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Oil, Human Rights and Women

Inge Amundsen, seniorforsker, Chr. Michelsens Institutt

Onsdag 17. september 2014

Amnesty International, Litteraturfestivalen, Kulturhuset Stavanger

(2)

The Resource Curse

The Dutch Disease The Paradox of Plenty

Oil rich countries can be worse off

• Rich in natural resources

• Poor in economic development

Explanations

• Economic explanations

• Political explanations Democracy first theory

Norway

Australia

Canada

Chile

Brazil

Malaysia

Botswana

Angola

DR Congo

Nigeria

The Sudan

Southern Sudan

Sierra Leone

Liberia

Zambia

Azerbaijan

Tajikistan

(3)

Economic Explanations

Relative price effect

• Higher currency value

• More imports (cheaper)

• Decline of competitiveness

The ‘Dutch Disease’

• Over-investment in extractive industries

• “Crowding out” (manufacture, agriculture)

• De-industrialisation

• Limited economic diversification

Volatility

• Uncertainty for businesses

• Government waste and debt

• Government borrowing

• Capital flight

Negative developments

• Uneven distribution

• Increasing inequality

• Increasing poverty

Authoritarianism increases

• Entrenched elites

• Violent defence of privileges

• Weak institutions

(4)

Some figures

• 2010: 61.2% of Nigerians lived on one dollar a day or under

• 2004: 52,8& (an increase of almost 10%)

• Around 100 million Nigerians living on less than a dollar a day

• “Subjective” poverty (measured as those who feel themselves to be poor) increased from 75.5% in 2004 to 93.9% in 2010, meaning that less

Nigerians were happy with their lot.

• Total income $ 300 bn over 25 years, but economy as poor as in 1973

• HDI rank 158 (0.511 low ▼)

• Extreme income inequality (Gini coefficient: > 0,60)

• UN HDI: 0.445 (160 of 177 countries)

• Poverty line: < 60%, children underweight: 30-40%

• “The 200 families”

• Oil: 90% of government revenues

• Oil income: comparable to Norway

(5)

Political Explanations

The prize of controlling the gov’t increases

• Higher government revenues

• Large benefits of being the “state elite”

Consumption, enrichment, corruption

• Extraction for status, wealth

Embezzlement, bribes, “commissions”,

“contributions”

“Nationalisation”, “privatisation”, monopolies

“Dead meat” oil companies

State power and autonomy increases

• Off-shore, foreign, High-Tech

• “Un-earned”, easy money

• Little taxation domestic economy

• No “social contract”

• Little influence business/middle class

• Little influence of civil society

INCENTIVES

• Big money

• (Not much else)

• Status and wealth MEANS

• Buy off rivals (co-optations)

• Buy friends (nepotism, favouritism)

• Buy means of coercion

• Buying (manipulating) institutions

Gov’t resources for elections

Vote buing

Impunity

(6)

Democracy First Theory

Thumb rule: Democracy

At least TWO elections leading to change in government

A country will be cursed only when it becomes oil-export dependent before

accountable and democratic state institutions are established and consolidated

Exceptions?

(7)

The Effect on Women, I

Indirect resource curse effects

Economic effects

• “Crowding out” (manufacture, agriculture)

• Higher consumer prices

• Increasing poverty

• Reduced social spending (health/education)

Political effects

• Little taxation domestic economy

• No “social contract”

• Little influence business/middle class

• Little influence of civil society

(8)

The Effect on Women, II

Direct petroleum sector effects

Sector characteristics

• Foreign, High-Tech, big politics

• Specialised skills

• Male dominated sector

Direct production effects

• Little direct employment

• Few “local content” possibilities

On-shore

Pollution

Pipelines

Flaring

Conflicts

(9)

A positive note on women?

Some openings?

In services

• Hotels, restaurants (prostitution)

• Delivery of fish, fruit, vegetables

In management

• Secretaries, office workers

• Senior management

Minister of Petroleum Resources Diezani Alison-Madueke (Allegedly using large amounts of public money to charter a private jet for herself and her family)

Minister of Finance Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala Isobel dos Santos

3.7 bn US$ 2014

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