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INTEGRATING FINANCIAL STABILITY AND MONETARY POLICY ANALYSIS

GOVERNOR ØYSTEIN OLSEN

27 APRIL 2015

(2)

2

Unemployment Inflation

House prices Household debt ratio

Sources: Thomson Reuters and Norges Bank

-2.5 0 2.5 5 7.5

-2.5 0 2.5 5 7.5

2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 0

2 4 6 8 10 12 14

0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14

2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014

US UK

Euro area Norway

100 150 200 250 300

100 150 200 250 300

2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014

60 100 140 180

60 100 140 180

2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014

(3)

Basis for advice on CCB: key indicators

50 100 150 200

50 100 150 200

1976 1986 1996 2006

Source: Norges Bank 3

House prices / disposable income Credit / GDP

Real commercial property prices Banks` wholesale funding ratio

50 100 150 200

50 100 150 200

1976 1987 1998 2009

0 20 40 60

0 20 40 60

1976 1984 1992 2000 2008

50 100 150 200

50 100 150 200

1976 1986 1996 2006

(4)

0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1

0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1

1980 1987 1994 2001 2008

Early warning models for financial crises

4

US UK

Norway Spain

0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1

0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1

1980 1987 1994 2001 2008

0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1

0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1

1980 1987 1994 2001 2008

0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1

0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1

1980 1987 1994 2001 2008

(5)

Increased capital requirements in Norway

CET1 capital. Percent. 1 July 2013 – 1 July 2016

Sources: Ministry of Finance and Norges Bank 5

4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5

2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5

2.0 3.0 3.0 3.0

1.0 2.0

1.0

1.0

0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16

0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16

1 July 2013 1 July 2014 1 July 2015 1 July 2016

Countercyclical buffer

Buffer for systemically important banks Systemic risk buffer

Conservation buffer Minimum requirement

(6)

Framework

Loss function, L: L

0

= 𝐸

0

𝑡=0

δ

𝑡

𝑡2

+ λ𝑦𝑡

2

)

where π

t

= inflation deviation from inflation target

𝑦

t

= output gap

Demand, 𝑦

𝑡

: 𝑦

𝑡

= 𝑓(𝑟

𝑡

, … ) − 𝑧

𝑡

Impulse from financial instability, 𝑧

𝑡

: 𝑧

𝑡

= β ∙ 𝑧

𝑡−1

+ α ∙ FI

t

𝛼 = � 0 if financial instability does not arise 1 if financial instability arises Level of financial imbalances, FI

t

: FI

t

= 𝑔(𝑟

𝑡

, … )

6

(7)

Financial stress does not arise

0 6 12 18 24 30 36

Output gap

0 6 12 18 24 30 36

Inflation

Does not take risk into account Takes risk into account

0 6 12 18 24 30 36

Real interest rates

0 6 12 18 24 30 36

Financial imbalances

7

(8)

Financial stress arises

0 6 12 18 24 30 36

Output gap

Does not take risk into account Takes risk into account

0 6 12 18 24 30 36

Inflation

0 6 12 18 24 30 36

Real interest rates

0 6 12 18 24 30 36

Financial imbalances

Financial stress arises

8

(9)

INTEGRATING FINANCIAL STABILITY AND MONETARY POLICY ANALYSIS

GOVERNOR ØYSTEIN OLSEN

27 APRIL 2015

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