GRA 19703
Master Thesis
Thesis Master of Science
Transparency and Impression Management Strategies in Sustainability- and Annual Reports
Navn: Vilde Aas Johansen, Nanna Lynes Thorup
Start: 15.01.2021 09.00 Finish: 01.09.2021 12.00
Transparency and Impression Management Strategies in
Sustainability- and Annual Reports
Hand-in date:
01.07.2021
Campus:
BI Oslo
Supervisor:
Kim van Oorschot Programme:
Master of Science in Leadership and Organizational Psychology
Acknowledgements
Firstly, we would like to thank our supervisor Kim van Oorschot for her excellent guidance and constructive feedback through the process. Her support has been both valuable and essential for the development of our research project, and her drive, commitment, and motivation have really been encouraging!
Secondly, we want to thank our friends and families for supporting us throughout the year. Their patience and understanding have meant a lot during this time. Additionally, for our companions: thank you for your housekeeping and cooking skills. We really appreciate it!
Lastly, we would like to thank each other for a good collaboration. Even though we have had to communicate digitally because of the Covid-19 pandemic, we have still managed to enjoy this period.
Nanna Lynes Thorup Vilde Aas Johansen
Oslo, June 2021 Oslo, June 2021
Executive Summary
This study applies methods to detect impression management strategies from the studies of Hahn and Lülfs (2013), Sandberg and Holmlund (2014) and Talbot and Boiral (2015) in order to critically assess transparency, and greenwashing, on environmental matters, in Norwegian organisations’ Sustainability Reports (SRs) and Annual Reports (ARs) throughout the period 2010-2020. The study uses longitudinal within-case and cross-case analyses, on a sample consisting of 15 organisations, from 6 industries. To determine transparency in the reports, we conceptualize a measure called ‘level of neutrality’. The level of neutrality
variated significantly within and across organisations and industries. In particular, the findings revealed that, despite a gradual improvement between 2010-2020, there is a lack of transparency in most Norwegian organisations’ SRs and ARs.
Additionally, the development of transparency from 2010-2020 seems to be unrelated to the comprehensiveness of reporting, such as compliance with GRI, as measured by an Organisational Sustainability Maturity Model. Hence, our
analysis suggests that Norwegian organisations’ reporting practices have had, and have, greenwashing tendencies. The findings of the thesis align with the critique of the usefulness of sustainability reporting (Boiral, 2013; Burritt & Schaltegger, 2010; Mähonen, 2020), and substantiate the prevalence of impression
management strategies in sustainability reports (Kanbaty et al., as cited in Hamza and Jarboui, 2021).
Table of Content
Acknowledgements 1
Executive Summary 2
1.0 Introduction 4
2.0 Literature Review 6
2.1 Corporate Social Responsibility 6
2.2 Historical Development of CSR: International and National Perspectives 8
2.3 Sustainability Reporting 10
2.4 Synthesis of Research on Greenwashing in Sustainability Reporting 14 2.5 Studies on Norwegian Sustainability Reporting 16
3.0 Research Question 18
4.0 Methodology 19
4.1 Research Design and Approach 19
4.2 Sample and Data Collection 20
4.3 Time use 21
4.4 Validity and Reliability 22
4.5 Development of Inter-Rater Reliability 23
4.6 Justification and Application of Codes 25
5.0 Findings 26
5.1 Level of Neutrality 27
5.2 Longitudinal Within-Case Analysis 29
5.3 Longitudinal Cross-Case Analysis 33
6.0 Discussion 35
6.1 Longitudinal Within-Case 36
6.2 Longitudinal cross-case 39
6.3 Organisational Sustainability Maturity Model 41 6.3.1 Level of Maturity in Norwegian Organisations 43
6.4 Theoretical Contribution 44
6.5 Practical Implications 46
6.6 Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research 47
7.0 Conclusion 48
8.0 References 49
1.0 Introduction
The world’s nature is deteriorating at rates unparalleled in millions of years on a global scale (WWF, 2020, p.4). As of 2010, the world’s population uses 1,5 planets to provide enough resources and absorb the produced waste (WWF, 2010) Humanity is producing food, waste, and energy at a pace that is far from
sustainable - and all companies, regardless of size, contribute. The palpable disregard for the planet’s environment is deep-rooted in our economic model and has pushed the natural world to the limit (WWF, 2020, p.4). The consequences of sustained high emissions are irreversible changes in the climate system, including increases in extreme weather, loss of biodiversity, and changes in ecosystems, which all people and animals depend on (IPCC, 2014).
The strong economic growth has led to an improved standard of living in large parts of the world. However, the ever-growing economy is one of the predominant drivers of greenhouse gas emissions (Allen et al., in press; Arneth et al., in press; IPCC, 2014). The awareness that the global economy is a substantial driver of climate change, and that businesses need to be held accountable have risen sharply since the 1980’s, when the World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED) published ‘Our Common Future’, often referred to as the
‘Brundtland Report’, on Sustainable Development (SD) (Borglund et al., 2017;
Epstein & Roy, 2001; Hahn & Lülfs, 2013; Simnett et al., 2009). Accordingly, the rate at which businesses address Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) has grown rapidly on an international scale. Similarly, Sustainability Reports (SRs) have become the most important tool for businesses to communicate their environmental and sustainability-related CSR-efforts (Borglund et al., 2017).
Despite a plethora of ways to define CSR, the European Commission’s (2011) definition is often used: “the responsibility of enterprises for their impacts on society…. with the aim of identifying, preventing and mitigating their possible adverse impacts” (p.6). The term CSR has been much applied over the past decade, but other terminology, such as Social Responsibility and Environmental, Social and Governance, have emerged over the years (Borglund et al., 2017). In recent years, the terms Sustainability and Sustainable Business have gained traction (Borglund et al., 2017; Strand et al., 2014). Borglund et al., (2017) and Matten and Moon (2004) argues that the new terms have not replaced CSR, rather, they are used interchangeably in the field, and by extension, in business (p.10). In
accordance with Borglund et al. (2017) and Matten and Moon (2004), we will use the terms interchangeably throughout this paper.
Since the turn of the millennium international sustainability initiatives, standards, regulations and national legislations have increased (Borglund et al., 2017; Ditlev-Simonsen, 2014; Kiron et al., 2012). The overarching goal of these efforts has been to improve the overall quality of SR (Borglund et al., 2017). For instance, Norway’s Accounting Act §3-3 legislates non-financial reporting on social responsibility (Ditlev-Simonsen, 2014; Regnskapsloven, 2020). Due to the growing number of international and national efforts, businesses are increasingly engaging in non-financial reporting (Ditlev-Simonsen, 2014). According to multiple studies, the most commonly used non-financial sustainability reporting guideline, both internationally and among Norwegian organisations, are the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) (Borglund et al., 2010; Deloitte, 2020; KPMG, 2017).
The GRI framework emphasises that reporting should be accurate,
balanced, clear, comparable and reliable and should therefore result in transparent reporting (Borglund et al., 2017, p. 245). Despite the prevalent use of reporting frameworks such as GRI, greenwashing continues to be a widespread problem in SRs (Boiral, 2013; Mähonen). According to Lyon and Maxwell (2011)
greenwashing is “the selective disclosure of positive information about a company’s environmental or social performance, without full disclosure of negative information on these dimensions, so as to create an overly positive corporate image”(p.9). Greenwashing runs contrary to the reporting guidelines emphasized by the GRI framework, and results in non-transparent reporting. Lack of transparency results in overly positive SRs used to influence stakeholders’
perspective and does not represent a true reflection of organisations sustainability efforts (Coupland 2006; Hahn and Lülfs, 2013). In fact, by using SRs as a tool to shape the impression stakeholders have of them, organisations engage in
impression management (Sandberg and Holmlund, 2014). More specifically, in SRs impression management is about how, and to what extent, information is disclosed to the reader (Bansal & Kistruck, 2006). Since impression management, by nature, represents a lack of transparency it is associated with greenwashing.
The critique of sustainability reporting, and its prevalence, has led some researchers to question whether sustainability reporting is useful at all (Boiral, 2013; Burritt & Schaltegger, 2010; Mähonen, 2020).
Both greenwashing and transparency (together and in isolation) have been well covered, from multiple theoretical perspectives, in the literature (Boiral, 2013; Burritt & Schaltegger 2010; Gray, 2010; Laufer, 2003; Sandberg and
Holmlund, 2014). On the contrary, impression management have not been covered as extensively in greenwashing research, but some researchers such as Hahn and Lülfs (2013), Hooghiemstra (2000), Merkl-Davies and Brennan (2007), and Sandberg and Holmlund (2014), have explored the topic. The general sentiment in the research is that impression management often features in SRs, which further supports the notion that greenwashing is a prominent problem in SRs.
Notwithstanding, to the best of our knowledge, there is no research that applies methods to detect impression management strategies to examine the transparency (and greenwashing) of environmental matters in Norwegian organisations’ SRs and ARs within the time span 2010-2020, by conducting a qualitative longitudinal within- and cross-case analyses. As such, we aim to close this gap with our thesis.
The findings of the thesis suggests that there, generally, is less variation in transparency between Norwegian organisations and within industries in 2020, contrary to 2010. Nevertheless, the transparency of Norwegian organisations’
reporting, on environmental matters, in their SRs and ARs, is lacking. Hence, suggesting greenwashing tendencies, as is evidenced by previous research.
2.0 Literature Review
2.1 Corporate Social Responsibility
As a topic, CSR is discussed through different disciplinary and conceptual lenses, such as environmental studies, organisational behavior, marketing, organisational theory, strategy, accounting, and management, to mention some (Aguinis &
Glavas, 2012, p.933; Verona & Ferramosca, 2020; Waddock, 2004). Furthermore, there is substantial variation in the level of analysis applied in the study of CSR within different disciplinary fields (Aguinis & Glavas, 2012). The result is a highly fragmented, sometimes confusing, literature (Aguinis & Glavas, 2012;
Waddock, 2004). The fragmented nature of CSR has resulted in a surplus of definitions (Dahlsrud, 2008), as briefly stated in the introduction. The definition presented by the European Commission (2011) is one of the attempts to create a joint definition in order to clarify the scope of CSR, and is therefore commonly used by businesses (Borglund et al., 2017). For a topic that can be traced far back in history, it is unusual that researchers still do not agree on a common definition
of the term, nor if business should have responsibility in the first place (Crane et al., 2008).
In the Cambridge Dictionary (2020), responsibility is defined as being accountable, liable, and as the ability to make good decisions. The extent of CSR, especially whether businesses have responsibility that extends beyond the law, has long been debated (Borglund et al., 2017; Crane et al., 2008). The debate on responsibility can be traced as far back as Adam Smith’s The Wealth of Nations (Brown & Forster, 2013). However, in today's academic landscape, it is generally dominated by two contradictory perspectives conceptualized by Friedman and Freeman (Borglund et al., 2017; Carroll, 2008). According to Friedman (1962)
“few trends could so thoroughly undermine the very foundation of our free society as the acceptance by corporate officials of a social responsibility other than to make as much money for their stockholders as possible” (p. 133). Embedded in Friedman’s perspective is a shareholder-centric view - which holds that investing in social responsibility is beyond the scope of the firm (Borglund et al., 2017;
Carroll, 2008; Crane et al., 2008). Freeman’s (1984) perspective on responsibility is stakeholder-centric - businesses should attend to all appropriate stakeholders in order to be socially responsible (Garriga & Melé, 2004, p.60). Freeman’s view holds that responsibility is a prerequisite for business success (Borglund et al., 2017; Waddock et al., 2002). Whether businesses have a shareholder- or stakeholder-centric perspective is often affected by local conditions, and is therefore largely contextual (Borglund et al., 2017).
The topics which constitute CSR are affected, not only by the
multidisciplinary nature of the topic, but also by continuous societal changes (Aguinis & Glavas, 2012; Borglund et al., 2017). Following the Financial Crisis of 2008, bonus- and wage levels became prominent topics in discussions of CSR.
More recently, ‘negative environmental impact’, ‘third party assurance’, ‘diversity and inclusion’ and ‘greenwashing’ have become relevant terms associated with CSR (Borglund et al., 2017; Kurpierz & Smith, 2020; Verona & Ferramosca, 2020, p. 179). It is evident that CSR is an evolving topic, which might be better understood by exploring its origins. The next section of this paper will therefore expand on the historical development of CSR.
2.2 Historical Development of CSR: International and National Perspectives Articles published by Carroll (2008) and Husted (2015) have traced the origin of CSR back to the start of the 19th century. However, most scholars who write about the history of CSR tend to pinpoint its beginning in the 1950s. Multiple works on CSR were published in the 1950s, including the widely influential
‘Social Responsibilities of the Businessman’ (Carroll, 2008). In this publication, Bowen formulated a question that is still relevant today: ‘What responsibilities to society may businessmen reasonably be expected to assume?’ (Bowen, as cited in Carroll, 2008, p.7). The essence of Bowen’s question can easily be recognized in the current debate on responsibility outlined in the previous chapter.
The 1960s marked an enormous growth in CSR, especially in terms of defining the scope of the term. The most prominent scholar in this period was Davis (1960), who formulated a precise definition of CSR: ‘Businessmen’s decisions and actions taken for reasons at least partially beyond the firm’s direct economic or technical interest (Davis, as cited in Carroll, 2008, p.8). Throughout the 1960s CSR grew from being mainly concerned with philanthropy, to include employee well-being and customers (Carroll, 2008, p.9).
In the 1970s CSR expanded rapidly, and a plethora of scientific studies were published. Most notably are the works of Carroll (1979). Carroll (1979) formulated a broader definition of CSR, which encompasses an economic, legal, ethical, and philanthropic aspect. Carroll’s extended definition gained substantial traction (Carroll, 2008; Christofi et al., 2012). As such, the scope of CSR clearly expanded during the 1970s. It is worth noting that environmental issues became much more prominent during the late 1960s and grew substantially during the 1970s (Carroll, 2008). One cause for the spur of interest in environmental issues was the publication of “The Limits to Growth” report by Meadows et al. (1972).
Whilst the previous decades focused on determining the scope and
definition of CSR, the 1980s gave way to a more fragmented view on CSR due to the emergence of complementary themes and concepts (Carroll, 2008). One of the important topics in the development of CSR was Jones’ (1980) focus on the voluntary aspect of CSR, and on CSR as a process, and Frederick’s (1960) focus on environmental pollution and destruction, and questionable pursuits of profit by managers (Carroll, 2008, p.18). One reason for the spur of interest in CSR during the 1980s was the publication of the Brundtland report, in 1897, by the UN (Ditlev-Simonsen et al., 2015). This publication laid the foundation for how most
countries, including Norway, practices sustainability to this day. Because Brundtland at that time was Norway’s Prime Minister and head of the UN commission on Environment and Development, it was important for Norway to act as a worldwide role-model within CSR (Ditlev-Simonsen et al., 2015, p.4). As such, the Norwegian Government played an active role in CSR nationally, mostly through ownership in several companies (Ihlen & von Weltzien Hoivik, 2015).
This was quite a different approach to CSR than nations like the USA had, where the government is an outsider in the national CSR agenda (Ihlen & von Weltzien Hoivik, 2015).
In the 1990s few noteworthy contributions to the core CSR literature emerged. However, there were four particularly interesting developments in the 1990s. The first development was the rise of great CSR practices and
sustainability-focus from businesses. The second was Elkington’s (1997)
introduction of the Triple Bottom Line (TBL), and the third was the launch of the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) (Carroll, 2008; Gulluscio et al., 2020). The GRI will be elaborated on in chapter 2.3. The fourth development in CSR came in the wake of the Brundtland report and concerned an international discussion of CSR from a business perspective (United Nations, 1992). The CEO of Norsk Hydro, of which the Norwegian government is a major shareholder (Regjeringen, 2020), contributed in these CSR discussions alongside CEOs of other large international corporations, such as Shell, Volkswagen, and Alcan (Ditlev-Simonsen et al., 2015). The publication of the book “Changing course, A global Business Perspective on Development and the Environment'' was the result of these discussions (Ditlev-Simonsen et al., 2015). Due to the Norwegian Government's involvement in Norsk Hydro (Regjeringen, 2020), Norway was an integral contributor of international CSR development during the 1990s.
In the early 2000s there was a tremendous increase of both theoretical and empirical contributions to CSR (Carroll, 2008). This can be argued to have further complicated an already fragmented and confusing literature (Aguinis & Glavas, 2012; Waddock, 2004). While there had been a rapid growth in CSR during the past 20 years, the field really took hold in the 2000s and became a global
phenomenon. The growth has been most prominent in Europe for both voluntary initiatives and legislation (Carroll, 2008). For instance, the Scandinavian countries have been prominent actors in the CSR field (Ihlen & von Weltzien Hoivik, 2013).
However, despite Norway’s prominent role in CSR during the 1980s and 1990s,
the country fell behind in their national CSR agenda compared to the other Scandinavian nations during the 2000s (Lafferty et al., 2007). According to Lafferty et al. (2007), this relates specifically to the implementation of a sustainable development agenda.
During the past 10 years there have been a rapid increase in a number of new topics in the CSR field, such as corporate governance and CSR maturity models (Sari et al., 2021; Verona & Ferramosca, 2020). The increased focus on corporate governance, which is how businesses are directed and controlled, can be seen as a direct result of the intensification of both voluntary and mandatory non-financial disclosure (The Committee on The Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance, 1992; Verona & Ferramosca, 2020, p. 188). According to Sari et al., (2021) CSR maturity models can be viewed as a tool to assess organisations’
readiness within sustainability, through measurements of maturity. According to Paulk et al., (1995) as cited in Sari et al., (2021), measurements of maturity relate to the extent to which certain processes are defined, managed, measured,
controlled and improved (p.1165). Measurements of maturity are usually based on whether predefined requirements are reached for specified levels (Sari et al., 2021). In essence, performance relative to the determinants of the maturity-level (Sari et al., 2021). As such, maturity models that build on maturity measurements describe how the organisation currently performs on specific requirements, and which requirements to improve in order to achieve a better level of maturity (Comussi and Patel, as cited in Sari et al., 2021). This means that the results of the assessment can be used as a foundation for organisations to improve their
sustainable efforts (Sari et al., 2021). CSR maturity models are generally developed by applying qualitative methods, such as content analysis, on organisational websites and/or SRs (Sari et al., 2020; Witek-Crabb, 2019).
In the introduction, this paper touched upon how corporate disclosure on CSR is often published in CSR-reports or SRs. The historical development of Sustainability Reporting is not well covered in Carroll’s (2008) otherwise comprehensive literature review of CSR. Due to the importance of SRs in this thesis, the next chapter will elaborate the topic further.
2.3 Sustainability Reporting
The development of SR is closely intertwined, and in many ways parallel, with the development of CSR, which also gained significant traction during the 1970s
and 1980s (Christofi et al., 2012; Tsalis et al., 2020). According to Siew (2015) SR has accumulated various synonyms since its conception. Among these synonyms are: CSR-reporting, SD-reporting, TBL-reporting, non-financial reporting, and ESG-reporting (Zrnić et al., 2020). The term SR will be utilized throughout this paper as opposed to the other terms presented above. This section will mostly elaborate on the GRI framework for SR, but the United Nations Global Compact (UNGC) and the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) will be mentioned.
Due to the intertwined nature of CSR and SR, it is unsurprising that the concepts face similar challenges. The similarity is particularly striking in regards to how SR should be defined. In fact, Gray (2010) states that the highly contested nature of how SR is defined can reduce the usefulness of the concept. The
constantly evolving nature of the concept can be seen as one of the main causes of the problem (Zrnić et al., 2020). However, the definition proposed by GRI is often used by both scholars and businesses (Borglund et al., 2017). The frequent use of GRIs SR definition can arguably be attested to the widespread use of GRI’s SR standard. Therefore, GRIs definition of SR will be applied throughout this paper.
According to GRI (n.d.), SR can be defined as “a report published by a company or organisation about the economic, environmental and social impacts caused by its everyday activities” (para 2). However, the early stages of SR are marked by a narrower view on what constitutes sustainability (Gotken et al., 2020).
The emergence of SR in the 1970s can be seen in context with the
substantial growth in CSR literature and the increased awareness of environmental issues during the decade. Reflected, for instance, in the establishment of a global organisation for addressing environmental issues, The United Nations
Environment Program (UNEP) (Gotken et al., 2020). In the 1970s businesses, especially in Europe, began to publish information on the social impact of their operations (Fifka, 2012; Hahn & Kühen, 2013). Despite the increased focus on the environmental impact of businesses, most disclosures in the decade focused on employee issues (Tsalis et al., 2020).
In the 1980s the research on SR increased to a large degree, despite the political victories, and by extension, political agenda, of Reagan and Thatcher (Fifka, 2012). Gokten et al. (2020) argues that the flourish of SR in this decade is largely due to four events: the establishment of the “World Commission on Environment and Development” (WCED); the publication of the landmark report
“Our Common Future”; the Exxon Valdez oil spill, and; the publication of the Valdez Principles by “The Coalition for Environmentally Responsible
Economies” (CERES) (pp.107-108). The Valdez Principles can be regarded as the first guide to ethical environmental behavior for businesses (Gotken et al., 2020, p.108). Following the Brundtland Report businesses reporting practices shifted toward environmental issues, whilst still incorporating social issues (Tsalis et al., 2020). This trend was reinforced following the Exxon Valdez accident and the release of the Valdez Principles (Gotken et al., 2020). The Exxon Valdez accident reinforced the environmental reporting shift mainly because it highlighted the importance of SR for stakeholders (Gotken et al., 2020, p. 109). However, the main emphasis was still on a rather narrow category of environmental issues - air pollution and water contamination (Tsalis et al., 2020).
The 1990s marked a positive change in SR interest. A rapidly increasing number of businesses started to release SR in the 1990s, and research which focused exclusively on SR rocketed (Fifka, 2012). However, the major contributions to SR in the 1990s was the publication of Elkington’s TBL and GRI’s framework for SR for businesses (Fifka, 2012; Gotken, 2020; Hahn &
Kühen, 2013; Tsalis et al., 2020). As stated in the introduction, the TBL was an expression of the need for additional dimensions to measure sustainability:
economic, social and environmental (Elkington, 1997). Another significant event in the 1990s is the initiation of the UNGC, which launched a framework to assist businesses with their sustainability goals on a global scale (UNGC, n.d.; UNEP et al., 2013). According to White (1999), the GRI framework represents the
foundation for the institutionalization of SR. Thus, the end of the 1990s marked the first standardization of SR (Gotken et al., 2020). However, this is an ongoing process, as researchers and legislators strive for more comprehensive
standardizations of SR (Burritt & Schaltegger 2010,; Gotken et al., 2020).
The 2000s marked a period of increased standardization of SR following a number of publications and legislations. The GRI published the updated versions of their SR framework throughout the 2000s, namely the G2 (2002), G3 (2006), and G4 (2013). 2006 marked the publication of the G3 and the training
documentation and sectoral application guidelines, which established SR as an area that required knowledge and experience (Gotken et al, 2020, p.111). In 2010 UNGC formally recommended the GRI reporting framework for SR for
businesses (Gotken et al., 2020). A comprehensive sectoral guideline was released
by GRI in 2011. It included the following sectors: Non-Governmental
Organisations (NGOs), airports, construction, real estate, mining and metals, food, and financial services (Gotken et al., 2020). When GRI published the G4 in 2013, it included Principles, Standards and Implementation guidelines for creating a SR for all sizes of organisations, in any sector (Gotken et al., 2020). The SR expertise exam was launched by GRI in 2015. The purpose of the exam was to provide a certification of professionals who can carry our G4-standard SR (Gotken et al., 2020). 2015 was a particularly important year for the UN, when member states adopted the 17 SDGs as part of the 2030 Agenda for SD (Tsalis et al., 2020; SDG, n.d.). Both GRI and UNGC have expressed that businesses should adopt the 17 goals in order to contribute to SD (GRI & UNGC, 2017, 2018). This has caused some businesses to attempt to include the SDGs they work on into their SRs (Tsalis et al., 2020).
The first global standards for SR were published in 2016 by GRI and the
“Global Sustainability Standards Board”. These standards are developed to ensure a transparent way for businesses to present the negative and positive impact they have on the environment, society and the economy based on globally accepted standards (Gotken et al., 2020). Part of the rationale behind including negative aspects in the reporting standards is, as briefly mentioned in the introduction, to avoid greenwashing (Borglund et al., 2017; Kurpierz & Smith, 2020).
Greenwashing will be elaborated on further in section 2.4.
The GRI is an important landmark in the development of SR, and is considered the main global reporting standard to date (KPMG, 2011). GRI is seen as important mainly because the standardization of organisations’ SR efforts creates a common language on which stakeholders and shareholders can assess and compare performance - for instance in regards to transparency. Transparency relates whether organisations communicate their sustainability efforts in a clear and truthful manner, enabling stakeholders to make sound, fact-based, decisions (Borglund et al., 2017). Multiple principles for transparency have been proposed, however, those that relate specifically to SR are: balance, comparability, accuracy, timeliness, clarity, and reliability (Fernandez-Feijoo et al., 2014). These principles are close to identical to GRI’s reporting standards, which as previously
mentioned, is accuracy, balance, clearity, comparability and reliability (Borglund et al., 2017). As such, the application of the GRI framework should result in transparent, and therefore neutral, reporting. Despite this, sustainability reporting
has been criticized for having a lack of transparency (Boiral, 2013). For instance, Boiral (2013) states that SRs are simply marketing tools whose purpose is to improve organisations’ image. The result of Boiral’s (2013) review was that the lack of transparency in organisational SR have reduced much SR to a simulacrum:
an artificial and idealized representation that is disconnected from reality (p.2). As such, non-transparent SR does not represent an accurate representation of
organisations sustainability efforts, but would rather be an exemplification of greenwashing, which is a known problem within SR (Boiral, 2013; Kupierz &
Smith, 2020). As such, transparency is a vital aspect of SR. Therefore, some academics question whether sustainability reporting is useful at all (Boiral, 2013;
Burritt & Schaltegger 2010,). Burritt and Schaltegger (2010) argues that due to the many definitions and different standards, SR is difficult to understand and
therefore impossible to measure and compare. Mähönen (2020), on the other hand, states that the problem with SR is that they are biased, and often represent eco-efficiency or greenwashing rather than true sustainability (p.7). As such, there seems to be disagreement regarding the usefulness of organisational SR among academics.
2.4 Synthesis of Research on Greenwashing in Sustainability Reporting As mentioned in the introduction, greenwashing is the selective disclosure of positive information about a company’s environmental or social performance, without full disclosure of negative information on these dimensions, so as to create an overly positive corporate image (Lyon & Maxwell, 2011, p. 9).
According to Kupierz and Smith (2020), greenwashing is often a result of
pressure, rationalisation and opportunity - the greenwashing triangle. In fact, there are both economic and reputational gains and losses from what information is reported by the organisation, even when the reporting is not honest (Kupierz &
Smith, 2020). Therefore, in relation to SR, greenwashing is when companies appear as more sustainable or environmentally friendly than they are. Hence focusing only on the positive aspects of the company’s impacts in their SR. This entails that there is selective disclosure of positive information, whilst negative information is left out, minimized or legitimized, in order to create a positive impression (Kupierz & Smith, 2020). The result of selective disclosure is
non-neutral SRs, which can be categorized as non-transparent reporting. Lack of transparency is, as outlined in the previous section, an example of greenwashing.
Greenwashing has become a salient topic within research in recent years, as sustainability reporting has become a more common practice either voluntarily or due to legislation (Bowen & Aragon-Correa, 2014). An important question is whether the increase of disclosure on environmental information reflects increased transparency or lack thereof, and therefore, impression management (Marquis et al., 2016). In essence, whether the inclusion of more information has incremental value to support stakeholder’s decision-making or if it is an expression of
opportunistic behaviour deemed as beneficial to the organisation (Sandberg &
Holmlund, 2014).
According to Siano et al. (2017), multiple studies on greenwashing have fortified the idea that sustainability reporting lacks transparency, and is a type of impression management, rather than an unbiased communication of organisational efforts. Impression management can be described as organisational behavior used to shape the impression others have of them (Sandberg & Holmlund, 2014).
Therefore, heavy use of impression management techniques may imply that the SR is used to present a non-transparent and idealized image of the organisation (Sandberg & Holmlund, 2014; Hoogheimstra, 2000). For instance, legitimation strategies, a subcategory of impression management, and whether these contribute to increased transparency, have also been explored in the literature (Hahn & Lülfs, 2013). Hahn and Lülfs (2013) distinguishes symbolic legitimation, that seek to modify stakeholders’ perception of organisations, from substantial legitimation, which seek to communicate real change of organisational actions and initiatives.
Hahn and Lülfs (2013) found that organisations often use symbolic legitimation strategies to communicate negative information and aspects. As such, the
‘balance’ aspect of transparency (and GRI) is not fulfilled by organisations who communicate negative information in their SR in this manner, and is therefore associated with greenwashing (Hahn & Lülfs, 2013).
Neutralization strategies is another subcategory of impression
management. Neutralization techniques are broad justifications, which can be applied by organisations to manage stakeholders' impressions, by legitimising negative aspects (Talbot & Boiral, 2015). Because neutralization techniques are a form of impression management, it does not represent transparent reporting of information, rather it is an expression of greenwashing. Interestingly, Kanbaty et al., as cited in Hamza and Jarboui (2021), found that impression management is significantly associated with SRs. These findings substantiate Boiral (2013),
Burritt and Schaltegger (2010) and Mähonen’s (2020) critique of sustainability reporting.
However, it should be noted that the majority of the aforementioned research is not conducted in a Norwegian context, therefore, the next section offers a brief overview of the sustainability reporting practices of Norwegian organisations.
2.5 Studies on Norwegian Sustainability Reporting
The majority of studies addressing Norwegian sustainability reporting over the last decade include the 50 or 100 largest Norwegian companies in their data collection. A study conducted by Vormedal and Ruud (2009) showed that only 10% of the 100 largest companies in Norway complied with the requirements on environmental reporting in 2009. However, much has happened in the last 11 years, and new requirements and legislations for sustainability reporting have significantly increased this percentage. According to KPMG (2017, 2020) Norwegian organisations’ have reporting rates similar to the global average of 77%. However, KPMG’s (2020) analysis also showed that the reporting rate of Norwegian organisations’ have decreased from 89% in 2017 to 77% in 2020. This is contrary to Deloitte’s (2020) analysis, which showed that Norwegian
organisations’ have had little to no change in their reporting practices during the last three years. However, these differences could be due to a difference in Deloitte and KPMG’s sample, which for Deloitte consisted of the 50 largest organisations, whilst KPMG included the 100 largest organisations. As such, the changes observed by KPMG in the sustainability reporting rate could be a result of changes in companies listed as nr. 51-100.
Deloitte’s analysis also differs because it focused particularly on how Norwegian organisations scored according to the (IR) framework, which is
developed by the International Integrated Reporting Framework (IIRC). Deloitte’s analyses on Norwegian organisations’ sustainability reporting shows that 62% of the 50 largest companies in Norway reported on sustainability using the GRI standard in 2019, and 68% addressed the SDGs (Deloitte, 2020). These numbers have increased compared to 2018, where 54% used the GRI standard and 66%
addressed the SDGs (Deloitte, 2019). However, Deloitte had expected a much larger percentage of Norwegian companies to have implemented the SDGs, given
that we have moved into the last decade of the UN’s 2030 Agenda (Deloitte, 2020).
Deloitte’s analyses from the previous two years have shown interesting results related to the inclusion of a materiality analysis. A materiality analysis is a method used by organisations to identify and address sustainability issues, risks, and opportunities, from both the organisation’s- and the stakeholder’s perspective (Calabrese et al., 2019). The findings from Deloitte’s (2020) analyses from 2016-2019, shows that companies that include a materiality analysis score significantly better in the integrated reporting (IR) framework than companies without structured reporting on stakeholders and materialities. As such, Deloitte’s (2019) analysis indicates that a materiality analysis is one of the most important denominators for high quality reporting.
A significant topic in Deloitte’s (2020) analysis was greenwashing in Norwegian companies, and how this affects the transparency of SRs. The majority of reports from 2019 focus on a favorable development illustrated in a manner that is perceived as positive for the reader, and descriptions of the company’s negative impacts on identified conditions are rare (Deloitte, 2020). According to Deloittte (2020) Norwegian companies still need to improve the overall neutrality of their reporting practices, as their current practice lacks transparency. The increased focus on neutral reporting was motivated by Deloitte’s assumption that companies should be mature enough to fully comply with GRI’s principle of neutral reporting on non-financial information. Their findings showed that
organisations complying with the GRI standards, generally, achieve a higher score compared to companies that do not (Deloitte, 2020). However, their analysis also showed that there was a limited degree of transparency among Norway’s 50 largest companies in 2020. The lack of neutrality in the analysed reports, means that both the reports and the companies are perceived as less transparent (Deloitte, 2020). This implies that Norwegian organisations’ sustainability reporting, to some degree, is characterized by greenwashing. As such, Norwegian
organisations’ reporting practices are in line with the previously mentioned critique of SR outlined in the previous section.
Therefore, in light of the research addressed in our literature review, we find it intriguing to explore greenwashing in Norwegian organisations by
conducting an in-depth analysis which focuses on impression management and its effect on transparency in SRs.
3.0 Research Question
CSR and Sustainability reporting are both well-established research fields that can be traced back to the beginning of the 20th century. The development within the fields are, to some extent, parallel due to the relation between organisational and environmental issues - topics which have received increased interest in the last decades. Consequently, much research has been conducted on CSR and SR in recent years, on both a global and national scale. Noteworthy research streams and topics within the fields concerns: the nature of the CSR and SR concepts and what they entail; frameworks for reporting on SR, greenwashing, and related concepts such as transparency and impression management, in SRs.
Greenwashing and transparency are topics which have received increased attention in recent years (Borglund et al., 2017), both internationally and
nationally. For instance, KPMG (2011, 2017, 2020) analysed Norwegian
organisations’ reporting rates, practices, and performance. Deloitte (2019, 2020) analysed greenwashing, transparency and performance in Norwegian
organisations’ SRs. However, both Deloitte and KPMG reports are general overviews, and do not provide an in-depth analysis on the topics. On the other hand, Hahn and Lülfs (2013), Sandberg and Holmlund (2014), and Talbot and Boiral (2015) amongst others, have conducted research on impression
management strategies and their effect on transparent reporting, but not over time.
Talbot and Boiral’s (2018) study on impression management in the SRs of companies within the energy sector, covers a five year period. However, despite offering a more longitudinal perspective, Talbot and Boiral (2018) suggest further research on the development of the quality of reported information, i.e.
transparency of the report, and whether this variates between industries. Given the critique of the usefulness of SRs due to greenwashing by Boiral (2013), Burritt and Schaltegger (2010) and Mähonen (2020), and the problem identified by Talbot and Boiral (2018), our thesis aims to analyse this gap in the literature.
Therefore, we seek to conduct an in-depth study with the purpose of analysing and comparing Norwegian organisations’ SRs and/or ARs over several years, whilst focusing on the use of impression management strategies and their effect on transparency, and greenwashing, by extension. As such, our research questions are:
1.How do Norwegian organisations’ use of impression management strategies impact the transparency of their Sustainability Reports (SRs),2. How has the use of impression management techniques (transparency) evolved over time,and 3. Is there a difference in the transparency of SRs within Norwegian industries over time?
The importance of this study aligns with the increased interest in organisations’ sustainability reporting practices. Furthermore, we find it highly important to see whether Norwegian organisations’ use impression management strategies in a manner that reduces the transparency of their SRs and/or ARs, i.e.
whether they are used to create a positive image and reputation among their stakeholders, and if this changes over time. In other words, we wish to examine the extent to which greenwashing, through non-transparent reporting, has been, and is, present in Nowegian organisations’ SRs/ARs within the time span 2010-2020. Lastly, sustainability is a broad term and our study does not seek to cover all subsumed subjects within sustainability. Instead, our study focuses on disclosed information onclimate- and environmental aspects.
4.0 Methodology
This section of the thesis is dedicated to the presentation and justification of the chosen methodological approach for our study. Methodology is defined as “the theory of how research should be undertaken” (Saunders et al., 2009, p.3), and can be both qualitative and quantitative (Bryman & Bell, 2011). Qualitative research usually emphasizes words instead of quantification in the collection and analysis of data, and is often inductive (Bryman & Bell, 2011, p. 68). An inductive approach to the relationship between theory and research focuses on deriving meaning from the data (Bryman & Bell, 2011; Hancock & Algozzine, 2006).
4.1 Research Design and Approach
The purpose of this thesis is to assess the transparency of different Norwegian organisations, and industries, by examining how they apply impression
management strategies on environmental matters in their SRs and/or ARs, and whether this has changed over time. Based on our research questions, we found that a qualitative, inductive, methodology would be most appropriate. In order to explore our research question we have chosen to conduct a manual multiple-case
study. Document analysis is commonly applied in case studies (Hancock &
Algozzine, 2006), and is appropriate for our study because ARs and SRs can provide meaningful answers to our research question. Our selection of research design is determined by the extent to which it allows us to fully explore the organisations’ SRs/ARs in-depth and produce a rich, descriptive analysis.
Creswell, as cited in Merriam and Tisdell (2015), defines case study research as “a qualitative approach in which the investigator explores a bounded system (a case) or multiple bounded systems (cases) over time, through detailed, in-depth data collection involving multiple sources of information (e.g., observations,
interviews, audiovisual material, and documents and reports), and reports a case description and case-based themes” (p.40). A multiple-case study is preferred for our study because it allows for better theory building by enabling variation and comparison between organisations (Bryman & Bell, 2011). In addition it allows for a longitudinal approach, which is appropriate to determine how the
phenomenon we are interested in changes over time (Bryman & Bell, 2011).
To limit the scope of the multiple-case study we have chosen to apply some boundaries. Firstly, our study will mainly focus on SRs. However, sustainability related information in ARs will be utilized in order to cover a broader time span. Secondly, CSR and Sustainability are broad terms, therefore our study will only examine disclosed information on environmental aspects.
Thirdly, our study is bound by time, in that we analyse reports published between 2010-2020. Fourthly, the study only includes organisations ranked amongst the 100 largest organisations in Norway. Lastly, only organisations that have their reports publicly available will be included in our sample. To code and analyse the reports, we used the Atlas.ti software.
4.2 Sample and Data Collection
Non-random, purposeful sampling is usually applied in qualitative research (Merriam &Tisdell, 2015). Purposive sampling is used to gather data that is relevant for the research topic (Bryman & Bell, 2011). The sampling of organisations that fits the boundaries chosen for the study is consistent with purposive sampling. The sample of this study consists of 15 organisations, from six different industries.To be able to provide a comparison of organisations within an industry, we decided that a minimum of two (2) organisations should be
included per industry. However, whenever possible, the aim was three (3) organisations per industry.
Data collection for the study involves gathering SRs and ARs from
different Norwegian organisations’ corporate websites. This involves locating and downloading reports that are publicly available and compliant with the time span specified for the study.A factor which influenced the number of organisations per industry was the number of organisations with available reports in the time period 2010-2020, which varied significantly. For instance, we had to contact many organisations via email in order to request access to their SRs. With the exception of one (1) organisation, we received no replies to our inquiries. As such,
availability of reports caused some limitations regarding which organisations and industries we could include in our analysis. Time constraints was another factor that affected the total number of organisations in our sample.
4.3 Time use
The time spent on coding the ten (10) reports from the first organisation (Yara International) we analysed, familiarizing ourselves with the codes, calculating inter-rater reliability, and discussing, reviewing, editing and removing codes took longer than intended. The estimated time spent on this phase was about 300 hours.
This is mostly due to repeated meticulous reading of Yara International’s reports in their entirety, and substantial time spent re-reading articles and code
descriptions in order to evaluate which codes were the right fit. For the organisations used in our sample, the time spent coding each organisation depended on the length of the reports. The reports had great variation in length, ranging from 3 to 300 pages. The information provided in the reports may vary in different degrees and the reports are therefore read in detail. However, there are some sections which are naturally excluded, such as financial statements and sections regarding employees and the board of the organisation. We spent approximately 8-12 hours coding the longest reports (150-300 pages) while the shorter reports could be coded in 2-7 hours (3-149 pages). In total, we spent 481 hours reading and coding 10 years worth of reports for 15 organisations. Because of the significant amount of time spent on acquiring all the reports and coding each organisation, we did not manage to code more than 15 organisations in total.
Before writing the findings, we re-read the summaries we had written for each report for every organisation (see Appendix A, section 1.0). We had
originally estimated the time-use for this part of the thesis to roughly 180-190 hours. However, the actual time spent writing the findings section was about 290-300 hours. The exaggerated time-use is mostly due to the time spent double-checking the reports and our summaries, in order to write up the most relevant, prominent and correct information.
4.4 Validity and Reliability
According to Lincoln and Guba (1985) qualitative research needs to be evaluated by its ‘trustworthiness’ a criterion which consists of four aspects:credibility, transferability, dependabilityandconfirmability.In the following paragraphs, these terms will be defined and discussed in relation to our study.
Credibility relates to whether the findings of a study are believable or not, and relates to how plausible findings are for others (Bryman & Bell, 2015).
Credibility can be ensured by upholding the standards for good research practice (Bryman & Bell, 2015). In this study this means that all steps of the research process are carried out carefully and thoroughly documented in a way that is easily followed by others.
Transferability refers to the degree to which the findings of a study are applicable to other contexts (Bryman & Bell, 2015). In order to enable other researchers to pass judgment on the transferability, the descriptions of the study need to be detailed and in-depth about the context in which it is situated (Lincoln
& Guba, 1985). The context and boundaries of our study will, arguably, reduce the general transferability of our findings. For instance, our study uses time
(2010-2020), place (Norwegian organisations), performance (top 100
organisations), and availability (publicly posted reports) as boundaries. As such, our findings are not necessarily applicable in other time eras, countries, or levels of performance. It should be noted that the goal of the study is not to ensure transferability, but rather explore a bounded case in depth. However, this study will emphasize thick descriptions in order for other researchers to be able to pass judgment on the transferability of the study.
Confirmability concerns the level of objectivity in a research process, and it should be apparent that the researcher’s personal values or predispositions have not affected the research or the results (Bryman & Bell, 2015). While quantitative research strives for objectivity, qualitative researchers acknowledge that complete objectivity is impossible (Willig, 2013). Describing, reflecting and problematizing
the role of the researcher is often referred to asreflexivity(Willig, 2013).
Reflexivity, then, is a way to reflect upon how the researcher's values, beliefs and experiences may have influenced the study. For instance, we both believe that the conservation, protection and sustainable use of our natural resources are
paramount for a safe future for the coming generations. This belief could, of course, influence how critically we view the sustainable actions described by large organisations. In addition, we have different educational backgrounds and as such, we may regard information differently. We acknowledge that these factors might influence the research, however, our goal is that the research is not affected by our personal values in any meaningful way.
Dependability concerns whether the theoretical inferences drawn in a study can be justified, and is the qualitative parallel of reliability (Bryman & Bell, 2015). In order to ensure the dependability of a study, detailed notes on all parts of the research process should be described and kept in an easily accessible manner (Bryman & Bell, 2015). This will make it possible for other researchers to critique our process and results. In our study, this would mean that all the steps of the research process and the reasoning behind them should be stated clearly and included in the thesis. The development of the interrater reliability of our study will be covered in-depth in the next section. However, for the full disclosure of the methodological process, see Appendix B.
4.5 Development of Inter-Rater Reliability
To begin with, we analysed the same reports separately to see whether we were in agreement about what codes should be used on the different segments. This was to ensure good inter-rater reliability. We decided to code all the reports available within the time-frame 2011-2020 (2010 not available) from one organisation (Yara International) in order to decide which codes to use, and to reach a satisfactory inter-rater reliability. However, we also took random samples of different reports from various organisations to test the inter-rater reliability throughout the project (see Appendix B, section 3.0). To begin with, we randomly selected Yara
International, which was one of the organisations that had reports available within the chosen time-frame. The reports were coded either one or two at a time, before we calculated the reliability and then discussed any discrepancies. The process of calculating the inter-rater reliability was carried out via three steps. The first step was to individually report the total number of coded segments used in a table in a
shared excel sheet (see table 1 below). The second step was to have a meeting where we went through which segments we had coded and discussed any
discrepancies and why we had differed in our coding. If the same segments were coded with the same code, or codes, we reported this as an agreement. The final step was to write up the number of agreements in the excel sheet and calculate the inter-rater reliability. Inter-rater reliability is given by the following formula:
Inter-rater reliability = 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 x100 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑜𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠
Table 1: Summary of inter-rater reliability scores
Organisations &
Year Nanna Vilde Nr. of Agreements Reliability Score Yara International AS
2011 87 122 45 43,06%
2012 86 86 41 47,67%
2013 95 92 63 67,50%
2014 80 84 54 67,00%
2015 30 29 22 74,54%
2016 91 92 65 71,04%
2017 97 99 56 73,51%
2018 84 80 57 69,51%
2019 73 83 48 80,00%
Stolt-Nielsen AS
2015 7 7 7 100%*
2020 39 33 28 77,78%
Gjensidige AS
2015 14 14 14 100%*
2020 122 120 89 73,55%
Orkla
2010 23 23 17 74,42%
Norsk Hydro
2016 84 83 59 71,17%
2017 95 99 78 80,41%
* = this reliability score is high because this report was very short, which resulted in few codes.
As previously mentioned, we discussed which codes we had used and why we had used them, if there were any disagreements between our codings. Initially, we started our coding process with 24 unique codes, from four different sets of codes (see Appendix B, table 1). Throughout coding each Yara International report, we discussed, revised and/or removed several codes we disagreed on in order to reach a higher interrater reliability. For instance, we removed the code set, with three codes, from Cho et al., (2015) due to differing interpretations and a general lack of agreement regarding the codes. However, the codes also had some overlap with Sandberg and Holmlund’s (2014) analytical categories, which we found to be more useful. Additionally, we had a higher rate of agreement with Sandberg and Holmlund’s (2014) codes. After the process of discussing, revising and removing codes, we ended up with 20 unique codes from three different sets of codes. The sets of codes were from: Hahn and Lülfs (2014), Sandberg and Holmlund (2014), and Talbot and Boiral (2015). For an in-depth description of the development of inter-rater reliability and codes, and the finalised set of codes, see table 1, 2, and 3 in Appendix B.
4.6 Justification and Application of Codes
Throughout our discussions regarding which codes to use in the inter-rater reliability process, we developed some boundaries and/or modifications for certain codes. This was done in order to best capture information that would help answer the research questions. In the following sections, the codes with
boundaries and modifications will be elaborated on. Additionally, the reasons for these changes will be covered.
Hahn and Lülfs (2014) have codes that relate to legitimation strategies used by organisations when discussing negative environmental performance. As mentioned in the literature review, there is a difference between symbolic and substantial strategies. The strategies that are symbolic can be connected to lack of transparency. Only Coercive Action: Detailed are regarded as a purely substantial strategy that does not seek to influence stakeholders’ perspectives. As such, we regard this as a neutral way of communicating how the organisation handles negative aspects. While Indicating Facts and Marginalisation can be viewed as a mix between a symbolic- and substantial strategy, we have chosen to only apply these codes in instances when it is used as a symbolic strategy. For instance, when it is a clearly negative aspect that is not elaborated on or there is a lack of a
benchmark it is coded as Indicating Facts. When it is visibly a negative aspect that is clearly rendered unimportant or negligible it is coded as Marginalisation. All other negative aspects or information that is presented in a neutral, well described, manner, will be coded as description.
When it comes to the use of Sandberg and Holmlund’s (2014) codes we use the Description code, inisolation, for any statement relating to environmental aspects that is presented in a neutral manner. We have chosen to use Description, incombination,with any of the Writing Styles (vague, subjective, positive, emotional) if it is a description of environmental efforts, practices, guidelines, action etc. that is not presented in a neutral manner. As such, when ‘Description’
is coded with a Writing Style, it is not a neutral statement.
With the codes from Talbot and Boiral (2015) these refer to how managers talk about their organisational sustainability performance in an American setting.
We included these codes because we wanted to see if they were relevant in organisational SR/AR, in a Norwegian setting.
The rationale behind these modifications was that we wanted to include codes that are used to report negative aspects (indicating facts, rationalisation etc.), in addition to codes that are used to report positive aspects (i.e. praise, positive, promotion of a systematic vision), in a non-neutral way. This enables us to explore the notion of transparency in organisational SR/AR through making it possible to code negative and positive information that is reported in both a neutral and non-neutral manner. That way we capture the full range of
strategies/techniques used by organisations to communicate environmental efforts.
5.0 Findings
In this chapter we will present the most significant findings from our coding of the SRs and/or ARs of 15 Norwegian organisations, in six different industries,
between 2010-2020 (see table 2 below). Firstly, our conceptualisation of
transparency, i.e. the level of neutrality will be introduced. Secondly, a complete overview of the neutrality level for all 15 organisations across 10 years will be described. We will then present the most interesting findings relating to neutrality from our within-case analysis followed by the main findings from our cross-case analysis, in light of our research question. The findings from our within-case- and cross-case analyses that are not presented in this chapter, can be found in
Appendix A.
5.1 Level of Neutrality
Because the modification of the applied codes allowed us to assess transparent reporting practices on environmental efforts in SRs/ARs through impression management, we decided to develop a measure to convey the degree of transparent reporting - the level of neutrality. The level of neutrality can be
viewed as a measure of impression management techniques used in SRs/ARs, and is therefore a way to assess transparent reporting, and greenwashing, by extension.
The level of neutrality is based on the distribution of coded segments in each organisations’ report. As mentioned in the previous section, we have chosen to use the “description” code (in isolation) for segments that are reported
neutrally, in a detailed manner, regardless of whether this information is negative or positive. In addition, there is one code for admitting that the organisation has acted in a negative way (“admission”) and one that describes how they have dealt with a negative incident (“coercive action: detailed”). Both codes are used to communicate either positive or negative information in a neutral manner. Lastly, the “covid-19: acknowledgment” code is used to communicate the impact of covid-19 on emissions, in a neutral manner (see Appendix B, table 3). Note that segments with these codes are viewed as neutral only if they are coded in isolation. All other codes are used to cover any variation in how information is presented in a non-neutral manner. To calculate the level of neutrality, we divided the number of neutrally coded segments on the total coded segments, in each report from 2010-2020 for all organisations in the sample. The results of these calculations will be covered in the following chapter. However, for a complete overview, see table 1 and section 5, in Appendix A.
To be able to assess which organisations that had a level of neutrality that reflected transparent reporting, a threshold of 75% was established. A threshold of 75% were deemed satisfactory because it signifies a level of neutrality well above the 50% average. However, it also takes some variation between the two coders into consideration.
Table 2: Organisations and Industries in the Sample
Organisation Industry
DNB
Finance Nordea
Sparebank1 SR-Bank Storebrand
Tryg Insurance
Gjensidige Statkraft
Energy Norsk Hydro
Mowi
Aquaculture Salmar
Norgesgruppen
Consumer goods Orkla
Reitangruppen Wilh. Wilhelmsen
Shipping Stolt-Nielsen
Graph 1: Level of Neutrality in Norwegian Organisations Between 2010-2020
Graph 1 shows the development of the level of neutrality for each organisation between 2010-2020. We decided to disclose the level of neutrality graphically because it makes it easier to track the development of each
organisation individually. Additionally, it becomes easier to compare and contrast the organisations’ development. When examining the level of neutrality for all organisations across 10 years, there is a clear pattern. With the exception of Retiangruppen (RG), all organisations seem to evolve from having considerable variation in 2010-2011 to becoming more centralised between the 50,00% - 87,50% level of neutrality. In essence, there is a general upwards trajectory between 2010-2020 for all organisations in the sample, except RG. Besides this pattern, there are considerable differences between organisations, such as Salmar and Norsk Hydro, and between industries, such as Finance and Shipping. To view the level of neutrality for all organisations individually, see Appendix A, section 5.0.
In the following sections, we will present a more comprehensive analysis of our findings by examining the individual development of certain organisations and industries throughout the period 2010-2020.
5.2 Longitudinal Within-Case Analysis
In this section, we will present the most significant findings from the within-case analysis. We have found that the following organisations are particularly
interesting: RG, Sparebank1 SR-Bank (SB1), Nordea, Storebrand, and Salmar.
Graph 2: Level of Neutrality: Reitangruppen
RG’s development throughout the period 2010-2020 is interesting due to their low level of neutrality, which is shown to be under 25% every year. From 2011-2015 the level of neutrality is equal to zero, which is a unique development in
comparison to the other organisations. The graph also shows that the level of neutrality for 2019 is lower than in 2010, showing no improvement throughout the period. However, RG provides reports with extremely limited information, hence few coded segments. This needs to be taken into account when looking at the level of neutrality. RG remains under the threshold of 75% throughout the period 2010-2020.
Graph 3: Level of Neutrality: SB1
SB1’s development throughout the period 2010-2020 is of particular interest because it diverges from the other organisations in multiple different ways. For instance, SB1’s level of neutrality stays under 25% until 2015, and under 50%
until 2018. As such, it takes seven years for SB1’s level of neutrality to get above 50%. After the level of neutrality stabilizes between 2018-2019, it decreases again to slightly above 50% - ending on a downward trend. As such, SB1’s level of neutrality throughout 2010-2020 are far below the 75% threshold. SB1 is the only organisation where the level of neutrality has had a small but steady incline, followed by a sharp increase and a decrease again in 2020. Additionally, with the exception of RG, SB1 has the lowest level of neutrality of all the organisations in 2020. Despite SB1’s development being unique, Salmar’s development in the level of neutrality has some similar tendencies. For instance, both organisations
begin with 0,00% in level of neutrality, and use considerable time to get above the 50%-line.
Graph 4: Level of Neutrality: Nordea
Nordea’s development throughout the period 2010-2020 is of particular interest due to their relatively steady decrease in level of neutrality. The graph shows that the level of neutrality has sharp peaks in a downward trend from 2010-2016, before it remains relatively stable throughout most of the period. Out of the 15 organisations in the sample, Nordea is one of few that has a lower level of neutrality in 2020 compared to the first report in 2010. However, Nordea has remained below the 75% threshold since 2014. Norgesgruppen’s (NG)
development throughout the period is somewhat similar to Nordea’s in terms of variation. With the exception of 2017-2018, Nordea has alternating peaks and valleys every year. NG’s level of neutrality shows the same pattern.
Graph 5: Level of Neutrality: Storebrand
Storebrand’s development throughout the 2010-2020 period is interesting because of the stable nature, and the degree, of the level of neutrality. Storebrand has no sharp inclines or declines, with the exception of the dip from 2015-2016. As such, Storebrand’s level of neutrality is the most stable one in the sample. With the exception of SB1 there are no other organisations with an equally steady incline.
Additionally, with 83,82%, Storebrand has the highest level of neutrality, across the sample, in 2020. With a level of neutrality at 83,82%, Storebrand is well above the 75% threshold.
Graph 6: Level of Neutrality: Salmar
Salmar’s development is noteworthy because of its highly variable, but slowly rising level of neutrality. Salmar’s development between 2010-2016 follows a
peak and valley pattern, with considerable variation, in an upward trajectory.
Following 2016, Salmar has a steadily increasing level of neutrality towards 2020.
Despite the steady incline between 2016-2020, Salmar remains just above the 50%-line and therefore under the threshold for transparent reporting. Stolt-Nielsen (SN) follows a similar pattern as Salmar, but is at a considerably higher level of neutrality throughout the 2010-2020 period, and ends at 81,25% in 2020.
5.3 Longitudinal Cross-Case Analysis
In this section, we will present the most significant findings from the cross-case analysis. We have found that the following industries are particularly interesting:
Finance, Consumer Goods, and Energy.
Graph 7: Level of Neutrality: Finance Industry
The development of the level of neutrality for the finance industry has two main points of interest: it is both an industry with a high degree of similarity between most of the organisations, and with a significant outlier. Nordea, DNB, and Storebrand follow a relatively similar level in neutrality, and cross each other multiple times in the 2010-2020 time span. In addition, they all end on an upward trend with a similar slope. The outlier, SB1, has significantly lower levels of neutrality until 2018-2019 and never reaches a similar level of neutrality as the other organisations. Further, SB1 has a relatively sharp decline from 2019-2020 and ends up with a much lower level of neutrality than the rest of the
organisations in the finance industry. Storebrand is the only organisation in the
