Why are some peace agreements more implemented than others?

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Why are some peace agreements more implemented than others?

A statistical analysis of comprehensive peace agreements and bureaucratic quality, 1989-2015.

Master's thesis in Peace and Conflict Studies Department of Political Science

UNIVERSITY OF OSLO

Spring 2019

Author: Anders Garbom Backe Supervisors:

1. Dr Jemima Garcia-Godos 2. Dr Tore Wig

Word count: 31,776

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Why are some peace agreements more implemented than others?

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A statistical analysis of comprehensive peace agreements and

bureaucratic quality, 1989-2015.

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Why are some peace agreements more implemented than others? A statistical analysis of comprehensive peace agreements and bureaucratic quality, 1989-2015.

http://www.dui.uio.no

Print: Reprosentralen, University of Oslo Word count: 31,776

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Abstract

What enhances the implementation of peace agreements in post-civil war societies? Previous research has focused on international actors, power-sharing arrangements and sequenced implementation. Consequently, the local capacity and the actors that take part in the practical implementation process have largely been ignored. I bridge the state capacity and peacebuilding literatures, concentrating on a specific form of state capacity: Bureaucratic quality. I hypothesise that high-quality bureaucracies enhance peace agreement implementation by building trust and being more effective. I use several indicators from mainly the Varieties of Democracy and the World Bank databases to test the effect of bureaucratic quality on implementation data gathered from the Peace Accord Matrix (PAM) database. The PAM database includes implementation data of 34 comprehensive peace agreements (CPAs) in 31 countries between 1989 and 2015. CPAs both address the root causes of the conflict and involve all parties to the conflict. After testing several linear regression models accounting for panel- specific heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation, this thesis finds no empirical support for the proposed hypothesis: Bureaucratic quality does not enhance CPA implementation after civil war. A series of robustness tests and explorative tests are run, including alternative control variables and the application of a cross-sectional version of the dataset. Overall, the results do not allow me to change the substantial conclusion – the effect of bureaucratic quality is inconclusive. The thesis provides a critical analysis of the methods and theories applied to explain the implementation of CPAs, including shortcomings with the existing data. Several contributions to the peacebuilding literature are provided. These include discussions on security dilemmas, sequencing, power-sharing arrangements, state capacity, conflict characteristics, resources, and third-party assistance. I argue future studies on the causal relationship of state capacity and implementation should consider factors related to the local context that may vary over time, such as cognitive perceptions and specific provision types. The thesis suggests the need for research on “crucial” case-studies and possible research questions. Future research should also consider reconceptualising bureaucratic quality and refining the measurements of third-party assistance.

Keywords: Bureaucratic quality, state capacity, comprehensive peace agreements, implementation, civil war, peacebuilding.

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Acknowledgements

First of all, I want to thank my supervisors, Jemima and Tore. The critical and positive feedback, the encouragements, and the input you have given me have been crucial for the development of this thesis. Despite your busy schedules, you have found time to answer my emails and have in-depth talks – sometimes stretching over several hours. This is very much appreciated!

Next, many warm thanks to my fellow students. A special thank you to my fellow seminar participants for helping me getting a good start: Nina, Bård Nikolas, Thea, Camilla, Laura, Victoria and Abdul. Important feedback and support has also been provided by all the students I have been lucky to share the reading room and a number of lunches with. Thank you for the great company and the endless rounds of quizzes and chess through several semesters: Abby, Indigo, Intan, Jorn, Mo, Sofie, Sverke, Tyler, Victoria, Bård, James, Julie, Jørdi, Melanie, Per, Silje, Øyvind, Cris, Eirin, Falk, Ferdinand, Fride, Ingeborg, Irene, Kari, Kathi, Leonor, Sofia, Fredrik, Kristian, Sindre, Therese, and many more! I have been very fortunate to be part of such a great student environment. In particular, I want to thank Mo for always answering my calls and Falk for helping me book study rooms. Also, the “peaceful dinners” have provided me some great breaks from writing and many funny moments.

To write a master’s thesis is a large and challenging project. I would not have made it without the continuous support and encouragement from my wife-to-be Ragnhild and my mother Unni, in addition to other friends and family – you know who you are! And I am looking forward to finally spending more time with you again.

I am very grateful to Madhav Joshi and Michael Quinn for taking your time to talk with me about my project and for your encouragement and feedback.

I also want to send a thank you to all the great colleagues and friends I had the pleasure to work with during my internship-period in NYC. I am grateful several you still keep in touch, and a special thanks to Cameron for your many encouragements!

A special thanks must also be directed to those of you that offered your time to proof-read my thesis: Tyler, Neven, Indigo and Eirin – thank you very much for your very helpful feedback!

Lastly, a heartfelt thank you to Fritt Ord for granting me the scholarship that allowed me to improve the thesis in ways that elsewise would not be possible.

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List of figures, graphs and tables

Figure 2.1: Hypothesised effect of high-quality bureaucracy on CPA implementation …… p.25 Figure 2.2: Hypothesised effect of low-quality bureaucracy on CPA implementation …….. p.26 Figure 2.3: The proposed causal model ……… p.33 Table 3.1: Summary statistics ……….. p.49 Graph 3.1: Histogram of CPA implementation ……… p.50 Graph 3.2: Implementation rate per year for each case (separate) ……… p.51 Graph 3.3: Implementation rate per year for each case (grouped) ……… p.52 Graph 3.4: Histogram of bureaucratic quality ………. p.53 Table 4.1: Ordinal bureaucratic quality and average implementation ………. p.54 Table 4.2: First year bureaucratic quality and last year implementation levels of each case . p.56 Graph 4.1: Scatterplot of bureaucratic quality and CPA implementation ………. p.57 Table 4.3: Regression table with the main models ……….. p.60 Table 4.4: Regression table with minimalistic models ……… p.64 Table 4.5: Statistically significant thresholds for bureaucratic quality and CPA implementation

………... p.66 Table 5.1: Suggested cases for a “crucial” case study ………. p.83

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Abbreviations

ACLED Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project CINC Composite Index of National Capability

COW Correlations of War (database)

CPA Comprehensive Peace Agreements

GDP Gross Domestic Product

NGO Non-Governmental Organisation

PAM Peace Accord Matrix (database)

PSA Power-Sharing Arrangements

UCDP Uppsala Conflict Data Program (database) UNPKO United Nations Peacekeeping Operations V-Dem Varieties of Democracy (database)

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1.0 Introduction____________________________________

“While we have found strong empirical support for the effects of aggregate implementation on peace duration, we have only anecdotal evidence as to why some peace agreements are implemented at much higher levels than others”.

(Joshi & Quinn, 2015b, p. 889).

The quote above is from the conclusion of Joshi & Quinn’s (2015b) study on the effect of the level of implementation of comprehensive peace agreements on durable peace. Their study is one of several that provides empirical support for the claim that higher levels of agreement implementation lead to lasting peace¹. Still, we know very little about what helps post-war countries reach such high levels of implementation (Dayton & Kriesberg, 2009, p. 3). My aim is to fill this knowledge gap, and my research question is:

What factors facilitate the implementation of comprehensive peace agreements in post- civil war societies?

To clarify, peace agreements are defined as “comprehensive” using two criteria. First, “the major parties to the conflict [are] involved in the negotiations that produced the agreement”, and, second, “the substantive issues underlying the dispute [are] included in the negotiations”

(Joshi, et al., 2015a). I focus on comprehensive agreements because they address the root causes of the conflict, solve commitment problems and normalise political relationships (Joshi &

Quinn, 2015b, p. 872). Furthermore, similarly to Joshi & Quinn (2015b, p. 871), I study the

“aggregate implementation” of peace agreements, meaning “the extent to which an entire negotiated agreement […] is implemented”.

Previous research on what enhances peace agreement implementation is limited. Even important contributions have problematic aspects that should be addressed. For example, peace researchers have tended to focus on international actors (Hartzell, et al., 2001; Ogutcu-Fu, 2015;

Pospieszna & Schneider, 2011; Bekoe, 2005; DeRouen Jr., et al., 2010; Hartzell, 1999; Joshi &

Quinn, 2015b; Walter, 2002; Toft, 2009; Philpott & Powers, 2010). They then ignore the role of the main local implementers in the war-torn countries – not least, the public bureaucrats that

1 In part, the following studies have drawn similar conclusions – either by using general implementation as an explanatory or control variable in their analysis, or by studying the effect of implementation of specific

provisions on peace duration: (DeRouen Jr., et al., 2010; Hehn, 2011; Stedman, et al., 2002; Hartzell & Hoddie, 2007; Joshi, 2015; Jarstad & Nilsson, 2008; Joshi & Quinn, 2015a; Joshi & Quinn, 2016; Joshi, et al., 2015a;

Joshi, et al., 2015b)

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2/147 execute much of the practical implementation. I therefore focus on a specific type of state capacity, namely bureaucratic quality, bridging this state capacity literature with the peacebuilding literature. To my knowledge, only one study has been done on the relationship between state capacity and peace agreement implementation (DeRouen Jr., et al., 2010). As we will see, however, the study includes few cases and their operationalisations are both weakly linked to implementation and endogenous to conflict.

Bureaucratic quality, on the other hand, is tightly linked to implementation, by emphasising the role of public administrators that take part in the practical implementation process. The quality of a bureaucracy is conceptualised to be a continuum. Here, a bureaucracy of high-quality involves personnel that is recruited on the basis of merit, that is impartial and that treats every citizen equally according to the rule-of-law. I argue high quality bureaucracies are expected to facilitate implementation by being effective (meritocratic and non-corrupt experts) and trust- enhancing (impartial, autonomous and abiding by rule-of-law). Bureaucratic quality can have both a negative and positive effect on implementation, depending on whether the quality is low or high, respectively. Therefore, my hypothesis is:

High quality bureaucracies lead to higher levels of implementation of comprehensive peace agreements.

By using new datasets, my thesis follows a new trend, measuring the actual level of implementation (Joshi, et al., 2015a). Peace researchers have tended to take the actual implementation of agreements for granted and have rather used binary outcome variables, typically peace duration or agreement success – in other words, absence of war (DeRouen Jr., et al., 2010; Hartzell & Hoddie, 2007; Hoddie & Hartzell, 2003; Hehn, 2011; Lee, et al., 2016;

Martin, 2013; Mattes & Savun, 2009; Ogutcu-Fu, 2015; Pospieszna & Schneider, 2011; Walter, 2002) Absence of war can be defined as “negative peace”, which is different from “positive peace”. Positive peace involves active interaction – cooperation and peaceful ways to resolve disagreements and conflicts (Galtung, 2013; Parver & Wolf, 2008; Hehn, 2011, p. 16). This thesis acknowledges that both aspects of peace are important and focuses on positive peace.

That is, how the formerly warring parties can cooperate peacefully to implement solutions to the root causes of their violent conflict.

That peace agreements are comprehensive is a criterion for case inclusion in this thesis (Joshi, et al., 2015a, p. 552). Not every peace agreement is the same. Every peace agreement entails an

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3/147 agreement on keeping the peace, but comprehensive agreements also include many other provisions. Peace researchers have tended to concentrate solely on the ceasefire aspects and the negative peace factors they entail (Walter, 2002; Hartzell & Hoddie, 2007; DeRouen Jr., et al., 2010). They then ignore all the other provisions of the agreement, which are interesting in themselves and eventually lead to peace (Joshi & Quinn, 2015b, p. 872). This thesis, therefore, is the first quantitative study on the effect of state capacity (bureaucratic quality) on the level of implementation of comprehensive peace agreements.

In this thesis, I run a liner regression with cross-sectional time-series dataset for 34 cases from 31 countries. The data is mainly based on the Peace Accord Matrix (PAM) and the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) databases (Joshi, et al., 2015a; Coppedge, et al., 2017). The explanatory variable, bureaucratic quality, is operationalised as “public and impartial public administration”

and is measured at the country-level at each year. The outcome variable, Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) implementation, is recorded by PAM and made into percentage scores of how many of the provisions (or clauses) that are either initiated, intermediately implemented or fully implemented. I run several models, including various control variables and robustness tests. However, I find no support for the proposed hypothesis, and several tests indicate some other important explanatory factor is omitted. State capacity, in the form of bureaucratic quality, did not enhance peace agreement implementation in post-civil war societies between 1989 and 2015.

I contribute to the literature in mainly three ways. First, I develop a theoretical argument linking bureaucratic quality and peace agreement implementation. Second, I run several empirical tests of the proposed causal relationship, providing empirical insights suggesting that state capacity is not important for CPA implementation. Third, I recommend possible trajectories for future research. I provide concrete suggestions for possible research questions and “crucial” case studies, in addition to discussions on existing data problems.

This thesis is structured as follows: First, in the theory chapter, I start with a literature review before I present my stylistic model and hypothesis. Second, the chapter on research design goes through the conceptualisation and operationalisation of the variables of the regression, before I present the applied regression models and methods as well as summary statistics.

Third, the analysis chapter has four main parts: The descriptive analysis, the findings of the main regression model, the results from some explorative tests, and a discussion of the different

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4/147 results including an inferential analysis. The main discussion is then allocated in the final main chapter, where I discuss the conceptualisation and operationalisation of the two main variables of the proposed causal model. Lastly, I conclude by reflecting on other weaknesses of the theory and the methods, providing suggestions for future research.

Finally, the thesis is summarised with concluding remarks. Additionally, there follows a bibliography and appendices. The appendices are structured as follows: Appendix A1 presents a list of the cases included in the analysis. Appendix A2 lists all provision types in the dataset.

Appendix A3 presents and discusses a series of robustness tests and explorative tests. The last two appendices present summary statistics of the main variables and discussions on the data.

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2.0 Theory and literature review_______________________

The broad tendency in the peacebuilding literature is a focus on international actors and power- sharing arrangements between decision-making elites and making analyses within some form of security dilemma. In the first part of the literature review, I present these contributions and argue that they ignore the local practitioners that take part in the implementation process.

Therefore, in the literature review’s second part, I narrow down and discuss the literature on local state capacity and comprehensive peace agreement (CPA) implementation in more depth.

Here, I find that the conceptualisations and operationalisations of state capacity need refinement, and I suggest bureaucratic quality instead. The proposed relationship between bureaucratic quality and CPA implementation is discussed in detail in the stylistic model. This discussion includes an assessment of what the interests of the bureaucrats may be, what other factors may interfere with this proposed causal model, as well as an ideal and hypothetical example. I conclude that high-quality bureaucrats are both effective (meritocratic and non- corrupt experts) and trust-enhancing (impartial, autonomous and abiding to rule-of-law), while low-quality bureaucrats are the opposite. I then hypothesise that higher levels of bureaucratic quality will lead to more of the CPA being implemented.

2.1 Literature review on implementation of peace agreements

This thesis seeks to explain what leads to differences in the level of CPA implementation. The peace literature sometimes talks about peace agreement implementation, peace duration and peacebuilding interchangeably, with some authors developing theories for implementation based on what in practice is for example a study on peace duration². The concepts of implementation and negative peace are thus easily blurred³. In reality, however, they are separate concepts that arguably have a causal relationship. Higher levels of CPA implementation enhances the likelihood of durable, negative peace (Joshi & Quinn, 2015b;

Hartzell & Hoddie, 2007). The reason for this is that the implementation signals commitment,

2 For example Walter (2002, p. 53) operationalise CPA implementation as whether armed conflict resumes within five years; and DeRouen Jr. et al. (2010) mixes peace success and an ordinal measure of implementation into one variable.

3 “Negative peace” is commonly used to describe the absence of direct violence, while «positive peace» denotes cooperation and the “coupling” of actors (Galtung, 2013, p. 52).

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6/147 creates trust, normalises the relationship between the former combatants and resolves the underlying issues of the conflict (Joshi & Quinn, 2015b, p. 872). In the words of Joshi & Quinn, the reasons implementation is effective are:

(1) “CPA implementation normalizes political relationships between hostile groups”;

(2) “CPA implementation solves the types of credible commitment problems and information uncertainties that can lead conflict actors to resume violence (often out of fear of a pre-emptive strike)” and (3) “CPA implementation addresses the root causes of civil conflict that drive rebel recruitment" (Joshi & Quinn, 2015b, p. 872).

On the other hand, we still know little about what enables some former war dyads to reach the levels of trust and commitment that enables them to adhere to implementation processes that are full of severe challenges.

The dynamics for implementation of an entire agreement are different from that of keeping a simple ceasefire. Implementing “positive” actions such as reforms and policies is not the different from the “negative” action of refraining from violence (Hehn, 2011, p. 15). Even though an explicit (and important) part of every peace accord is abstaining from armed conflict, there are usually many other dimensions to an agreement – not least the resolution of the underlying issues that caused the conflict in the first place. Furthermore, although the nature of each provision may relate to conflict in some way, securing negative peace and implementation are not the same endeavour. Both preconditions, inter alia, are a capacity of the state, but are very different forms of state capacity. Duration of peace focuses on the (deterrence from and absence of) military action, while implementation involves various “civil” procedures. These civil procedures can vary from relatively simple actions, such as releasing prisoners, to initiating larger political processes, for instance security sector reforms. Both are important, and both require a degree of trust-building and some strategic interaction between the main actors. Still, they are different.

In sum, it makes sense to emphasise the absence of war recurrence, as peace arguably is the ultimate goal. However, if implementation can make the difference for whether this is achieved or not, we ought to pay more attention to implementation itself. The empirical findings of those researchers that say they investigate what allows for peace agreement implementation, but test negative peace through the success of the ceasefires alone are not directly applicable to this thesis. Still, I will, for the sake of the theoretical arguments brought forth, include these studies in the discussion, regardless of their operationalisation. Nonetheless, studies that do have empirical tests on what affects the level of implementation explicitly will be emphasised more.

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7/147 2.1.1 Peace agreement implementation

The literature traditionally analyses peacekeeping and peacebuilding process with some form of security dilemma in mind (Walter, 2002; Peceney & Stanley, 2001; Joshi & Melander, 2017;

Appel & Loyle, 2012; Obayashi, 2018; Sobek, 2010; Mattes & Savun, 2009; Bekoe, 2005;

Jarstad & Sisk, 2008). The security dilemma paradigm has several directions, among others credible commitment, costly signalling, bargaining and mutual vulnerability⁴. These types of perspectives have several factors in common. They all are pessimistic in the way that they view the process of going from civil war to peace as severely difficult. Here, usually, one or more armed groups in a dispute must agree on giving up their military capabilities and grant the other party or parties the monopoly of force (Walter, 2002). This involves highly uncertain periods, where there often are asymmetries in power and information (Mattes & Savun, 2009). This is what, in essence, constitutes the security dilemma, while the different perspectives differ somewhat in their focus.

Those analysing “credible commitments” postulate that each party needs to feel convinced that the other party is genuinely committed to the peace process. If not, they need certain guarantees that they know will not be arbitrarily reneged upon (DeRouen Jr., et al., 2010; Walter, 2002;

DeRouen Jr. & Chowdhury, 2016; Brandt, 2018). The “costly signalling” related to this then highlights the painful steps and concessions a party must make to signal such commitment (Walter, 2002; Appel & Loyle, 2012; Joshi & Melander, 2017). Those emphasizing

“bargaining” base their analysis on the parties’ continuous assessment of the military, political and economic capabilities of both themselves and their opponent(s) (Butcher, 2015; Clayton, 2013; Hultquist, 2013; Obayashi, 2018; Mattes & Savun, 2009; Walter, 2009). Similarly, the perspective of “mutual vulnerability” pays attention to the decision-making environment and stresses that for each step in the implementation phase, the parties must remain mutually and equally vulnerable (Bekoe, 2005). That means that one party should not end in a disproportionately advantageous situation, since that will make the other(s) feel wary of being exploited.

All these perspectives thus focus on the decision-makers, their goals, and what means they may use to reach these goals. By doing this, they emphasise that the parties always weigh the costs

4 Much referenced examples: (Walter, 2002; Jarstad & Nilsson, 2008; DeRouen Jr., et al., 2009; DeRouen Jr., et al., 2010; Sobek, 2010; Martin, 2013; Hultquist, 2013; Joshi & Melander, 2017; Obayashi, 2018; Bekoe, 2005)

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8/147 and benefits of adhering to the peace process or opting out – that is, whether to resume armed conflict.

Given the assumption that the central problem for any party to a peace agreement is the security dilemma, the literature prioritises to identify measures that alleviate problems of trust and make the parties of the conflict feel safe, or otherwise incentivise them to stay peaceful (Walter, 2002;

Hartzell & Hoddie, 2007; Joshi, et al., 2016; Greenhill & Major, 2007; Roeder & Rothchild, 2005; Sriram, 2008; Mattes & Savun, 2009).

Often, such measures entail some form of sequencing and/or a security guarantee. Sequencing means that a certain factor needs to be in place first, in order to make another action acceptable or safe (Joshi, et al., 2015b; Joshi, et al., 2016; Jarstad & Sisk, 2008). A security guarantee may involve some form of division or sharing of power or having a third-party guarantee their safety in some way (e.g. by having military forces oversee the process) (Walter, 2002; Hartzell &

Hoddie, 2007; Sriram, 2008). In practice, these factors usually manifest themselves as power- sharing arrangements and peacekeeping forces of third-parties.

When it comes to the general concept of sequencing the implementation of one factor before another – for example implementing the granting of amnesty before implementing disarmament, at least two problems appear. First, theoretically, the question about how the first measure was implemented remains. What allowed that to happen without neither trust and peace falling apart, nor being overwhelmed by practical challenges and technical difficulties? May there be another factor that allows for both the implementation of both – the granting of amnesty and the rest of the agreement? Second, on a smaller and more methodological note, doing a sequence study forces you to reduce the possible variation in the dependent variable: To avoid problems of endogeneity, one needs to subtract the values of the explanatory variable (e.g. the implementation of verification measures) from the outcome variable (the implementation score) (Joshi, et al., 2016, p. 1002; Maekawa, et al., 2018, p. 9). Rather, we should explore what enables the implementation of any provision and avoid unnecessarily reducing the variation in the dependent variable. Keeping this in mind, I will now go through the suggested remedies to the security dilemma as suggested by the literature.

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9/147 2.1.1: a) Power-sharing arrangements

The concept of power-sharing arrangements⁵ (PSAs) is broad and multi-dimensional, and it is often both diversely conceptualised and operationalised (Binningsbø, 2013). Essentially, five forms can be identified: Political, military, territorial, economic and constraining power- sharing⁶. There are both qualitative and quantitative research studying the effect of one of these forms of PSAs alone, investigating the cumulative effect of several or all of them, or comparing their independent effects⁷. Interestingly, there still does not seem to be a clear consensus on their directional effect nor importance.

The argument for PSAs in relation to CPA implementation is that these arrangements need to happen before other crucial steps (such as disarmament) to guarantee the parties a safe position of influence and power (Joshi, et al., 2015b). This could be a seat in the government, an autonomous area, an integration to the national military, control over important resources, or a judicial protection. However, only one study has been done on the effect of PSAs on CPA implementation explicitly operationalised as such. That study is the recent quantitative paper by Maekawa et al. (2018, p. 15), where PSAs (in their territorial and political form) was only a control variable. The authors found their results to be inconclusive.

Several studies argue they test implementation, but, in reality, test the duration of negative peace, most notably Walter (2002, p. 53). Walter concludes PSAs are important, but not without third-party security guarantees. Yet, given that she operationalises implementation as negative peace, there are a larger number of analyses with negative peace as outcome variable that in practice become relevant. Here some conclude PSAs have positive effect on peace duration (Mattes & Savun, 2009; Jarstad & Nilsson, 2008; Hartzell & Hoddie, 2007; Mukherjee, 2006a;

Gates, et al., 2016), while others conclude they have a negative effects (Roeder, 2005; Tull &

5 The term “power-dividing” is used both as a contrast and a synonym for similar arrangements (Roeder, 2005;

Hartzell & Hoddie, 2007). This alteration between terms is understood as mainly a rhetorical measure. Both

“power-dividing” and “power-sharing” denote a pact that settles the distribution of power, resources and territories for an interim period. Roeder (2005, p. 15) uses the term “power-diving” to emphasise long-term strategies for limiting the power of the government, by introducing civil liberties, multiple majorities and checks and balances.

6 Most authors summarise them into four: Political, military, territorial and economic (Hartzell & Hoddie, 2007;

Sriram, 2008). Others list three: Dispersive, inclusive and constraining power-sharing (Gates, et al., 2016).

However, when considering all of these together, I argue there are five distinct forms of power-sharing. Gates et al have essentially renamed territorial and political power-sharing dispersive and inclusive power-sharing respectively, while constraining is a novel category that can be added to the four echoed by most others.

7 Much referenced examples include: On political PSAs (Norris, 2008; Mukherjee, 2006b), on political, and military PSAs (Walter, 2002; Obayashi, 2018), on political and territorial (Noel, 2005), on political, military and territorial PSAs (Jarstad & Nilsson, 2008; Mattes & Savun, 2009), on political, military, territorial and economic PSAs (Hartzell & Hoddie, 2007; Sriram, 2008), and on political, territorial and constraining PSAs (Gates, et al., 2016). Also see (Binningsbø, 2013) for a summary on studies of power-sharing and conflict.

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10/147 Mehler, 2005), and others again find no effect (Mukherjee, 2006b; Binningsbø, 2013). Further, qualitative studies either enhance that there are many severe challenges in the implementation of PSAs or argue that power-sharing is easier after e.g. disarmament, for instance (Sriram, 2008, pp. 186-190). Additionally, it is applied to explain many other conflict-related factors – such as peace duration, ethnical division and armed struggle, democracy, and civil society inclusion – and the results are highly varied⁸.

What can we extract from the debate on PSAs? The nature of these arrangements – involving former war enemies initiating a rather intimate cooperation project – makes them interesting and relevant. Empirically, however, they have their limitations, and the evidence seems to emphasise the importance of local context and specific, local arrangements. In addition to the importance of context, there is the point of sequencing. PSAs are another element that needs to be implemented. In order to explain CPA implementation in general, we should rather identify other factors that can explain the implementation of PSAs along with other provisions. We should avoid applying implementation of one provision to explain another.

2.1.1: b) Third-parties

A second factor emphasised in peace research as needed before further implementation can proceed are third-party security guarantors (Walter, 2002; Hartzell & Hoddie, 2007; Pospieszna

& Schneider, 2011; Hartzell, et al., 2001; Karlén, 2017; Peceney & Stanley, 2001). Usually refers to a guarantee of military intervention, entailing an external actors’ army either present on the ground, or stationed outside the territory while giving a credible pledge about “coming to the rescue” if needed. In other words, a third-party in the peacebuilding literature, is usually conceived as an external, impartial military force that poses a physical threat to any party violating the peace.

However, in a broader context, a third-party may take several roles that are relevant for peace agreement implementation in addition to military assistance. A third-party may have an important role in the pre-agreement context, through a mediator role, which may also impact their long-term commitment. Further, in the post-agreement setting, third-parties may provide financial support (donors), administrative support or verification tasks.

When talking about third-parties, researchers often consider the United Nations and military forces, typically those under UN Peacekeeping Operations (UNPKOs). However, the term

8 See Binningsbø 2013 for a neat summary of many important contributions.

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“third-party” or “external actor” is rarely sufficiently clarified. The terms may denote a single state, a group of states, a supranational or international organisation, or a non-governmental organisation (NGO). Further, the operationalisation varies, ranging from dummies for any presence via implementation scores to donor moneys provided and media coverage⁹.

When it comes to the effect of third-party mediators on long-term peace and peace agreement implementation the empirical tests for this have not yielded confident support¹⁰. For donors providing financial aid, the main picture from the literature is that aid reduces the chance for (renewed) armed conflict and even enhances social inclusion in ethnically divided societies (Marshall, 2017; Chesterman, 2010; Haass, 2019; Joshi, et al., 2016). However, the monetary aid from outside actors also seem to ineffective in building “positive peace”, the democratisation process falling short of elites that manage to exploit the support for personal gain and staying in power (Haass, 2019). The aid effectiveness may thus depend on the regime type of the recipient (Mansfield & Snyder, 1995). Furthermore, some critics highlight the international community’s notorious tendency to give too little too late. Some even argue that such trends make peacebuilding and implementation harder, because any aid at all gives expectations of improvement, which in turn are not met – causing extra frustration¹¹. Additionally, the rebels are more likely to return to armed conflict if they are sponsored by an external actor to do so (Karlén, 2017).

Administrative support is not as explored in quantitative research. Some find that local administrative capacity and institutional quality is important for avoiding conflict (Taydas, et al., 2010), but the external administrative support to enhance local capacities has not yet been proven significant. Some find that sending in external bureaucrats to support the implementation process is associated with higher implementation. However, they are dependent

9 Some examples of different operationalisations of third-parties include the total number of UN personnel (Maekawa, et al., 2018), the combination of implementation of UN Peacekeeping operations, Net foreign aid, and global media coverage (Joshi & Quinn, 2015b), and presence of intervention (DeRouen Jr., et al., 2010).

10 Examples of studies on mediation and peace agreement implementation and/or peacebuilding include Walter (Walter, 2002, p. 89), that find mediation to have no effect, Holmes (2017), that find partial support for biased mediation causing less implementation, DeRouen Jr. & Möller (2013) and Quinn et al. (2013), that both find direct mediation reduces short-term violence, not long-term, Pospieszna & Schneider (2011), that find mediation is positive for getting an agreement signed by the parties but not for the implementation phase, DeRouen &

Chowdhury (2016) and Lounsbery & DeRouen Jr (2016) find that mediation either alone or in interaction with peacekeeping operations helps keeping peace while intervention alone increases conflict, and Eriksson & Kostic (2013) are generally critical of “peace imposed from above” and emphasise the often lacking legitimacy among the local population.

11 Examples of studies on donors or financial aid (either as an explanatory variable or control variable) and peacebuilding include Joshi & Quinn (2015b), Vadlamannati et al. (2014), Colareise (2014), DiGiuseppe et al (2012), Fearon et al. (2009), Chesterman (2010), and Haass (2019).

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12/147 on both being accompanied by peacekeeping forces, and on the bureaucracy having the capacity to make use of their personnel¹².

Furthermore, the third-parties can take a role as verifiers of implementation, possibly contributing with more advanced technology and skill as well as providing more reliable information to both parties in order to enhance trust. At least one study finds support for this being important when measured with other factors¹³.

Most significant in the literature, however, are military interventions. Here researchers are fairly unanimous in that they are important for keeping short-term peace and facilitating the implementation (Walter, 2002; Hartzell & Hoddie, 2007; DeRouen Jr., et al., 2010). Still, critics highlight both the ambiguous commitment of outside actors and the unfortunate and unsustainable long-term consequences: They tend to focus on negative peace through what in practice can be seen as a foreign military occupation, and they usually impose democracy and a liberal market from (outside and) above (Richmond, 2005; Eriksson & Kostic, 2013; Philpott

& Powers, 2010; Paris, 2004; Sriram, 2008). This is done instead of supporting, to a larger degree, local actors in fostering positive peace and democracy from below. This often results in the local actors remaining unprepared when the occupiers pull out – often immaturely (Philpott & Powers, 2010; Richmond, 2005; Paris, 2004). It is also pointed out that, while usually very helpful, security forces are not strictly necessary, as there are examples of parties managing to implement CPAs without military intervention (Hartzell & Hoddie, 2007, p. 105).

Still, despite some negative associations and some insignificant results, third-party peacekeeping forces, UNPKO in particular, are noted in the literature as the most important measure for securing the signing and implementation of peace agreements¹⁴.

12 Maekawa et al. (2018) argue they capture administrative support through GDP per capita and consider it in relation to UN personnel, but this control variable is statistically insignificant, and they recommend finding a better measurement. DeRouen (2010) emphasise that the merit of external help is dependent on the local capacity.

13 Examples of studies applying the verification-aspect of third-parties include Walter (2002, p. 26), who briefly discusses that third-party verifiers can provide reliable information as an unbiased third-party; Maekawa et al.

(2018), who only partially capture this aspect when they measure the general presence of UN staff (and they only find that they enhance implementation when combined with peacekeeping forces), and Joshi et al. (2016), who use the implementation of verification measures as an explanatory variable, which they find to enhance implementation.

14 Examples of studies that find a positive relationship between third-parties and agreement

success/implementation include (Joshi, et al., 2016; Walter, 2002; Greenhill & Major, 2007; Toft, 2009;

Pospieszna & Schneider, 2011), while for example Joshi & Melander (2017) and Mukherjee (2006a) do not find support for this.

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13/147 It should also be mentioned that the interventional military forces may contribute to enhance the local capacities to alleviate the problem of so-called “spoilers”. Any actor that perceives the peace process as “[threatening] their power, worldview, and interests, and uses violence to undermine attempts to achieve it” is what Stedman (1997) calls a “spoiler”. Greenhill & Major (2007)¹⁵ postulate that potential spoilers are static and that their interests are altered in accordance with changing abilities of its opponent as the implementation phase unfolds. Thus, it becomes both difficult and unnecessary to control for static spoilers. Nonetheless, the state’s ability to stop them from spoiling the peace process may be checked by measuring the material capabilities to deter such threats. Yet, how do we measure material capabilities in a situation where the final authority of control of the means of force are still not clearly defined and loyalty to the peace process is still up for question? We may, as some have, combine the military

“leverage” of both the government and the (former) insurgents (Maekawa, et al., 2018) or simply their Gross Domestic Product (GPD) per capita (DeRouen Jr., et al., 2010). Regardless what the local capacities may be, however, these abilities to co-opt spoilers may be considerably enhanced by third-parties (Greenhill & Major, 2007).

In sum, in order to alleviate the security dilemma and enhance implementation, third-parties may contribute via five roles: Military intervention, donors giving financial aid, administrative support, verification monitoring and mediation. The empirical evidence so far indicates that military intervention is important, while mediation has not proven to be helpful. The other roles are positively associated with higher implementation but not yet broadly supported.

Importantly, third-parties relate to the local capacities. International organisations like the UN, regional organisations, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and countries thus may send experts and bureaucrats to give advice or give a helping hand in the implementation process.

For weak states, this may be crucial in order to successfully complete the implementation. On the other hand, receiving such help also requires a certain capacity: The ability to communicate and coordinate along with having the infrastructure to receive and distribute people, equipment and technology is necessary for the aid to be effective. The weakest states, states that are under- staffed, lack coordination, and have weak infrastructure, thus, may be too fragile to take advantage of third-party help (DeRouen Jr., et al., 2010). Additionally, the willingness to help and what type of aid the third-parties provide is heavily influenced by the current international environment and their national interests, which makes their effect more unreliable (Hartzell &

15 Who built on and further developed the concept after Stedman

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14/147 Hoddie, 2007; Walter, 2002; Chesterman, 2010). Further, if the promised help comes too late, it may contribute to the failure of the process (Walter, 2002, p. 106). That means that third- parties potentially have a crucial role, but it depends on them being willing and able in due time and on how they interact with local actors.

2.1.1: c) Conflict characteristics

Traits of the conflict prior to the agreement (or any other peace process) are often found to impact the chances of success, in particular the duration and intensity of the war. For CPA implementation, several scholars have argued that long and intense wars (that is, the costs being higher) make the peace process more difficult. The reason for this is that the trust, divisions and animosity between the groups have been allowed to grow (Maekawa, et al., 2018; Joshi &

Quinn, 2015b; Walter, 2002). When there is less trust, the parties may endure fewer delays and frustrations before they resort to violence again. Furthermore, I would add, the more destruction and death, the more there is to reconstruct. There is more infrastructure to rebuild, the more victims to aid, and the more trauma and animosity among the people, making protest and anti- cooperation more likely. Empirically, long and intense conflicts have been associated with less implementation, though some find this relationship to be significant (Maekawa, et al., 2018) and others not (Walter, 2002, p. 161; Joshi & Quinn, 2015b).

In sum, conflict characteristics, such as the intensity and duration of the war, negatively affect the implementation of peace agreements. This may also influence the bureaucracy in several ways. First, a long lasting conflict may have restrained the development of a high quality government, as conflict hampers investment and causes insecurity (Sobek, 2010). The conflict constitutes a serious threat to the civil bureaucrats and their ability to do their job safely and uninterrupted. A short conflict, on the other hand, may give more of what can be called a

“shock” than anything else. That is, something that keeps the bureaucrats able to resume where they were, rather than experience a complete breakdown.

2.1.1: d) Regime type and institutions

When it comes to the type of regime and democratic institutions, we know more about how they relate to conflict onset than peace agreement implementation. It is considered a “truism”

in the conflict literature that democracies are less likely to experience armed conflict (Hegre, 2014)¹⁶. Furthermore, the international community is dominated by a “liberal hegemony” where

16 The “consolidated democracies” are at least less likely to experience war than semi-democracies. The harshest autocracies are also unlikely to experience war (Hegre, et al., 2001).

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15/147 all states are encouraged to strengthen institutions of democracy and trade – which arguably are interlinked philosophies promoting peace (Miklian, 2014). Countries torn by civil war are per definition not functioning democracies, and most CPAs are expected to have provisions on democratic reform (Jarstad & Sisk, 2008). Several researchers find that non-democratic regimes experiencing democratic reform are more likely to return to armed conflict (Mason & Greig, 2016; Cederman, et al., 2010; Cook, et al., 2016; Gleditsch & Ruggeri, 2010; Mukherjee, 2006a). This is particularly true if they are military regimes or if the parties fight over governmental power.

The picture is different when we investigate studies that analyse the regime type in relation to agreement implementation. Joshi (2015) finds that democracies, during agreement implementation, are more successful in neutralising threats to conflict onset, such as high child mortality rates. Conversely, Jarstad & Nilsson (2018) conclude that different regime types make no difference in implementation of peace agreements. Furthermore, Keels & Mason (2018) emphasise that democratic institutions may make peace agreement implementation more complicated, because the executive is restricted by lengthy processes and political opposition.

Although empirical evidence suggests that democracies are better at building peace, it is not evident that democracies should be more effective in implementing a peace agreement. It is argued that societies that have either access to or experience with political pluralism are better

“equipped” for the peacebuilding process (Carothers, 2007a, p. 24; Berman, 2017, p. 31).

However, similar empirical support for the effect of democracy on implementation lacks, with several insignificant results (Jarstad & Nilsson, 2008; Walter, 2002, p. 88; DeRouen Jr., et al., 2009). In fact, this seems particularly unclear when it comes to the non-democratic aspects of corruption and lacking transparency. “Personalistic”, unstable and authoritarian regimes are associated with more corruption (Chang, 2010). Some have suggested that corrupt institutions may allow more effective processes by “greasing the wheels” (Andersen & Krishnarajan, 2017).

Yet, why any such “grease” should be more likely to be provided to further CPA implementation and not to reach other goals, on a general basis, is unclear.

One problem with the quantitative studies on regime type and implementation is that the concepts and indicators they use are too broad and vague. What constitutes a “democracy” is very complex and multifaceted. Underdeveloped conceptualisations and inaccurate measurements may explain why several of the studies are inconclusive. They do not necessarily capture the interests of the actors and what motivates them to comply with the implementation

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16/147 process. We should instead apply more refined parameters, measuring separate aspects of democracy and specific institutions – which several databases now allow.

2.1.1: e) Resources and funding

We have already discussed the possible positive effects of financial aid from third-parties.

Regardless of whether from international actors or national sources, the local actors “need substantial financial resources to implement peace settlements” (Hartzell & Hoddie, 2007, p.

107). Empirics do indicate that having a larger economy enables implementation. This makes sense, as several of typical provisions require complex and costly procedures, such as demobilisation, that requires transportation, security, accommodations, logistics, and observers.

Additionally, to manage most of these tasks, one needs practitioners, further increasing costs.

In this context, it is at least partly relevant to mention the numerous studies that use gross domestic product (GDP) per capita as an explanatory variable. Arguably, the measure is the country’s prosperity, but the measure can also serve a proxy for many things, most prominently state capacity. For example, Joshi & Quinn (2015b, p. 882) argue GDP per capita proxies “the state's capacity to deliver basic public goods”. They also find partial support for its positive effect on CPA implementation, just as Maekawa et al. (2018). In my opinion, the argument that these findings can be theoretically linked to state wealth and financial resources to implement CPAs, and not only the concepts they are intended to (like the broader “state capacity”), seems reasonable. In conclusion, we can take insight both from parts of the literature on wealth and parts of the state capacity research, both indicating that it should be positively associated with high CPA implementation.

2.1.1: f) Summary

Research on peace agreement implementation tends to address this issue through concepts of security dilemmas, concentrating on decision-makers. The research is, furthermore, mostly interested in measures that mitigate fear, uncertainty and lack of trust. The most common explanatory factors are power-sharing arrangements (PSAs – in their five forms) and third-party intervention. These are usually considered to have a vital and positive effect on CPA implementation. Additionally, other third-party roles – financial and administrative support, verification measures and mediation – have been tested and usually indicate positive effects on implementation, though not always significant, especially not mediation. To a lesser degree, conflict characteristics (duration and intensity), regime type and financial capabilities have been considered in explaining CPA implementation. The latter two are usually positively associated

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17/147 with implementation, while severe and long conflicts are expected to make implementation harder.

Studies addressing the abovementioned factors have two common problems. First, for the sequencing studies in particular, they still fail to explain the initially implemented provisions.

Second, they ignore other important implementers, not least local actors that take part in much of the practical and behind-the-scenes work.

The former insurgents and the government are not the only actors in a peacebuilding process.

For example, under demobilisation, it is crucial that the rebels actually give up their weapons and attend the events as they ought to. There are practitioners that provide the locations, communications, assistance, organisation, registration, and reporting – a group that includes civil servants, public officials, state officers – that is, the public bureaucrats. Similarly they accommodate the implementation of power-sharing arrangements, coordinating security forces, distributing donor money, and other factors. The state’s ability to tackle the practical challenges of implementing a comprehensive peace accord is taken for granted in previous research. I believe this deserves more attention.

More generally, when it comes to the widespread analytical emphasis on security dilemmas, to what degree are they helpful in this context? They are helpful in understanding and explaining central challenges. Yet, they focus solely on decision-makers. They then ignore other actors that are involved in the process. Furthermore, they often concentrate on military-oriented capacities, even though CPA implementation involves many “civil” endeavours. The former warring parties will always know returning to armed conflict always remains an option¹⁷. Still, they will have other concerns that may impact their decision. Additionally, actors other than the decision-making elites are involved and important in the implementation process.

17 Though far from the only option, and often the return to violence actually may be a less effective or even favourable action for the parties that many claim: Public diplomacy and condemnation, threats of withholding materials or embargo of funds, and so on may be more readily available and in the interest of a party than risking war through a violent response instead (Hartzell & Hoddie, 2007, p. 96).

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2.2 Literature review on state capacity and implementation

2.2.1 State capacity and peace agreement implementation

The existing theory on the relationship between state capacity and the implementation of peace agreements is very limited. There is only one explicit study on the relationship between these two factors – the 2010 article “Civil war peace agreement implementation and state capacity”

by DeRouen Jr and his colleagues. Therefore, I find it important to thoroughly discuss this highly relevant study.

DeRouen Jr et al. define state capacity as "the state's ability to accomplish those goals it pursues, possibly in the face of resistance by actors within the sate" (DeRouen Jr., et al., 2010, p. 335). This conceptualisation of state capacity makes their analysis tautological: Explaining the success of implementation with “the ability to accomplish one’s goals” is self-explanatory.

We cannot clearly distinguish what explains and what is being explained. Nevertheless, their operationalisation and discussion provides helpful contributions.

Further, they operationalise state capacity by measuring both CINC scores¹⁸ and GDP per capita (DeRouen Jr., et al., 2010, p. 337). They argue that combining these two indicators “is sufficient to classify” the cases’ state capacity.

DeRouen Jr et al do a qualitative case-study, investigating the effect of state capacity on agreement success (a combination of implementation and durable peace). They analyse 14 cases within five conflicts¹⁹, choosing the cases with “purposive selection”, including “diverse variation within a relatively small group”. They also included third-party intervention, power- sharing arrangements and the scope of the agreement as factors in the discussion.

They find state capacity to play a “significant role” and to be a “strong predictor” of implementation success overall. Stronger states are better at implementing – without any outside help. Additionally, as a state gets weaker, they do not only get both worse at implementing and more likely to receive third-party help, but they are also worse at benefiting from this aid. The weakest states are not able to take advantage from the external help offered.

18 CINC scores are “annual values for the computed Composite Index of National Capability”, which are “based on total population, urban population, iron and steel production, energy consumption, military personnel, and military expenditures” (DeRouen Jr., et al., 2010, p. 337).

19 The five conflicts are United Kingdom-Northern Ireland, Indonesia-Aceh, Burundi, Mali and Somalia. All the same conflicts, except Somalia, are included in my study, and I add 30 more. Additionally, I only include comprehensive agreements, not every agreement to each conflict, as DeRouen Jr. et al do, and I follow each agreement up to ten years after they were signed.

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19/147 Interestingly, their main conclusion, on peace success, is that “peace agreements and state capacity are necessary but not sufficient conditions for sustainable peace” (DeRouen Jr., et al., 2010, p. 344). Rather, DeRouen Jr et al finally conclude, the “three legs” of state capacity, third-party intervention and implementation need to work together to secure peace, also stressing that each conflict is unique.

This conclusion is both promising and confusing. The first problem about it is the outcome variable. Their dependent variable, the peace agreement success, had two shortcomings. First, by combining the level of implementation and whether armed conflict reoccurred, they did not essentially differentiate themselves from the vast existing literature on war recurrence – not so much explaining implementation as explaining peacekeeping. In fact, the Peace Accor Matrix (PAM) dataset includes several cases where high implementation scores (above 75%) are reached at the same time as war reoccurs during the implementation period. Here battle-related deaths range between 25 (Angola) and 1404 (Sudan) as well as somewhere in between (Guinea- Bissau, Burundi, Rwanda, Tajikistan, East-Timor). Second, by conceptualising the implementation as either partially or fully successful or failed (an ordinal-level variable at best), they ignore both many nuances of implementing comprehensive peace agreements (CPAs) and the incremental process implementation usually takes (Joshi, et al., 2016, p. 1002). CPAs address the underlying conflict roots, and we have other strong empirical indications advocating that the more of them that are acted upon, the more likely lasting peace is. To better distinguish different levels of implementation would therefore be both more accurate and helpful in analysing the peacebuilding efforts.

The second problem about their conclusion is the main independent variable for explaining agreement implementation: state capacity, which is operationalised in problematic ways. The GDP per capita-proxy is influenced by many factors, including endogenous aspects of conflict:

GDP per capita both has causal connections to conflict onset and is affected by conflict (Hendrix, 2010, p. 277). Next, the CINC scores include even more elements that do not relate to the nature of civil policy implementation, such as military expenditures and steel production.

Not only are these endogenous and vaguely related to peace agreement implementation, but they are also not clearly linked to their definition of state capacity – the “ability to accomplish those goals it pursues” – which is tautological and problematic in the first place. The definition of state capacity should avoid tautology, and its operationalisation should avoid endogeneity while at the same time be more theoretically related to the outcome.

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20/147 Lastly, their sample size has its pros and cons. It seems to reach for a compromise between a large-N study (that possibly could make a more generalizable study) and a case study with one or two cases (that could go even further into detail, e.g. via process-tracing). Though carefully picked out, five conflicts make a very small number to base a generalizable conclusion upon.

Still, it is true that the case-studies allow for the observation of case-specific nuances a large-N regression cannot. Nonetheless, this does not fully reap the benefits of what a large-N study may offer. New datasets now allow for such larger-N studies, which will most likely yield more reliable and generalizable results for the relation between these two variables. My thesis seeks the advantages of such data and method.

2.2.2 Bureaucratic quality

2.2.2: a) Bureaucratic quality as state capacity

My research question is what factors facilitate the implementation of peace agreements in post- civil war societies. Like DeRouen Jr et al, I expect the capacity of the state to implement the agreement to be important. However, the concept of state capacity involves many dimensions.

Hendrix (2010) identifies three dimensions of state capacity and 15 common operationalisations of the concept. Of these, he highlights “bureaucratic quality” which falls under the dimension he calls rational legality, meaning the bureaucratic and administrative capacity of the state. The two other dimensions he calls rentier-autocraticness and neopatrimoniality, which cut across several aspects, namely military capacity, the ability to extract revenue (taxes, export, etc.), and the coherence and quality of institutions (democracy).

In comparing the 15 widely acknowledged and applied conceptualisations and operationalisations of state capacity in the context of conflict studies, Hendrix concludes that bureaucratic quality has the best “construct validity”. By this he means two things: That it captures well the theoretical concept of state capacity (measurement validity), and it clearly discerns between competing causal mechanisms (avoids endogeneity with conflict onset).

Notably, Hendrix makes this argument considering the outcome of conflict onset (whether rebels will rebel), not to the implementation of peace agreements. Still, the construct validity remains unharmed, and I will argue there is no apparent reason to expect any endogenous relationship to CPA implementation. Even though implementing the provisions of a peace accord via financial support and institutional improvement may contribute to a change in

Why are some peace agreements more implemented than others?

Why are some peace agreements more implemented than others?

A statistical analysis of comprehensive peace agreements and bureaucratic quality, 1989-2015.

Master's thesis in Peace and Conflict Studies Department of Political Science

Why are some peace agreements more implemented than others?

____

A statistical analysis of comprehensive peace agreements and

bureaucratic quality, 1989-2015.

Abstract

Acknowledgements

Table of contents

List of figures, graphs and tables

Abbreviations

1.0 Introduction____________________________________

2.0 Theory and literature review_______________________

2.1 Literature review on implementation of peace agreements

2.2 Literature review on state capacity and implementation