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‘It’s the Economy, Stupid!’

Political Economy Analysis and Political Corruption Studies

Inge Amundsen, senior researcher, Chr. Michelsen Institute, Bergen/Norway Wednesday, 20

th

of November 2019

ANU workshop, Canberra, Australia

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Political Economy Analysis

and Political Corruption Studies

Political Economy Analysis

• Upcoming political science approach

• PEA theories and approaches

The Resource Curse theory

• Economic and political aspects

• The democracy first theory

Political Corruption Studies

• Political vs administrative corruption

• Political corruption as power preservation

Analytical Tools

• Research questions

(3)

Political Economy Analysis

• Interdisciplinary: economics, sociology and political science

• Explains how political institutions, the political environment, and the economic system influence each other

• Economic interests of politicians

• Political influence of economic interests

(4)

The Resource Curse

The Dutch DiseaseThe Paradox of PlentyThe Rentier State model

Oil rich countries can be worse off

• Rich in natural resources

• Poor in economic development

Explanations

– Economic explanations – Political explanations Democracy first

theory

Norway

Australia

Canada

Chile

Brazil

Malaysia

Botswana

Nigeria

Angola

DR Congo

The Sudan

Sierra Leone

Liberia

Zambia

Colombia

Azerbaijan

Tajikistan

(5)

Economic Explanations

Relative price effect

• Higher currency value

• More imports (cheaper)

• Competition difficult

The ‘Dutch Disease’

• Over-investment in extractive industries

• Under-investments in manufacture, agriculture

• “Crowding out” (decline of competitiveness)

• De-industrialisation

• Limited/difficult economic diversification

Volatility

• Uncertainty for businesses

• Government waste and debt

• Government borrowing

• Capital flight

(6)

Political Explanations

The prize increases

• Higher government revenues

• Large benefits of being the “state elite”

• Consumption, enrichment, corruption

State autonomy increases

• Off-shore, foreign, High-Tech

• “Un-earned”, easy

• Little taxation domestic economy

• No “social contract”

• Little influence business/middle class

• Little influence of civil society

State power increases

• Means to manipulate institutions

• Means to buy (off) rivals

• Means to buy instruments of coercion

Conflict increases

• Uneven distribution

• Increasing inequality

• Increasing poverty

Authoritarianism increases

• Entrenched elites

• Violent defence of privileges

• Weak institutions

(7)

Democracy First Theory

A country will be cursed only when it becomes oil-export dependent before

accountable and democratic state institutions

are established and consolidated

Exceptions?

Norway “4 times blessed”

1 Established democracy

– Rules of the game settled

2 Resource management

experience

– Hydro-electric power plants – Competent civils service

3 No big expectations

– Modest start

4

Big finds

The First Law of

Petropolitics: The price of oil and the pace of

freedom always move in opposite directions in oil- rich petrolist states.

Thomas Friedman 2006

Phillips 1962 $/year: 2 000 000 Gvt. income $/year: 20 000 000 000 Petroleum Fund 2019: 1 100 000 000 000

(8)

Political Corruption

• Abuse (capture) of public power for private benefit

• Misuse of entrusted power for private gain

Political when political decision makers abuse their power for private benefit

Political

Power holders Rules of the game

Bureaucratic

Implementors

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Political Corruption: Two faces/phases

Extraction Power preservation

Bribery

• Corruption per se

• Kickbacks, sweeteners,

percentages, grease money, …

Embezzlement

• Theft

• Privatisations

Fraud

• Economic crime

• Element of cheating

• Tax systems

Extortion

• Element of violence

• No/little returns

Buying friends

• Favouritism

• Clientelism, patronage

• Co-optation

• Nepotism

Buying support

• Vote buying, handouts

• Majorities

Buying impunity

• Courts and judges

• O&C institutions

• Political nominations

Buying security

• Means of violence

Incentives

Means

(10)

The petroleum sector ideal

(11)

Petroleum sector corruption

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Political Corruption as Power Preservation: MENA

Extraction

• Bribery

• Embezzlement

• Fraud

• Extortion

Power preservation

• Buying friends

• Buying support

• Buying impunity

• Buying security

Incentives

Means

(13)

Research Questions

Developmentalist states?

• State autonomy

• Incentives

• Capabilities

• Established crony capitalism

From business to politics or vv?

• Regime characteristics

• New politicians

Seek ye first

the political kingdom and all else shall be added unto you

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Research Questions

When petrodollars run out?

• Peak oil

• Diversification

• Social contract

• Conflict

50%

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