Ideologies of Extraterritorial Foreign Policy in Northern Europe and the
USA
Hans Olav Stensli
Dissertation for the Dr.polit.-degree, University of Bergen, Norway
2006
Oceans Apart:
Ideologies of Extraterritorial Foreign Policy in Northern Europe and the
USA
Hans Olav Stensli
Dissertation for the partial fulfilment of the Dr.polit.-degree,
Department of comparative politics University of Bergen, Norway
February 2006
department of comparative politics, University of Bergen. He has been a source of motivation throughout my studies of politics and in fact was a chief reason why I developed an interest in macro theory, in the first place.
I am indebted to Pål Bakka and Terje Knutsen for reading a draft of the thesis in its entirety, and for their very valuable comments. Former colleagues at the department of defence studies at the Royal Norwegian Naval Academy were great commentators to drafts of individual chapters. Unfortunately, this department ceased to exist as a consequence of the
reorganisation of the armed forces in the years 2004-2006. Especially, I enjoyed the seminars with Michael Prince, Hans J. Wiborg and Jan Tore Nilsen. Michael Prince in particular helped through suggestions to the prose in chapter 1. Bjørn Terjesen and Karl Rommetveit were also great colleagues and generously let me participate at the Norwegian forum for the study of naval history. A number of librarians were very supportive of the effort. In addition to Pål Bakka at the University of Bergen, I remain indebted to Ragnvald Høgh and Thomas Brevik at the Naval Academy, and Hans Christian Bjerg at the Danish Defence Archive.
The research project on the Conditions for Democracy in Europe provided me with a great arena to discuss some of the earliest drafts of the first chapters of the thesis. In particular, I would like to thank Professor Sten Berglund at Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, and Henri Vogt at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs.
The department of comparative politics at the University of Bergen was very helpful throughout the process. Sincerely thanks to heads of the department during this time,
professors Stein Kuhnle, Lars Svåsand and associate professor Nina Raaum, who let me use an office at the department during the last years of the project.
Table of contents:
1 Introduction-theme and theory ...7
1.1HOW STATES MADE INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS, AND VICE VERSA...27
1.2THE ISSUE OF DESIGN IN COMPARATIVE HISTORICAL SOCIOLOGY;SOME METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS WITH BEARING ON THIS ANALYSIS...31
1.3THE CHALLENGE OF EXPLAINING MACRO-CHANGE IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS...39
1.4OPENING THE "BLACK BOX" OF IRTHEORY: TWO COMPETING GROUPS OF APPROACHES ON DOMESTIC ACTORS AND INSTITUTIONS IN FOREIGN POLICY...55
1.4.1 Rational actors ...55
1.4.2 What rational Choice cannot explain ...61
1.4.3 Historical institutionalism – an alternative framework ...63
2 Extraterritorial Sovereignty – Idealtypes and the Selection of Cases ...69
2.1 Ideology; Two ideal types of views on sovereignty at sea and how the process of state building shaped institutions and preferences...74
2.2EXTRATERRITORIAL STATE INTERESTS – UNITS AND HYPOTHESES...105
2.2.1 State principles and preferences ...105
2.2.2 Selection of the units based on hypotheses ...109
3 States and Navies 1600-1856; Institutionalisation and Ideology...135
The Hansa in Norway and Iceland...138
The Hansa, Sweden and Finland...142
The Hanseatic League, England, Ireland, and the Rise of Dutch power...145
Denmark and the Hanseatic League ...148
The fall of the Hanseatic League as a major regional Power ...151
3.1NAVAL TECHNOLOGY,PERSONNEL AND ORGANISATION...159
3.2THE BALANCE OF SEA POWER AND EXTRATERRITORIAL SOVEREIGNTY...167
The Dutch Republic - An International Liberalist? ...168
England as a naval hegemon ...177
The USA-an emerging Naval Power...199
Sweden ...208
Denmark-Norway and Germany ...215
3.3MONOPOLIES OF VIOLENCE?THE PRACTISES OF PIRACY AND PRIZE-TAKING AND NORTHERN EUROPE UNTIL 1856...219
3.4STATES AND NAVIES -A COMPARATIVE OVERVIEW...223
4 Extraterritorial violence in the Industrial age, 1856-1945...225
4.1FROM PAX BRITANNICA TO A WEAKENED MARITIME EMPIRE:BRITAIN AND THE INTERNATIONAL HIERARCHY 1856-1945...228
4.2THE RISE AND FALL OF A CONTINENTAL SEA POWER;GERMANY...253
4.2.1 Early developments in German naval thought...254
4.2.2 The Influence of Mahan upon German History...262
4.2.3 German navalism 1895- 1918...266
4.3THE ASCENT OF A MARITIME HEGEMON;THE US ...281
4.3.1 US state formation and a modest Naval Power: The US NAVY 1845-1890 ...284
4.3.2 The dog that never really barked; The USA as a regional Imperial power ...292
4.3.3 Isolationism, Internationalism and the attempt at establishing world order through international institutions ...311
4.4FROM PAX BRITANNICA TO WWII:HEGEMONIC STABILITY VS INSTABILITY AND THE PERIPHERIES OF NORTHERN EUROPE AND THE NETHERLANDS...331
4.4.1 The Nordic states ...332
4.4.2 The Netherlands-still liberal after all these years...357
4.5CONCLUSION; ARMS RACES, GLOBALISATION AND MARITIME POLITICS IN THE INDUSTRIAL AGE...363
5 An American Empire? The US and liberal International Institutions, 1945-2001...367
5.1FORWARD DEPLOYMENT AND THE TRANSLATION OF THE NEW DEAL TO THE INTERNATIONAL SCENE; THE US AND THE POST-WAR INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS...369
5.2THE EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL MARITIME COOPERATION... 383
5.3AFTER EMPIRE; THE UK1945-2001 ... 409
5.4ENJOYING AND CRITICIZING PAX AMERICA?THE NORDIC COUNTRIES AND THE NETHERLANDS,1945-2001... 421
5.5NAVIES IN A UNIPOLAR WORLD ORDER;THE US AND NORTH EUROPEAN NAVAL STRENGTH... 445
5.6THE PAST AS THE FUTURE IN THE ATLANTIC EMPIRE?OVERSEAS OCCUPATIONS, TERRORISM AND PIRACY... 453
6 Conclusions ... 479
6.1EMPIRICAL CONCLUSIONS... 479
LOCALLY VALID IDEAL-TYPES... 480
6.2THEORETICAL CONCLUSIONS... 499
APPENDICES... 517
APPENDIX I-quantitative estimate navies of the major powers... 517
APPENDIX II: REGISTERED MERCHANT SHIPS IN 1000 TONS... 519
APPENDIX III: Landings of fish in 1000 metric tons in European states 20th Century ... 519
BIBLIOGRAPHY; ... 521
List of figures
Figure 1.0: Possible extensions of present continental shelves under national
jurisdiction beyond the 200 nautical mile limit.……….……...17 Figure 1.2; Types of comparisons based on two sets of proposition…………..………... 33 Figure 2.01; The Structure of the Causal argument-process between state-formation and international instiutions……….…………72 Figure 2.02; concepts applied to Levels of analysis……….74 Figure 2.1.1; Main groups of variables………..92 Figure 2.1.2; Maritime Principles, overseas interests and Foreign
policy dispositions………..96 Figure 2.1.3; Defining characteristics of international liberalism and paternalism…….100 Figure 2.2.1: A typology of units………108 Figure 2.2.2: Typology of Units for the study of Northern Europe and the USA……….,132 Figure 5.2: Zones of National Jurisdiction 1958 versus 1982 Law of the Sea
Convention…………….…..….404 Figure 5.3; Baseline for territorial sea after 1951, Northern Norway………….…………..416 Figure 6.1.1: State trajectories……….………..489 Figure 6.1.2: institutionalization and ideologic content of international hegemons…..496 Figure 6.1.3: Oceans under national jurisdiction, The Northeast Atlantic 2003….…….498 Figure 6.2; Nature of hegemony and state autonomy in maritime policies for the majority of polities ………....513
List of tables
Table 2.1: Rules for categorization of states according to degree of overseas
interests……….….95 Table 3.4: total size of sail- and steamship navies 1820-1860………..224 Table 4.3.2: Naval expenditures and Total federal expenditures in the US, 1890-1914..302 Table 4.3.3: US Fleet in December 1941………...322
Table 4.4.1.3: Naval and total defence expenditure in Sweden and Norway 1892-1905, in millions Swedish kroner………..352 Table 5.2 Changing patterns of claims to territorial waters; Number of states claiming different width of territorial waters………...386 Table 5.2.2 Land based reserves of minerals in major production countries,
in percent of world total land based reserves,1977………....393 Table 5.5.1 Force structure of the US Navy and US Marine Corps 2001……….446 Table 5.5.2; Force structure Royal Navy and the Royal Marines………..449 Table 5.5.3: Force structure of Navies in Germany, The Netherlands and the Nordic countries 2001……….451 Table 5.6: IMO Reports on acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery against ships
1997-2003……….…468
Abstract
In the study of international relations, domestic variables have rather seldom been used to explain phenomena on the international level. In comparative politics and historical sociology, explaining domestic outcomes have been based upon reductionist concepts of the international system, if this level has been addressed at all. In the latter discipline, analysis is often truly sociological, while in the former, economic models of action and systems are predominant.
In contrast, this thesis is a demonstration of the utility of comparing states by using explanatory variables from international relations, while at the same time presenting a sociological analysis of international institutions.The interplay between international and domestic politics is highlighted, as is the interplay between material and ideational incentives for action, since the state is embedded in a domestic as well as an international society. By combining the strategic and the habitual reservoir of action, interesting perspectives emerge through an empirical analysis of extraterritorial foreign policy. Extraterritorial foreign policy is maritime and naval state policies, and these policies were shaped by domestic and international factors, just as the policies in turn shaped international relations and institutions. It is argued here, that both the interplay between the domestic and international, and the combination of strategic and habitual state preferences can be studied by applying a typology of states based on ideological principles and degrees of overseas interests.
From the second half of the 17th century, the international system showed a higher degree of hierarchical properties than what often portrayed in neorealism. Therefore, the moulding of international institutions was highly dependent upon both preferences and ideational motives on behalf of the strongest powers in the international system. For smaller states, the alternatives were bandwagoning or sovereignty-seeking behaviour. However, the nature and content of the
international institutions created structures that could be utilised by all states in the international society. It is demonstrated here that the post-war era therefore led to a major upheaval in the history of the international system, since it represented more formal equality for all states in a system where power was unevenly distributed. In spite of globalization and large-power rivalry, the autonomy of smaller states increased: sovereignty was transformed, not eroded. State autonomy increased for the majority of states as liberalism increasingly was institutionalised on the
international level. Nevertheless, the thesis demonstrates that historically, other organizations than states have also waged war and used political power at, and from, the sea.
1 Introduction-theme and theory
“Ultimus limes cruce Christi signatus. Non licet ultra ire”. Translated into English, this should correspond to the phrase “The outer limit marked by Christ’s cross. Further journeys not allowed”.1 This information is written on the territory portraying the northern fringe of Norway on an Italian map dated 1467. Borders, frontiers, cleavages and distinctions are essentials of politics and social life, including the community of social scientists. One can only hope to be forgiven for crossing the disciplinary borders of the ever more divided and specialised field labelled social science. And yet, crossing some bridges might also yield new and interesting perspectives to enduring themes in social science. I do so in the firm belief that the present analysis deals with a specific theme and with empirical data that have been neglected by political scientists and sociologists. The method and approach applied here makes the present thesis belong to the realm of comparative politics. While this field of study shares unclear boundaries with sociology, history and some approaches in
international relations, comparative politics as conceived here lies in the borderline between history and sociology. It is a field literally defined by its method,2 but its true distinctiveness lies in the fact that it both tries to study societies and institutions as entities through an ideographic approach, and on the basis of this empirical analysis seeks to contribute to attempts of creating "nomothetic" social theory. In other words, the view here is that “nomothetic theory can only be constructed as a
pyramid of ideal-types on the basis of locally valid ideographic statements”.3 This requires a close analysis of the stated covered here. The essence of the following challenge is to carve out such ideal types and interpret them in a meaningful way for one field of world politics. I intend to combine those ideal types in an analytical model where state preferences and principles are combined4, where the international system is seen as constituted by both ideas and material factors, and where the principles of the states that occupy the highest positions in the international hierarchy especially shape international relations, and thus the enabling and restricting structures that all states must take into account in foreign policy decision-making. The first - and mainly ideographic- purpose of this thesis is to analyse how a group of states have used their agents at sea to define, consolidate,
1 Ræstad, 1912: 152
2 The case-oriented strategy, or the small-n approach, in comparative politics has sometimes been called The comparative method. See Smelser, 1973, Ragin, 1983, Skocpol, 1979. Such approaches seem to fall between two stools in some respect. On one side, historians and other specialists on one country or region (or city for that matter), often criticizes a study of more units as being too inaccurate. As Skocpol has argued, however, the demand that all sources in social science should be primary sources would render such comparative studies impossible. On the other hand, advocates of statistical analysis at times have argued that the potential for generalisations and contributiuon to nomothethic theory in small-n studies is too small. All in all, the continuum between detailed case studies and universalising social theory involves different conceptions of how social and human sciences can be carried out. We will repeatedly return to this later in chapter 1. See Gerring, 2004 for a useful overview.
3 Bakka, 1998: 5.
4 John M. Hobson has strongly argued in favour of such an approach (Hobson, 1997: chapter 1 and ibid: 221)
transcend and dispute borders and demarcations of areas beyond their territorial base or motherland, activities that have been produced from both ideational and material interests. Needless to say, this kind of activity raised both questions of international cooperation and conflict, as well as domestic debates on identity and interests.5 Thus, the ideographic part of the exercise is not so much aimed at describing the praxis of maritime policies, as it is to see this praxis as embedded in the habitus of foreign policy. In this way, the praxis of maritime politics is seen as a particular quality of foreign policy and an indicator of the level of institutionalization of world politics. This activity is here divided into two phenomena.
Firstly, extraterritorial sovereignty6 is the claims to de jure state annexation or occupation of new territories and oceans, often at the expense of other units. This represents a political ambition, often inspired by ideological arguments. I will argue that no single source of social power was
predominant a priori in time and space as a source of motivation for extraterritorial ambitions. Thus, mono-causal theories of imperialism will be disputed throughout the thesis, as will approaches in which single sources of social power are given primacy.
Secondly, the actual exercise of extraterritorial sovereignty was carried out by various, but
increasingly homogenous institutions. The state agent that I hold to be the chief instrument in this process is the navy. However, the dividing line between state agents and non-state actors has at times been blurred.7 I label all these types, governmental or not, of agents as means (or institutions) of extraterritorial violence. The means and praxis8 of extraterritorial violence constitute the
5 Hobson, 1997 is one of the most promising recent attempts at combining historical sociology and IR in a way that offers new nomothetic findings for IR.
6 For a discussion of concepts of the state in competition with ideologies of Empire, see Armitage, 2000, Skinner, 1978, Tully, 1995. A principle reason why, with the exception of the dependencia-school and world-systems analysis, extraterritorial sovereignty has been less analysed, perhaps lies in the foundation of political thought itself.
As Armitage (2000: 3-4), reminds us, political thought is ”…by definition the history of the polis, the self-contained, firmly bounded, sovereign and integrated community that preceded and sometimes shadowed the history of empire.
For this reason, The British Empire has not been an actor in the history of political thought, any more than political thought has generally been hospitable to considering the ideologies of empire”.
7 In this respect the ideographic analysis of extraterritorial violence is a particularly interesting contribution to a nomothetic theory of the modern state. I will argue that the institutionalisation of violence at sea to a high degree parallells the strengthening of state apparatuses. The clashes between states in the industrial age to a considerable degree were fought as naval arms races and battles that in turn increased the perceived need to create international instiutions that sought to regulate extraterritorial sovereignty.
8 The central motivation behing applying a praxis approach here lies in my assumption that the empirical analysis is the most important task of social science in the sense that empirical work both evaluates existing theories as well as produces the raw material on which to revise, expand and replace existing theory. Theory and methodology are both a group of tools to enhance the empirical analysis, not the other way around. Moreover, I find the use of this type of analysis as particularly intriguing when applied to comparative politics and international relations-themes in the longue duree. Praxises of war and diplomacy appear throughout the last millennium, in changing forms, in different contexts, but always observeable. While some scholars probably will see praxis-analysis within social science as somewhat “radical” (mainly, one might suppose, because it is somewhat novel in CP and IR), I will argue to the contrary.My position here is one of rather extreme positivism. I see constructivism in CP and IR in much the same light; it is a positivist approach to empirical analysis that builds on scientific realism. In this view, a praxis or
secondary and institutional part of the ideographic analysis. Extraterritorial violence is the application of physical force at sea and in the littoral of overseas territories.9
This phenomenon is seldom addressed in political science. As Robert Jervis once remarked, among social scientists, “it is a common-place that navies are even more hide-bound than most
bureaucracies”.10 At the time of writing, new exotic naval concepts as that of sea basing (whereby a huge mobile, fleet is used as the base for military strikes and thus renders territorial bases obsolete) are being investigated. According to the US Navy, the concept of sea basing “revolutionizes the projection, protection and sustainment of sovereign war fighting capabilities around the world”11, presumably by using ships as the base for both sailors, aviation crews and ground forces.
Furthermore, I will demonstrate that the states covered here all contained particular configurations of thought on how and why extraterritorial violence should be applied. This was their ideology of extraterritorial violence. Even among the major economies of the world, we have found eras where these states (The US 1866-1889) had restricted extraterritorial ambitions. In contrast, even
continental states and relatively small island states at times sought to become world powers through building first-rank navies from scratch (Imperial Germany 1893-1914 illustrates the former, Imperial Japan 1880-1941 the latter). These empirical issues have important bearings on nomothetic macro theory in international relations and comparative politics alike. The empirical variation of this phenomenon cannot be explained by Marxist theories that treat states as part of superstructures, or by theories from international relations that treat states as synonymous to firms in a perfect market.
Thus, a potential nomothetic contribution to IR from this thesis is analysing the international system through the model of an international hierarchy, rather than anarchy, of states, and how this
constructivist approach is not radical in any sense of the word. In the words of John Searle (1995:228, italics added by me) :"From dollar bills to cathedrals, and from football games to nation-states, we are constantly encountering new social facts where the facts exceed the physical features of the underlying physical reality". Moreover, the notion of states as actors with a certain identity implies that collective intentionality exists. Again, this rests on the philosophy of Searle (ibid: 25, 26) who states that collective intentionality does not require “the idea that there exists some Hegelian world spirit, collective consciousness, or something equally implausible”. Rather, collective intentionality is intersubjective belief. Searle also constructs a central epistemological argument concerning ideas and physical reality that is a foundation for this thesis: “social facts in general, and institutional facts especially, are hierarchically structured. Institutional facts exist, so to speak, on top of brute physical facts” (ibid: 35) and “for social facts, the attitude that we take toward the phenomenon is partly constitutive of the phenomenon” (ibid: 33).
9 One might question why the candidate has not chosen the term”Sea Power” for the present analysis. As will become evident in the empirical chapters, however, sea power is a more ideologically laden and normative term.
The colonialist A. Mahan, who in practise founded sea power as a field of study, was an emminent theoretician on sea power at the tactical level, but probably failed to grasp the dynamics of an international political system in the 20th century.
10 Jervis, 1995: 47
11 ”Naval Transformation Roadmap”, Secretary of the Navy 2003: 24. At the time of writing, the costs of such a project are uncertain. The CVN/CVNX carriers alone, however, are estimated at a total of 120 Billion dollars, the DDX destroyers some 75 Billion dollars, while the costs of the new Maritime Prepositioning Force of cargo ships remain an unknown factor in the equation.
hierarchy allowed the strongest state influence the international system on the merits of their national ideology through extraterritorial ambitions. In other words, principles as well as material interests are seen as vital contributions to foreign policy and the making of international institutions.
As Peter Katzenstein has reminded us, "Collective expectations can have strong causal effects"12, and collective expectations are not always based on purely material utility-maximizing. Neither factor should be given primacy a priori. If power is distributed by means of a hierarchy –or even through hegemony- then the ideology and preferences of the stronger state will contribute to the shaping of international institutions. On the question of state formation and nation-building13, the thesis will not seek to turn the theories of IR and CP on the head. However, I will apply
contributions from both by attempting to analyse the following related questions;
• To what degree did was preparation for an execution of war at sea a peculiar praxis of foreign policy?
• In what ways were the states analysed here different actors in international maritime politics beyond varying material capabilities? Were these differences of such magnitude that they produced different foreign policy habitus14 or dispositions to act?
12 Katzenstein, 1996:7. As John Lewis Gaddis (1992/93:55) justly claimed in opposition to mechanic theories of international relations, international relations are created by “conscious entities capable of reacting to, and often modifying, the variables and conditions they encounter. They can at times see the future taking shape; they can devise, within limits, measures to hasten, retard or even reverse trends. If molecules had minds of their own, chemists would be much less successful in predicting their behaviour. It is no wonder that the effort to devise a
“molecular” approach to the study of politics did not work out…The simple persistence of values in politics ought to be another clue that one is dealing here with objects more complicated than billiard balls”.
13 The term state formation is used as synonymous to state building in the thesis. The term state-and nation-building is referring to the formation of the nation-state or the state-nation. The theoretical position on these processes is the same as in Rokkan, 1993, and Mann 1993.
14 The use of habitus in the social sciences has been an object of much debate. The point of departure here is the importance of habit in social action. Charles Camic (1986:1044) defined habit as "a more or less self-actuating disposition or tendency to engage in a previously adopted or acquired form of action". In this thesis, habitus means a broad disposition and character that guides the behaviour of a collective actor (Camic calls this a "stable inner core"
of the actor. In our terminology, it means a national equilibrium of identity within state borders that serves as a source for guiding behaviour.) For our purposes here, the emphasis will be how state formation and nation building in interplay with geopolitics created a basis for both reflective and less reflective behaviour. Once acquired, a habit has a self-sustaining quality up to a certain point. In other words, the interplay between ideology and interests might create a habitus that is enduring. At the same time, we will discuss how such dispositions to act change. In the same way as introducing the concept of "praxis", the term "habitus" in contemporary sociology brings forth the
predominance of French social scientists (notably Bordieu), but one should keep in mind that "habit" as a kind of action was central also to Max Weber, although the very term habit remained in the background of his theoretical writings. However, he repeatedly returned to the term "Eingestellheit", understood as an inner disposition to act according to a pattern. Indeed, it seems evident that this was central to the emphasis Weber laid on path dependency.
"The further we go back in history…social action, is determined in an ever more comprehensive sphere exclusively by the disposition toward the purely habitual" (Weber, Cited in Camic, 1986: 1059). In fact, Weber in the
introduction to Economy and Society stated that "traditional action" (determined by ingrained habit) among the types of social action formed the great bulk of everyday action. Now, in sum this led Weber to develop a
• Thirdly, and most importantly, to what degree was the ideological and naval power of states connected?15 Did policy changes at the state level change relations among states in the maritime dimension of foreign policy, and if such alterations took place, did they constitute a change of the international state system?16
If states are to be considered “different actors”, then we shall require that states with comparable interests carry out different policies within the same issue. That is, there will be empirical variations that interest in the form of brute material factors alone cannot explain. A change of the international system means a pronounced higher degree of institutionalisation of a particular principle at the international level. We shall here require that a change takes place when formal treaties that visibly changed state praxis and the relations between states are created.
The main alternative to our hypotheses will be that ideas and ideology do not matter, in the sense that there is no need to complicate empirical analysis by introducing ideational variables. Thus, the alternative hypotheses will claim that there are no significant empirical variations in policies between states with similar interests. Material factors are not only necessary, but also sufficient variables that account for empirical observations. The major schools of thought with relevance to the subject will therefore be Marxism or neorealism. In the first, state autonomy hardly exists, in the latter states are “like units”, which makes a comparison of states theoretically irrelevant. In order to create a viable approach to address the hypotheses, we will have to look into some central concepts and theories of IR in the following part of the chapter. On the basis of this, chapter 2 will be an attempt at creating a new typology that combines ideational and material variables through different ideal types of extraterritorial policy. The empirical chapters will analyse historical trajectories through the use of these idealtypes, and the last chapter will address the theoretical and empirical utility of the approach created.
The ideology of extraterritorial violence among states with overseas ambitions has often been
macrosociological approach where habit in fact played a central role, and this is strikingly visible in his comparative historical sociology (see Camic, 1986: 1062-1063 for a convincing discussion). At the same time, Weber stressed the differences between forms of rationality (see for example Ringer, 1997: 105-107). For our purposes; foreign policy certainly contain elements of both purposive-, value-, and traditional action. Therefore, we should also expect to see empirical deviations from our idealtypes; indeed, for a wberian sociologist, the deviations are crucial to the empirical analysis. Indeed, this entire thesis can be seen as a study of deviations from the ideal type of purposive rationality in foreign policy, and according to Ringer, 1997:154, “In a Weberian causal analysis, the focus would be upon the way in which a world view brought about a particular historical sequence and outcome, rather than possible alternatives”
15 The power of states and their capacity to influence international institutions will be analysed by applying a framework similar to the IEMP – modell of Michael Mann, 1993
16 See especially Wendt, 1999; chapters 3 and 6.
dubbed imperialism, since the most spectacular use of extraterritorial violence has occurred in contests of power between peoples, and since these contests often reflected an asymmetrical
relationship of power. I will argue that the process of “imperialism”17 has gone through changes that to some degree have altered world order through the mechanisms of international institutions.18 These norms and obligations regarding state praxis have been the result of state formation-processes, and at the same time they have changed and influenced states. By studying changes in the character of imperialism, and by seeing norms as significant, mono-causal explanations of imperialism or political development are by implication criticized throughout the thesis.
Furthermore, I propose that these phenomena have important contributions to mainstream theories of comparative politics (CP) as well as international relations (IR). If this indeed is the case, my scholarly navigation in distant fields of study may bring back to the nest a few exotic cases worth discussing in the age of “globalisation”. It may not be true to the letters of the founding fathers of comparative, political sociology, but I certainly find it to be true to their spirit.19 In sum, this thesis does hardly reveal new facts previously undiscovered by historians, but it certainly gives a new framework for interpreting macro history. Thereby this analysis contributes to causal theory.20
The second –and mainly nomothetic- purpose of this thesis thus is to construct a new model for interpreting and explaining the interplay between states on the international arena. Through this discussion, I believe, will emerge an approach that might best serve the empirical study of extraterritorial politics. A central assumption is that ideology21, understood as a source of social power to the degree that it creates a disposition to act in foreign policy, should be combined with
17 That empire and imperialism are contested and value-laden concepts is an understatement. Originally, imperialism was used from the 1860s to denote the aspirations of Napoleon III. Later it was applied to Great Power rivalry and the acquisition of colonial territories in Africa and Asia. Today the term is most often used to describe the
domination of colonies by stronger states. Theories of why imperialism occurred can be divided into sociological ones (for example Schumpeter who sees imperialism as counter-productive), economic or Marxist ones (as Andre Gunder Frank, who sees imperialism as a result of the profit-seeking incentives inherent in capitalism), and strategic or political, which see the phenomenon caused by many factors. The difference between these schools of thought also lies in how broadly they define imperialism. Thus Marxists and neo-Marxists use the concept also in the sense of neo-colonialism, where the centre (or metropole) exploits or alternatively benefits from, its asymmetric
exchanges with the periphery (or satellite). And yet, imperialism is also (increasingly, as far as I can see), applied to all forms of incursions into other states`s sovereignty. I will discuss the conceptual problems further in chapter 4, since imperialism in this thesis noted a special and intensive form of claims to extraterritorial sovereignty. My own definition is rather similar to the definition in Abernethy, 2000: 20
18 To be defined below
19 See for example Rokkan, 1987: 55, Wallerstein, 2000, Tilly, 1984
20 Ringer, 1997
21 Ideology in the field of foreign policy is an elusive concept, but this does not make ideology a worthless theoretical category, it is reality itself that is elusive at this point. To quote Weber "On its earthly course an idea always and everywhere operates in opposition to its original meaning and thereby destroys itself" (Camic, 1986:
1040).
materialist modalities of power in such a model. In all modesty, much is at stake on exactly this point. IR scholars have often claimed that they do not study states, but relations among states, and what has been called the state system (or sometimes “the international system” or “the international society”). In doing so, they need nothing more than some simple assumptions of what states are. By the 1980s, the prevailing assumption was that states were "like units", not functionally
differentiated, and since they were parts of an anarchic state system, could be treated as firms in a market.22 While such an approach certainly has some merits, such a theory seem ill equipped to address fundamental changes in the state system, witness the fall of the Soviet Union and the other communist states in Europe. This critique of some of the more celebrated theories in IR was elegantly summed up by Professor Ian Clarke already prior to the revolution of 1989:
"International relations may be practised in a constant framework of inter-state relations but the states themselves are changing, yielding a new substance to their contacts. Competing perspectives on the state- contractual, organic, liberal, Marxist, repressive, administrative and interventionist- reflect differences of theoretical interpretation, but also the heterogeneity of the world’s many states as well as the historical evolution of the state in recent centuries."23
Interestingly, the contents and effects of extraterritorial sovereignty24 have gained more attention within the international relations literature than within mainstream comparative politics and macro sociology. The gap between the two traditions should not be unbridgeable, since political science is the study of power, where power is most clearly manifested in the distinctions between friend and foe. As several scholars within IR have recognised, the importance of extraterritorial sovereignty is
22 See Waltz, 1979 for the elagant and classical argument in favour of such a microeconomic assumption in IR.
Thus, both neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism are variations of the theory of the firm in a market, applied to states on the international arena.
23 Clark, 1987: 211. The same author in 1999, when commenting upon globalization and its challenge to IR theory, stated that “The “domestic” is as much a part of the fabric of the international system as any abstracted
“structure” of the relations between states..It is precisely in the synergy between the two that the dynamic of change is to be located” (Clark, 1999: 5
24 See below. Extraterritorial sovereignty is a claim to hold sovereignty in a varying degree beyond the original, bounded and demarcated territory of the state. Today this can be applied to embassies and military bases placed on the territory of other states. It can also be applied to the personnel in these facilities in general. At the other end of the scale, we find extraterritorial sovereignty claims and practises in form of colonial rule, be it direct and indirect, and different forms of imperialism, be it formal or informal. This thesis will deal with such sea-borne “empires”, but particularly it will seek to analyse claims to state sovereignty at sea it self, including small islands and the seabed beyond the littoral. Imperialism is hardly a precise term in order to describe all instances of the latter phenomena.
Thomson (1994) uses the term extraterritorial violence, without strictly defining what she means by extraterritorial.
It is evident however, that she in practise means that extraterritorial is defined as activity at sea for the period she analyses.
vital to an understanding of world order(s), be it historical25orders or our temporary one. On the other hand, IR literature, as opposed to CP and historical sociology, has paid little attention to state- building and its relationship with international institutions and imperialism (in the sense applied here, imperialism primarily is understood as formal, direct rule of “less developed countries”. The term “Paternalism” will be applied to post-colonial sentiments26). States are all too often taken as given in mainstream IR27, due to the concentration on international systems in the discipline.28 Thus, studies of extraterritorial sovereignty remain few. This is regrettable, since it is a highly substantial topic. The contestation and struggle for claims to maritime rights is a highly important aspect of Western European state formation and –consolidation, and the concept of the State presupposes the concept of the political.
Furthermore, Otto Hintze noted land “(as opposed to naval) warfare’s negative impact”29 on representative assemblies and democratisation in Europe. Did naval strategy influence political regimes and vice versa? While this thesis is only a small step (at best) towards addressing this Big question, my aim here is to conceptualise, set forth hypotheses on and analyse the ideological impact on this field of foreign policy in Northern Europe and the United States. Even a brief overview of these phenomena indicates the importance of the subject. The discourses and praxis on rights to extraterritorial sovereignty laid the foundations for the ideology and justification of overseas
empires.30 Maritime and overseas activities made for diverse and intense interactions between states
25 Thomson, 1994 Spruyt, 1994, Modelski and Thompson, 1988
26 I will seek to define these concepts in chapter 2.
27 I cannot see that there is a very substantial difference, for example, in how neorealism (e.g. Waltz, 1979) and the so-called regime literature and “liberal institutionalist school” (Krasner, 1983, Keohane, 1986) view the states.
These states vary in their resources/power, but they behave by the same logic. They can be seen as rational actors on the market, and thereby micro-economic theory can explain their functioning in international relations. I think it is important to point pout that this generalisation does not apply to classical realism, as defined by Wæver, 1992.
Wæver, 1992: 47-52 shows that classical realists like Morgenthau and Kissinger did not treat states as rational actors in a narrow sense. On the contrary, these authors shared a pessimism that was to some degree ontological and also concerned the limits of knowledge, thus these scholars climed that statesmen often relied more on visions and intuition than rationality and complete information.
28 This is particularly evident in the literature of this ”American social Science” (Hoffman, 1977) from the late 1970s. Today, as in the 1960s, domestic theories of politics is applied in the IR literature, but has so far failed to make a substantial breakthrough. But then again, there will perhaps never be “!a Theory” of international politics.
29 Downing, 1992: 4. Although Downing`s contribution is impressive in many ways, it is characteristic that he in
”The Military Revolution and Political Change” only briefly touches upon sea power and the entrepreneurship, financial problem-solving, technical innovations and organisation required to run a navy. The result of this, I propose, is a highly partial story. For example, England is interpreted in light of her land power; ”Military organization in medieval England deviated somewhat from the classic medieval pattern in two regards: a higher proportion of infantry and a larger complement of mercenaries” (ibid: 159). Thus, the role sea power played in English power and wealth (greatly facilitating the strengthening of representative institutions) is ignored. Downing (ibid: 175) simply register that “Military expenditures peaked at 1.7 millions pounds in 1655, high by English standards, but per-capita taxation in England was only one-fourth that of Prussia in 1688, and England’s wealth greatly exceeded that of backward Prussia”. Could it be that the different political economies of sea power and land- power accounted for parts of this difference?
30 See for example Armitage, 2000 for this verdict in the case of the British Empire.
in Europe that helped shape both state formation processes and international institutions, including the institutions of state practises shared by sovereign states. The increasing number of issues of extraterritorial sovereignty and sharing of this sovereignty created highly dynamic, but always contested, international institutions. Ocean policy is by its very nature one of the most international topics that any coastal state is forced to deal with through its foreign policy. Thus it is an ideal topic to concentrate on when analysing the interplay between national/ideology and crafting of
international institutions, since this cluster of political issues has a long history that affects the majority of states. Furthermore, the modern state, according to Max Weber, is an organised monopoly of the use of relatively legitimate violence. The lack of analysis of the organisations of violence, largely armies, navies and air forces, is profound in mainstream social science.31 This seems to indicate that not only theory, but also ideology among social scientists determines what are being defined as “proper” subjects of inquiry.32 In this thesis, navies will be seen as vital
components of state formations. An organisation without naval forces is vulnerable to exogenous pressure if that organisation claims sovereign rights in oceans, simply because such a state will not be able to perform the “functions of state” as described in international law (to be discussed later in this chapter), and because it will have limited abilities to protect freedom of transport at sea.
Furthermore, as the military theoretician Julian Corbett pointed out in 1911, extraterritorial violence gave modern states the opportunity to wage limited wars. By projecting power against weak polities overseas, in particular, the state could annex resources in a relatively cheap way, or so it seemed in the imperial age. As Modelski and Thompson stated in their seminal work on sea power, “seapower is an essential component of world order because of what navies, and navies alone, can do”.33 Naval praxis is a concrete indicator of the ideological character of foreign policy. How, where and when states used (or did not use) extraterritorial power gives us valuable information on the habitus of state policy.
Extraterritorial sovereignty seems to be of high relevance also from a contemporary view. A leading scholar in international law even claimed of the law of the sea that “No branch of international law has undergone more revolutionary changes during the past four decades.”34 The third UN
Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), lasting from 1974 till 1982 was by one observer coined “the biggest smash and grab since the European powers at the Berlin Conference in 1885 carved up black Africa”.35 Today, even as the present texts of law give reasonably clear guidance on
31 See Giddens, 1987 for a similar view.
32 See Neumann, 2002 and Ulriksen 2002 for similar conclusions.
33 Modelski & Thomson, 1988: 11
34 Shearer, 1994: 218
35 Lord Ritchie Calder, cited in Ulfstein, 1982: 26
demarcation of zones at sea, sea territory and continental shelves, it is obvious that the regulation of resources and conflict at sea are far from solved by technical or political solutions. To some degree, the UNCLOS “regime”36 has created new problems. Results from this failure can be seen in the global crisis in the fisheries, increasing pollution in the seas, and in the conflicts regarding the Sprat Islands, the tough negotiations between states and international organisations concerning the
utilisation of marine resources, the increased occurrence of piracy and armed attacks by non-state actors at sea and perhaps even in global hydrographical and climatic changes which might be of huge importance for the human condition. The fear of large-scale use of extraterritorial violence by non-state actors in 2004 prompted the US to introduce a 200-mile "maritime security zone", and to seek to encourage its allies to carry out similar increases in the extent of their monopolies of violence.37 Simultaneously (and paradoxically), more and more tasks that traditionally have been carried out by military organizations in the western world are now being outsourced to private actors. Even in the UK -the archetype of a naval power- a private firm trains the Royal Navy “in operating and maintaining its newest nuclear-powered submarines”.38 Furthermore, the role of maritime resources has at times been able to arouse strong passions, signalising the symbolic value often attached to distant waters and isles. Twenty years after the Falklands war, Argentine President Eduardo Duhalde thus could claim that “Las Malvinas are ours, stained with the blood and tears of our heroes”.39 The fact is that the 1982 conclusion of the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea led to an increase in national jurisdiction over oceans that gave incentives for claiming sovereignty over ever more marginal islands and islets. At the time of writing, a number of states have unsettled disputes over islands and ocean masses. These states include Russia, Norway,
Denmark, Canada, Iceland, the United States, Mexico, Colombia, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Argentina, Honduras, Jamaica, Panama, Croatia, Spain, UK, Morocco, Haiti, Cuba, Greece, Turkey, France (in the Indian Ocean), Madagascar, India, Mauritius, Iran, The United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia , Botswana, Namibia, Bahrain, Qatar, Eritrea, Yemen, Egypt, Sudan, China, Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, Singapore, Japan, North Korea, and South Korea.40 In fact, the extensions of (outer limits to) the national continental shelves are still disputed in many areas, with considerable economic significance. Below, for example, the UN has sought to map possible extensions to present continental shelves.
36 The so-called ”international regimes” will be discussed below
37 See for example http://www.abc.net.au/news/newsitems/200412/s1267205.htm
38 Singer, 2003: 12. Singer gives an impressive overview of the process of privatization of military tasks. And the trend has been increased after this publication.
39 Aftenposten April 3rd 2002.
40 See http://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/claims_2005.pdf, for updates on such disputes.
Figure 1.0: Possible extensions of present continental shelves under national jurisdiction beyond 200 nautical miles
The sea beds that could be extended as continental shelves under national jurisdiction are marked with light grey colour on the oceans in the map above. The potential for disputes in arctic waters is downplayed in this map.41
The political history of maritime sovereignty matters for international relations as well as for the domestic political and economic institutions in coastal states. Furthermore, I will claim that the questions of maritime policies should be seen as embedded in a larger field of world politics.42 Extraterritorial sovereignty, where maritime policy is a vital component, affects the relations between states and between state and citizens. In sum, extraterritorial sovereignty is indeed a facet of sovereignty. I therefore, at least partly, agree with the historians Cain and Hopkins who state that
41Map taken from http://www.soc.soton.ac.uk/CHD/unclos
42 See Modelski & Thompson, 1988: 13-14 for an interesting suggestion in this respect.
the distinguishing feature of imperialism “is not that it takes a specific economic, cultural or political form, but that it involves an incursion, or an attempted incursion, into the sovereignty of another state”.43 As a matter of fact, extra-territorial sovereignty should be seen as embedded in world politics and in the foreign policy of every coastal state. But the present theories and concepts of maritime policies suffer from two main problems. Firstly, maritime policy is often studied as isolated phenomena where the political culture and general foreign policy is not taken sufficiently into consideration. Thus, scholars in international relations have too often made sweeping generalisations of such scope that empirical variations in time and space simply are ignored. Secondly, the
traditional theoretical concepts of mare liberum and mare clausum, while still very valuable, are too wide to provide us with a thorough understanding of both state policy and international institutions regarding maritime world orders. In an attempt at addressing these two related challenges, chapter 2 proposes a comparative typology based upon materialist state interests (degrees of overseas
interests) and ideational national maritime principles (mare liberum and –clausum). This results in a way of analysing international relations where states are seen as different types of actors on the international arena. At the same time, this difference is not explained solely in terms of preferences, power and interests. In this perspective, state interests, the struggle over principles in international institutions and the culture of national policies are seen as entangling clusters of variables that interact. The result is international as well as national institutions mediated by national, historically formed configurations of thought. I propose that institutional political economy and historical institutionalism add explanatory power to international relations. How can such a theory be coherent and testable? I suggest that comparative design and –methods should be applied in order to craft testable hypotheses of limited constructivism.44 In other words, theories from both international relations and comparative politics are used in order to produce an approach to the study of ocean policies and maritime world orders. This does not mean that I propose a novel Theory of
Comparative politics and international relations. Rather, I will construct a typology of ideal types with analytical potential for this aspect of national and international politics. Thus, I claim that among hegemons, large powers and small states alike, there will be a substantial degree of empirical
43 Cain and Hopkins, 2002: 54. I will present some major qualifications of this definition in chapter 2, where I will argue that the concept of empire and imperialism is applied too broadly by Cain and Hopkins. For an extensive discussion of empire as concept, see Armitage, 2000: 27-39. “Rulers could claim imperial status on the grounds that they possessed a number of distinct territories which were united only under their headship. This conception of imperium as a compound of territories could, like the other meanings of the term, be traced back to the Roman Empire” (ibid: 33)
44 "Constructivism" applied to IR is an old approach in this rather new discipline. I agree with Wendt (1999: 3) when he argues that "In the post-war period important constructivist approaches to international politics were advanced by Karl Deutsch, Ernst Haas and Hedley Bull". Furthermore, macro-sociological theories of the 1970s undoubtedly can be seen as social constructivism applied to an international level (Esp. Rokkan`s conceptual map of Europe.
variation on maritime preferences and principles.
What we have witnessed during the last five decades is a territorialisation of the seas. This has made ocean politics far more integrated into the process of territorial sovereignty than in previous epochs.
I see no reason why this process should be reversed in a world of interdependence. Furthermore, the utilisation of marine resources have become more like territorial ones; witness the use of offshore oil- and gas-installations, the contestation of islands and the increasing importance of fish farming in the sea. And yet, the increase in the scope of formal national jurisdiction has not solved the
international "tragedy of the commons" in maritime matters. On the contrary, globalizations seem to deepen some of the difficulties at reaching regional agreements of separating jurisdictions (see chapter 5).45 This is one reason why scholars in IR continue to be so preoccupied with international co-operation, institutions and regimes concerning extraterritorial sovereignty. In particular, I will argue that the case of maritime sovereignty and –international institutions illustrates the importance of hegemons in shaping world orders.46
The relative lack of corresponding interest for the phenomena within CP, I will argue, represents a drawback for theoretical innovation on the theory of the modern state within historical sociology.47 I will claim that the Baltic and North East Atlantic was a centre of gravity for the formation of the modern North European state, and that the modern coastal state is not only a monopoly of violence within its territorial borders, but also an exporter of extraterritorial violence. Most students of both comparative and international politics are probably unaware, for example, that the early modern navies of Denmark-Norway and Sweden were equal in strength to the English navy, and stronger than the Spanish and Dutch navies till the late 16th century.48 It was this ability to utilise the sea for transportation and violence that to a significant degree determined the configurations of states and international institutions in Western Europe, and indeed to the territories at one time or the other controlled from Western Europe. The empirical data and theoretical analysis in this thesis represent
45 See Clark, 1999 and Sassen, 1996 for interesting analyses between ”globalization” and IR theory, and globalization and sovereignty.
46 The latter term used in the same way as by Hedley Bull, 1977. State configurations and world orders, in my view, should particularly be studied in periods of transformation. Robert Cox wrote that “The notion of a framework for action or historical structure is a picture of a particular configuration of forces. This configuration does not
determine actions in any direct, mechanical way but imposes pressures and constraints. Individuals and groups may move with the pressures or resist and oppose them, but they cannot ignore them. To the extent that they do
successfully resist a prevailing historical structure they buttress their actions with an alternative, emerging configuration of forces, a rival structure” (Cox, 1993, cited by Sinclair, 1996: 8).
47 As I will argue below, several sociologists actually have tried to link domestic and international levels of ananlysis. See for example Mann, 1993, and Wallerstein, 1974, 1980, 2000. The latter`s ontological position more or less breaks down the dichotomy between international and domestic alltogether.
challenges to established theories and hypothesis on state-building, political development and state autonomy in comparative politics, and views on macro-change in international relations. I have not been able to avoid an extensive theoretical discussion in the first part of the analysis. I have found this necessary, in agreement with the position of Arthur Stinchcombe that “Theory ought to create the capacity to invent explanations. During the course of research in a particular substantive area, a sociologist is ordinarily confronted with phenomena for which there are no theories”.49
If we are to study extraterritorial sovereignty, our theory must allow us to see the interplay between states and international institutions. Both are effects as well as results.50 Especially demanding theoretically is the boundary-transcendent character inherent in the phenomena of extraterritorial sovereignty. Thus, concepts like “the state” and “sovereignty” gain a quality that is not covered in mainstream political science.
The phenomena dealt with in this thesis to a large degree have been neglected in comparative politics. On the other hand, I at least partly agree with Janice Thomson51, John Gerard Ruggie52, Barry Buzan and Richard Little53 that theories in International relations are ill equipped to explain the macro transformations of the international “system” and its units.54 However, these so-called
“constructivists” have so far not developed alternative theories in the traditional social-scientific sense of the word.55 Another attempt at theoretical innovation in IR circles around the cognitive model, in which decision-making is seen as partly determined by ideas and perceptions that make up cognitive “maps” and knowledge-structures.56 The latter approach partly has influenced the micro- perspective in this thesis beyond the conception of the rational, calculating statesman, and I believe that it is compatible with a macro-perspective as well. The problem is how to build theories, or at least substantial, testable hypotheses, on such a micro-foundation. If this is not possible, then the
48 The comparative strength of navies are documented and analysed by the Swedish historian Jan Glete in two magnificent works. See Glete, 1993 and 2000
49 Stinchcombe, 1968: 3. See also Giddens, 1984 for a similar view.
50 See Martin & Simmons, 2001: 451-460.
51 Thomson, 1994
52 Ruggie, 1986 and 1993
53 Buzan & Little, 2000
54 Sinclair, 1996: 5 declared that ”the demonstrated inadequasis of mainstream approaches to international relations place a premium on theoretical innovation in the study of international relations”
55 The exchange of views between Robert Keohane and constructivists to a large degree reflects differences about what criteria such theories should meet.
56 For a useful overview, see Matarese, 2001: 2-11. Matarese makes an original attempt at connecting these maps to historic experience and cultural variables. See also Holsti, 1970, 1962. Helen Milner (1997: 3) points out ”In the 1960s and 1979s theories of international relations that focused domestic factors abounded”. When IR moved in more or less into two (rather similar) camps called neorealism and neo-liberal institutionalism (more ”scientific”
theories according to their proponents) domestic factors were driven out.