Perspective on Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR)
by
Bjørn-Tore Blindheim
Thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of
PHILOSOPHIAE DOCTOR (PhD)
Faculty of Social Sciences University of Stavanger
2010
N-4036 Stavanger NORWAY
© 2010 Bjørn-Tore Blindheim ISBN: 978-82-7644-406-3 ISSN: 1890-1387
To Cathrine, Emma, Helena and Sofie
Oluf Langhelle, friend and supervisor; Thanks!
Contents ... vii
Part I ... 1
1 Introduction (As if Society Doesn’t Matter…) ... 2
1.1 Research aims ... 6
1.2 Structure of the thesis ... 7
2 Background: The Study Field of Business and Society ... 9
2.1 Autonomy and Control ... 9
2.2 The Construct of CSR ... 11
3 Theory ... 22
3.1 Institutional Theory ... 24
3.2 The Current Institutional Analysis of CSR ... 25
3.3 The New Institutional Descriptive Argument ... 30
3.3.1 Manifestations of CSR within National Institutional Fields ... 37
3.3.2 The Potential Political and Institutional Implications of CSR ... 40
3.4 The New Institutional Normative Argument... 46
3.4.1 Institutional Theory and CSR: A Normative Inquiry ... 49
3.5 Analytical Model ... 52
3.6 Summary of Research Questions ... 53
4 Methodology ... 55
4.1 Introduction ... 55
4.2 Some Epistemological and Theoretical Considerations ... 55
4.2.1 Final Remarks on the Research Prologue ... 61
4.3 Research Design (or the Construction of Plots) ... 63
4.3.2 Data Production and Construction ... 72
4.3.3 Analysis and Interpretation ... 73
4.4 The Trustworthiness of the Study ... 77
5 Results ... 80
5.1 Research Articles ... 80
5.2 Analytical Content of Article I ... 82
5.3 Analytical Content of Article II... 86
5.4 Analytical Content of Article III ... 90
5.5 Analytical Content of Article IV ... 94
6 Discussion ... 96
6.1 The Institutionally Contingent and Embedded Nature of CSR 96 6.2 Institutional and Democratic Implications of Explicit CSR ... 101
6.3 Towards a Political Conceptualisation of CSR ... 109
6.4 Towards an Convergent Institutional Perspective on CSR .... 117
6.5 Implications for the Institutional Analysis of CSR ... 119
6.5.1 Understanding Manifestations of CSR ... 120
6.5.2 Understanding Societal Implications of Manifestations of CSR ... 121
6.5.3 Justifying the Role and Responsibility of Business ... 122
7 Conclusions (As if Society Mattered...) ... 123
7.1 Limitations with the Study ... 124
7.2 Final Remarks ... 127
References ... 130
Part II ... 164
List of Articles ... 165
Article II ... 213 Article III ... 264 Article IV ... 292
Part I
“There are (…) situations where an institution has its raison d’être, mission, wisdom, integrity, organization, performance, moral foundation, justice, prestige, and resources questioned and it is asked whether the institution contributes to society what it is supposed to contribute” (March and Olsen, 2005) “…pressures for organizational autonomy are
like coiled springs precariously restrained by the counterforce of the state and ready to unwind whenever the system is jolted” (Dahl, 1982)
1 Introduction (As if Society Doesn’t Matter…)
The research reported in this thesis has been directed by three interconnected questions: 1) How can institutional theory contribute to our understanding of the contingent nature of CSR and manifestations of CSR within national-level fields? 2) What are the potential institutional and political implications of CSR? and 3) How can institutional theory contribute to discussions of a justified foundation for companies (political) efforts on the societal arena?
Since the 1950s, the role of business in, and the responsibility of companies towards, society have increasingly been addressed in terms of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) (Carroll, 1999, 2008;
Frederick, 2006). Simply put, CSR refers to responsibilities that either a corporation has to society or responsibilities that society imposes on corporations (De George, 2008).
The research on CSR is dominated by two broad strands of literatures (Gond, Palazzo, and Basu, 2009), the economic or instrumental approach to CSR (e.g., Friedman and Friedman, 1962; Friedman, 1970;
Husted and Allen, 2000; Maignan and Ferrell, 2001, 2004;
McWilliams, Siegel, and Wright, 2006; McWilliams and Siegel, 2001;
Porter and Kramer, 2002, 2006), and the duty-aligned or ethical approach on CSR (e.g., Bowie, 1998; Cassel, 2001; Donaldson and Dunfee, 1999; Donaldson and Preston, 1995; Freeman, 1984; Mahon and McGowan, 1991; Melè, 2002; Shrivastava, 1995; Swanson, 1995, 1999). Each approach holds – more or less explicitly – both positive/descriptive and normative ambitions.
The inquiry of this thesis is informed by two concurrent observations.
The first observation is that, within the Business and Society literature – and in particular within the instrumental and duty-aligned perspectives – the notion of CSR is often interpreted within the assumptions and aspirations of methodological individualism (e.g., Weber, 1968) and a social and political philosophy putting individual rather than collectives in the centre of its ideas about the ideal institutional order, and of theories on how to understand and explain societal phenomena.
Methodological individualism is “the doctrine that all social phenomena – their structures and their change – are in principle explicable in ways that only involve individuals – their properties, their goals, their intentions, and their rational choices” (Elster, 1985, p. 5).
As such, methodological individualism makes individuals – citizens, managers, consumers – and their choices the primary object of study (Petrovic, 2008). The analysis begins and ends with the individual rational calculation: societal phenomena must be explained by showing how they result from individual actions, which in turn must be explained through reference to the intentional states that motivate the individual actors (Heath, 2009). Methodological individualism does not deny the existence of social structures. These are social realities. But social structures – as institutions – should be understood and explained with reference to the individual characteristics of their constituents (Weber, 1968).
The basis of the instrumental and duty-aligned approaches to CSR within the assumptions and aspirations of methodological individualism has important implications for how the notion of CSR is understood, that is, what the notion contains, how responsible – or irresponsible – corporate action is, and of the variables that might promote responsible behaviour.
In its positivist and descriptive outlook (e.g., Husted, 2003) the instrumental or strategic approach to CSR seeks to explain responsible – or irresponsible – corporate behaviour with reference to rational self- seeking individuals’ (mostly corporate managers) pursuit of profit maximisation. In its normative outlook (e.g., Friedman and Friedman, 1962; Friedman 1970), the instrumental or strategic approach justifies CSR solely on economic grounds. In slightly other words: business and companies may legitimately engage in CSR only when their underlying motivation is the attainment of financial performance.
In its positivist and descriptive outlook, the duty-aligned or ethical approach to CSR seeks to explain corporate responsible – or irresponsible – behaviour with references to the values premises of individual preference-based action. In its normative outlook, the duty- aligned or ethical approach justifies CSR on ethical grounds. In slightly other words, business and companies should engage in CSR because this is the right thing to do according to some ethical treaty, that, in turn, should inform moral reasoning and better individual decision- making.
The second observation informing the inquiry of this thesis – and one that is closely connected to the first observation – is that – within the Business and Society literature – the notion of CSR is often interpreted in apolitical terms. With this I mean that interpretations of CSR tend to ignore the specific political and institutional roots of CSR (Frederick, 1987; Hanlon, 2008), it tends to ignore the political nature of the social institution of business, the corporate entity, and the activities
companies perform under the rubric of CSR (Crane, Matten, and Moon, 2008; Scherer and Palazzo, 2007, 2008), and it tends to ignore the potential institutional and political implications of CSR (Barley, 2007;
Vogel, 2005). This second observation can also be formulated as the logical implications of the assumptions of methodological individualism inherent in the instrumental and duty-aligned approaches to CSR.
The convergent institutional perspective of CSR suggested in this thesis contrasts with the assumptions of methodological individualism that are inherent in both the instrumental and duty-aligned perspectives on CSR, and assumes that social reality contains “chunks of irreducible social matter” (van Oosterhout, 2002, p. 125), that through regulative, normative and cognitive institutions provide institutional logics (Friedland and Alford, 1991; Thornton, 2004) that inform specific manifestations of CSR within an institutional field (e.g. van Oosterhout and Heugens, 2008). An institutional approach to CSR thus questions the assumption of methodological individualism that unified individual subjects are the units of society and economic, social, and political behaviour. That means that rather than seeing challenges of corporate responsibility as residing primarily in the value premises of individual preference-based action – as assumed within instrumental and duty- aligned perspectives – an institutional perspective assumes that challenges of corporate responsibility constitute an inherent aspect of the structures of political rules, institutions, and identities (e.g., March and Olsen, 1996). The position that social reality contains “chunks of irreducible social matter” does, however, not preclude the possibility of agency. Actors are capable of purposefully acting in pursuit of their own interest, potentially leading to both the maintenance and change of institutions (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991). At the same time, they do this within socially constructed frames, both constituting and limiting their purposefully interpretations and actions (Scott, 2008; Lounsbury, 2008).
The institutional perspective on CSR in this thesis has not only positivist or descriptive, but also normative ambitions. That is, it is argued that the perspective holds promises for justificatory purposes, and hence can be used to outline criteria for probing into the question of why the social institution of business and companies has a responsibility towards society, and what constitutes the elements of this responsibility. The position taken is that political democracy and the pursuit of the common good not only depends on economic and social conditions, but also on the appropriate design and functioning of political institutions (March and Olsen, 1984). The perspective thus builds on a normative vision of a political order based upon institutions (Wolin, 1960, 2004) as its point of departure for descriptive analysis of the impact of diverse institutional variables on manifestations of CSR, and reasoning about the how to judge and evaluate the institutional and political implications of CSR and manifestations of the notion within institutional fields.
In sum then, the thesis argues in favour of a convergent perspective (e.g., Jones and Wicks, 1999; Kochan, Guillen, and O’Mahony, 2009;
Margolis and Walsh, 2003; Van Oosterhout and Heugens, 2009; Wicks and Freeman, 1998) of CSR in which descriptive and instrumental analysis is combined with normative assumptions about the preferred institutional order and prerequisites for organisational and corporate responsibility.
1.1 Research aims
This study sees the construct of CSR in terms of how to understand and conceptualise the organisation and responsible business activity1. Given
1 This point of departure builds on Wick’s and Freeman’s (1999) discussion of the nature of business ethics.
the puzzles of CSR as methodological individualism and the concurrent apolitical nature of the concept, the inquiry of this thesis has been directed by the aim of suggesting an institutional convergent alternative to the instrumental and duty-aligned CSR perspectives, and to arrive at insights into some possible building blocks of such a perspective.
Within this framework, the inquiry has been directed by the following objectives:
1. To explore the institutional contingent and embedded nature of the construct of corporate social responsibility
2. To explore the potential political-institutional implications of corporate social responsibility
3. To contribute to discussions about a justified foundation for companies efforts on the societal arena from an institutional point of view
1.2 Structure of the thesis
The thesis consists of two parts. Part I contains the background for the study, research aims, theoretical framework and research questions, methodology, results, discussion and conclusion. The design and thus also the structure and disposition of this study reflects its theoretical more than its policy or empirical orientation. The context of the research has not primarily been some empirical real-life world of CSR, but rather the theoretically informed literature and constructs of business and society reflecting this world. Thus, relatively large emphasis is put on elaborating on the literature on CSR, and the institutional perspective from which I analyse and inquire into the notion of CSR.
Part II consists of the four research articles included in the thesis2: Article I. Blindheim, B-T. Multiple and Contesting Perceptions of Explicit Corporate Social Responsibility Within a National
Institutionalised Field. Submitted February, 2008 for publication to Business and Society. New York: Sage Publisher. Revised February 2009 and September 2009.
Article II. Blindheim, B-T. (2008) Corporate Social Responsibility:
The Economic and Institutional Responsibility of Business in Society.
In Mikkelsen and Langhelle (Eds.), Arctic Oil and Gas – Sustainability at Risk? London and New York: Routledge.
Article III. Blindheim, B-T. and Langhelle, O. (2010) Reinterpreting the Principles of CSR: A Pragmatic Approach. Corporate Social Responsibility and Environmental Management, 17: 107-117. John Wiley & Sons Ltd. and ERP Environment.
Article IV. Blindheim, B-T, Øgaard, T. and Mikkelsen, A.
Development and Validation of the CSR Issues Scale (CSRIS): A Corporate Citizenship Perspective. Submitted February 2010 for publication to Journal of Business Ethics. Springer.
2 In the following, I refer to the articles as “Article I”, “Article II”, “Article III” and
“Article IV”.
2 Background: The Study Field of Business and Society
This chapter first frames discussions about notions of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) within the dual notion of organisational autonomy and control (Dahl, 1982). The chapter then proceeds with a closer presentation of CSR as a definitional construct, and the different approaches towards the notion. As part of this presentation, I also present the study’s initial understanding of CSR.
2.1 Autonomy and Control
Discussions about the role and responsibility of business in society can be framed by what Dahl (1982) calls the fundamental problem of pluralist democracies, the dilemma between autonomy and control. In pluralist democracies, independent or autonomous organisations – like business organisations – can be understood as highly desirable and indeed necessary to the functioning of the democratic process itself, to minimising coercion, to protecting liberty, and to ensuring human well- being and societal development in general. It can thus be argued that organisations – for the sake of democracy and the common good – ought to possess some autonomy in society. Valuable as organisational autonomy is for societal development and the pursuit of the common good, organisational autonomy also creates an opportunity to do harm (Dahl, 1982, p. 1):
Organizations (like corporate entities) may use the opportunity to increase or perpetuate injustice rather than reduce it, to foster the narrow egoism of their members at the expense for a broader public good, and even to weaken or destroy democracy itself.
Although organisations ought to possess some autonomy in society, it can thus also be argued that organisations should be controlled. The dilemma between autonomy and control – or the problem of democratic pluralism – constitutes a central challenge of political life (Dahl, 1982):
How much autonomy should be granted to which actor, in respect to what areas and action, and in relation to what other actors? And how much control ought to be exercised by what actors, employing what means of control over what other actors, and with respect to what actions?
In more general terms, the problem of democratic pluralism comes close to a description of the entire project of political theory (Dahl, 1982), and it can also serve as a framework for, or overriding issue within, the Study-Field of Business and Society3.
The study-field of business and society is primarily concerned with the tension that arises from the interaction between the economic and the cultural, and political sphere of society, and the mechanisms to cope with this tension (Jones, 1983). As such, the social control of business – defined as the means by which society directs business activity to useful ends – constitutes the very essence of the field. Two questions are central to inquiries within the study-field (Jones, 1983): 1):
How compatible are the outputs and processes of the economic system with the values of the cultural and political system (How
3 This research follows Lockett, Moon and Visser (2006), who defined Corporate Social Responsibility as a field of study rather than a discipline. While disciplines can be identified with references to their theoretically or methodologically distinctive approaches (as are economics, philosophy, and sociology), or through being substantively distinctive and systematic (as are political science and law), CSR does not meet even the more “relaxed” definition or criteria of a substantive discipline (Lockett, et al., 2006).
compatible are existing social control mechanisms?, and 2) How can the outputs and processes of the economic system be made more compatible with the values of the cultural and political systems? (How can social control mechanisms be improved?).
Three broad strands of social control mechanisms can be outlined (Wood and Jones, 1995): public policy, market, and normative. CSR perspectives differ greatly in what strands are seen as relevant and appropriate. In general, while instrumental – or economic – approaches to CSR would emphasise the importance of market control mechanisms like consumer, owner, supplier, and competitor expectations and behaviours, ethical or duty-aligned perspectives would emphasise normative societal control mechanisms like moral suasion, symbols and references to values. In contrast to both the former, institutional approaches to CSR would emphasize the importance of public policy control mechanisms like laws, regulation, litigation, jurisgenerative politics, public discourses and democratic iterations (Benhabib, 2006, 2008), in addition to normative and symbolic orders and structures.
2.2 The Construct of CSR4
A possible source for identifying the modern roots of CSR is the work of Berle and Means (1932). They documented a separation of ownership from control in large United States (US) corporations, thus resulting in a:
“…small (managerial) group, sitting at the head of enormous organizations, with the power to build, and destroy, communities, to generate great productivity and wealth, but also to control the distribution of that wealth, without regard for
4 This section draws on ArticleII and III of Part II of the thesis.
those who elected them (the stockholders) or those who depended of on them (the larger public)” (Mizruchi, 2004).
In line with Berle and Means’ concern that increased corporate and managerial power could harm public interests, the early literature and definitions of CSR were tied more to society’s interests than to those of the firm. As such, CSR built upon moral ideas about the primacy of human interests over corporate ones and the desire to mitigate many of the negative consequences of corporate power – environmental degradation and poisoning, unhealthy products, inhumane workplaces, and more (Logsdon and Wood, 2002).
Selected definitions of CSR5. Bowen’s Social Responsibilities of the Businessman (1953) is generally recognised as the book that marks the beginning of the academic literature on CSR. His point of departure for writing about the social responsibility of business was that the largest corporations at that time were vital centres of power and their actions affected citizens in many ways (Carroll, 2008). Bowen defined social responsibility as “the obligations of businessmen to pursue those policies, to make those decisions, or to follow those lines of action that are desirable in terms of the objectives and values of our society”.
Writers after Bowen, including Davis (1960; 1967; 1973), Preston and Post (1975; 1981) and Carroll (1979), continued to search for an appropriate definition of the meaning and content of CSR6. In 1960, Davis suggested that corporate responsibility involves decisions and actions that transcend the firm’s direct economic interests. Davis later
5 This section largely presents definitions of CSR from the 1960 and 70 as this body of literature still provides an important context for the contemporary CSR debate (Blowfield and Murray, 2008).
6 Table 1 provides an overview of selected CSR definitions.
(1973) defined CSR as “the firm’s considerations of, and response to, issues beyond the narrow economic, technical, and legal requirements of the firm (to) accomplish social benefits along with the traditional economic gains which the firm seeks.”
A landmark contribution to the concept of CSR came from the Committee for Economic Development (CED) in its 1971 publication
“Social Responsibilities of Business Corporations.” The CED became interested in the topic by observing that business functions by public consent and its basic purpose is to serve constructively the needs of society (Carroll, 1999). The CED (1971, p. 15) report articulated a three concentric circles definition of CSR: The inner circle consisted of the basic responsibilities for the efficient execution of the economic function – products, jobs and economic growth. The intermediate circle in the CED understanding of CSR encompassed the business responsibility to exercise the economic function with sensitivity to changing social values and priorities: for example, with respect to environmental conservation; hiring and relations with employees; and more rigorous expectations of customers for information, fair treatment, and protection from injury. The outer circle outlined the responsibility that business should assume to become more broadly and actively engaged in improving the social environment.
Preston and Post introduced the notion of public responsibility in 1975.
At the core of this notion lies the idea that business and society are mutually dependent systems, and firms should be socially responsible by adhering to the standards of performance both in law and in the public policy process because they exist and operate in a shared environment. According to Preston and Post (1975, 1981) the notion of public responsibility expresses the responsibility of businesses for outcomes related to their primary and secondary areas of involvement with society; meaning that business organisations are not responsible for solving all social and environmental problems. Instead, they are responsible for solving problems they have caused and for helping to
solve problems and issues related to their business operations and interests. Together, the primary and secondary responsibilities define what Preston and Post (1975, p. 57) call the “legitimate scope of corporate responsibility”.
Carroll (1979) closed in on the notion of CSR by observing that society has some basic expectations towards the role and responsibility of business. The first obligation of business towards society is economic in nature, and refers to the fundamental responsibility of business to produce goods and services that society wants, and being profitable.
The second obligation of business is legal in nature, and refers to the responsibility of business to fulfill its core economic activity within the laws and regulations that society has laid down. The third obligation of business is ethical in nature, and refers to the responsibility of business to go beyond legal compliance, as society has expectations to business over and above legal requirements. The forth obligation of business is discretionary in nature, and refers to the voluntary responsibility of business in “doing what is right” even if there are no clear-cut societal expectations.
Given this range of obligations business has to society, Carroll (1979, p. 500) thus defined CSR as “the economic, legal, ethical, and discretionary expectations that society has of organizations at a given point in time.” This conceptualization and definition of CSR is probably the most established, accepted and cited one for understanding the different aspect of the social responsibility of business in society (Crane and Matten, 2004), and it is also the one that constitutes the point of departure for the understanding of and the inquiry into manifestations CSR in this study.
Contrary to many contemporary instrumental and duty-aligned CSR conceptualizations, Carroll’s (1979) definition go beyond the idea that corporate responsibility is purely voluntary (ethical and discretionary) by emphasizing the importance of legal mechanisms and frameworks
Table 1: Selected definitions of CSR
Author Definitions of CSR
Bowen (1953) (CSR) refers to the obligations of businessmen to pursue those policies, to make those decisions, or to follow those lines of action that are desirable in terms of the objectives and values of our society.
Davis (1973) (CSR is) the firm’s considerations of, and response to, issues beyond the narrow economic, technical, and legal requirements of the firm (to) accomplish social benefits along with the traditional economic gains which the firm seeks.
Sethi (1975) Social responsibility implies bringing corporate behaviour up to a level where it is congruent with the prevailing social norms, values, and expectations of performance.
Carroll (1979) The social responsibility of business encompasses the economic, legal, ethical, and discretionary expectations that society has of organisations at a given point in time.
Frederick (1986)
The fundamental idea of corporate social responsibility is that business corporations have an obligation to work for social betterment.
Marrewijk (2003)
In general, corporate sustainability and, CSR refer to company activities – voluntary by definition – demonstrating the inclusion of social and environmental concerns in business operations and in interactions with stakeholders.
Waddock (2004a)
Corporate social responsibility is the subset of corporate responsibilities that deals with a company’s voluntary/discretionary relationships with its societal and community stakeholders.
McWilliams,
Siegel, and Wright (2006)
CSR (is) situations where the firm goes beyond compliance and engages in actions that appear to further some social good, beyond the interests of the firm and that which is required by law.
for informing responsible business conduct. The conceptualization also goes beyond many instrumental CSR conceptualizations by emphasizing that the economic mission and responsibility of business is not per see about making a profit for shareholders (e.g., Porter, 2006), but more importantly about an obligation to produce goods and services that society wants. The locus for defining responsibility is thus not – as in instrumental CSR perspectives – corporate objectives and interests, but the interests of people and society.
CSR perspectives. The notion of CSR later evolved into different approaches, covering related terms such as social responsiveness (e.g., Frederick, 1987), corporate social performance (e.g., Wartick and Cochran, 1985; Wood, 1991; Wood and Jones, 1995), the stakeholder approach (e.g., Donaldson and Preston, 1995; Freeman, 1984; Jones and Wicks, 1999), corporate citizenship (Matten and Crane, 2005;
Moon, Crane, and Matten, 2005; Nèron and Norman, 2008; Wood and Logsdon, 2002), the ‘triple bottom line’ approach (Elkington, 1994, 1997) and corporate sustainability (e.g., Marrewijk, 2003). CSR can thus be understood as an umbrella term for economic, social and environmental issues (Welford, 2003), wherein the relationship between business and society is studied.
Several typologies and classifications have been suggested to bring some order into the business in society literature (e.g. Blowfield and Murray, 2008; Carroll, 1999; Frederick, 1987, 1998; Garriga and Melè, 2004; Melè, 2008; Windsor, 2006). Brummer (1991) suggested that the spectrum of approaches to CSR could be ordered as classical, stakeholder, social demanding and social activist.
The classical approach to CSR, which can also be framed as arguments against CSR, comes in two variants. Building on classical Parsonian pluralism (Parsons, 1951), it could be argued that other institutions in society – like political institutions and civil society institutions – exist to perform the types of functions required by social responsibility
(Jones, 1999). The functional theory argument largely defines CSR along the same economic dimension as identified by Friedman and Friedman (1962). His property rights argument against CSR above what is profitable has its roots in classical capitalism. This perspective maintains that managers have no right to act other than to enhance shareholder value. To do otherwise constitutes a violation of the management’s legal, moral and fiduciary responsibilities. In sum, the social obligations of business are confined to satisfying legal and economic criteria.
Contrary to the classical perspective, the stakeholder perspective suggests that responsibilities of a business extend beyond shareholders to include the company’s stakeholders. In general, stakeholder theory is focused on those interests and actors who affect, or in turn are affected by, the corporation (Freeman, 1984). Stakeholders can be defined as persons or groups with legitimate interests in procedural or substantive aspects of corporate activity (Donaldson and Preston, 1995: 67). It is their interests in the corporation that identify the stakeholders, whether or not the corporation has any corresponding functional interest in them. Freeman’s stakeholder theory asserts that managers must satisfy a variety of different individuals or groups inside or outside the corporation. This could be a ‘primary’ stakeholder like the providers of capital, customers, employees and suppliers, but also more ‘secondary’
stakeholders like governments, local community organisations, indigenous people and non-governmental organisations (NGOs).
Stakeholder theory implies that it can be beneficial for the firm to engage in certain CSR activities that stakeholders define as important.
Otherwise, stakeholders might withdraw their support from the firm.
The social demanding approach holds that corporations are responsible to carry out those activities that society (not just stakeholders) demands and expects of them. A foundational idea is that, since business depends on society for its existence and growth, business should integrate social demands and expectations into its activities so that they
operate in accordance with the prevailing social values. As such, the approach is inherently relativistic: It does not state any specific action that corporations and their managers are always responsible to perform.
The actual content of CSR is dependent both upon time and place, that is, what society currently defines as its societal responsibility.
In contrast to the social demanding approach to CSR, the social activist approach to CSR holds that universal standards or values should determine corporate and managerial decision-making and action, independent of the view of shifting coalitions of stakeholders or expectations from society at large. Brummer (1991: 190) summarises the social activist approach to CSR in the following way:
“It (the social activist approach to CSR) holds that executives are responsible for pursuing social or moral goals from voluntary motives, even when doing so compromises the firm’s profit performance (at least in the short term). Corporations or their members are required to perform acts that benefit shareholders, stakeholders, and the general public, both in the primary areas of their business decision making (where the direct effects of their actions are more likely to be noticed) and in secondary and tertiary areas as well (where the indirect effects become more prominent). Last, in considering the interests and welfare of others, corporate executives are to respond to the formers’ ideal or rational interests rather than merely their expressed or current interests.”
The responsibility assigned to businesses and companies in the different approaches to CSR are summarised in Figure 1 (adapted from Article II, 2008):
Figure 1: Responsibility assigned to business in different CSR perspectives
The arrow pointing towards the right indicates increasing degrees of responsibility towards society, from “contractive” to “expansionist”
notions of responsibility (Article I). “Contractive CSR” refers to a notion of CSR in which the responsibility mechanisms is initiated by collective-level actors (e.g., the state, tri-partite arrangements), and where the collective-level actors usually functions as the prime responsibility bearers, but where the corporate entities affiliated with the responsibility program become involved in the administration of CSR issues close to the core economic functioning of the corporate entity. In contrast, “Expansionist CSR” refers to notions of CSR in which the corporate entity assumes a responsibility for a potential broad range of issues beyond the core economic mission of the firm (Article I). The classical approach to CSR falls closest to the base of the arrow (‘the only responsibility of business is to make profit’), while we find the social activist approach at its point (‘corporate managers as moral and social leaders’)7.
7What I refer to as instrumental and duty-aligned CSR perspectives in many ways cut across the approaches outlined by Brummer (1991). Instrumental CSR perspectives is most firmly rooted within a classical approach to business in society, where making a profit for shareholders constitute the ultimate justification of business responsibility.
Some stakeholder (e.g., Mitchell, Agle, and Wood, 1997) and social demandingness approaches has however also an identifiable instrumental orientation (Scherer and Palazzo, 2007). Duty-aligned or ethical CSR perspectives are most firmly rooted within the social activist approach to business in society, where ethics and universal
“Contractive CSR” “Expansionist CSR”
Classical Stakeholder Social demandingness Social activist
Having presented a general backdrop from which to frame discussions about the role and responsibility of business in society (autonomy and control), and some definitions and approaches to CSR, I now turn to an outline of the overall theoretical perspective from which I proceed to analyse institutional manifestations of CSR, the potential societal level implications of CSR manifestations, and the justification of CSR.
norms constitute the ultimate justification for responsible business conduct. Some stakeholder (e.g., Freeman, 1984) and social demandingness approaches (Wood, 1991) has however also an identifiable value orientation (Blowfield and Murray, 2008; Melè, 2008).
3 Theory
This chapter presents an overall theoretical framework for discussing the institutional contingent and embedded nature of CSR, its potential political-institutional implications, and for conceptualising CSR as a political construct. This theoretical framework is the New Institutionalism of political science (e.g.; Hall, 1986; Katzenstein, 1996; March and Olsen, 1984, 1989, 1996, 2006a, 2006b; Olsen, 1983, 1988, 2009; Skocpol, 1985, 19928.
What makes this variant of new institutionalism9 especially relevant for analysing a construct like CSR, it that it offers a framework for discussing both what variables inform different interpretations and manifestations of CSR, and that it builds on normative criteria for judging the appropriateness and desirability of organisational behaviour and its potential institutional and political implications. As such, the new institutionalism of political science unites normative10 political theory with descriptive/empirical11-positivist/interpretationist
8 The New Institutionalism is “new” in the sense of constituting an alternative to the
“old” institutionalism of political science.
9 Institutional theory comes in several variants, each with its own conception of what constitutes ‘old’ and ‘new’ institutional theory (Scott, 2001).
10 I refer to normative theory as theory that attempts to interpret the function of, and offer guidance about the social responsibility of the business firm on the basis of some underlying (philosophical and/or political) principles (Donaldson and Preston, 1995).
11 I refer to descriptive institutional theory as theory that is used to describe structural- regulative and normative-cognitive aspects of institutions, and their implications for individual preferences and behaviour.
organisational theory about how to – through institutional and organisational mechanisms and structures – support or sustain specific values and interests within the framework of representative democracy12.
The theoretical framework for this thesis thus follows the approach of Jones and Wicks (1999) for outlining a convergent perspective, in this study, in which the theory – the new institutionalism –combines an
‘orthodox’ or functionalistic social science approach (Burrell and Morgan, 1979) that purports to describe and understand manifestations of organisational and societal phenomena (empirical/descriptive research), with normative inquiries specifying what is and what is not the role and responsibility of business in society. As such, the thesis answers a recent call for linking and converging positivist and empirical organisational (CSR) research to normative theories (e.g., Kochan, Guillen, Hunter, and O’Mahony, 2009; Margolis and Walsh, 2003; Walsh, Meyer, and Schoonhoven, 2006).
This chapter proceeds as follows: Next, I briefly present the field of institutional theory. I then discuss some limitations of the current institutional analysis of CSR. This discussion constitutes the point of departure for three institutional accounts: 1) how institutional logics can inform contestation and multiple manifestations of CSR within a national institutional field, 2) the potential institutional and political
12 It should however already at this stage be noted that the new institutional perspective do not come without some highly problematic elements. Peter (1996) summarises the theoretical problems of new institutionalism as the paradox of constraints (Grafstein, 1992), the absence of a clear definition of the notion of institution, the tautology problem, the problem of the capacity of institutional design, and, finally, the problem of conceptual stretching and reductionism. I return to some of these problems both in chapter 4.3.1 (“Selection of Theoretical Perspective”) and chapter 7 (“Limitations”).
implications of explicit manifestations of CSR, and 3) the appropriate (political) role and responsibility of business in society from an institutional point of view. Finally, the three institutional accounts of CSR – embodying both descriptive and normative argument – are united into a single analytical model illustrating the main theoretical inquiries and assumptions of the thesis.
3.1 Institutional Theory
Institutional theory comes in different variants or approaches13. Campbell (2004) makes a distinction among three versions of institutional analysis: rational choice, organizational, and historical institutionalism. The New Institutionalism of political science falls neither into the category of organisational nor of historical institutionalism14. Rather – and as will be clear from the discussion below – it can be described as building on the assumptions of both, uniting historical institutionalism’s normative aspirations and its assumptions about the importance of structural-regulative institutions for understanding individuals’ perceptions and behaviour, with the organisational institutionalism’s assumptions about the importance of
13 Hall and Taylor (1996), Campbell (1997), Peters (1999), Campbell and Pedersen (2001), and Scott, 2001) give a detailed overview and analysis of the different variants of institutional theory: its historical roots, differences, and similarities.
14 Scott (2001) and Campbell (2004) categorise the new institutionalism of political science as historical institutionalism. Although it certainly – as Scott (2001, p. 26) formulates it – hearkens back to the turn-of-the-century institutional scholars who devoted themselves to the detailed analysis of regimes and governance mechanisms, new institutionalism also builds on assumptions associated with organisational institutionalism, e.g. the idea that taken for granted cognitive and normative structures constrain and enable actors.
normative, cognitive, and symbolic structures for understanding behaviour.
3.2 The Current Institutional Analysis of CSR15 An increasingly large body of literature argues that we need to pay more attention to how institutional mechanisms influence managers’
understanding of the social responsibility of business, and whether or not corporations act in socially responsible ways (Aguilera, Rupp, Williams, and Ganapathi, 2007; Boxenbaum, 2006; Bűhner, Rasheed, Rosenstein and Yoshikawa, 1998; Campbell, 2007; Doh and Guay, 2006; Gjølberg, 2009; Hoffman, 1999, 2001; Jennings and Zandbergen, 1995; Jones, 1999; Orlitzky, Schmidt and Rynes, 2003; Walsh, Weber and Margolis, 2003; Matten and Moon, 2005, 2008). Looking beyond the differences among variants of institutional theory, the importance of the literature is that it focuses on how institutional variables constrains and enables behaviour and argues that institutions beyond the market are often necessary to ensure that corporations are responsible to the interest of social actors apart from themselves (Campbell, 2006). An organisation’s action – and individual’s understanding of the world and choices – is understood not as a result among an unlimited array of possibilities, but rather as a result of a narrowly-defined set of legitimate alternatives (Scott, 1995). As such, institutional theory asks questions about how perceptions and choices are shaped, mediated, and channelled by the institutional environment. Focusing on the institutional determinants of CSR is important because companies are embedded in a broad set of political and economic institutions that affect their behaviour (Campbell, Hollingsworth, and Lindberg, 1991;
Fligstein, 1990, 2001; Hall and Soskice, 2001; Morgan, 2007; Roe,
15 Parts of this section draw on Article I in Part II of the thesis.
1991, 1994; Whitley, 1992, 1999, 2002). As argued in chapter 1 of this thesis, this is a somewhat neglected insight within the instrumental and duty-aligned perspectives on CSR, that too often understand “corporate practices, prices, and working conditions as matters of managerial discretion rather than an outcome of production networks as economic, political, and ideological systems” (Levy, 2008, p. 947).
Although the current institutional analysis of CSR holds some promise, it comes with its own weaknesses and limitations. A first observation is that the current institutional analysis of CSR relies on a somewhat one- dimensional and over-deterministic account of institutional theory that only to a limited degree take into account recent developments within institutional theory (e.g., Levy and Scully, 2007; Lawrence, Suddaby, and Leca, 2009; Lounsbury, 2008; Zilber, 2002). That theory explains how to account for heterogeneity, contestation and practice variation, as well as homogeneity and consensus within a distinct institutional field.
Furthermore, through emphasising how a dominant and exclusive (Scott, 1994, 2001) institutional logic of the role and responsibility of business in society informs consensus around the manifestations of CSR within an institutionalised national framework, the literature often ignores the very essence of the notion of CSR: managerial discretion or agency (e.g., Carroll, 1979; Matten and Moon, 2008; Marrewijk, 2003).
Much of the current institutional analysis of CSR envisages managers’
choices and corporate actions as structurally bounded and highly institutionalised, and thus – to borrow a phrase from Meyer and Rowan (1977, p. 344) – ‘in some measure beyond the discretion of any individual participant or organization’. Differently put, the current institutional analysis of CSR very much discharges the essence of the notion of explicit CSR itself, that of managerial discretion or agency, allowing “each entity, individual or group” some relative freedom to act according to its awareness, capabilities and best understanding of its situation” (Marrewijk, 2003, p. 98), within some political, economic, and cultural bounds. Consequently, the framework also somewhat
ignores how actors not only adapt to their institutional context, but also often play an active role in shaping those contexts (e.g., DiMaggio, 1988; Maguire and Hardy, 2006; Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Levy and Scully, 2007; Lounsbury, 2008).
A second observation is that the current institutional analysis of CSR seems to direct most attention towards the study of the variables that inform different manifestations of CSR, and how we can understand these manifestations, rather than to the potential outcome of CSR. That is, the current institutional analysis very much treats CSR as explanandum, rather than as explanans. As such, CSR is treated as a dependent variable in need of explanation (e.g. Aguilera, et al., 2007;
Campbell, 2006, 2007; Matten and Moon, 2005, 2008). Although this is highly valuable research, an argument of this thesis is that the institutional analysis of CSR should also concern itself with, and make inquiries into the potential implications of CSR (e.g., Barley, 2007;
Walsh, et al., 2006). Rather than treating CSR as an dependent variable in need of explanation, such an approach would treat CSR as an institutional independent variable with the potential to increase our understanding of the institutional and political outcome or implications of different manifestations of CSR. Within the study field of CSR – and especially within the instrumental tradition – there is a huge body of literature that has used CSR as explanans in order to explain corporate financial performance (although with very mixed conclusions, e.g.
Aguilera, et al., 2003; Margolis and Walsh, 2003). CSR is, however, not regularly used as explanans in order to make inquiries into its potential societal implications. As argued by Matten and Moon (2008)
‘…it remains, (…) open to future research whether different social issues are more effectively and efficiently addressed by explicit than by implicit CSR; how the social outcomes reflect fairness, social inclusion, and equalities of opportunities…’. The relative lack of research into the societal implications of CSR is a paradox; early definitions of CSR
were tied more to society’s interests than to those of the firm (e.g.
Bowen, 1953).
A third observation is that although institutional theories have normative as well as positive ambitions, the current institutional analysis of CSR is seldom used for justificatory purposes (Van Oosterhout and Heugens, 2008); that is, the theory is not used for making inquiry into and discussing the appropriate role and responsibility of business in society. Normative considerations have mostly been treated as explanans in positivist institutional explanations of CSR. Campbell (2007, p. 962) argues for example that
corporations are more likely to act in socially responsible ways the more they encounter strong state regulation, collective industrial self-regulation, NGOs and other independent organizations that monitor them, and a normative institutional environment that encourages socially responsible behavior.
Such positivist inquiries often constitute a point of departure for, or often coexist with, normative arguments about the worth and superiority of specific institutional structures for obtaining or promoting socially responsible behaviour. Again, Campbell (2007, p.
963) can serve as a good example of this kind of normative inquiry within the institutional analysis of CSR:
…some suggest that the best way to get firms to behave in socially responsible ways is to convince their managers that it is either the right thing to do ethically or it is in their self-interest (Handy, 2003; Kaku; 2003; Prahalad and Hammond, 2003).
Appeals such as these may help, but institutions are critical, especially if we are concerned with ensuring that corporations actually behave in socially responsible ways, rather than just pay rhetorical lip service to the issue.
Valuable as such normative inquiries is, and contrary to the position of Van Oosterhout and Heugens (forthcoming), an argument of this thesis, is that institutional theory – or more precisely, the New Institutionalism of political science (e.g., March and Olsen, 1984; 1996; Olsen, 2009) – also holds some justificatory promise and potential for discussing the role and responsibility of business in society.
A fourth and final observation is that the current institutional theory of CSR has yet to suggest a convergent perspective, in which empirical and positive analysis is combined with normative judgement about the appropriateness of diverse manifestations of CSR and what the role and responsibility of business in society should be.
Given these observations, an important argument of this thesis is that a more satisfactory institutional analysis of CSR needs to account for the existence not only of multiple and contesting logics (Friedland and Alford, 1991; Scott, 1994; 2001) and its embedded institutional contradictions (Meyer and Rowan, 1977) existing within an institutional field, but also for the role of actors and agency in molding the material practices and symbolic constructions that constitute the organising principle of a given institutional logic and order. In addition, a more satisfactory institutional analysis of CSR should also make inquiries into the potential implications of CSR. Rather than treating CSR as a dependent variable in need of explanation, such an approach would treat CSR as an institutional independent variable with the potential to improve our understanding of the institutional and political outcome or implications of different manifestations of CSR. Further, given the potential societal and institutional impact and implications of CSR, the institutional analysis of CSR should also discuss how to critically evaluate and judge the appropriateness of companies’ CSR efforts, and the role and responsibility of business in society. Finally, the descriptive and normative oriented institutional analysis should inform each other in a dialectic fashion, and hence comprise a convergent institutional perspective on CSR.
3.3 The New Institutional Descriptive Argument Most fundamentally, the new institutionalism of political science (e.g.
March and Olsen, 1984, 1996) is a theory – or a collection of ideas16 – about the structuring effect of institutions on individuals’ perceptions, behaviour, and action, through which mechanisms this influence comes about, and about institutional adaptation and change. It thus resemble an historical interest in political theory for the ways in which behaviour is institutionally contingent and embedded (e.g. Wolin, 1960), limiting the room for individual will-calculation, but without excluding the possibility for agency. However, the new institutionalism of political science is more than this. It can also be understood as a normative political theory, directing attention to politics as ‘the interpretation of life’ (March and Olsen, 1989, p. 47), and the values and importance of political criteria as a foundation for sustaining the political order (e.g.
Crick, 1962) itself.
Unlike, or in contrast to, other ‘stories about politics’ (March and Olsen, 1994, p. 3) and decision-making, behaviour and action within formal normative organisations, structures and rules (e.g. reductionism and structuralism), the new institutional perspective of political science assumes that political institutions and structures – or formal organisations – have an independent and structuring effect on an individuals’ view of the world, perceptions, attitudes, decision-making and behaviour. Preferences are not only exogenous, but also endogenous constructed in which the institutional structures and rules individuals find themselves.
16 March and Olsen (1984, 1996) argues that the new institutionalism of political science not should be understood as a fully developed and logical consistent theory, but rather as a collection of – sometimes inconsistent – ideas about politics, behaviour in formal organisations, and the institutional condition for politics. For the purpose of this thesis, I will still refer to the new institutionalism of political science as a theory.
That means that the institutional perspective questions the view of structuralism (dominating the discipline of sociology) that politics and individuals’ perceptions and behaviour within formal organisations first of all should be understood and explained as reflecting exogenous variables like class, social stratification, economy, religion, and ideology. That also means that the institutional perspective questions the view of reductionism (dominating the disciplines of economics and psychology) that politics and decision-making and action within formal organisations should be understood and explained as the aggregated outcome comprehensible at the individual level. Instead, the new institutionalism of political science insists on an independent effect of political structures and institutions and formal organisation on individuals’ views of the world, the construction of meaning, roles and identities, the matching of identities to situations, the activation of rules of appropriateness, and behaviour (March and Olsen, 1984, 1996, 2006a). In short, institutions matter (e.g., Skocpol, 1985; Krasner, 1991), and inform identities and what March and Olsen (1984) refer to as logics of appropriateness, making some interpretations of the world and lines of actions more probable or reasonable (and appropriate) than others:
Political institutions are collections of interrelated rules and routines that define appropriate action in terms of relations between roles and situations. The process involves determining what the situation is, what role is being fulfilled, and what the obligations of that role in that situation are (March and Olsen, 1989, p. 160).
The central idea can be formulated like this: Structural/regulative and cognitive/normative (and symbolic) aspects of institutions define and institutionalise roles and identities for individuals, who in turn define rules of appropriateness informing some interpretations, behaviour and lines of action as appropriate, that is, as normal, natural, right, or good,
and some interpretations, behaviour and lines of action as appropriate, that is, as unnatural, wrong and bad (March and Olsen, 2006a).
The notion of institution. The new institutionalism of political science takes its point of departure from the ‘old’ or historical institutional tradition (e.g., Weber, 1946) and of political science. This variant of institutionalism assumes that institutions matters in political life and that politics could be understood by acquiring knowledge about the formal normative organisational structure of political institutions.
Therefore, the hallmark of this tradition was an insistence on descriptive and detailed analysis of political structural-regulative institutions, regimes and governance mechanisms. The old institutionalism – and indeed political science as a discipline – also had a strong normative orientation, in which political institutions were understood as the basic condition for the existence of a political order (Wolin, 1960).
The new institutionalism of political science represents a renewed interest for these two central elements of the old institutionalism. Most importantly, the new institutionalism assumes that the structural- regulative aspects of political institutions and formal organisations make a difference: that individual perceptions and behaviour can partly be understood with references to the formal normative organisational structure in which they function.
At the same time, the new institutionalism of political science deviates from the historical tradition by building on a much broader notion of institution. Institutions are not only structural-regulative formal organisations, but also normative, cognitive, and symbolic orders (March and Olsen, 1984; Olsen, 1988).
Formal organisations are more than their explicit structures, procedures, routines, budgets, demographic and physical structures and the like. From a new institutional perspective, formal organisations can
also be understood and studied as normative orders defining interests, goals, ideas, and values, informing perceptions and behaviours based more on a logic of appropriateness than on a logic of consequences.
Institutions define for individuals what is and is not appropriate, creating behaviour capable of exceeding conceptions of self-interest towards (moral) obligations (Olsen, 1988). As a result, ‘political behaviour, like other behaviour, can be described in terms of duties,
obligations, roles and rules’ (March and Olsen, 1984, p. 744).
Finally, institutions are also cognitive (and symbolic) structures, that is, the rules that constitute the nature of reality and the frames through which meaning is made (Scott, 1995).
In sum then, the new institutionalism of political science sees institutions as including both ‘formal structures and informal rules and procedures that structure conduct’ (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992, p. 2). As such, new institutionalism draws attention to both the structural- regulative aspects of institutions (the state, financial system, and the like), and the normative and cognitive aspects of institutions (patterns of thought and taken-for-granted assumptions informing what is, and what is not natural or appropriate in a specific situation) (Tempel and Walgenbach, 2007). Given this broad notion of institution, this thesis builds on Scott’s (1995, p. 33) definition of institution as consisting of
‘cognitive, normative, and regulative structures and activities that provide stability and meaning to social behaviour’, transported by
‘various carriers – cultures, structures, and routines’, operating ‘at multiple levels of jurisdiction’.
Institutional effects. The new institutional perspective of political science sees politics as an ‘interpretation of life’ (March and Olsen, 1984, p. 741), thus challenging and opposing the instrumental notion of politics as who gets what and how (Lasswell, 1958). Building on Pateman (1970) and Lafferty (1981), politics is ‘regarded as education, as a place for discovering, elaborating, and expressing meanings, establishing shared (and opposing) conceptions of experience, values,
and the nature of experience’ (March and Olsen, 1984, p. 741). Further, political institutions do not only represent authority and power, but also collective wisdom and ethics, suggesting ‘physical, cognitive, and moral frames for action, concepts through which we observe and construct reality, rights and duties, perceptions of fairness and symbols through which individuals makes identifications’ (Olsen, 1988, p. 32).
Given these ideas about the ‘political’ and ‘political institutions’, the new institutional perspective builds on broad assumptions about the effects and potential outcome of institutional life. The interest is not primarily directed towards the allocation of scarce resources in the face of conflict of interests, but rather and more importantly to how established institutions affect individuals’ commitment, belonging, understanding, and interpretations (Olsen, 1988), and the condition for individual action on the basis of the interests of the political community (Arblaster, 1987) and the common good.
New institutional theory sees the construction of meaning and belief as an important aspect of politics, and one which institutional life is capable of affecting (Olsen, 1988). Further, institutions shape the definition of alternatives and influence the perception and construction of the reality within which action takes place (March and Olsen, 1996).
It is assumed that political institutions – both as structural-regulative arrangements, and as cognitive, normative, and symbolic orders – affects citizens’ conceptions of self, expectations of life, political resources, and activities. Further, it is assumed that political institutions influence and affect an individual’s perceptions of the values of representative democracy itself; politics, democracy, justice and freedom (Olsen, 1988), and thereby also questions of the role of political institutions vis-à-vis other spheres of society, the relationship between these spheres – e.g. political vs. business – and what interests and values the different institutions of society should promote and assume responsibility for. Attention is thus directed to the potential institutional effect and implications for the political order itself,
individuals’ identification with the political community, legitimacy and trust (Olsen, 1988). From an institutional point of view, the formal- regulative aspects of institutions should not only be judged according to its economic and technical efficiency, but also upon its impact on the conditions for sustaining the political order itself (Crick, 1962) and symbolic and cultural aspects (Meyer and Rowan, 1977).
The new institutional perspective does not only argue that established political institutions and formal organisations have an independent effect on individuals’ perceptions and action, but also that the change of institutional life is capable of determining change in individuals’
interpretation, constructions, and actions (e.g. Egeberg, 1984). Thus, an institutional perspective assumes that political institutional reforms and adaptation will – over time – inform change in citizens’ perceptions of the political order and its own role within it and responsibility for sustaining that order.
Agency. A source of controversy among institutionalists and for critique of institutional theory is the role of agency within the institutional assumptions and argument (e.g. Lounsbury, 2007, 2008).
In general, institutional analysis has seen limited room and possibilities for agency and individual and organisational level action influencing and determining the same institutional framework in which they function. To a certain extent, this is also true for the new institutionalism of political science, in which institutions are ‘usually associated with routinization and repletion, persistence and predictability, rather than with political change and flexibility, agency, creativity and discretion’ (March and Olsen, 1996, p. 258). At the same time, the new institutionalism of political science – as the neo- institutionalism of sociology (e.g. Meyer and Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio and Powell, 1991) – does not rule out the possibility for agency and institutional change. As argued by March and Olsen (1996, p. 258):
