, the presence of a radical flank can undermined the movements a whole, reducing outside support and legitimising negative attention from media and authorities.
The radical flank effect is important in the cross-case analysis in this study, because Fallujah develops several traits throughout 2013 that makes it stand out as the radical flank of the Sunni Protest movement.
Framing processes
Of the three dimensions in the political process model, framing processes is probably the least studied (McAdam et al., 1996). McAdam et al. (1996:6) argue that studying political opportunity and mobilising structures is “[…]inherently easier than trying to observe the social construction and dissemination of new ideas.”. Additionally, the lack of precision when defining framing processes may have contributed to limiting the efforts to study of this dimension (McAdam et al., 1996).
To avoid confusing framing with any cultural aspect of a social movement, I will use the definition originally put forth by David Snow:
“[…] the conscious strategic efforts by groups of people to fashion shared understandings of the world and of themselves that legitimate and motivate collective action.” (McAdam et al., 1996).
Additionally, this definition is useful as this study looks at movement development and outcomes. The actions of the different groups within the movement are more important in the developing stages, than when the movement emerges (McAdam et al., 1996).
Every society has a shared set of histories, truths and symbols that make up what can be called a “cultural toolbox” (Robinson, 2004). These cultural tools are interpreted and utilized in different ways by different groups and movements, creating “[…] a set of contrasting ideologies and sets of meaning in any given society” (Robinson, 2004:116). The political process model maintains that collective action, including mass violence, involves “[…]
normative framing to facilitate the mobilization of resources and motivate individuals to sacrifice their time, money, energy, and lives” (Hafez, 2004:39).
Political opportunity and mobilising structures can only explain partly why and how social movements emerge, and does too little to account for human agency and culture (Gamson and Meyer, 1996). People’s perceptions and ideas of what is possible must necessarily be advantageous to and inspire to collective action for a movement to emerge (Gamson and