Chapter 5: Analyzing the Indian case
5.7. Chapter conclusion
This chapter has shown a range of socio-technical dynamics and learning processes in village level solar power provision, and provided insights in aspects that play a role for the usefulness and long-term viability of such models. At the same time as giving insights in the substance of the projects, the case has also demonstrated factors that may have importance for learning and innovation in socio-technical experimentation in niches. As pointed out by
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WBREDA officials, they had undergone a long learning process, and met many unexpected problems underway.
The initiators of this socio-technical innovation process had high visions and important capabilities, and they had the courage and skills to develop and implement new socio-technical designs in a serious attempt to create new social structures. They also had the ability to get a range of other actors on board in various ways (national level government actors, equipment suppliers, the state government, and local governments), and secure financing and human resources for the implementation of their ideas. A range of different factors thus defined the structural space (or room for maneuvering) within which the implementing actors could apply their creativity.
The solar mini-grids gave access to basic electricity services of interest for households, businesses and other users. The trust-based system with flat rate tariffs constituted a practical model that provided important incomes for operation and maintenance in early years, but also gave openings for creative uses of electricity, but in “unruly” ways that affected the whole system. The electricity users’ practices gradually developed in ways not anticipated initially and the already implemented socio-technical configurations strongly limited the kinds of improvements the involved actors could make.
The local socio-technical systems became a normalized part of the local communities, and changed the community members’ expectations to the use of electricity. The positive achievements in terms of providing important services had paradoxically contributed to making the users dissatisfied and drawing as much power as they could, which in turn affected the functioning of the system. It put pressure on the technically weakest link, the batteries, and contributed to reduction of hours of electricity supply. The technical weaknesses and constraints of available equipment (and lack of flexibility in terms of gradual expansion) were outside the control of the project implementers and influenced most of the local socio-technical system. The technical weaknesses had to be compensated for through the social organization, including a large responsibility and difficult tasks for local committees and operators.
Since the operators played key roles, their skills and motivation were important for the level of performance at the different power plants. Their motivation seemed to be influenced by salary levels, follow-up by contractors and project implementers, and working conditions, among other things. However, they were not in a position to influence neither the factors that led to over-use of power, nor the reduced willingness to pay for the services. The task was also difficult for the local committees and organizations in charge. Economic sustainability became difficult, but affordable electricity services were provided for significant portions of the community members in each village, including those who had access through other people’s charging of batteries for them. There were spatial challenges due to the outreach and specific routes for the gridlines in the mini-grids, although less than what is common in conventional grid extension.
In addition to the users of the electricity, the other involved actors (local committees, contractors, operators, etc.) also developed their roles and practices as part of the socio-technical system, differently from what had been planned and anticipated. WBREDA depended on the willingness of these other actors to do a good job, but they tended to have
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insufficient commitment for their roles. The projects could possibly have functioned better if WBREDA had been able to follow up the projects more directly – more “hands-on”, instead of trying to make middle actors take care of the projects. A more hands on approach would also have entailed challenges, like need for more staff and ensuring their commitment, but could possibly have been easier. The emerging outcomes of the socio-technical innovation process led to continuous adjustments by the implementing agency, while the main characteristics of the model remained the same.
Instead of the high visions and inspiration that had been prominent initially, it seemed like the work of the implementers was now to a larger extent driven by duty as well as pressure from the electricity users, operators, and other local actors, as well as external observers. This was also related to the changing policies that seemed to make the projects less relevant and future oriented. The Sunderban projects had gone from being celebrated by all observers, including researchers and policy makers, to becoming an example of an experiment or pilot project which was hardly seen as a model for replication and upscaling, due to its challenges in economic and technical performance (changing the expectations of niche and regime actors). As noted in studies of community energy in the North, the projects struggle to survive and economic sustainability is a challenge (Seyfang and Smith 2007). This indicates that efforts for deliberate social and technological change is hard work that might give frustration, be expensive and lead to criticism of those people who took responsibility and tried.
However, the Indian framework conditions could allow for further implementation of solar mini-grids. A comprehensive activity that has some similarities with the WBREDA model, is the implementation of so-called “solar micro-grids” (or small mini-grids) implemented and operated by Chhattisgarh Renewable Energy Development Agency (CREDA) in hundreds of remote villages in the state of Chhattisgarh in India (Millinger et al.
(2012). CREDA learned from WBREDA according to a leading expert on the solar PV work in India. The CREDA model was standardized, simplified and smaller than WBREDA’s Sunderban model, and provided very basic electricity provision. Starting from 2002, these were funded through the Ministry of New and Renewable Energy’s program for Remote Village Electrification (RVE) and the state government. They were managed through an institutional framework and system for operation and maintenance made up by government offices at different levels of governance, under CREDA. Economic sustainability was neither seen as possible nor necessary here. The costs for operation and maintenance were partly covered by the revenue and partly by funds from the implementing agency (the government).
Affordability and operational sustainability were central aims. The actual functioning and quality of electricity access achieved in these activities is beyond the scope of this discussion.
However, the example illustrates that the national framework conditions in India does allow for some kind of replication of solar micro- or mini-grids, at least for state governments.
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