• No results found

Industry Study: Lessons Learned

N/A
N/A
Protected

Academic year: 2022

Share "Industry Study: Lessons Learned"

Copied!
11
0
0

Laster.... (Se fulltekst nå)

Fulltekst

(1)

Safety Culture: Lessons Learned from the Tanker Industry

Joseph Ludwiczak, General Secretary, Liberian Shipowners’ Council

Liberian Shipowners’ Council Ltd

• Inter-Industry Working Group: fatal fire &

explosion incidents; chemical & product tankers

• Most incidents were AVOIDABLE

• Failure to follow guidelines and procedures

• Indications of a systemic failure of the safety management system

Industry Study: Lessons Learned

(2)

• Regulations are not a substitute for good management practice

• Compliance with acceptable industry procedures &

guidelines was not considered essential

• Passive or inactive safety management enabled unsafe conditions to develop and proliferate

• Working safely did not appear to be a condition of employment

Safety culturewas in the black hole

Industry Study: Lessons Learned

Industry Study: Lessons Learned

• Profound ignorance of the essential role of the “human factor” in

effective safety management

(3)

• Marine transportation is a high-risk business conducted in a hostile and unforgiving environment.

• Cost of “human error” = +$1,000,000/day excluding criminal indictments etc.

• “Human error” responsible for 70 - 90%

of all industrial accidents

The Safety Challenge in Shipping

How are we doing?

Navigation Accident Frequency 1987-2007: Lloyds Fairplay

(4)

• DNV statistics demonstrate that a ship is twice as likely to be involved in a

serious accident today compared to only five years ago.

• AND, the costs of these accidents have doubled.

The Safety Challenge in Shipping

Lloyd’s List: 22 February 2008

Aviation, Health Care, Nuclear, Shipping

• Multi-discipline industry

• Irregular working hours 24/7 with no room for error

• Complex systems

• Fixed chain of command (open communication?)

• Staff are licensed or certified

• Communication can be a matter of life and death

• Initiative continuously challenged

• Success can be influenced by the performance of

“others” (pilots, agents, suppliers, port authorities etc.)

Complex Industries: Safety Challenge

Source: Advanced System Safety Management

(5)

Key Focus: Human Behavior

• Accidents are caused by normal people undertaking normal activities in abnormal circumstances.

• We have all made errors.

• We always have made errors.

• We always will make errors.

• Shipping professionals (onshore and onboard) are human and therefore prone to error

Key Focus: Human Behavior

• Human error can be detected, reduced, and contained but NOT eliminated

• We can not “engineer out” human error, but...

• We can design equipment and systems that will take human error into

consideration

(6)

Key Focus: Human Behavior

Non-technical causes of human error include:

• Stress

• Imperfect information processing

• Fatigue

• Workload

• Poor decision making

• Cognitive overload

• Poor interpersonal communications

Training: Non-technical Skills

• Communication

• Team work

• Organization

• Management

• Problem solving

(7)

Threat and Error Management

Practical approach to risk management It is based on:

• Understanding nature and extent of error

• Changing conditions that induce error

• Determining behaviors that prevent or mitigate error

• Training personnel

Threat and Error Management

• Errors are INTERNAL

• Threats are EXTERNAL

• Each must be managed in order to achieve a

desired outcome.

(8)

Errors: Internal actions or inactions

Violation errors - deliberate failure to adhere to procedures or regulations

Procedural errors - followed procedures but executed incorrectly

Proficiency errors - error due to lack of knowledge or skill

Communication errors - missing or wrong information exchange or misinterpretation

Decision making errors - decision that unnecessarily increases risk

Threat: External action or inaction

Anticipated: weather; port congestion

Unanticipated: heavy traffic in shipping lanes; equipment malfunctions; engine failure; port officials, tug boats, line handlers

Latent: existing conditions that may interact with ongoing activities to precipitate a

problem; equipment design issues; fatigue

(9)

Threat & Error Management

Source: Advanced System Safety Management

Uncharted Hazard Int‘l Rules & Regs

Company Policies & Procedures

Environment Control Center

Commands

Traffic Communication Problems

Incorrect Information Equipment Failures

Loading

Hazardous Cargo Charting Errors

• Human error can be managed and mitigated

• Effective safety management improves efficiency, raises productivity and

increases profit potential

Safety is good business

(10)

• Safety Management = Risk Management

• Risk Control Cost Control

• Cost Control Efficiency

• Efficiency = Productivity

• Productivity = PROFIT

Safety is good business

Advanced System Safety Management

What next?

• Recognize that human error is the symptom, not the disease

• Design equipment, operations and systems that recognize the realities of human behavior

• Standardize equipment where possible

• Invest in effective training programs; include training for non-technical skills

• Where feasible, enable crews to operate as teams;

encourage open communication

• Establish standard operating procedures & ensure compliance

(11)

Safety Culture: Lessons Learned from the Tanker Industry

THANK YOU

Liberian Shipowners’ Council Ltd

Referanser

RELATERTE DOKUMENTER

Spørsmålet om hva som bør være målsettingen for norske beslutningstagere i forbindelse med krisehåndtering i NATO, ble vurdert ulikt blant seminardeltakeme. Enkelte viste til

There is also some evidence of changes in aspects of the safety culture, at least on a manifest level, made possible through the longevity of the development programme, by the use

We investigate (1) how studies on an urban scale combine qualitative experience-oriented research techniques and quantitative tracking techniques, and what potential the

Lessons learned and improvements (RQ2) were studied through observations and group interviews in the study of the capstone projects. Two main areas were identified where

Section 3 presents the lessons learned so far from the CCUS PN members, including the factors that have influenced the evaluation and selection of the CO₂

The other contribution is developing a knowledge base: The process through which the two literature review methods are applied, will result in a collection of knowledge /

Lessons from the Tabas 1978, Rudbar 1990, and Bam 2003 earthquake disasters were identified for various stages of earthquake disaster planning, rescue, medical emergency

However, the Fugaku super- computer development program made a survey questionnaire, with the Japanese HPCI (High Performance Computing Infrastructure) users, about the list of