Baltic-Nordic Rendezvous
The Politics of Environmental Cooperation
Originally based on contributions from a conference he Id by Fafo in Oslo in 1994, the report has been prepared by a Norwegian-Danish board of editors: Jan Dietz and Aadne Aasland (Fafo, Norway), and Børge
Klemmensen and Poul Kragh (the Department of Environment, Technology and Social Studies at Roskilde University, Denmark)_
'Baltic-Nordic Rendezvous' is issued in the framework of the (ommon Security Forum, an independent international network of academics and politicians devoted to promoting the idea of common security.
��Fafo
Institute for Applied Social Science P.O. box 2947 Tøyen
N-0608 Oslo, Norway
Fafo-report 204 ISBN 82-1422-165-6
Jan Dietz, Børge Klemmensen,
Poul Kragh and Aadne Aasland (eds.)
Jan Dietz, Børge Klemmensen,
Poul Kragh and Aadne Aasland (eds.)
Baltic-Nordic Rendezvous
The Politics of Environmental Cooperation
(ommon Security Forum Studies
Fafo report 204
© Fafo Institute for Applied Social Science 1996
Published in cooperation with Roskilde University ISBN 82-7422-165-6
Cover page: Jon S. Lahlum
Cover page illustration: 'The Message' (1904/5, pastel on paper) by the Lithuanian artist Mikalojus Konstantinas Ciurlionis v (1875-1911). The
painting is printed by permission of the M. K.
C
iurlionis State Museum of Art in Kaunas, Lithuania.Printed in Norway by Falch Hurtigtrykk
Common Security Forum Studies:
Liv Tørres: South African Workers Speak, Fafo, 1995
Jan Dietz: Putting the Past behind. A Review of Living Conditions along the Eastern Baltie Rim, Fafo, 1996
Also available from Fafo:
Gudmund Hernes and Knud Knudsen: Lithuania Living Conditions. A Sodo/ogical Study, Fafo/
Soteco, 1991
Erik Hansen: Living Conditions on the Kola Peninsula, Fafo/Soteco, 1993
Jens B. Grøgaard (ed.); Estonia in the Grip of Change, The NORBALT Living Conditions Project, 1996
Aadne Aasland (ed.): Latvia: The Impact of the Transformation, The NORBALT Living Condi
tions Project, 1996
Knud Knudsen: Lithuania in a Period of Transition, The NORBALT Living Conditions Project, 1996
Erik Hansen: Coping with It: St. Petersburg and Kaliningrad Facing Reform, The NORBALT Living Conditions Project, 1996
For complete information about Fafo's publications, please write to Fafo, Institute for Applied Social Science, P.O.Box 2947 Tøyen, N-0608 Oslo, Norway (tel. + 47-226760 00, fax + 47-22676022).
The reader may also wish to consult Fafo's Internet homepage at http://www.fafo.no:80.
Contents
Preface ... 11." •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 7 Introduction
Environment and Security in a Baltic-Nord ic Context ... 15 Jan Dietz
Part I The Challenges and the Setting
The New Baltic-Nord ic Agend a ... 33 Terje Rød Larsen ... 33
Preventing Pollution through Good Governanee ... 37 Anne Breiby
International Cooperation Need ed
to Reseue Environmental Knowled ge ... 41 Dr. Mecislovas Zalakevicius
Part Il National and International Efforts
Environment for Europe and the Role of the European Union ... 47 Tue Rohrsted
The World Bank and the Environment in the Baltie States ... 55 Kari Homanen
Finland 's Environmental Cooperation with Its Eastern and Southern Neighbours: Lessons and Policy Options ... 65 Timo Laukkanen
Environmental Policy Cooperation: The Case of the Russian-Finnish-
Norwegian Troika ... 7 5 Andrey Komarov
Iceland 's Role in Future Environmental Cooperation ... 79 Ingimar Sigurdsson
5
Part III The Role of NGOs
Strategies for Action: An Expanded Role for NGOs? ........... 83 Dr. Tonis Kaasik
I\IGOs: Their Influence and the Importance of Integrity ........... 89 Tore Brænd
Estonian Youth Nature House - An Example of Environmental Education through NGOs ... 95 Anne Kivinukk
Part IV 5trategies and Policy Choices
Research and Policy Implementation in the Nordic-Baltic Region ...... 1 01 Børge Klemmensen
Common Environment - Divergent Interpretations? ...................... 1 1 5 Jørn Holm-Hansen
Postscript
Pollution Prevention, Decent Living and Security In Search of a Research- Policy Dialogue on Key Elements in the Baltic Agenda 21 ... 129 Børge Klemmensen and Poul Kragh
Appendixes
A Programme ................. 1 47 B List of participants ............... 1 50 C A Brief Introduction to the Common Security Forum ... 1 52 Jan Dietz
O The NORBALT Living Conditions Project: A Presentation ...... 1 55 E Presentation of the Department
of Environment, Technology and Sodal Studies, Roskilde University .... 160
Preface
When the Norwegian research institute Fafo decided to hold an international semi
nar devoted to environmental challenges in the Baltic-Nordk Region, it drew in
spiration from two soutces. Since 1 990, Fafo has carried out a series of living con
ditions surveys in the former Soviet Union, the first being a nationwide study in Lithuania. In 1 994, Fafo set in motion a regional living conditions project encom
passing Estonia, Latvia, Lithuahia, the Kaliningrad endave and St. Petersburg (NORBALT). Secondly, being a participant in the Common Security Forum, Fafo has been eager to take part in the current ex:ploration of security challenges after the break-up of the Soviet empire. There can be no doubt that the new security concepts emerging under the banner of common security must incorporate environ
mental concerns, in addition to an understanding of socio-economic developments.
The seminar turned out to be an energetic and stimulating event. The dis
cussions covered a broad range of topks relevant to environmental cooperation in the Baltic-Nordic Region, focusing on problems in and around the Baltic Sea. Sev
eral of the contributions contained a wealth of detailed, up-ro-date information.
Although diverse, the contributions were marked by professional knowledge and commitment. For all these reasons it was decided that a compendium should be published.
One of the positive outgrowths of the seminar was the many new contacts made. Representatives of Fafo and Roskilde University found to their pleasure that they shared important perspectives on the future of the Baltk-Nordic Region, be
sides having mutually complementary expertise. It was, therefore, natural for Fafo to ask Roskilde University to participate in the follow-up of the seminar.
The present report, then, is the result of a collaboration between the De
partment of Environment, Technology and Social Studies at Roskilde University and Fafo. A board composed of two Norwegians and two Danes - the undersigned - has been responsible for the editorial work. 'Baltic-Nordic Rendezvous' is issued as the third publication in the new Fafo series Com mon SecuYity Forum Studies. Both the report and the series have been made possible thanks to generous support from the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, which is the sponsor of the Common Security Forum.
7
Common security is a comprehensive notion. It should be stressed at once that the report does not set out to provide a complete inventory of the environmental, po
litical, or indeed strategic, problems facing the countries in the Baltk-Nordic Region.
Rather, the intention has been to identif}r common environmental problems, see
ing them in a regional perspective. One should note that no generally acceptable definition of the Baltic-Nordic Region has yet emerged, making analysis difficult from both an academic and a political po;m of view. But we would argue that en
vironmental challenges in the Baltic Sea, which are bound to concern all countries in northern Europe, constitute an obvious example of common problems and com
mon interests, and hence the need to think in regional rather than national terms.
So even if some of the arguments and condusions have to be tentative, we will feel safe in assuming that the compendium is topical.
The environment has tended to be the domain of the natural scientists. In the countries in transition, but elsewhere too, development prirorities are of ten ser by economists. Thus the character of the debate on the environment has been pre
dominantly technical and technocratic, holding back, we believe, both the evolut
ion and the application of the concept of sustainable development. The social sci
ences and the humanities must become more involved! The edi tors as weU as the contributing authors seem to agree that there is a need for an openminded, inter
disciplinary approach.
'Baltic-Nordic Rendezvous' is organised around four broad themes. After the introductory chapter, which discusses some of the security aspects of environmental problem-solving, an overview is given of the raclonale for intensif}ring international cooperation around the Baltic Sea (part 1). The next contribudons outline the roles and perspectives of national governments and multilateral institutions like the World Bank and the EU (part Il). Recognising the limitations of traditional interstate cooperation, three artides are speciBcally devoted to the work of the NGOs (part III). The fourth set of papers takes a deeper look at the interplay between research and policy-making, focusing on how the implementation of environmental meas
ures can become more effective (part IV). The postscript calls for a rejuvenated research-policy dialogue. In separate appendixes additional information is provided about the seminar programme, the seminar participants, the Common Security Forum, the NORBALT project, and Roskilde University. The reader may also Bnd it useful to consult the map of the Baltic Sea drainage area.
We want to express Dur appreciation to Julia Ferkis and Geir O. Pedersen for helping to prepare the conference, and to Jo Cranner, Hallvard W. Johnsen, and Britt Eva Kinn for giving a hand in some of the editorial tasks. Thanks are als o due to Jon S. Lahlum for his handling of the manuscript.
Above all, we wish to thank the eontributors, who come from all eorners of the region, for their dedication to the projeet and the insights they have kindly shared.
We sineerely hope that the articles will find a larger audienee through this book.
And, of course, we very mueh hope that the book ean contribute to the debate on how environmental cooperation can be improved in the Baltic-Nordic Region.
Jan Dietz Børge Klemmensen Poul Kragh Aadne Aasland
9
The Baltie Sea Drainage Area
Reproduced by permission of the Helsinki Commission
1 1
Introduction
Environment and Security in a Baltic-Norclic Context
Jan Dietz
Introduction
Environment and security are recurring themes in the debate on Baltic-Nordic cooperation. Usually, though, they are kept apart. The environment seems to lay daim to and to create an entirely new agenda, while security is commonly regard
ed as being too sensitive and complex to be dealt with in a Baltic-Nordic context.
Nonetheless, the thrust of the seminar that gave birth to this report was to explore how problems of both environment and security in the Baltic Sea Area can be addressed through improved international cooperation. The concepts of com
mon security and sustainable development, furmulated by the Palme Commission and the Brundtland Commission respectively, were introduced as a tentative frame of reference. Although difficult to apply, the concepts gave a resonant background to seminar discussions. Interestingly, the existence of a link between security and en
vironment was taken for granted by most participants. This in itself illustrated how far the debate has developed sinte the 1980s, when the proponents of common securitywere largely, and perhaps somewhat one-sidedly, preoceupied with the threat of nuclear war.
The present artide diseusses four disunct but interwoven issues pertinent to environmental eooperation and the possible emergence of a Baltic-Nordie po
litieal community. First, the artide foeuses on region-building, in recognition of the growing importanee of the region as an arena for environmental efforts. What will a future Baltie-Nordic Region look like? What are the basic Baltie and Nordic interests involved in such a project? The Balkan tragedy notwithstanding, the end of the Cold War and the disintegration of the Soviet empire have paved the way for new forms of international cooperation, new manners of seeurity thinking, new norms of international behaviour, and new eooperative patterns. Regionalisation is an authentic expression of the eurrent mood and possibilities in European poli
ties. The phenomenon is manifest around the Baltie Sea, an area particularly troub
led by environmental damage. Second the article reviews current environmental problems in the three Baltic states, pinpointing the quesdonable legacy of Soviet armed forces and the need to rethink industrial development. It then goes on to diseuss some of the major, security-related obstades to progress. Significantly, Bal
tic-Russian relations are still marked by deep mutual mistrust, something whieh also 15
reduces the chances of organising environmental work on a regional, Baltic-Nor
die basis. Third, the potential for expanding international cooperation is consid
ered. Following a brief look at the current renewal of traditional bilateral and mul
tilateral collaboration, new forms of regional interaction are discussed. Networks of various non-state and state actors probably represent the future. The article high
lights the significance of a dynamic Baltic-Nordic research-policy dialogue, of ex
tensive NGO participation, and of a eontinuing public interest in environmental problems.
Finally, the article draws together some of the general security implications of Baltic-Nordie region-building supported by environmental cooperation.
Region-bui lding
ane of the most steiking features of the new Europe is the rise of the region. aur continent seems to be undergoing a period of experimentation, and it is notewor
thy that mueh of the eurrent reordering of power is taking place in the context of regionalisation or region-building (Iver Neumann 1 994). Regional schernes and aspirations are thiek on the ground, not least in the belt covering the old dividing line in Europe (Ola Tunander 1 994). The Oslo seminar testified to the popularity of the terms the Baltic-Nordic (or Nordic-Baltic) Region and the Baltie Sea Region (Area). This language is not self-evident; to begin with, the word region is ambigu
ous and requires some clarification. In the present report, the term is used in at least two different senses: ane, the region is taken to signifY a geographie entity com
posed of neighbouring states, engaged in, chiefly traditional, inter-state cooperat
ion. Two, the region is perceived as emerging through the many and of ten uncoor
dinated actions of non-state actors, e.g. cides and NGOs. In the latter case, the region can be seen as a system of interlocking networks rather than as a territorial entity (whieh does not mean that one can dispense with geography altogether).
Whatever interpretation one considers most valid or useful, the Baltie-Norruc Region is surfaeing as one of the more prornising region-building projects in Eu
rope today. The project itself, though, is difficult to map, both literally and meta
phorically. The terms the Baltic-Nordic Region and the Baltic Sea Area are some
times used interchangeably bur are they really synonymous? What do they actually cover? Even if most actors and observers appear to agree that the Baltic Sea -Mare Balticum -forms the core of the new region, it should be noted that there are no universally accepted definitions of either term. ane seemingly straightforward read
ing is to let the region include all the five Nordie states (i.e. 'Norden'), in addition to Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Bur can one reasonably ignore littoral states such
as Russia, Poland and Germany, even though, in a strict cultural sense, they are not Nordic? lf, on the other hand, one sticks to the countries on the shores of the Bal
tic Sea, Nordic countries like Norway and Iceland will fall ourside.
One can avoid some of the dilemmas by simply proceeding from the mem
bership of the Council of the Baltie Sea States (Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germa
ny, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Poland, Russia, Sweden, and the EU Com
mission). The definition is tautological but may be helpful for some practical purposes, i.a. because environmental problems are at the top of the Council's list of priorities (concern for the environment was also a motivating factor in the foun
dation of the Council). But the paradoxes cannot be made to disappear entirely.
The above definition can be misleading, too, in that it may encourage the impres
sion that the new regional cooperation in northern Europe is a 'free for all', char
acterised by idyllic inclusiveness and consensus on the rules of the game. The com
prehensive and generous definition provided by the Council of the Baltic Sea States do es not automatically correspond to popular perceptions in the Baltic and the Nordic countries of an imminent, or already existing, Baltic-Nordic identity. There are, then, at least two potential contenders or partners: (i) the smaller circle of the eight Baltic and Nordic nations, ti ed together by ideas of 'Nordicity', and (ii) the wider group, basically coterminous with the Council of the Baltic Sea States. So it would be wise to acknowledge that there are competing, and perhaps incompati
ble, regional visions and programrnes. For the sake of simplicity, we shall refer to the Baltic-Nordic Region in this article, it being, we hope, obvious when either of the two interpretations are implied.
The essential point is that we are dealing with a region in the making, which do es not have a definitive cast or vocation. The contest over definitions is in fact an integral part of the region-building process. It is a region taking shape at a time when the very nature of international cooperation is being transformed. The broader process of European integration influences and buttresses Baltic-Nordic cooperat
ion in severai ways. Despite its internal problems, the European Union remains the predominant political force in Europe, attracting new members and pioneering new forms of cooperation. The EU is important to both the Nordic and the Baltic co un
tries, not only per se, as a political entity, but als o because the current membership includes most of the two groups' closest friends and trading partners. With Swe
den and Finland joining as members, this trend is reinforced.
To be quite precise, the Baltic-Nordic Region, whether narrowly or broadly defined, is bound to be a sub-region, not a self-sustaining group of nations. Con
sequently, all major political reforms, in the environmental and other fields, must be formulated with an eye on developments in the rest of Europe, and particularly within the EU. For example, environmental standards in the Baltic as well as the Nordic countries will be heavily influenced by commercial and legal developments 1 7
in the single market. It seems likely that EU environmental policies will shape the agenda for environmental regulations in and around the Baltic Sea (Håken R. Nil
son 1 994).
Baltie and Nordie positions
What are the foundations of the Baltic-Nordic Region? Although the region is a cultural, economic and political novelty, it can use numerous historical building
blocks. The strong, almost instinctive, urge to define a whole region using the Bal
tie Sea as focal point, is highly suggestive. The Baltk Sea has been of immense importance, commercially and culturally, through the centuries. In this perspective, the stagnant Cold War period represents no more than an aberration. The Baltk Sea has not only connected the ddes and states situated along the Baltic Rim, it has also had a unifYing function in Northern Europe by providing a smooth pas
sage to the North Sea, and vice versa. Anumber of trans-national identities are now being called forth in Northern Europe, witness the success of the 'New Hansa'. Yet there is no question that spedal affinities exist between the three Baltie and the five Nordie countries. The popular Nordic support for the Balts in their struggle to break loose from Soviet rule, can be seen as a sign of this doseness. Human energies that were held in check during the Cold War may now contribute to the generation of an unmistakable Baltic-Nordic identity, building on and possibly changing the common understanding of 'Norden'. Moreover, the existence and relevanee of a peculiar Nordic-Baltk bond are recognised by many outside ohservers, creating expectauons that no doubt reinforce the region-building process.
The three Baltic countries are shaking off the past. They are looking to the West for support, inspiration and a sense of seeurity. In world politics, they tend to be treated as a group. Undeniably, history and geography bind them together;
50 years of Soviet occupation and the permanent proximity of Russia give them a common outlook. But we cannot at all be sure that the Estonians, Larvians and Lithuanians see themselves as sharing a clear-eut Baltie identity. There are severai grounds for caution: The usage of the term 'Baltie' is of recent origin, and it is some
times claimed that the Baltic identity has been pushed upon the three countries by the rest of the world, mostly because it is convenient to lump them together. Clos
er scrutiny, of course, immediately reveals that they are highly different linguist
kally and culturally. They are often natural competitors, their economies not being complementary but fairly similar in size and strueture. Also, the external points of reference are not identical, even if the orientation towards the West is a common
trait. Expectations vary as to what regional cooperation should mean, in both in
tra-Baltic and Nordic-Baltic terms.
Independence has enabled the Baltie countries to embark on new and more ambituous national polides, and to become directly involved in international co
operation. However, a nationalist impulse makes itself felt side by side with the inclination to embrace international cooperation. The impulse, which is not sur
prising considering that the Baltic nations are still emergent, is perhaps most vis
ibly at work in intra-Baltic affairs, where traditional rivalries are dose to the sur
face. An innocent bur telling example can be found in the quick establishment of three separate national airlines (in contrast to the Scandinavian countries they of
ten emulatd).
At the same time, the demise of the Cold War security order has made it easier to revitalise intra-Nordie cooperation. With the disappearance of East-West con
frontation and old threats, all five Nordic countries have become freer to pursue active foreign polides in Central and Eastern Europe. The Baltic countries seem to have become one of the main arenas for new joint Nordic initiatives. W hereas EU challenges often divide the Nordic countries, the Baltie predicament definitely unites them, providing Nordic cooperation with an unused, popular mission. In a sense, the newfound Nordic enthusiasm for the Balties mirrors the Baltic drive towards the West.
How do the Nordic governments view their role in relation to Baltic secur
ity? Some German and American drcles have been urging the Nordic countries to assurne spedal responsibility for the safety of the Baltic countries. The response has been rather cool. To the Nordic governments, the inherent possibility of having to extend military security guarantees 100ks unattractive and potentially dangerous, La. because a bilateral framework may be at variance with NATO's strategy of col
lective defence. With this important reservation, the Nordie countries appear to be committed to a common policy of advandng the security of Baltie countries wher
ever they can and to the extent possible. It should be recorded that Denmark, Fin
land, Norway, and Sweden, together with Great Britain, are helping to set up BALT
BAT, a joint Baltic battalion designated for UN peacekeeping operations. By providing training and various equipment for BALTBAT, bur also through a number of other bilateral measures, the Nordie countries are contributing to the establish
ment of independent Baltie armed forces.
For Nordic and other Western governments there should be ample reason to expand practical cooperation with the Baltic states and other former Commu
nist countries in Central and Eastern Europe. Increased collaboration should ben
efit countries on both sides of the old iron curtain: Firstly, an increasing share of today's problems cannot be dealt with sensibly by individual governments acting
1 9
alone. Being regional in scope, many problems require regional soludons. Second
ly, the human contact that comes with an extension of practieal cooperation gives weight to the ongoing consolidation of democracy in the Baltic states. Thirdly, and similarly, the development of links and common interests counteracts the danger of regional political instability. And fourthly, practical cooperation injects substance into the sometimes elusive idea of European integration. Environmental coopera
tion is interesting on all counts: Besides being a potential source of tension and conRiet, environmental problems hold out opportunities for engaging in useful, relatively uncontroversial international cooperation. Generally, the growing recog
nition that Europe is facing a new and different set of threats to security and sta
bility following the end of the Co Id War, lends Iegitimacy to a more active Western involvement in Central and Eastern Europe, including increased funding.
Current environmental problems
While the Baltic and Nordic countries share interests in relation to the environment, most of the problems and definitely most of the truly grave problems - are phys
ieally located in the three Baltic states and in the Baltie Sea. This single fact deter
mines the nature of Baltic-Nordic environmental cooperation, moving it, at least temporarily, in the direction of development through aid. In addition, it provides the cooperation with a dear, easily understood rationale. For the Baltic countries, a heavy focus on environmental problems is generally advantageous from the point of view of fund-raising.
Estonias, Latvias and Lithuanias exceptional environmental predicament originates in the recent Soviet past. As recounted at the Oslo seminar, the Baltic states were given high priori ty by the champions of heavy industry throughout the post-war era. All three Baltic states experienced a rapid and brutal process of 1n
dustrlalisation determined by the preferences and whims of central planners in Moscow. Growth was achieved at the expense of both the environment and local interests.
The environmental problems caused by the Soviet Army, Navy and Air Force merit particular attention. First of all, they vividly show up the dose connection between environment and security. Secondly, the scale and character of the dam
age are such that the effects will reverberate for generations, making it impossible for the Baltic states to handle the complieations single-handedly. In Estonia alone, there are 570 abandoned military installations, and the cost of cleaning up after Soviet troops has been estimated at 54,752,697,000 kroons, i.e. USO 4 billion (Estonian Ministry of the Environment 1 994). The Estonian GOP, by comparison,
was USD 1.656 billion in 1 993 (Venesaar and Hachey 1995). Soviet milirary forc
es have left a trai! of contaminated soil and groundwater, radioactive waste, unsafe ammunition depots, sea mines, etc. Sadly, the Russian government has neither the will nor the resources to correct past environmental errors outside its own present borders. Similarly, there is Httle interest on the Baltic side in cooperating with Rus
sia. Mumal suspicions and resentments continue to doud Baltic-Russian relations, although the tensions between Russia and Lithuania appear to be less strained now than a few years ago.
One area that stands aur as a fumre field of regional cooperation is industri
al development. lf it is true that environmental policy so far has been tilted towards minimising rather than forestalling harm, it is high time that the root causes are addressed. A shift is all the more necessary in light of the prospect that the Baltic countries will make a leap in industrial production in the com ing years. So far, the economic troubles of the transition have heen a blessing in disguise, as the decline in industrial production has also meant a decline in the emission of pollutants into air and water. In the course of a single year, from 1992 to 1993, GDP dropped by 8.6 per cent in Estonia, 14.9 per cent in Latvia , and 17. 1 per cent in Lithuania (Venesaar and Hachey 1995). The awe-inspiring task of Baltic governments today is not just to achieve sustained growth, but to create sustainable, 'green' growth.
The present situation in the energy sector illustrates how intimately indus
trial and environmental challenges are linked. The Baldc countries, who have lost their supply of cheap Soviet fud, rely heavily on run-down nudear and coal-fired plants. Energy is scarce, expensive and risk-ridden. Without access to more and deaner energy at a reasonable prke, the current economic restructuring will grind to a halt. Securing energy is first and foremost the responsibility of the Baltic gov
ernments. Bur healthy Baltic energy policies are also in the lang-term interest of the international community, and especially the Nordic countries. Increased for
eign contrihutions seem to be justified, but should not come pure1y in the form of more soft loans; possibly, one should stimulate transfers of environmentally sound technologies and managerial skills.
Constraints on cooperation
It can be contended that the principal obstades to progress in deaning up the en
vironment and in working for sustainable development are not of a practical or a technkal, or even of an economic, nature. The most formidable constraints are re1ated to security concerns. Good neighbourliness normally depends on firmly rooted feelings of mutual security. The requisite trust is missing in Baltic-Russian relations, 21
which hold the key to the development of a broad regional cooperation around the Baltie Sea. Commentators have pointed out that Latvia and Estonia appear to be less worried about the state of Baltic-Russian relations than the Nordie countries are! (Peeter Vares 1994) A full analysis of the historical reasons for the Baltic-Rus
sian mistrust falls outside the scope of this artide, but some of the causes have al
ready been hinted at. Here, it should suffice to add that in the Baltic countries environmental damage tends to act as a constant reminder of Soviet-Russian rule, thus reinforcing old enemy images.
Although Russia is politically diminished, she cannot be discounted as a great power in the future - not in Europe and certainly not in the region. Irrespective of political motives, the sheer size ofRussia represents a problem in a region-building perspective. Any regional cooperation that indudes Russia as a full partner, runs the risk of being seriously unbalanced. It should be stressed that the Baltic area re
tains its strategic importance for Russia: The Baltic ports are vital to the control of the Baltic Sea, directly and indirectly giving maritime access to Western Europe.
The ports are also of great potential commercial interest, as they offer a gateway to the West for Russian entrepeneurs. The loss of the three Baltie states in effect en
hances the military significance ofKaliningrad and St. Petersburg. Kaliningrad, still the headquarters of the Baltie Fleet, has become Russia's sole ice-free oudet to the Baltic Sea. For the foreseeable future, it seems unlikely that Russian authorities will consider a demilitarisation of the endave. Whether or not Russians actually fear Western encroachment, the prospeet ofBaltic membership in NATO does provide the military establishment with an excuse for freezing Kaliningrad's military status.
Not infrequently, Russian politicians make statements that are perceived as threatening by Baltic leaders and public opinion mainly concerning the treatment of Russian-speaking minorities. The new, or rather revised, Russian military doc
trine appears to signal a return to traditional security thinking atter a phase marked by a commitment to arms control and an emphasis on cooperation with the West.
The doctrine pinpoints the necessity of 'up holding stability in regions bordering Russia and its allies, as in the world in general' (Peter Wallensteen et al. 1994). One would expect that the Army's increasing influence in the shaping of Russian for
eign policy has been widely noticed in the other former Soviet republics.The war in Chechnya has been followed dosely by the Balts. Against this background the continuing existence of security fears in the Baltic countries is easy to understand.
The Russian empire has collapsed twice - in 1917 and 1991 - people may weU be reminding themselves. Could it also be restored a second time?
Under such political circumstances, agreement on fundamental environmen
tal principles or goals, like the necessity of carrying through sustainable develop
ment, is likely to be superficial. Public awareness of environmental threats has grown tangibly in many countries since the Brundtland Commission's report 'Our Com-
mon Future' was issued in 1987. Internationally, more human and economic resources are spent on the environment than ever before. Yet it can be argued that the world has made few major strides - or at least that progress does not match present challenges. Being an all-embracing concept, sustainable development is exceedingly difficult to operationalise. The critical question is still how sustainability can be turned into practical, coherent policies. How, for instance, can relevant in
dicators of sustainable production and consumption be developed and built into economic reforms? Subsequently, if this exercise is feasible, how does one ensure compliance? The uneasiness characteristic of Baltic-Russian relations adds to the problems in pursuing sustainable development in a regional, Baltic-Nordic perspec
tive.
Rethinking environmental cooperation
To recapimlate a basic point, international cooperation in Europe is increasingly being rethought and rearranged in the context of the region. It is important to note that even though the end of the Cold War has had a liberating effect on Baltic-Nordic cooperation, the environment does not represent a tabula rasa. Valuable precedents exist in bilateral cooperation as well as international regimes. Furthermore, region
al actors were quick to seize the opportunities once the iron curtain started com
ing down. The Ronneby meeting in 1990, which was attended by all prime minis
ters in the region, gave a boost to international cooperation to protect the Baltic Sea. In parallel, as we have observed earlier, novel and of ten rather informal kinds of cooperation are materialising, providing much of the present excitement sur
rounding the Baltic-Nordic Region. Some observers even hold that the new net
works acmally constitute the region Qoenniemi and Wæver 1992).
Nobody would disp ute that significant contributions can - and have to - be made through government-led bilateral cooperation. For example, Finland's in
volvement in environmental projects in Karelia, St. Petersburg and Estonia is sub
stantial and impressive. Sweden has been stepping up its cooperation with Eston
ia. Here, cooperation has undoubtedly been aided by the fact that severai Estoniari ministers acmally have held or still hold Swedish citizenship (Ola Tunander 1 993).
All Nordic countries have offered assistance in the form of know-how or funding, including Iceland, as announced at the Oslo seminar. Additionally, of course, the Baltic governments have signed a string of bilateral framework agreements with other Western European countries. In other words, stronger and more numerous bilat
eral links are on the cards, and it is evident that they will form an indispensable part of the new regional cooperative pattern.
23
What can be hoped for with respeet to funetional, i.e. seetor-based, international regimes (understood as inter-state agreements and the bodies set up in their sup
port)? Certainly, international environmental regimes are not a new phenomenon in the Baltie area. Aehievements had been made weU befare the fall of the iran eur
tain, implying that, in this area at least, the foundations for progress should be sol
id. The Gdansk Convention of 1 973, on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resourees of the Baltie Sea and the Belts, was a forward-looking, exemplary agree
ment at the time. The same is true for the Helsinki Convention signed in 1974
(coming into force in 1 980), which represents the first international attempt to regulate all sourees of pollution. The revised agreement, though, from April 1 992,
goes much !l.lfther, La. by stressing the need for preventive measures. An ambitious action plan for cleaning up the Baltic Sea has been adopted Goint Comprehensive Environmental Action Programrne). Not only the Httoral states are involved in the implementation, bur also the countries of the catchment area (Beiarus, the Czech Republic, Norway, Slovakia, Ukraine), the EU Commission, international devel
opment banks, and the International Baltie Sea Fisheries Commission. NGOs par
ucipate as observers. The Helsinki Commission (HELCOM), responsible for the supervision of the Convention, has taken on added political importance with the introducuon of conferences for the ministers of the environment. All these chang
es exemplifY how the emancipation of the Baltic states has enabled improvements in inter-state international cooperation.
However useful, bilateral and multilateral agreements based on international law cannot address the full range of environment and security-related challenges, nor are they enough to make a region. One possible path, whieh can (bur need not) lead to supranational cooperation, is to act, in a more eonscious fashion, on the specific strengths of the region. The Baltie-Nordic Region seems to offer an excep
tional degree of flexibility and immediacy.
Three requirements
The institutional arrangements needed to set up a more ambitious regional coop
eration around the Baltie Sea, will not he diseussed hete. Rather, three thernes that are easily overlooked in abstraet diseussions on the politieal struemres in the new European order will be identified. These thernes, which were explored in same detail at the Oslo seminar, amount to requirements for suecessful regional eooperation on environmental issues. Further, they are highly relevant to any dehate on region
building and regional identities, being obvious elements in the formation of a Bal
tie-Nordic civil society. The first requirement is an effective research-policy dialogue,
both across the region and in the individual countries. Secondly, extensive NGO involvement is essential to moving the environmental debate forward and to the creation of a political community genuinely transcending national boundaries. The third point made is that public interest in the environment has to be sustained in the Baltic countries.
Research-policy dialogue: Confident cooperation invariably rests on system
atie exchanges of news and views. The seminar brought home the need for increased and more direct communication about environmental challenges in the Baltic
Nordic Region. Contact between the research community and policy-makers must be strengthened, it was contended, and new channels for dialogue opened. At the same time, greater interaction seems to be warranted between the natural sciences and the social sciences. The first dialogue stands to improve with an extension of the latter.
Above all, an intensified research-policy dialogue seems to be sorely needed
within the Baltic states. In the Nordic countries , the applied social sciences are gen
erally recognised as useful in policy planning. The ex-Socialist states were isolated for decades, and there is litde precedent for critical appraisal of policies with the aid of scientific data. This is not to say that Scandinavian politicians always wel
come critical comment! Soviet authorities were given to secrecy about environmental damage just as they were in other respects. Although democratic practices are tak
ing hold, and although there is growing openness in the media, there is still a ten
dency to limit public insight into government conduct. As a political concept, central planning may be dead, but its paralysing effects are still felt. Thanks to the infamous five years plans, the very word planning is discredited and difficult to use. A fresh start is needed, therefore, and the Nordic countries should be in a good position to assist Baltic governments in the pressing task of designing acceptable and effective policy instruments. Scandinavian-style living conditions studies represent one pos
sible platform (the NORBALT Living Conditions Project 1 995). According to current Norwegian thinking, living conditions research should first concentrate on providing an overview of a nations social and economic life. On this basis, one should proceed to carry out in-depth studies of special problems.
NGO involvement: NGOs spearheaded Baltic defiance in the last years of the Soviet Union. Still, Baltic NGOs are relatively weak, as a reflection of the weak
ness of civil society. The merits of a broadly based public debate involving NGOs, are primarily threefold: Firstly, a continuous dialogue is a necessary condition for keeping evironmental commitment alive, possibly also for fostering public spirit in societies long made passive by an overpowering state. Secondly, the NGOs can play a key role in the dissemination of information about environmental problems and developments. They can make crucial contributions to environmental educat
ion, notably by popularising fresh scientific gains. Thirdly, NGO vigilance increases 25
the chances that questionable policies will not go uncontested; there will always be a corrective.
Without the NGOs, Baltic governments will hardly be able to absorb all the relevant lessons from environmental experiences in the West. One should not for
get that the transitional period offers the opportunity to study - and avoid some of the mistakes made by Western European countries in the course of post-war industrialisation. The Baldc NGOs can only perf orm their demanding tasks if they have a clear international orientation. Their ability to act can probably be strength
ened through more active Baltic-Nordic network-building.
Public opinion: Public interest in environmental issues was considerable in the period leading up to Baltic independence; often, environmental problems be
came a rallying point for individuals and gro UpS opposed to the Communist re
gimes. It can weU be daimed that the Baltic environmentalists were among the first to make effective use of glasnost. It is interesting to notice that one of the earliest acts of the Lithuanian parliament after freedom had been won, was to pass the Environment Protecdon Law of 1 992. Even though there still is public concern, other political issues have seized centre stage, the most important being the popu
lar demand for rapid economic progress. The dwindling interest in the environment in the Balties poses an indirect threat to regional cooperation. If the gap between public perceptions in the Baltic and in the Nordic countries becomes too wide, bold common action will become impossible, and it may be hard to maintain the cur
rent level of Nordic funding.
An urgent chaUenge for Baltic environmentalists is to find ways to sustain public consciousness, keeping in mind that the political benefits to be reaped in reality are greater than before: Much has already been done since the arrival of in
dependence to modernise environmental management in the Baltie states; min is
tries have been reorganised and new legal frameworks adopted. And as opposed to Soviet times, today's Baltie authorities are democratically elected and can be held accountable in environmental matters.
Concluding remarks
Environmental cooperation can be viewed as an end in itself, but cannot be under
stood or carried OUt in isolation. It interacts with other areas of political activity, . and may advance the overall proeess of European integration. Thus, environmen
tal efforts can be a prelude to more extensive and binding international cooperat
ion. Environmental cooperation has already become an important ingridient in the complex process of regionalisation occurring around the Baltic Sea. In the long run,
region-building may blunt the edges of the traditional, state-centred security ap
proach, and prornote interest in and commitment to the idea of common security.
Working together on safeguarding the common environment may help to weave the Baltie countries into the general fabric of Nordie cooperation. Impor
tantly, the Nordie connection provides the Baltie countries with another bridge to Europe, that is to say, to a minimum of stability and political normaley. Depend
ing on the general climate in European polities, ties with the Nordie community might be useful in attaining membership in key Western institutions like the EU and NATO.
A Baltic-Nordic environmental framework also offers opportunities for in
troducing Russia, or the ei ties and areas that are most directly affected by develop
ments in the Baltic Sea, into mainstream European cooperation without raising sensitive strategic issues. The Nordie countries will, for both environmental and political reasons, be sympathetic to a broadly conceived regional cooperation which ensures Russian participation. By virtue of being present, the Nordie countries may mitigate Baltic-Russian tensions, thus removing some of the obstacles to meaning
ful, practical-minded Baltic-Russian collaboration.
If the new region makes a successful transition from vision to incontrovert
ible reality, it will become a valuable component in the new European security or
der, and there is also the possibility that it will influence, or indeed help to define, the shape of a future pan-European confederation. As suggested by severai seminar participants, comprehensive cooperation in and around the Baltie Sea Area could serve as a model for other regions in Europe. The flexibility that already distinguishes Baltic-Nordic cooperation encourages the belief that Russian interests and prob
lems can also be addressed. The gradual proliferation of networks in the Baltic
Nordie Region may not necessarily resolve all problems related to Russia's role. But one could argue that the more regional links there are, the greater the likelihood that modes of cooperation can be found that are amenable to both Russia and her European neighbours.
With the liberation of the three Baltie states comes the restoration of cul
tural unity across the Baltie Sea and the hope that the wounds created by forty years of repression can be healed. Nordie citizens have followed developments with a sense of wonderment, relief and admiration. The Baltie countries bring a diverse cultur
al heritage, and an appreciation of cultural values sharpened by adversity, to the new Europe. They will be able to enrich not only their neighbours in the Baltic-Nordic Region but the rest of the world. The Balts are making Europe whole. Without cultural unity, it is impossible to envis age a European order capable of doing jus
tice to the claims of both the environment and security.
It is still all to easy to view the world through the timid, restrictive lenses of Cold War polities. Old habits are hard to break for nations as well as individuals.
21
Environmental security is an imperative. It is also a challenge to our collective European imagination, asking us to push for nothing less than a metamorphosis in international relations, a change that, one day, may shift the centre of gravity from suspicion and fear to confidenee and trust.
The author is gratefol for useful comments from Dr. philos Jens B. Grøgaard, Erik Hansen, Dr. Iver B. Neumann, Dl: Ola Tunander and Dr. Aadne Aasland.
References
Environmental lssues. En vironmental Damage from the Soviet-Russian Military Occupation (Septem ber 1 995), Estonia Today, (fact sheet), Ministry of Foreign Affa irs of the Republic of Estonia (source: the Eston ia n Ministry of the Environment)
Joenniemi, Pertti and Ole Wæver (1 992), 'Regionalization around the Baltic Rim. Notions on Baltic Sea Politics'. In Cooperation in the Baltie Sea Area, Report from the Second Parliament
ary Conference at the Storting, Oslo, 22-24 April 1 992, Nord 1 992:24, Stockholm: the Nordic Council
Neumann, Iver B. (January 1 994), 'A Region-building Approach to Northern Europe', in Re
view of International Studies, London
Nilson, Haken R. ( 1 994), 'The Role of the European U n ion in the Baltic Sea: Which Model for Environmental Management is Offered, and How?' In Security for the Ba/tie Region, Jørn Gjelstad (ed.), PRIO Report 4/94, International Peace Research Institute, Oslo
The NORBALT Living Conditions Project. A Presentation, revised version ( 1 995), Fafo, Osl o.
(See appendix D i n this report).
Tema: Miljøproblemer (1993), Nordisk Østforum. Samfunn og kultur i Russland og Øst-Eu
ropa. Nr. 2/1 993, a rgang 7, Scandinavian U n iversity Press, Oslo
Tunander, Ola ( 1 994), ' Inventing the Barents Region: Overcom i ng the East-West Divide in the North'. In Stokke, Olav Schram and Ola Tunander (eds.), The Barents Region. Cooperation in A rctie Europe, The Fridtjof Nansen Institute, I nternational Peace Research I nstitute, Osl o
(PRlO), a n d Sage Publ ications
Tunander, Ola ( 1 993), 'Norden och havet- ett brev om regionsbildning fran en svensk i Norge'.
In B u l l, Bernt and Anders Kjølberg (eds.), Norge i det politiske kraftfeltet. Norden og USAs betydning for norsk politikk, Cappelen/Europa-programmet, Oslo
Vares, Peeter ( 1 994), 'Russia and the Baltie States: Are there Common Security Perspectives?' In Common Security in Northern Europe after the Cold War - the Baltk Sea Region and the Barents Sea Region, the Olof Pa lme International Center, Stockholm
Venesaar, U rve and George A. Hachey, J r. (eds.), ( 1 995), Economic and Social Changes in the Baltie States in 1992-1994, Tal linn: Estonian Academy of Sciences, I nstitute of Economics Wal lensteen, Peter and Kjell-Ake Nordquist, Bjorn Hagelin, Erik Melander ( 1 994), Towards a Security Community in the Baltie Region, the Baltic U niversity Programme, Uppsala Un iver
sity, Sweden 1 994.
29
Part
IThe Challenges and the Setting
The N ew Baltic-Nordic Agenda
Terje Rød Larsen
!fyou dont know where to go, you will end up at a different pface.
I could not resist opening my statement here today with these paradoxical but wise words from 1\lice in Wonderland'. The debate on evironmental challenges in the Baltie area is still young, and it is vitally important to identif}r targets, and ways to reach them, both in the short and the long term. The Nordie countries, for their part, have only just begun to formulate environmental policies that address com
mon problems in the wider Baltic-Nordic Region. While there is widespread rec
ognition that the full of the iron curtain and the liberation of the Baltie nations have opened new avenues in international cooperation, there is uncertainty as to the kind of concerted efforts that are necessary, and how they should be organised and in
stitutionalised.
Various national policies may pull in different directions, as may programrnes design ed by international ageneies and development banks. Priorities may be hard to set. But they must be. There is a tvvin risk that, on the one hand, insufficient attention is given to serious environmental problems - the so-called hot-spots - and that, on the other hand, time and resources are wasted through duplication of work.
So we need to know where to go. We need to discuss as openly and construc
tively as possible how we can solve environmental problems white promoting sus
tainable economic growth - knowing that we are dealing with a region marred by the mistakes of the past. Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia are bracing themselves for structural reform, and it is the dury of the Nordie countries, in the spirit of good neighbourliness, to try to ease their pain.
In our deliberations we have to ass ess possible new dangers, and consider our responses to them. How will lack of progress in efforts to improve the living conditions of ordinary people affect soeial and political stability in the Baltic coun
tries and in the region as a whole? If, as we cannot rule out, economic stagnation
goes hand in hand with environmental deterioradon - what will the psychological impact be? Let us not forget that environmental deterioration and mo un ting po
lideal and economic instability in the Baltic states may easily produee similar det
rimental effects in the Nordic arena. Thus, the Nordic countries als o have a self
interest in Baltie progress and stability.
We should take a serious look at how environmental eooperation can be used to prornote political stability in the region as a whole. We must ask how the actual
33